

ENTREPRENEURIAL URBANISM... WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS? A CASE STUDY OF GOVERNANCE RESTRUCTURING IN JIYUAN, CHINA

A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in

in the Faculty of Humanities

2021

Yong ZHANG

Department of Geography

School of Environment, Education and Development

CONTENTS

List of Figures	5
List of Tables	6
Abstract	8
Declaration	9
Copyright Statement	10
Acknowledgement	11
Chapter 1 Introduction	12
Late glurbalisation and (re)turn of the nation-state	14
Urbanising governance and the refashion of partnerships	15
Research aim and objectives	16
The chapters and conclusion	17
Chapter 2 Entrepreneurial urbanism theory at 30⁺	22
2.1 Introduction	22
2.2 The entrepreneurial urbanism approach	24
2.3 Genesis and early development (in North Atlantic countries)	31
Walking different walks	32
Talking similar talks	35
2.4 Theoretical transfer to China	39
Being Chinese cities	40
Becoming Chinese cities	42
2.5 The principal contribution	46
Inter-urban competition	46
Urban entrepreneurship	48
Public-Private partnership	50
2.6 Research issues in the entrepreneurial urbanism approach	52
Extending entrepreneurial urbanism theory	53

	A sympathetic critique	57
2.7	Forward with entrepreneurial urbanism theory (in China): A framework	59
Chapter 3	Researching urban elites space	64
3.1	Introduction	64
3.2	Towards an emancipatory theorisation of the urban	65
	Setting the parameters	67
3.3	Intensive case study of an entrepreneurial city	70
	Intensive research	70
	Case(s) study	72
	Data sources	74
3.4	Putting urban(ising) elites in space	77
	Identifying and accessing elites	80
	Interviewing elites	85
3.5	Conclusion	87
Chapter 4	Waves of crisis-driven urbanism	89
4.1	Introduction	89
4.2	Waves of crisis-driven urbanism	90
	Wave One: Anti-migration urbanism (till 1992)	95
	Wave Two: Anti-settlement urbanism (till 2012)	102
	Wave Three: Just-in-time urbanism (till ?)	116
4.3	The city assembled	123
	Jiyuan	124
	Re-visioning partnership	132
	Rebalancing dichotomy	135
4.4	Conclusion	137
Chapter 5	Scaling and rescaling partnerships	139
5.1	Introduction	139
5.2	The partnerships in their scale and the scale of partnerships	141

5.3	The varieties of partnerships	144
	Extra-local authority-led partnership	146
	Local authority-led partnership	162
	Cross-scalar partnership	176
5.4	Conclusion	185
Chapter 6	Busting and booming debt-wishes	187
6.1	Introduction	187
6.2	Refill urban-rural dialectic with China	191
	Becoming rural (collective) in contemporary China	192
	The topography of shareholding reform in Jiyuan	194
6.3	State entrepreneurialism and state corporatism	198
	State entrepreneurialism	198
	State corporatism	207
6.4	Urban territorialism and desakota	214
	Urban territorialism	214
	Desakota, just-in-time	222
6.5	Conclusion	227
Chapter 7	Conclusion	230
7.1	Introduction	230
7.2	Geographies of the entrepreneurial city	231
7.3	Concluding thoughts: the Chinese cities of entrepreneurialism	238
	Appendixes	240
	References	254

(Total word count: 79826)

LIST of FIGURES

Figure 2.1 Entrepreneurial urbanism in China: an analytical framework	61
Figure 4.1 The unfolding of the crisis-driven urbanism in three waves	93
Figure 4.2 Three waves of crisis-driven urbanism.....	94
Figure 4.3 Circulation of capital in the second wave of urbanisation	114
Figure 4.4 Jiyuan's intra-province performance in terms of urban-rural integration	124
Figure 4.5 The spatial expansion of urban Jiyuan city since 1988	127
Figure 4.6 Location and administrative boundary of Jiyuan City.....	129
Figure 4.7 The emerging ideal-type circulation of capital in the 'people-oriented' urbanism.....	135
Figure 5.1 Extra-local authority-led (ELA-led) partnership	148
Figure 5.2 Local authority-led (LA-led) partnership.....	164
Figure 5.3 A bird's-eye view of Wangwu Old Street at Yugong village.....	174
Figure 5.4 Shareholding structure of Jiyuan Culture & Tourism Investment Group	175
Figure 5.5 Cross-scalar partnership.....	177
Figure 6.1 Jiyuan's topography and population density by township in 2018.....	195
Figure 6.2 Desakota in a hypothetical Asian country	223

LIST of TABLES

Table 2.1 Theoretical development: between ‘glocalisation’ and ‘glurbanisation’ and beyond.....	29
Table 2.2 Causal relations abstracted from entrepreneurial urbanism	31
Table 2.3 Established varieties of local (state) governance in North Atlantic countries	33
Table 2.4 ‘Glurbanisation’ versus ‘Glocalisation’.....	37
Table 2.5 State Socialism vs. Keynesian Fordism.....	41
Table 2.6 Neoliberalism in the ‘West’ vs. neoliberalisation in China.....	42
Table 2.7 Urban entrepreneurialism vs. state entrepreneurialism.....	44
Table 2.8 Static vs. dynamic competitive advantages.....	48
Table 2.9 Urban entrepreneurship in evolution	49
Table 2.10 Towards an agenda for entrepreneurial urbanism-based research in China	60
Table 3.1 Intensive and extensive empirical procedures	71
Table 3.2 The definition and bounding of case(s) of inquiry.....	74
Table 3.3 Constraints of three data sources and mitigation schemes.....	75
Table 3.4 Generic classification of interviewees.....	78
Table 3.5 Positional, decisional and reputational methods in identifying the elites	80
Table 3.6 Accessing the elites in Jiyuan: strategies and tactics	82
Table 4.1 Anti-settlement urbanism in China (till 2012)	104
Table 4.2 Evolving models of CDB-UIDC corporatism	109
Table 4.3 Just-in-time Urbanism (till ?).....	117
Table 4.4 Jiyuan’s evolving development vision since 1981	125
Table 4.5 China Public Private Partnerships Centre-listing PPP programs in Jiyuan.....	130
Table 5.1 The varieties of actually-existing partnerships in Jiyuan.....	145
Table 5.2 Promotion and relegation criteria for enterprise zones in Henan (2009-2012).....	149
Table 5.3 Rating system of enterprise zones in Henan (2013-2020).....	150
Table 5.4 The evaluation criteria for enterprise zones in Henan (2010-2020).....	151

Table 5.5 Guidelines for the governance of enterprise zones in Henan (2009-2020).....	152
Table 5.6 Village resettlement policies for developing enterprise zones in Henan (2009-2020). 154	
Table 5.7 Enterprise zones in Jiyuan.....	157
Table 5.8 Financial management system of enterprise zones in Jiyuan (2008-2018)	161
Table 5.9 Participation in PPP projects in China by enterprises of different ownership	182
Table 5.10 Quoted price from two suppliers in the bidding	183
Table 6.1 Approaches to the urbanising state, market and society in China.....	190
Table 6.2 Jiyuan's socio-economic development by topography in 2018	197
Table 6.3 Characteristics of selected villages.....	197
Table 6.4 Evolving priorities of 'Coordinated Urban-Rural Development' in Jiyuan.....	201
Table 6.5 Land use planning in Jiyuan	203
Table 6.6 Coordinated Urban-Rural development in Jiyuan	205
Table 6.7 Shareholding reform of Northgate.....	212
Table 6.8 Territorial restructuring of villages in the shareholding cooperative reform	216

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the contribution of entrepreneurial urbanism theory to the explanation of urban governance in China. Two major themes run throughout this analysis. First, to fully understand the contemporary strategies and practices of local economic and political actors in China requires an appreciation of the effect of the link between state rescaling and business politics on the issue of peasant citizenization. Second, geography matters to the formulation and management of entrepreneurial urbanism.

Entrepreneurial urbanism theory was initially developed to capture a particular reorientation of urban political economy in North Atlantic countries. It rested upon three central claims over the changes underway in Baltimore: public-private partnerships increasingly worked alongside local governments to boost local economies; the design and delivery of these partnerships were entrepreneurial and went beyond the territory-based redistributive policies; and these partnerships fed into a fiercer inter-urban competition. Entrepreneurial urbanism theory stresses the inevitability of such changes to urban governance in the macroeconomic shift of Keynesian Fordism, despite some case-study materials suggesting otherwise. This thesis presents a genealogy of entrepreneurial urbanism theory, including its migration to and mutation within China. It then seeks to build an analytical framework that develops the key contributions of entrepreneurial urbanism theory while also navigating the investigation of urbanising governance in China.

The empirical focus of this thesis is the municipality of Jiyuan. Since the 1990s, this small emerging city has built up a robust local economy based upon heavy industry, despite its disadvantageous location in Henan, one of the biggest agricultural provinces in China. However, the past decade has exposed the city to unprecedented economic and ecological challenges. Via the ‘waves of crisis-driven urbanisation’ concept, the status quo of Jiyuan is considered first in the shifting broader space economy and overlapping effects of previous urban policies over the past four decades. Through contrastive case studies of different public-private partnerships and rural collective economic shareholding cooperatives, using semi-structured interviews with key policymakers and practitioners, the institutional constellation assembling the urban process is mapped.

I argue that entrepreneurial urbanism theory relocates the research foci of city governing, but the theory users tend to underspecify the role of state rescaling within the local-global nexus, hollow out the urban-rural dialectic, and thus foreclose alternative urban process by presuming North Atlantic ethnocentrism unnecessarily.

DECLARATION

The author confirms that no portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.

COPYRIGHT STATEMENT

The copyright of this thesis and the ownership of intellectual property rights are regulated according to the following notes:

- i. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the “Copyright”) and s/he has given The University of Manchester certain rights to use such Copyright, including for administrative purposes.
- ii. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts and whether in hard or electronic copy, may be made only in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as amended) and regulations issued under it or, where appropriate, in accordance with licensing agreements which the University has from time to time. This page must form part of any such copies made.
- iii. The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trade marks and other intellectual property (the “Intellectual Property”) and any reproductions of copyright works in the thesis, for example, graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions.
- iv. Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication and commercialisation of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available in the University IP Policy (see <http://documents.manchester.ac.uk/DocuInfo.aspx?DocID=487>), in any relevant Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the University Library, The University Library’s regulations (see <http://www.manchester.ac.uk/library/aboutus/regulations>) and in The University’s policy on Presentation of Theses.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

or A Tale of Two Cities

Thanks to the Covid-19, the final touches to the thesis before submission were accomplished at a quarantine hotel near Shanghai Pudong Airport. Staying in this liminal space once in a lifetime (hopefully), I cannot resist adapting Doreen Massey's (2005, pp. 118) famous line inspired by her train journey: As I travel between the two places, I am part of the constant process of the making and breaking of links that constitute me myself, Manchester, Jiyuan, and space itself.

Born and raised in Jiyuan, a place my mum still subconsciously call a *xian* (a rural county) instead of a *shi* (a city), I only have lived there less than a year in total since college. However, it has somehow haunted my fundamental understanding of the city and urbanisation no less than many other metropolises where I have studied or worked over the years: Zhuhai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Beijing, and Hong Kong, to such extent that I feel compelled to dedicate the thesis to this anonymous city beyond the knowledge of most Mancunians. This would not have been possible without the support I obtain from those who help my fieldwork and exchange ideas with me.

Anonymity has little to do with Manchester, whose longest history of (de)industrialisation intrigued my application to the University. The academic supervision and constant inspiration I received from Professor Ward and Wong made me immensely proud of this decision. Not much more I can say, except that I owe the former a beer and the latter a new year party. The colleagues and friends at SEED have also been sources of insights and wit. Mike and Alannah's meticulous (proof)reading greatly improved the readability of this piece of writing. I am fortunate to know them through the Platypus Manchester Reading Group. I should also mention Professor Shenjing He, who first introduced me to the notion of 'entrepreneurial urbanism' many years ago at SYSU.

Did I by any chance change Manchester or Jiyuan by travelling in between? I think so. My teenage niece Jiajia is living proof of this, as the first British city name she remembered was Manchester, just like many of my Mancunian audience who, thanks to my work, were capable of finding Jiyuan on a map of China. What is more certain though, is that through engagement with all these places and people, near and far, I myself have been transformed. If it were up to me, their names would consume another page. A special mention goes to Ziliang, whose hospitality to a newcomer four years ago made Manchester a warm, despite rainy, place to recall.

Yes, Mum and Dad, Brother and Sister-in-law, Jiajia and Erjia, I did it.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Now that the city belongs to the people, everything should proceed in the spirit that the people themselves are responsible for managing the city (Mao, 1948).

The most useful and appropriate approach to understanding contemporary urban governance in global context is to develop a conceptualization that is equally sensitive to the role of relational and territorial geographies, of fixity and flow, of global contexts and place-specificities (and vice versa), of structural imperatives and embodied practices, in the production of cities (McCann and Ward, 2010, pp. 175).

This thesis is about the governing of cities. It examines the politico-economic entrepreneurship and brokerage that took place around ‘new-type’ urban development in Jiyuan – one among the hundreds of emerging while ‘off-the-map’ Chinese cities. Although premised on the understanding that much has changed in the urban politico-economic sphere in China since the Xi-Li administration, this thesis does not register uncritically claims of a ‘new-type urbanisation.’ The capacity (or otherwise) of actors to affect and shape the ‘new-type urbanisation’ of the local economy, is one of the central topics of discussion in this thesis. Entrepreneurial urbanism theory is explored and its ability to explain the redirection of managing structures in Chinese cities is examined, whilst also not forgetting that the patterns of urban governance (the focus of this thesis) have emerged in the context of evolving national and global setup. This introduction situates the changing patterns of urban governance by, first, exploring the complexity of globalisation before, second, establishing how the government has been replaced by governance, as well as the form is taken by business involvement in local glurbanisation strategies.

Over the past four decades of globalisation, cities have become objects of policy fervour as a part of the extensive shuffling of scale-based capacities. Although globalisation has never been immune to the political mediation by nation-states, from local to global actors, institutions and companies have displayed unprecedented interest in devising strategies suited to the platforms provided by cities (e.g. OECD, 2007). The intensifying interaction between the economic and the political has borne witness to the rising vibrancy of urban activities and the emergence of new cities (Brenner, 2013; Wu, 2016a). Nevertheless, the global financial crash in late 2008 and the long shadow it subsequently cast over the global socio-economic situation, has incurred surging reflections on the

‘dark side’ of neoliberal globalisation and has thus fuelled the anti-globalisation sentiment in its heartland (cf. Stiglitz, 2002, 2018). Since President Xi and Premier Li took office in P. R. China, a country widely seen as one of the biggest beneficiaries of and contributors to the prior wave of globalisation, they have sought to deepen its local effects, despite firmly separating the economic realm from the political one. In his keynote speech at the World Economic Forum at Davos, President Xi (2017) delivered a ‘robust’ (Financial Times, 2017) defence of globalisation:

The point I want to make is that many of the problems troubling the world are not caused by economic globalisation. For instance, the refugee...the international financial crisis...It is not an inevitable outcome of globalisation... Just blaming economic globalization for the world's problems is inconsistent with reality, and it will not help solve the problems...There was a time when China also had doubts about economic globalisation and was not sure whether it should join the World Trade Organization. But we concluded that integration into the global economy is a historical trend... Therefore, China took a brave step to embrace the global market.

Meanwhile, in a fervent effort to promote the modernisation of China's system of governance and its capacity, President Xi (2014, see CPC Central documentary research office, 2017, pp. 8) remarked:

The fundamental feature of our governance of China is the Chinese Communist Party-led socialist system. We have to be very clear ideologically that, the modernisation of China's governance system and governance capacity is absolutely not westernized or capitalised!

Thus, we are told that we are living in turbulent times in which supralocal transformation is reworking the political economy of an urban century. As a series of tangled processes unfold, they create a new set of conditions within which cities are forced to operate. In China, these were interpreted as compelling cities to compete against each other to better concretise and enrich the blueprint of state development. Once at the receiving end of globalisation, emerging metropolitans in China such as Shenzhen are gearing up to be the next leading globaliser in competition against Los Angeles and San Francisco. Meanwhile, small- and middle-sized cities like Jiyuan are also globalised due to their unprecedented embeddedness in the globalising production network, despite being far less prominent. Furthermore, cities like Jiyuan (which are located in less developed regions) embrace globalisation because it seems to be one of the few options that avoid population shrinkage, something which has occurred in 30% of Chinese cities in the past decade (see Long and Wu, 2016). It remains to be seen whether a ‘global city’ demands a different governing structure and policies to those adopted in a ‘shrinking city’, but Jiyuan does struggle to

navigate between the two forces that reshuffle the hierarchy of cities.

Late glurbalisation and (re)turn of the nation-state

Glurbalisation was initially proposed as an analytical lens to understand the ‘entrepreneurial strategies that are concerned to secure the most advantageous insertion of a given city into the changing interscalar division of labour in the world economy’ (Jessop and Sum, 2000, pp. 2295). Underpinning this perspective is an explicit assumption that cities, parallel to multinational corporations, have become strategic actors in the process of globalisation since the late 1970s.

An interscalar division of labour entails an interscalar division of regulation. The empowerment of cities tends to push the nation-state to the back seat, making the latter less prominent in negotiating labour-capital conflicts and tension (Swyngedouw, 1997). Although the ‘hollowing out’ of the nation-state did not really happen, it goes without saying that the nation-state ceded its once monopolised power both upwards and downwards, i.e. globally and locally. More often than before, the nation-state has played as the mediator between multinational companies-led inward investment and cities, through the use of economic incentives and political leverage (see, for instance, Dicken, 1988; Mair, Florida and Kenney, 1998; Balchin, Sykora and Bull, 2002).

There was a clear sign in the early 1980s that cities were becoming exposed in new ways to ‘a pervasive environment of beggar-thy-neighbour competition, mutual undercutting and collectively counterproductive subsidisation’ (Peck, 2017a, pp. 6). However, it still took thirty-some years for North Atlantic cities to acknowledge that economic dynamics built upon market-friendly regulatory experimentation, ‘festivalisation’ (Harvey, 1989a, pp.11), and corporate attraction efforts had become increasingly negative and zero-sum.

It was not until the financial meltdown on Wall Street in 2008 and widespread fiscal stress in US cities that it was realised this regulatory rescaling was fraught with crises. A decade earlier than that, we were already reminded that only ‘strong competition’-oriented entrepreneurship had the potential to generate above-average profit and was thus Schumpeterian, while ‘such an orientation tend(ed) to fail for various reasons to ensure continued capital accumulation’ (Jessop, 1998a, pp.80).

‘Failing cities have forfeited the right to self-governance’ claimed the higher-tier state when imposing emergency management of fiscal cleansing and local state downsizing to cities (Peck, 2017a, pp. 24). In this narrative, ‘insolvent cities are the authors of their own misfortune’ (Peck, 2017b, pp.328) instead of a conjunctural consequence of neoliberalised ‘structures of public and

private finance, legal and constitutional regimes, and patterns of federal and central-local relations’ (Peck, 2017a, pp. 22). Or, as subsequent history shows, the emergency rule that subjected cities both ‘to the summary judgements of the financial markets and to *Caesarist* actions on the part of state authorities’ (Peck, 2017b, pp.349, emphasis original) preludes a (re)turn of authoritarianism (Peck and Theodore, 2019).

Urbanising governance and the refashion of partnerships

Economic globalisation since the 1980s has implied a tendency to reduce the scope of a national government (particularly in previously welfarist countries) to that of a local government which cannot ‘make war or peace’, ‘issue passports or forbid outsiders from entering their territory’, ‘issue currency’, and ‘control imports or erect tariff walls’ (Peterson, 1981, pp. 4). Meanwhile, economic globalisation went hand-in-hand with the *de jure* or *de facto* privatisation of public service provision (Ward *et al.*, 2015). However, it does not necessarily give rise to a hegemonic urban ‘regime’ or ‘bloc’ (cf. Jessop and Sum, 2000), consistent with the gist of governance, capable of ‘attain[ing] a range of defined outcomes’ by controlling an activity (Hirst and Thompson, 1996, pp. 184).

Since 2014, the sudden rise of the Public-Private Partnership to its present state of popularity in China has drawn economic and political attention to the potential post-stimulus ‘austerity urbanism’ (cf. Davidson and Ward, 2018). No doubt, China’s four-trillion post-2009 economic stimulus had provided a soft landing for the domestic and international economy (cf. Harvey, 2016) while also accumulated unprecedented public debt, notably in the form of urban investment bonds issued by local governments. As these bonds came into collective maturity since 2013, local governments have been experiencing unprecedented financial pressure (see Pan *et al.*, 2017).

Introduced by then Minister of Finance (Lou, 2019) at a time of increased global economic volatility in conjuncture with prominent local hidden debt risk, the PPP bear the hope to fix these pressing issue by referring to the *modus operandi* that has come to prominence in North Atlantic cities since the 1980s, particularly those in the UK¹ (see Foreign & Commonwealth Office of UK, 2016; HM Treasury, 2017). It seems at first glance that the rise of partnerships in the UK and China at the conjuncture of fiscal austerity and downturn economic growth unveiled some causal relationship between national trends and local responses. However, this explanation built upon

¹ Somewhat surprisingly, during his budget speech on 29 October 2018, then Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Hammond announced the end of Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and Private Finance 2 (PF2), two of the most common approaches to public-private partnerships in UK since 1992, without specifying any successors or replacement so far.

ahistorical and aspatial cross-country comparison is far from sufficient to comprehend the role of PPP in governing cities and formulating place-based, structural competitiveness-oriented strategies in China. Instead, there is a need to situate the partnerships between market forces and ‘enabling’ authorities (Cochrane, 1993) as well as between ‘economic and extra-economic factors’ (Jessop, 1998) in the place-specific institutional settings and development trajectories. Only in this way we can better elucidate the significant difference between PPPs in the two countries, for example, that the Urban Investment and Development Corporations (see Li and Chiu, 2018; Jiang and Waley, 2018) preceded the partnership initiative in China, while the Urban Development Corporations and partnerships were institutional innovations of the same era in the UK.

Research aim and objectives

Placed in this environment of urban policy emulation and innovation, the central aims of this thesis are to develop an updated explanation of the urban development agenda in light of the supralocal responses to evolving economic globalisation and to examine and map some of the granular details of city governance via the case of Jiyuan, China. Since the 1990s, this small emerging city has built up a robust local economy based upon heavy industry, despite its disadvantageous location in Henan, one of the biggest agricultural provinces in China. However, the past decade has exposed the city to unprecedented economic and ecological challenges. To tackle these challenges, Jiyuan has proactively formulated institutional and discursive partnerships, among other municipal policies (see a detailed discussion in Chapter 4).

In order to realise this research aim, I challenge the uncritical use of entrepreneurial urbanism theory to explain contemporary Chinese urban governance. Forged in the North Atlantic countries, entrepreneurial urbanism theory thrives on explaining how macro-level economic and political changes affect inter-city relations, giving rise to a particular shift in local governing. The shift was evident in the institution (public-private partnership), space (place-based economy), discourse (entrepreneurship) and policy (supply-side). The parallel between orthodox theoretical directives and the contemporary policy agenda, built upon the once imaginative (now mundane) belief that cities can/should play a more critical role in the competitive global economic order, does not guarantee their convergence.

Instead, the parallels *per se* warrant careful explanation: Does the retooling of partnerships by the Chinese central government indicate an inevitable failure of state regulation (e.g. Ford-Keynesianism or neoliberalism)? What kind of developmental strategy can local actors formulate against the path-shaping forces emanating from outside the locality? To address these and other

questions, an array of issues are confronted: How has the form and function of the urban political economy across Chinese cities changed over the past decades? Through carefully mapping out the urbanisation trajectory of Jiyuan, some of the more exaggerated claims made under the ‘new-type urbanisation’ rubric are addressed. In addition, how much of the increased local strategy formulation, action and discourse exemplified in the PPP and shareholding reform of rural collective economic organisations in Jiyuan is due to the supralocal policies as opposed to globalisation? To what extent do these amount to entrepreneurial urbanism with Chinese characteristics? Finally, what is the most sophisticated way of theorising the global sense of space in urban governance? These are key issues that will be returned regularly in this thesis.

Accordingly, I have set out five interrelated research objectives as follows:

- (i) to analyse the genesis, development and travel (to China) of the entrepreneurial urbanism theory-cum-approach², teasing out its principal argument and (in)capacity towards an operational research agenda;
- (ii) to refine the research agenda (for the city in question) through philosophical and methodological critique;
- (iii) to contextualise the latest prominent urban strategies in Jiyuan against the previous four decades of China’s urbanisation process, periodising and highlighting its evolutionary characteristics within the reworked research agenda;
- (iv) to examine Jiyuan’s aspiration to be an example of ‘Industry-City Integrated’ new-type urbanisation via various partnerships, comparing and contrasting their institutional form, content and discourse; and
- (v) to investigate Jiyuan’s policies towards ‘Urban-Rural Coordinated’ development through the restructuring of rural collective asset ownership, comparing different ways of conceptualising ‘urban’ in China.

The chapters and conclusion

Chapter 1 outlines the structure of the thesis. It situates the research topic in the broader phenomenon of ‘glurbanization’ (Jessop and Sum, 2000), the changing functions of the nation-

² Note: Like many other terms, entrepreneurial urbanism initially represented an interpretation (i.e. theory) based on a specific object of inquiry and later spawned to be a distinctive analytical method (i.e. approach) (cf. Peck, 2018, pp. 467). Despite the two terms are sometimes used exchangeably in this thesis, this note is a reminder that there must be a process by which theory becomes method. During the process, the essential context giving rise to the initial theorisation might be significantly altered, and this alteration deserves close examination.

state, and the 'rehash' of partnerships in urban governance.

Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical basis of the thesis. The genealogies of entrepreneurial urbanism theory unveil a global-local dialectic at work in envisaging city governance transition. In tracing its advancement, the initial conceptualisation in the late 1980s in Baltimore and early development in North Atlantic countries to its not-so-recent 'application' in China, this chapter highlights a series of issues. First, despite the difficulty of identifying 'a single theory' due to the vast array of academic endeavours this approach has inspired, entrepreneurial urbanism theory still serves as a breakthrough to understanding urbanisation as an integral part rather than a side-effect of social change and economic development. However, the theory needs an extensive overhaul for it runs the risk of conflating 'process' with 'mechanism' (cf. Yeung, 2019a) in dealing with time, space and scale. Further, the theory is precluded from informing contextual research beyond the North Atlantic context due to its unnecessary North Atlantic ethnocentrism³. This chapter concludes by setting out a framework for a new kind of strategic-relational analysis of the urban process that will be developed in greater detail in the concluding chapter. The framework unpacks the duplet of entrepreneurial city and entrepreneurial urbanism, seeing the former as a more 'worlding' tendency while the latter a more 'provincialising' event (cf. McCann, Roy and Ward, 2013), and thus foregrounding their necessary-cum-contingent relationship (cf. Jessop 2005). Also, this framework sensitises analytical attention to the four broad forces this duplet is situated and their tensions in between: (i) trans-local circulatory capital, of various forms, searching for new locations for accumulation; (ii) territorial developmental agendas geared towards the political-economic goals of extra-local structure; (iii) the strategic selectivity of extra-local structures to prefer temporally-spatially specific policy experimentation (cf. Lim, 2017a); (iv) the recursive strategic calculation by the urban bloc to institute inter-scalar articulation and chronotopic governance (cf. Jessop and Sum, 2000).

Chapter 3 constructs a methodological path that builds upon the theoretical principles outlined in Chapter 2. The second section of this chapter elicits a realist critique of the conceptual conflation of 'urban' as both a 'process' and a 'mechanism' (cf. Yeung, 2019) by revisiting the 'old debates' (Cox, 2013a) between Historical-Geographical Marxism (*à la* Harvey) and Critical Realism (*à la* Sayer) in theorising the role of space in capitalist urbanisation. I argue that: (i) an explanation of

³ Note that ethnocentrism here represents not the US-UK focus of early urban entrepreneurialism theory, but the 'othering' of alternative urban processes in follow-up research through this lens, which increasingly prevents the theory of further development.

the ‘urban’ entails not only a global sense of the local but also a specification of the scale⁴ at which strategic policies are formulated by whom and how; (ii) the application of entrepreneurial urbanism theory in China necessitates a provincialisation of its theoretical arguments after carefully stripping off the contingent North Atlantic ethnocentrism; and (iii) an emancipatory theorisation of the urban requires a reactivation of urban-rural dialectic by sensitising research attention to the actually-existing urban-rural interaction. Therefore, this chapter introduces the concept of ‘waves of crisis-driven urbanisation’ as a potential supplement to existing research on entrepreneurial cities, which is to be elaborated in Chapter 4. Following this theoretical reworking, the third section of the chapter illustrates how an intensive (‘single-city’) case study of the space of urban elites can pull ontology, epistemology, methodology, and methods together in a concrete research project of an entrepreneurial city. It also concerns the methods deployed to collect and analyse the qualitative and quantitative, first-hand and second-hand data. In particular, semi-structured interviews serve not only to provide the bulk of first-hand empirical materials but also inspire the strategic collection and appraisal of other secondary data. The penultimate section turns to the methodological definition of the thesis’ object of study, i.e. political entrepreneurs and strategy formulation. It reflects on the complicated process of identifying, gaining access to, and conducting interviews with urban elites, in light of the ‘strategic-relational contingency’ (Jessop, 2005) and ‘mode of entry’ (Ward and Jones, 1999).

Chapter 4 returns to the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 2 and enriched in Chapter 3. Guided by the tentative analytical framework, Chapter 4 provides a conjunctural account of post-Mao urban policies in China, which points to a tendency of strategic-relational entrepreneurialism formation and evolution. The policies are central to the production of local conditions which contingently prepare localities for the introduction of policies around ‘partnership’ and ‘coordination’. Rather than providing a linear description of urban policy since 1978 and in the process going over well-trodden ground, this chapter seeks to situate Jiyuan in its broader context. The concept of ‘waves of crisis-driven urbanisation’ attempts to fuse Lefebvre’s (1991 [1974], pp. 86) metaphor of social space as a *mille-feuille*, Massey’s (1995[1984]) work on industrial layers and economic restructuring, and Offe’s (1994, 1995) idea of ‘crisis of crisis management’. This concept interprets the local effects of urban policies as a layering and crisis-displacing process. As such, this chapter first outlines three waves under different themes: *anti-migration urbanism*, *anti-settlement urbanism* and *just-in-time urbanism*, and extrapolates their particular structures in terms of local

⁴ Indeed, Harvey (1989, pp. 6) mentioned that ‘(t)he shift towards entrepreneurialism in urban governance has to be examined, then, at a variety of spatial scales - local neighbourhood and community, central city and suburb, metropolitan region, region, nation state, and the like’ but received undue attention.

institutional configurations, political opportunities, and centre-local relations. It then examines Jiyuan's experience through the three waves and foregrounds the ongoing policies that respond to the latest economic and ecological challenges. Finally, this chapter reaffirms and extends the arguments made in previous chapters by describing how orthodox entrepreneurial urbanism theory offers partial explanations at best. In order to move toward a fuller and more rigorous theory, the multidimensional and conflictual urban context needs to be more thoroughly considered.

Chapter 5 pivots around one particular element in the entrepreneurial urbanism approach - the role of 'public-private partnerships' in reconfiguring urban governance – subjecting it to empirical interrogation. Proponents of entrepreneurial urbanism tend to premise a thriving urban economy on the existence and functioning of partnerships, without which a city is unable to be properly governed. This chapter revisits partnerships in entrepreneurial urbanism theory to reiterate their position at the centre of its explanatory power. From the analysis in Chapter 4, three partnership types are presented to develop an analysis inspired by entrepreneurialism theory. These are *Supralocal Authority-led partnerships*, *Local Authority-led partnerships*, and *Cross-scalar partnerships*. Each one is developed in order to conduct a more sophisticated examination of urbanising governance. I argue that conventional entrepreneurial urbanism theory presumes a linear-transitional model of urban governance and underestimates the co-existence of the various partnerships. This chapter concludes by asserting that a partnership-based explanation requires reworking in several ways it is to better capture the intricacies of urban governance.

Chapter 6 provides a strategic-relational study of the 'urban' in urban governance as being in an antithetical relationship with the 'rural'. It includes an iterative double movement, between theoretical research into the urban-rural dialectic on the one hand, and empirical research into urban-rural linkages on the other. First, this chapter revisits and problematises Harvey's (mis)handling of the urban-rural dialectic. Second, it draws upon a set of alternative theoretical positions and assesses each one both empirically and theoretically. The four approaches are 'state entrepreneurialism', 'state corporatism', 'urban statism', and 'desakota'. Each approach is explored in conjunction with a comparison of rural collective governance across three selected villages in Jiyuan. Although four stances are used, I argue that the 'just-in-time desakota' has the most to say about 'city' governance (in Jiyuan), and is better placed to augment the explanations offered through entrepreneurial urbanism theory.

The concluding chapter reviews the key theoretical, methodological and empirical findings of the thesis and contributions to the existing literature. Alongside strengthening theoretical accounts of

post-2008 city governance restructuring in China, I argue for a crisis-sensitive theorisation of urban governance that combines the insights of entrepreneurial urbanism with the strategic-relational approach. Finally, I argue that the position taken on the strategic-relational approach, urban elites space research method, and waves of crisis-driven urbanisation provides a framework that can be developed through future research in this area. In a nutshell, this research contributes to the comparative studies of cross-scalar urban policies by stressing the recursive interaction between the selective trans-local context and strategic local action. Also, this research contributes to the further development of the entrepreneurial urbanism approach in China by unveiling the merit of ‘just-in-time desakota’ as a meta-theoretical stance to the research of actually existing urban-rural interaction in Chinese cities.

CHAPTER 2

Entrepreneurial urbanism theory at 30⁺

2.1 Introduction

So there was nothing politically unusual about the piece. It was helpful, of course, to have a synthetic statement to bring it all together... It showed how local processes, when aggregated and coordinated through the power of spatial competition, constituted a global process of immense significance that would be very hard to resist through local mobilisations alone (Harvey, 2016, pp. 175).

But we must look beyond city dignitaries to a wider range of actors who might be mobilised behind a collective project and to the institutional factors that might help to consolidate their support. Such actors can include branches of the local, central and, where relevant, supranational state; quangos and hived-off state agencies; political parties; firms; consultancies; trade associations and chambers of commerce; employers' organisations; business roundtables; trades unions; trades councils; citizens' and community groups; voluntary-sector organisations; public-private partnerships; local educational and religious institutions; social movements; and diasporic communities (Jessop and Sum, 2000, pp. 2291).

Thirty-some years have passed since the seminal coinage of 'urban entrepreneurialism' by David Harvey based on his observation of Baltimore in 1989. In hindsight, Harvey (2016, pp. 175) bantered that it is 'rather oddly' to see his 'most cited paper' coming out in the same year as the Berlin Wall came down. Few would doubt that the end of the Cold War and rise of US-dominated neoliberalism formulated an enabling background to the entrepreneurialization of urban governance in Western Europe and beyond (see Brenner, 2003). In fact, the absence of the word neoliberalism is so 'conspicuous' (Peck, 2014a, pp. 397) in Harvey's seminal paper that 'the story of the political-economic shifts behind the rise of urban entrepreneurialism under neoliberalism' was later rewritten in *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Harvey, 2016, pp. 176). On the cover of this book, Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher and Deng Xiaoping are juxtaposed with Paul Volcker, then Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, and together the four of whom allow Harvey (2005, pp.1) to argue with explicit confidence that '[f]uture historians may well look upon the years 1978–80 as a revolutionary turning-point in the world's social and economic history.'

Years before Harvey attempted to theorise China's post-1980s politico-economic transformation as an integral part of the global neoliberal transition, the thesis of entrepreneurial urbanism has generated repercussions on the then-nascent discipline of urban governance study in China (Olds, 1995; Haila, 1999; Wu, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2003). This impact is felt today, with China-based scholars contributing the fourth-highest number of citations of Harvey's seminal work, (according to Web of Science) following their North Atlantic peers based in the US, UK and Canada. Since the turn of the century, the surging inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI), espoused by the devolution of spatial regulation power from central government and growing local 'incentive for making money from selling the space', significantly refreshed the outlook of the 'post-socialist' industrial cities as well as the burgeoning new towns (Wu, 2000, pp. 1359). Alongside the FDI-led urban development, new economic institutions were created and the local political apparatus was remoulded in China (see Chapter 4). Explanations that recalled the Maoist regime, resting upon assumptions over rigid central-local command linkages, resources rationing and minimal local autonomy were marginalised (cf. Wu, 2003). Over the past decades, local authorities have become accustomed to spearhead the *de rigueur* of urban economic development by setting up special project teams, resource procurement staff, and, recently, 'Urban Investment and Development Companies' (see Pan *et al.*, 2017; Jiang and Waley, 2018; Li and Chiu, 2018). Convention centres, sports stadia, 'Disney-worlds', harbour places, spectacular shopping malls, and industrial parks have become the *modus operandi* for the 'emerging Chinese cities' (Wu, 2016a).

The recent renewed international attention to urban entrepreneurialism, some of which sought to arrange a farewell to this 30-year classic but ended up making slight revisions at best (cf. Lauermaun, 2018; Phelps and Miao, 2019; Pike *et al.*, 2020; Kefford, 2020; Liu and Yao, 2020; Guo, 2020; He, 2020) is a side note on the strong vitality of the theory. It is on top of these endeavours that I argue entrepreneurial urbanism theory still offers a vibrant scaffold with which we can better capture the trajectory of urban transformation in China and unpack the abstract and concrete forces interweaving the urban institutional fabric.

This chapter introduces the entrepreneurial urbanism theory, tracing its conceptual origins, tracking its development, and extracting its methodology. The early conceptualisation and development of the theory, drawing upon North Atlantic cities, is explored in Section 2.3, while the transfer to, and mutations in, China is examined in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 sets out the three key building blocks of the entrepreneurial urbanism approach: inter-urban competition, urban entrepreneurship, and public-private partnership. In Section 2.6, I analyse the various attempts to develop entrepreneurial urbanism theory and highlight an array of 'missing links' in current research. As part of this re-establishment of entrepreneurial urbanism theory, Table 2.10

summarises the core theoretical aims of this thesis, which steers a diagrammatical presentation of the analytical framework in Figure 2.1. Before all of these endeavours, Section 2.2 would first explain how and to what extent entrepreneurial urbanism can be seen as an approach.

2.2 The entrepreneurial urbanism approach

As Harvey (2016, pp.176) retrospectively put it, the coinage of urban entrepreneurialism was a ‘synthetic statement’ to unveil the ‘trends in urban governance then emerging in the wake of deindustrialisation and the economic restructuring going under Thatcher and Reagan.’ Unfortunately, Harvey has ‘far, far more to say about entrepreneurialism in his article but then reduces managerialism to redistribution’ and ‘misses some of the breadth of the original conception’ (Cox, 2020a). This omission even misguided the latest critique of urban entrepreneurialism based on historical analysis of urban planning and real estate development in post-war Britain, which concluded that their ‘managerialism ... turns out to have been far more entrepreneurial ... than is conventionally imagined’ (Kefford, 2020, pp. 13).

At the minimum level, when reading entrepreneurial urbanism theory *qua* Harvey as ‘a city-centric transition mode’ (Peck, 2014a, pp. 399) from the managerialist city government to entrepreneurial urban governance, there is a necessity to ‘go back in time’ to revisit the *urban managerialism approach* ‘in order to move forward intellectually’ (Ward, 2017, pp. 2). Instead of an urban governing method bounded by its historical frame (i.e. from post-World War II to late 1970s) or practice realm (i.e. urban development rather than urban regeneration), the urban managerialism approach interprets how social and spatial constraints on the urban poor’s access to scarce ‘indirect wage’ (e.g. public housing, education and mortgages) was mediated by the urban managers and gatekeepers (e.g. housing loan officers, town planners, estate developers, and social workers). In addition to this, the moral and political values of these urban managers may reinforce, reflect or reduce the inequalities of direct occupational wage (see Pahl, 1969; Craven, 1969; Williams, 1978; Forrest and Wissink, 2017). Moreover, that *urban managerialism approach* failed to address the issue of post-1980 urban regeneration was not because those managers stopped being ‘managerial’ (cf. Harvey, 1989a) or ‘entrepreneurial’ (cf. Kefford, 2020), but because the theoretical stance *per se* never succeeded in building the organic connection between distribution and accumulation (cf. Phal, 1974; Cox, 2020a).

Only from this vantage point of urban managerialism can we better capture what new light Harvey’s formulation of *entrepreneurial urbanism approach* sheds upon the research of city governing: by handling the issue of ‘real income’ at a similar time to Phal, Harvey’s (1974) coining of ‘class

monopoly rent’ successfully linked housing consumption to capital accumulation. It has already been established in the available literature on this topic that ‘class monopoly rent’ was an integral part of Harvey’s Marxist historical-geographical materialism that theorised the uneven process of capitalist urbanisation (Harvey, 1973, 1982, 1985a, 1985b) under the rubric of ‘urban revolution’ (Lefebvre, 1970). In this interpretation of urban process through ‘the twin themes of capital accumulation and class struggle’ (Harvey, 1985a, pp. 1), ‘built environment’ played a centrepiece for the ‘three circuits of capital’ (1982, pp. 408; 1985a, pp. 9) to arrive at a temporal and spatial ‘structured coherence’ (1985a, pp. 139). By extension, the change in (the delivery of) the built environment implied a significant change in the capitalist urban process.

Therefore, the construction of cultural, retail entertainment, and office centres in the North Atlantic cities since the 1980s was qualitatively different from previous jurisdiction-based delivery of public housing and education facilities from the *urban entrepreneurialism* perspective because the former was responding and feeding into an unprecedented ‘coercive law of’ inter-urban ‘competition’ (Harvey, 1989a) instead of post-war reconstruction (Kefford, 2020). This coercive power constituted a fundamental challenge to ‘municipal socialism’ in Britain and anticipated its doom prospect (Peck, 2014a). Furthermore, it quickly became a cross-nation, cross-party, and cross-ideology consensus that cities had to take an entrepreneurial stance to achieve economic development.

Thus, we arrive at the genuine contribution of urban entrepreneurialism. Apart from the more theoretical effort, Harvey (1989a) also made three defining (empirical) claims concerning the changes in governing Baltimore. First, public-private partnerships (PPP) were increasingly working alongside local governments to boost local economies; second, the policies and practices of PPPs were innovative and entrepreneurial in design and delivery; and third, the attention of local development began to switch from the territory (and associated social provision) to place (and particular civic projects)—moreover, all of these changes fed into the coercive power of intensified inter-urban competition.

Harvey did not deny the difference between the UK and US, where the former witnessed more active involvement of local authorities, encouraged by the central administration, in economic development directly related to production and investment; and the latter saw unprecedented integration between reviving civic boosterism with local government power for resource attraction. Instead, he argued that the three claims based on Baltimore represented a general trend observed for cities in both the UK and US. Guided by the three claims, a plethora of subsequent empirical studies emerged that were tailored to explore ‘the common entrepreneurial policies and practices

pursued by many industrialised cities over the last two decades' (Ward, 2010b, pp. 475). Not unexpectedly, these comparative studies succeeded in establishing the regularities and similarities between cities concerning a general 'entrepreneurial turn.' Meanwhile, despite being accused of 'totalising' and dropping space 'out of the picture' by *critical realists* (Cox, 2020b), the *entrepreneurial urbanism approach*, built upon Harvey's *historical-geographical materialism*, displayed no intention of seriously addressing these theoretical challenges (Castree, 2002). Instead, what interested Harvey (1989a, pp. 6, original emphasis) was the difficulty 'to find a way of proceeding that can deal specifically with the relation between *process* and *object* without itself falling victim to unnecessary reification'. Put differently, seeing 'the urban process as an active rather than passive aspect of political-economic development' does not entail treating cities as 'active agents when they are mere things' (Ibid., pp. 5).

Entrepreneurial urbanism approach, then, directed critical enquiry on (i) the geographical shape of severe social and economic problems underlying the surface of successful urban spectacles and images; (ii) the negative macroeconomic consequences of fiercer inter-urban competition in terms of the real income distribution, urban network stability, and long-run benefits; and (iii) its potential to transform into progressive urban corporatism to mitigate or challenge the hegemonic dynamic of capitalist accumulation (Harvey, 1989a, pp. 16).

Significant epistemological challenges, relevant to entrepreneurial urbanism theory, were addressed systematically in the conceptualisation of 'entrepreneurial cities' (Jessop, 1997, 1998a, 2000; Jessop and Sum, 2000), which marked another methodological advancement of the entrepreneurial urbanism approach. Shaped by the French regulation approach and neo-Gramscian state theory, the *entrepreneurial cities* approach maintains that cities can be defined as entrepreneurial and active actors so long as they are 'meaningful units of competition and able to pursue competitive strategies' (Jessop and Sum, 2000, pp. 2291). In order to do so, *entrepreneurial cities* entail an 'urban blocs/ regime' with 'capacities to realise particular discursive-material accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects' (Ibid., pp. 2310). Underpinning this 'strategic-relational approach' is an imaginary constitution of the (urban) economy 'as an ensemble of socially embedded, socially regularised, and strategically selective institutions, organisations, social forces, and activities organised around (or at least involved in) the self-valorisation of capital in and through regulation' (Jessop, 1997, pp. 2).

Meanwhile, *entrepreneurial cities* seek to deconstruct the 'coercive law of competition' adopted by the orthodox entrepreneurial urbanism approach. It distinguishes the strong competition from the weak competition, suggesting the former refers to potentially positive-sum attempts to improve

the overall (structural) competitiveness of a locality through innovation, while the latter refers to what are essentially zero-sum attempts to secure the reallocation of existing resources at the expense of other localities. Likewise, a distinction is made between static comparative advantages and dynamic competitive advantages (Jessop, 1998a), where the former refers to the Ricardian discourse of comparative advantages built upon broader social conditions such as cheap wage-labour, and the latter refers to the structural or systematic competition achieved through, and resulting in, enduring innovation (Jessop, 1998a; Cox, 1995; Stopper and Walker, 1989).

On top of this, *entrepreneurial cities* go beyond the 'four basic options of urban entrepreneurialism' (Harvey, 1989a, pp.8) and suggests five genres of a city's self-image building and place-marketing activities in a Schumpeterian (1934) sense: the production of new urban spaces, adoption of new methods of space production, opening new markets of urban living, finding a new source of funds, and redefining the urban position. In the making of entrepreneurial cities, time and scale, the traditionally extra-economic dimensions become the new foci of governance (Jessop and Sum, 2000).

With the once-entrepreneurial urban policies and narratives becoming increasingly mundane, customary and mobile, the recent decade has witnessed a rise of the comparative studies of transnational, cross-scalar, multi-site as well as relational urban governance policies (Ward, 2010a; McCann, 2010; McCann and Ward, 2010b, 2011; Peck and Theodore, 2010; Temenos and McCann, 2013). According to the perspective of 'policy mobility', any single case study of (entrepreneurial) urban governance today has to hold a 'global sense of place' (Massey, 1991, 2008) without allowing the covering concepts (like neoliberal globalisation) to be 'smothering' ideological fiat (Peck, 2017a, pp. 10). Out of the scepticism towards both universalism (Storper and Scott, 2016) and particularism (Robinson and Roy, 2016) emerged the 'conjunctural approach' to entrepreneurial urban policies (Peck, 2017a, 2017b; cf. Brenner, Peck and Theodore, 2010; Hall and Massey, 2010). In order to provide a granular capture of the positionality, situation and context of contemporary cities, this approach (re)proposes that case studies, middle-level concepts and revisable epistemological theory claims (like urban entrepreneurialism and entrepreneurial cities) have to be dialogically connected.

With the concept of entrepreneurial urbanism becoming increasingly heavier-loaded and urban entrepreneurial urbanism theory literature more disparate, a pulling-together of different (albeit overlapping) approaches seems more likely to critically assess its contribution. For the same reason, what is less realistic is to expect such a brief review to encompass all the debates that the theory has inspired. Not to mention that the effort of Chinese scholars has not been much presented.

Given that China is a latecomer in the debate of entrepreneurial urban governance and has yet to display a proportional impact (compared to its rapidly-growing volume of studies) on the prevalent English literature heavily reliant on North Atlantic cities, the following examination of entrepreneurial urbanism theory's theoretical development will be divided into two parts: one on its birth and (early) development in North Atlantic cities, and the other on the transfer to, and mutations in, China.

Instead of suggesting a clear-cut, disjointed temporal and spatial division of the theoretical development, this classification of ensuing literature analysis serves two guiding principles. First, the theory development is understood as an iterative process of constructing a scaffold of more substantial explanatory power by distinguishing the necessary mechanism from the contingent process (cf. Yeung, 2019). Second, investigation of existing studies would strategically focus on those research claims conducive to a common ground for a meaningfully comparative interpretation of the entrepreneurial urbanism in both North Atlantic and Chinese cities.

Table 2.1 Theoretical development: between ‘glocalisation’ and ‘glurbanisation’ and beyond⁵

	Academic backgrounds	Key proponents	Process of development	Theoretical objectives	Epistemological concerns
-1970	Urban managerialism	Pahl, Craven	abstract → concrete	The examination of distribution of ‘indirect wage’ was mediated by the urban managers and gatekeepers	Stratified and racialized housing markets
1977-1989	Pre-entrepreneurialism	Cockburn, Saunders, Duncan and Goodwin, Clark and Dear	concrete → abstract	The exploration of municipal socialism under the state welfarism through central-local linkages	Local political process in the UK
		Elkin, Logan and Molotch	concrete → abstract	The alliance between city politicians and business class in promoting local growth	Urban political decision-making in the US
		Harvey	abstract → concrete	To interpret urban process on the twin Marxist themes of capital accumulation and class struggle	The making of (sub)urbanisation in the US
1989-1996	Unfolding urban entrepreneurialism	Harvey; Boyle and Hughes; Cochrane, Peck and Tickell; Kearns and Philo; Roberts and Schein	abstract ↔ concrete	To interrogate the relation between capitalist development and the social and physical landscapes of urbanisation	Defining and explaining the emerging entrepreneurial characteristics and strategies
		Leitner; Ward; Jones; Harding; Hubbard	abstract → concrete	To link the theory with regime theory (and growth coalitions)	Internal architecture or urban entrepreneurial partnership and network in the US and the UK
		Painter and Goodwin; Jones; MacLeod; Peck and Tickell;	abstract	To link the theory with the French regulation approach	The local state as both a product and an agent of regulation
1997-2008	Entrepreneurial cities from North Atlantic to China	Cox and Mair; Jessop and Sum	abstract → concrete	To feed into the theory with neo-Gramscian state theory, critical discourse analysis, and Schumpeterian analysis of firms	Re-imaging of local economies (of extra-economic spheres) and cities as strategic actors for global competition
		Wood, Jessop, Brenner	abstract		Rescaling and reterritorialisation

⁵ For a detailed comparison of glocalisation and glurbanisation, see Table 2.4.

		Wu, Chien, He	concrete	To study the theory's compatibility in explaining local restructuring in China	Insights from theoretical transfer to China
2008-2020	Hyper-/Post-/Alternative/Variegated entrepreneurialism	McCann; Schindler; Acuto; Lauermann; McFarlane	concrete → abstract	To question the relation between entrepreneurial practices and growth politics, and to re-theorise the municipal statecraft	Revisiting and reworking the theory to couch the latest changes, and looking for alternatives beyond neoliberalism
		Wu, Li and Chiu; He	concrete → abstract	To question the theory's compatibility in explaining local restructuring in China	

2.3 Genesis and early development (in North Atlantic countries)

When Harvey's seminal work synthesised the urban process on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, he was running a risk of flattening the difference in-between. '[W]hat this overlooks, though, is that just as the urban managerialism of American cities was always weak compared with that of their European counterparts, so too is it the case with urban entrepreneurialism in the latter.' (Cox, 2011, pp. 2669). This section will unpack the national/institutional difference in entrepreneurial urbanism between the UK and US before teasing out the still-pertinent contribution of entrepreneurial urbanism theory.

Before presenting the genealogy of the birth and earlier development of the theory, there remains the need to determine a theoretical point of departure for entrepreneurial urbanism. From a realist perspective, it begs the following question: how can the 'entrepreneurial urbanism' be abstracted into a causal explanation (see Chapter 3)? Harvey's work provides a three-dimensional answer: politically, economically, and discursively (see Table 2.2).

Table 2.2 Causal relations abstracted from entrepreneurial urbanism

Structure	Entrepreneurial City ← Urban entrepreneurialism		
Object	City	Urban	Municipal government
Causal Powers	Public/private	Territory/place	Conservative/entrepreneurial
Conditions	State fiscal austerity	State rescaling	Intensified competition
Events	Public-private partnership	Place-based economy	Innovative discourse

Politically, a city with the structure of inter-dependent public and private sectors, and one necessarily possessing causal powers to generate (as well as liabilities to break) the public-private partnership under the specific condition of state-fiscal austerity, will increase public-private partnerships for urban infrastructural provision. Economically, an urban area with the structure of both territory and place, under the specific condition of nation-state rescaling, will decline a territory-based economy and give rise to a place-based economy (thus more uneven spatial development). Discursively, a municipal government with the structure of both conservation and entrepreneurship will embrace innovative discourse under the specific condition of intensified competition.

This realist reading radically problematises the flat reading of Harvey's argument as 'a city-centric governance transition model' or 'urban-scale transition narrative' (Peck, 2014a, pp. 399). It questions the common-sense causal relations built between the emerging structure of the theory and individual events in the first place. Put differently, the sheer abundance of entrepreneurial strategies, actions, and discourses cannot guarantee the establishment of an entrepreneurial city. Moreover, under certain conditions, the city may have an alternative to such a constitution.

From this point of departure, we can embark upon the journey of tracing precedent and subsequent studies around the theory of entrepreneurial urbanism in North Atlantic countries. By making comparisons according to a geo-historical context, an analysis of the literature recalls Cox's (1991, 1998, 2002) coinage of 'spaces of dependence', which are defined 'by those more-or-less localised social relations upon which we depend for the realisation of essential interests and for which there are no substitutes elsewhere' (Cox, 1998, pp. 2).

Walking different walks

US is generally believed to have a much longer history of business involvement in subnational governance than the UK or other Western European countries. Sbragia (1996, pp. 213) identified two rounds of subnational entrepreneurship, the first of which began in the antebellum period when state governments were active in co-funding the construction of railways and canals with private investors. The post-World-War-II period witnessed the second round of 'state activism' when municipal governments became more active in borrowing for, and investing in, local economic development.

Meanwhile, the non-elective public authorities, or special-purpose governmental entities, in the US date back to the Depression period and spread throughout the post-World-World-II period (Ibid, pp. 165-166). These authorities were normally self-financed rather than relying on taxation, often cutting across city/suburban boundaries, using a corporate rather than a bureaucratic form of internal governance, and had enormous leverage into developmental policies. These authorities allowed (public) jobs to be done 'without the clamorous debates, recurring compromises, and delay checks and counterchecks that characterise the rest of American government' (Walsh, 1978, pp. 3-4). Before the Reagan administration, these non-elective subnational authorities had been active for decades, implementing Keynesian urban policies including the Urban Renewal Programs of the 1950s, the Model Cities Program of the 1960s, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, and the Comprehensive

Employment and Training Act in 1978 (Gaffikin and Warf, 1993). In the research of Chicago, Peterson (1981, pp. 133) even argued that it was these unelected authorities that controlled the direction of development policies, rather than the elected city officials.

Notably, the Reagan administration terminated many of the previously-employed Keynesian urban schemes and sharply reduced federal subsidies to localities for public expenditure (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1989). What was relatively unnoticed, however, was that local public authorities were given leeway to use tax-exempt revenue bonds for public financing and, in this process, the roles of these authorities were further strengthened and institutionalised rather than weakened (Sbragia, 1996, pp. 163-187).

In short, the actually-existing ‘entrepreneurial urbanism’ in America in the 1970s and 1980s was a repercussion of the long-lasting tradition of public capital investment by subnational governments. To be exact, the subnational entrepreneurialism in the period 1960-1987 led by local governmental authorities was ‘a second prong of a strategy of circumvention that developed in order to evade the restrictions on state borrowing imposed in the late nineteenth century’ (Sbragia, 1996, pp. 143).

Table 2.3 Established varieties of local (state) governance in North Atlantic countries

	US	UK and Western Europe
State form	Fragmented	Unitary
Territorial expressions		
Central oversight of	Low	High
local land-use planning		
local capital expenditure		
local capital borrowing	Legislative	Administrative
State distribution interventions	Low	High
Public financial reliance on tax	Low	High
Social consequence		
Class contestation	Low	High
Inter-locality competition	High	Low
Discursive formation		
Individual freedom vs state oppression	Often	Rare
Equality of opportunity vs outcomes	Opportunity	Outcomes
Competition vs monopoly	Privilege competition	Accept monopoly

Source: Cox (2011), Sbragia(1996), Hambleton (1989), Gaffkin and Warf (1993).

By contrast, the transition to post-Keynesianism was felt more sharply in the UK (and Western

Europe), as seen from the radical municipal labourist activism against the Thatcher administration's disempowering of local governments (Hambleton, 1989; Gaffkin and Warf, 1993). At a time, the centralising measure fuelled the argument that Britain was 'more highly centralised than anything this side of East Germany' (Newton and Karran, 1985, pp. 129).

The differences between the two countries stemmed from different central-local relations, state forms and market institutions. The decentralised form of the nation-state and the fragmentation of a metropolitan area in the US kept class politics subordinate to that of inter-local competition, while the class-based bipartisan political system and unitary state form in the UK foregrounded the tenacious central *vis-a-vis* local relation (instead of inter-local relation) economically, politically and even ideologically (Cox, 2011; Newton, 1978). Meanwhile, unlike the US, the UK had no access to a mature municipal bond market for local public financing. In order to propel inter-city competition, bypass local government, and cultivate urban public-private coalition, the Thatcher administration, upholding a 'free-the-market' rationale (Hambleton, 1989, pp. 372), ended up allocating central funding to set up urban initiatives.

Viewing from this lens, the bilateral flow of urban policy and market-oriented rhetoric between the UK and the US since the 1960s and intensified during the Thatcher and Reagan administration (for example, via Urban Development Action Grants and Enterprise Zones), could not deny their significantly different styles of state intervention into the free market (Gaffkin and Warf, 1993). The public-private partnership, demanded by the entrepreneurial urbanism theory, also found different manifestations between the two countries. Drawing upon the research of Manchester's Olympic bid, Cochrane *et al.* (1996, pp. 1331) claimed that the locally based 'grant coalition' in the UK was not a US-style 'growth coalition' because, 'more often than not, the business elite is spending (or seeking to spend) public money not private money, bidding for grants rather than boosting for growth' (Ibid., pp. 1333). Furthermore, although the partnership was not foreign to the post-war UK (Kefford, 2020), it never reached an acknowledged level of independence from the government in British history (Davies, 2003).

In brief, the actually existing transition from Keynesianism to post-Keynesianism across the Atlantic was more variant and contested than Harvey's 'entrepreneurial urbanism' could suggest. At least the relationship between capital accumulation and class struggle, which buttresses Harvey's theory of entrepreneurial urbanism, appeared more contingent than necessary. The institutional parameters remained different both before and after this transition (see Table 2.3).

However, this narrative cannot go further to conflate a ‘space-in-itself’ and a ‘space-for-itself’ (Lipietz, 1994), which was against the conceptualisation of urbanisation as an open process, and that of cities as active agents (Harvey, 1989a, pp. 5; Cox and Mair, 1991; Jessop, 1998, pp. 89). As *per* Jessop’s (1998a, pp. 89) interpretation of Lipietz, a space-in-itself requires a ‘hegemonic bloc’ and a state to become a space-for-itself. To distinguish between these two is to probe the extent to which a clear accumulation strategy is formulated and to which this strategy has become hegemonic for the city and its region. In this view, neither the municipal government nor unelected authorities or their partnership and networking, in the UK or US, suffice to represent the agency of the city. The city and the urban process has to be interpreted both locally and globally, both here and elsewhere.

Talking similar talks

Despite all the evident variation in entrepreneurial urban governing transition, the increasingly global phenomenon of unelected business involvement in city governance that was often facing fiscal risks and competitive threats has fed into the polishing and advancement instead of deviation from the entrepreneurial urbanism approach. A significant part of the methodological and epistemological development was achieved by selectively fusing other literature. Notably, it was hard to imagine the coining of the *entrepreneurial cities* without exchanging ideas with the *urban regime* and *state rescaling* literature.

The *urban regime* approach provides a handy tool for identifying, accessing and researching ‘urban elites’, the often-implicit research subjects of *entrepreneurial urbanism* methodology (see Chapter 3). That is to say, for instance, although Harvey’s (1989a) account of entrepreneurial urbanism referred to the ‘opening vignette’ of an urban leadership colloquium held in Orléan in 1985 represented by eight North Atlantic cities⁶ (Bouinot with Lovi, 1987, cited in Harvey, 1989a, pp.4 and Peck, 2017a, pp. 6), he did not suggest a research methodology of direct engagement with the academics, businessmen, and policymakers participating in the conference. Meanwhile, in the research of structural coherence of ‘entrepreneurial cities’, Jessop and Sum (2000, pp. 2291) explicitly referenced an *urban regime* approach, which involves starting with political structures and city politicians and then moving to ‘a wider range of actors’ (quoted in the opening of this Chapter).

⁶ The participating cities include Brussels, Lausanne, Montréal, Munster, New Orleans, Orléans, St. Louis, and Sheffield (Bouinot with Lovi, 1987, cited in Peck, 2017a, pp. 27).

Rooted in the discipline of urban politics study in the US, urban regime analysis was born with the focal point on the informal (and formal) collaboration between (elected) public and (unelected) private agencies as necessary governing arrangements to mobilise collective action for local (economic) development (Mollenkopf, 1983; Mossberger, 2009). Undergirding the urban regime approach is a recognition of the fragmented authority and independence between the policymaking capacity of popularly elected public institutions and the wealth-generating resources of the market economy. Regimes, best embodied in the action of a relatively stable governing coalition or networking of elites, negotiate between the demands of electoral politics and forces of capital (Fainstein, S.S. and Fainstein, N.I., 1983a; Fainstein, N.I. and Fainstein, S.S., 1983; Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1989, 1993; Leiner, 1992).

In the fusion with the methodology of the urban regime, the *entrepreneurial cities* approach allowed a more granular analysis of the formulation and management of concrete (entrepreneurial) urban policies by considering the internal power relations within the coalitions between elected and non-elected local elites. In doing so, the approach was equipped with strengthened explanatory leverage into the public-private partnership highlighted by Harvey's account of entrepreneurial urbanism. Meanwhile, the *entrepreneurial cities* approach did not sacrifice the 'synthetic statement' (Harvey, 2009) of *entrepreneurial urbanism theory* when explaining the cross-coalition differences. Instead, it situated these differences in the uneven distribution of power within the coalitions and uneven distribution of benefits from coalition-based urban initiatives. For instance, Peck (1995) argued that intra-coalition power distribution between urban elites was not even commensurate with the range of interests they were supposed to represent. Also, even if the composition, orientation and objectives of entrepreneurial coalitions were still (significantly) shaped by the cultural, social and political characteristics of the locality, such as the vital role played by the local authorities in the UK in contrast to business-led ones in the US (Ward, 1996, 1997, 2000, 2003), coalitions typically made 'value-free' commitments to mobilise popular support for implementing the scheme, under a general pressure to achieve visible concrete policy results with a limited time span (Robson, 1989).

The strand of 'rescaling the state' (Jessop, 2002a; Brenner, 2004a; Jessop and Sum, 2006; Peck, 2002, 2003) literature, together with the 'third-generation' regulation theorists (Jones, 1997, 2001; Macleod, 1997, 2001) augmented the *entrepreneurial urbanism approach* by going beyond the implicit local vis-à-vis national dichotomy and examining the diverse and reflective scalar politics. Entrepreneurial urban governance was seen as a historical moment when the compromise of class interests was reached and sustained at the city (instead of state) scale via

negotiation of different social entities capable of ‘jumping scales’ vertically and horizontally (Uitermark, 2002, pp. 747, cf. Lipietz, 1992; Smith, 1993; Brenner, 1998a, 1998b; Swyngedouw, 1997). The entrepreneurial urban policy came out at the critical conjuncture of the crisis of Keynesian national spatio-temporal fix for globalising capitalism on the one hand, and the response by local governments to encourage innovation and financial speculation on the other (Jessop, 2000; Brenner, 2004a).

Moreover, drawing upon the concept of scale, the *entrepreneurial cities* approach ushered the concept of ‘glurbanisation’ (Jessop and Sum, 2000) to bring to the fore the analytical differences between city-level strategies and the firm-level strategies of ‘glocalisation’ lurking Harvey’s account of urban entrepreneurialism (see Table 2.4). In this regard, the entrepreneurial city is only defined according to its enduring and strategic innovation to enhance its structural competitiveness, rather than the zero-sum attempts to secure the reallocation of existing resources at the expense of other localities.

Table 2.4 ‘Glurbanisation’ versus ‘Glocalisation’

	‘Glurbanisation’	‘Glocalisation’
Strategic actors	Cities (perhaps as national champions)	Firms (perhaps in strategic alliances)
Strategies	Place- and space-based strategies	Firm- or sector-based strategies
New scales of activities and temporalities	Create local differences to capture flows and embed mobile capital	Develop new forms of scalar and spatial division of labour
Chronotopic governance	Re-articulate time and space for structural or systemic competitive advantages	Re-articulate global and local for dynamic competitive advantages

Source: Jessop and Sum (2000, pp. 2296).

Taken overall, an emerging consensus concerning the post-Cold-War research of urban governance in North Atlantic cities is that urban politics is being depoliticised (Swyngedouw, 2007; Davidson, 2013; MaCann, 2017). The rise of neoliberal governmentality makes obsolete those debates, disagreements, and dissensions once inherent to urban policymaking. Even with continuous and sometimes foreseeable failures, competition-based and growth-oriented urban policies remain the only possible and sensible option, to the extent that suggesting any alternative seems to be ‘talking another language’ (Davidson, 2013, pp. 154). More cynically, our understandings of urban development did not deny but instead factor in the contradiction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’. That is, we progress illogical actions as if we do not understand their outcome by claiming they are ‘a lot more effective and, moreover, protected by law.’ (Žižek,

1989, pp. 29-30)

This is not to say, of course, that the latest changes in the modes of governance were left unattended. A series of recent studies have furthered a Schumpeterian interpretation of urban entrepreneurship. For instance, Lauermann (2018) argues that the diversifying (Goldman, 2011; Raco and Street, 2012; Gibbs *et al.*, 2013; March and Ribera-Fumaz, 2014), experimental (Karvonen and Van Heur, 2014; Roy and Ong, 2011) and globally diplomatic (Acuto, 2013a, 2013b) urban agendas are moving beyond growth and becoming actually entrepreneurial. The entrepreneurial city is becoming a 'home terrain for an extraterritorial and globally ambitious municipal state' from the original 'territorially bounded growth machine'; the municipal state, by the same token, is 'the vanguard agent of global governance' rather than 'being sieged by the neoliberal economy' (Lauermann, 2018, pp. 207-208). Building on this is Phelps and Miao's (2020) analytical and normative classification of 'new urban managerialism', 'urban diplomacy', 'urban intrapreneurialism' and 'urban speculation', each denoting the 'varieties of urban entrepreneurialism.' This typology does not exhaust existing varieties but instead trivialise some essential processes of 'hyper-entrepreneurialism' (Wilson, 2017) as 'urban entrepreneurialism 2.0' (He, 2020), particularly the diverse forms of financialisation (Weber, 2010; Fields, 2015; O'Neill, 2019) driven by crisis and austerity (Davidson and Ward, 2014; Peck, 2014b). As the financialised urban governance proliferates, hybridises and mutates to an unprecedented degree, some alternative concepts such as statecraft are also being suggested (see Pike *et al.*, 2019).

In general, recent decades have witnessed a theoretical convergence as regards the development of entrepreneurial urbanism (focusing on global north cities), despite seemingly disparate and divergent empirical observations. As Cox (1991, pp. 279) has presciently argued, 'there is something seductively commonsensical about prevailing concepts of capital in the new urban politics', that is, capital seems to be causally defined by exchange, competition and distributional struggle, while 'class struggle appears as an occasional, even rare, event which only temporarily disturbs the smooth reproduction of social relations' (Ibid). As the class issue gradually loses the centre stage of urban politics to identity topic (Fukuyama, 2018), the critical implication inherent to the theory of urban entrepreneurialism becomes unprecedentedly irreverent. In contrast, entrepreneurship is re-depoliticised, regaining the potential to benefit the many rather than the few, as the only possible option towards an updated theoretical engagement with renewed practice. The rediscovery of urban politics cast its hope to 'returning to the ancient premises of democracy (à la Rancière) or coming up with a new theory of everything (à la Žižek)' (Davidson, 2016, pp. 156). However, we are yet to see any

substantive countermovement.

That does not imply, however, that little methodological progress has been made after Harvey's seminal work. Quite the opposite, the study of (entrepreneurial) urban governance has never enjoyed the abundance of research materials and methods more. Taken overall, this brief review has sought to demonstrate the way in which urban entrepreneurialism has ushered in a whole range of changes in the way in which the city operates at all levels, changes that can only be comprehended with reference to the changing nature of the social, economic and political processes that are operating at both the global and local level. The research now turns to the theoretical transfer to, and mutations in, China.

2.4 Theoretical transfer to China

It was not until the turning of the new millennium, when Jessop and Sum (2000) applied the entrepreneurial city approach to Hong Kong, that mainland Chinese cities started to join the debate of entrepreneurial urbanism (e.g. Olds, 1995; Haila, 1999; Wu, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2003). Given the abundant evidence that Chinese cities had been learning and adapting urban policies from their North Atlantic counterparts (often via the second pass of 'Asian Tigers') since the mid-1980s, e.g. the creation of physical and regulatory special economic zones, erection of industrial parks, tax relief and exemption to foreign-invested enterprises, and setup of urban land development corporations (Wu, 2003; also see Chapter 4), the late engagement with entrepreneurial urbanism theory *per se* warrants examination. Once begun, however, the follow-up literature proliferated faster than those on North Atlantic cities, bearing witness to the unprecedentedly rapid urban transformation of China.

With the apparent institutional difference on the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean, applying entrepreneurial urbanism theory in China cannot bypass the following challenges: (i) on what basis could the theory be applied in China? (ii) to what extent did the entrepreneurial endeavours of Chinese cities add up to entrepreneurial cities? (iii) were hegemonic urban blocs or regimes necessary for an entrepreneurial city observable in China? (iv) would the theory stand up to an interrogation of the rapid change underway in the governance of the urban economic and institutional environment? The answer to these questions steered the analysis of this strand of literature.

The analysis in this section divides the theoretical development of entrepreneurial urbanism into two phases, punctured by the financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath. It will be presented

as the study of Chinese entrepreneurial urbanism embarked from a comparison to post-socialist cities before a reference to neoliberal cities, echoing a changing narrative from ‘being Chinese cities’ to ‘becoming Chinese cities’ (cf. Wu, 2003; He and Wu, 2009; Wu, 2017).

Being Chinese cities

The application of entrepreneurial urbanism theory in China since the new millennium rested upon the appreciation that marketization, decentralised state and multinational companies-driven globalisation would be the new norms of the 21st century. Without this, it would be hard to explain why China readily became the 143rd member of the World Trade Organisation in 2001 when the memory of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 was still fresh. Prior to that, nevertheless, China was haunted by the question of ‘how long can the red flag carry on’ till the end of the 20th century, following the dramatic collapse of the Berlin Wall and the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama, 1992) in 1989, the same year Harvey’s influential paper got published.

For China’s affinity to the Eastern Bloc, the concept of ‘post-socialism’ (Andrusz *et al.*, 1996; Pickles and Smith, 1998; Herrschel, 1998; Young and Kaczmarek, 1999) loomed large in the research of post-1989 Chinese city governance transition, then a discipline in the bud (Wu, 2003; Gu, Wei, and Cook, 2015). This partially explained that the arguably earliest explicit applications of the entrepreneurial urbanism theory to China happened until 2003. In this article, Wu (2003) caricatured Shanghai as a post-socialist entrepreneurial city, suggesting that the concept of ‘entrepreneurial city’ offered an opportunity to bridge the gap between ‘Los Angeles to Shanghai’ (Robinson 2011; cf. Wu 2016b). In other words, an ‘entrepreneurial city’ with ‘glurbanisation’ strategies are defined in such a way that a constructive comparison can be made between cities under the different broader transition of regimes, i.e. the transition from the Keynesian welfare national state (KWNS) to the Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime (SWPR), and likewise the transition from socialism to post-socialism. From the perspective of the ‘entrepreneurial city’, the numerous dissimilarities between Keynesian Fordism and Soviet Socialism (see Table 2.5), and those between their respective successors (see Table 2.6), were secondary to their common nature of ‘crisis management’. Both regime changes were searching for ‘new institutional structures of regulation that suit the new accumulation regime’ (Hausner *et al.*, 1995; Smith and Swain, 1998, Wu, 2003, pp. 1679). Since any ‘glurbanisation’ strategy, unlike a spontaneous ‘glocalisation’, entailed a hegemonic bloc and a state (Lipietz, 1994; Jessop, 1998a), the ‘hollowing out of the state’ (Jessop, 1998b) in North Atlantic countries and state marketisation in China (Wu, 2003) were two facades of one globalisation process of reterritorialization and rescaling (Brenner, 1999), where the state still

had an implicit or explicit role to play.

Table 2.5 State Socialism vs. Keynesian Fordism

	Soviet Socialism	Keynesian Fordism
Crisis-driven	Cold war confrontation and the urgency of industrialisation to boom national defence capacity	Over-accumulation
Accumulation method	Extensive forms of accumulation	Intensification of labour processes
Accumulation operation	Planning and economic demand	Mass production leads to the intensification of production via market
Interventionist ideology	Comprehensive economic planning achieve efficiency	Deficiency of effective demand
Interventionist method	Work unit system Authoritative government organs State-owned enterprises (SOEs)	Government-led investment on infrastructure, social welfare, and military expenditure

Source: compiled by the author from Kornai (1980), Smith and Swain (1998) and Wu (2003).

Recall that Harvey (2005) bracketed post-1979 China into the brief history of neoliberalism, and neoliberal urbanism became the end-saturation stage of entrepreneurial urbanism (Peck, 2014a). An updated comparison between emerging neoliberal urbanism in China as against the ‘actually-existing neoliberal cities’ in developed capitalist economies (He and Wu, 2009; Wu, 2010) seemed an unrewarding project. If that were the case, China should not be a ‘strange case’ of Harvey’s (2005, pp. 34-41) neoliberal template for the ‘state authoritarian centralized control’ in the first place. Authoritarian control was anything but incompatible with neoliberalism because the latter was nothing but a particular, mobile technology of governing ‘free subjects’ (Ong, 2007, pp.4). In fact, it was the (still) mysterious cloud surrounding the ‘strange Chinese case’ that drove the alternative theorisation of transformative neoliberalisation in China; this arguably represented one of the many possible paths towards a ‘market society’ (Polanyi, 1944, cited in Wu, 2008, 2010).

In fairness, the additional theoretical and empirical contribution of this comparison lay less in suggesting another variant of the ‘dull compulsion of interurban competition’ (Peck, 2014a, pp. 399), but the conspicuous absence of (post-)socialism. In other words, it was no longer an important question as to ‘whether the hybrid system for the Chinese economy could be properly described as a post-socialist economy.’ (Wu, 2003, pp. 1680). Emerging Chinese cities in the 21st century were barely nostalgic for the ‘communist neo-traditionalist’ (Wu, 2008, pp. 1094) past, but became increasingly interested in aligning themselves with their Western

counterparts. The growth-first strategy, the transfer of the responsibility for welfare provision onto the market, and the city-branding & promotion in China all resonated with the ‘West’ (see Table 2.6).

Table 2.6 Neoliberalism in the ‘West’ vs. neoliberalisation in China

	West	China
Growth-first strategy	Overriding objectives of economic development	State-engineered property development-spearheaded accumulation
Social welfare and infrastructure provision	‘Roll-back’ welfare state, privatisation, and intensifying competition for resources	Ending of benevolent state, relinquishing the ultimate responsibility of ‘looking after’ society, dismantling work unit-based welfare system; introducing private investment
Urban policy	Capital subsidies, place promotion, supply-side intervention, central-city makeovers, and local boosterism	The local state starts to implement capital subsidies, place promotion, supply-side intervention, and local boosterism.
State-market interaction	Pervasive naturalization of market logic; urban policy resonates with competitive markets.	A mixture of market logic and state authority logic, state intervention supplements the pre-mature market.
Urban (re)development path	Privileging lean government, privatization, and deregulation; undermining or foreclosing alternative paths of urban development	Still powerful state; partially fulfilled privatization and deregulation; selectively deployed social redistribution and public investment

Source: Compiled by the author from Wu (2008), He and Wu (2009), Wu (2010) and Peck and Tickell (2002)

Over-stressing China’s deviance from the neoliberalism doctrine did little to strengthen the ‘causal’ power of neoliberalism theory and instead risked weakening its capacity to inspire ‘hermeneutic’ (cf. Jessop, 2005) analysis of ‘essential contradictions’ (Wu, 2010, pp. 6279) inherent in the neoliberalisation process *per se*. By reviewing the political-economic origin of China’s market-reorientation, Wu (2008, pp. 1094; 2010, pp. 628) argued that ‘there is no alternative’ space for accumulation after the previous state-led extensive industrialisation reached crisis proportions by the late 1970s.

Becoming Chinese cities

The financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath constituted a wake-up call for the neoliberalising world and counterintuitively pressed a speed-up button for the urbanisation of China. By consuming 40 per cent more cement between 2011 and 2013 than the United States had in the entire twentieth century, China saved capitalism after the 2008 crash (Harvey, 2016). Whether or not this was because of the seemingly unprecedented urgent need for an alternative way

forward, the debate about a potential ‘Chinese model’ resonated with the likely end of *Pax Americana*. A growing consensus was that we should neither attempt to ‘hammer Chinese empirical pegs into Western theoretical holes’ (Saich, 2002; cf Ang, 2016) nor retreat into ‘atheoretical, *sui generis* China exceptionalism’ (Peck and Zhang, 2013, pp. 365).

Beyond that, a methodological bifurcation continues. On the one end of the spectrum is the (neo-)cosmopolitanist argument that ‘there is no single development strategy or set of institutions that have to be adopted everywhere to foster’ economic growth (Whyte, 2009, pp. 388). On the other end is the vocal critique against ‘methodological nationalism’ lurking underneath those state-centric interpretations of Chinese urban development (see Pow, 2011; Wimmer and Glick-Schiller, 2002). Somewhere in-between, and frustrated by China’s oscillations between market-led and state-led development, ‘oxymoronic formulations’ (Peck and Zhang, 2013) like ‘neoliberal developmentalism’ (Ji, 2006), ‘state neoliberalism’ (Chu and So, 2010), ‘market socialism’ and ‘state capitalism’ (Economist, 2012) receive growing resort.

The conundrum of conceptually categorizing China applied not only to the macroeconomic-cum-institutional framework like ‘variety of capitalism’ (Peck and Zhang, 2013; Zhang and Peck, 2016) but also to the urban theory of entrepreneurial urbanism. Li and Chiu (2018, pp. 688) argue that public-private partnership in China was about ‘local state dominating market operation for its own economic and political gain’, and nothing similar to that was denoted by ‘the urban entrepreneurialism thesis.’ Instead, they (Li and Chiu, 2020) opt for state rescaling as a better explanatory framework, hinting that the state in the West and China is more comparable to each other than their cities. In addition, He (2020) argues that urban entrepreneurialism is turning towards a ‘2.0’ version of ‘financialisation, cross-scale dynamics, and post-political governance’. Meanwhile, existing empirical research has continued referring to the theory for understanding the creation and restructuring of public-private partnerships and urban development corporations (Jiang and Waley, 2018), the rise (and fall) of land-value-centred (re)development (cf. Wu, 2003; Qian, 2011; Su, 2015; Xie, 2020), the inclusion (and exclusion) of non-governmental and community groups in the decision-making process (Liu and Yau, 2020), and the profound effect of codifying inter-local competition (and diplomacy) in schemes initiated by regional, national or international organisations (cf. Chien and Wu, 2011; Chien, 2013; Wu, 2016a; Guo, 2020).

Out of the methodological swamp and renewed attention paid to ‘Chinese characteristics’ of urbanism came the coining of ‘state entrepreneurialism’ (Wu, 2016b, 2017, 2020). This term presented the governance of urbanism in China as an alternative governance option to the

neoliberal growth machine, a post-socialist or neoliberal variant of governance in the author's earlier writing. Drawing upon the reconciliation of planning centrality and market instruments – two seemingly contradictory tendencies in neoliberal economies – in China's urbanisation process, this concept attempts to build an independent framework in dialogue with the orthodox entrepreneurial urbanism theory (see Table 2.7). The coexisting ideological pragmatism, state dominance and urban informality formed the explanatory cornerstones for explaining the unique and hybrid urban transformation in China. By definition, 'state entrepreneurialism' refers to state engagement with the market in such an entrepreneurial manner that market instruments are employed under central planning in order to deliver economic growth and fundamentally legitimise the state power. In order to understand this process, it must be taken as a methodological point of departure that 'the state's planning power, its persistent land tenure and control over rural-urban mobility supersedes the market and dictates the direction and pace of urban growth in Chinese cities' (Hsing, 2010, pp. 7). The difference between 'state entrepreneurialism' and 'urban entrepreneurialism' is nuanced, central to which is whether or not the state has the capacity to contain the tension between 'planning' and 'market'.

Table 2.7 Urban entrepreneurialism vs. state entrepreneurialism

	Urban entrepreneurialism	State entrepreneurialism
Regulatory Crisis	Failure of Ford-Keynesianism	Failure of rigid planning economy
State Rescaling	Internationally and locally	Vertically and horizontally
Spatial fix rationale	Free market dominance	Planning centrality and market instrument
Regulatory scale	Built-up city	Urbanising administrative city
Planning rationale	Fixing externality	Planning for growth
Governance limit	Growth potential of market tools	State compromise to non-state agencies
Growth Aim	Capital accumulation	Maintaining state power
Municipal Financial emergency Dealing	Bankruptcy	Risk shirking and sharing

Source: Compiled from Wu (2003, 2008, 2010, 2016, 2017, 2019), Lim (2017) and Peck (2016).

In addition to reiterating the necessity of state engineering in the making of the entrepreneurial governance in China, the coining of 'state entrepreneurialism' promoted a renewed interpretation of Chinese city governance by rethinking two fundamental issues as follows. First, what defines a Chinese city? Traditionally, a short answer to this is that a Chinese city (*shi*) is, first of all, a subdivision of a state-administrative territory rather than a functionally integrated economic unit. An administrative city often includes both an urbanised core (high-

density built-up area) and extensive rural areas, the latter of which were primarily agricultural but with occasional towns (*zhen*), making it closer to a city-region in the Western sense. The urban core, together with some peripheral areas, is administratively divided into ‘city districts’ (*shiqu*) and the surrounding rural areas (with towns) into counties (*xian*) (see Chan, 2007). Simply put, the administrative boundary of Chinese cities does not dovetail with, but is generally administering a larger area than, the actual commuting zone for the urban core (despite some exceptions of megacities). Layered upon this understanding was Hsing’s (2010) territorial reading of ‘urbanisation of state’ dynamics in China. It highlights the (not unchangeable) jurisdictional boundary of a *shi* as the critical setting for the manoeuvre of state power via the agent of the local state. The jurisdiction does not determine the exercise of power, but it shapes and is shaped by the politics of accumulation and legitimation in the place’ (Ibid, pp. 12). Within the jurisdictional boundary, the local state governance of a metropolitan area has a dominant role in legitimating claims over the land, which has dominated China’s politics of accumulation and distribution in the post-Mao era and particularly since the 1990s (Ibid, p. 5). Meanwhile, intra-metropolitan parameters are mediated by the highly hierarchical state structure; this mandates the scale and scope of local state power directly to the level of bureaucratic rank and a jurisdictional boundary. Any local cadres’ territorial ambitions ‘that may exceed their jurisdictional rank and boundaries, must be affirmed and legitimised by adjusting ranks and redrawing boundaries through annexation, mergers, and detachment’ (Ibid, pp.12). On top of these understandings, the contribution of state entrepreneurialism on this issue suggests that the Chinese state ‘planned’ the urbanisation to develop ‘industrial capacities’ (Wu, 2017, pp. 3) in which the land-centric local accumulation was a means to achieve this end.

Second, what motivates Chinese cities to be enterprising? Previously, there were two main explanations: drawing upon the subjective will of local cadres to get personal promotion, and the objective restriction on local public finance that drives local governments to look for alternative sources of financial income. The first explanation argues there existed a GDP-oriented cadre evaluation system in the Chinese party-state so that those who aim for a higher position in the office have to meet the GDP growth target ‘subcontracted’ by higher-tier government and outperform their peers (Li and Zhou, 2005). The second explanation resorts to fiscal austerity brought by the *tax-sharing reform* of 1994, which significantly weakened the capacity of local finance and created a sudden gap between public expenditure demand and revenue at the local level (Sun and Zhou, 2013). Granted that local governments in China lacked financial tools such as municipal bonds or property tax, the monopolistic control over the supply of developmental land allowed local governments to generate extra-budgetary revenues from land appreciation (Cheung, 2014). The ‘state entrepreneurialism’, building upon

those explanations, suggests that the formulation and management of (economic and spatial) planning allowed Chinese cities to be *de jure* entrepreneurial cities that not only focus on short-term GDP growth but also structural competitiveness (Wu, 2017, 2003).

In a nutshell, the entrepreneurial urbanism approach not only transferred to, but also mutated in, China. An emerging consensus of this strand of literature is that reading entrepreneurial cities in China necessitates an alternative theorisation of the accumulating crisis-induced state rescaling on the one hand, and a continuing investigation of localised institutional and organisational innovations (e.g. urban investment and development corporations and public-private partnerships) on the other. This highlights the value of a state-centric analysis without treating nation/state as the ‘natural unit’ and thus falling victim to ‘methodological nationalism’ (Taylor, 1996; Wimmer and Glick-Schiller, 2002; Pow, 2011). It also points to the possibility of unfettering the theory of entrepreneurial urbanism from North Atlantic ethnocentrism without compromising its explanatory power. I now turn to the principal explanatory contributions of the entrepreneurial urbanism approach.

2.5 The principal contribution

Entrepreneurial urbanism theory makes three principal contributions to theorising urban governance by foregrounding the role of inter-city competition, urban entrepreneurship, and public-private partnerships in the governance of cities. Individually, each constituent sensitises research to the particular capacity of some cities to respond to and, in some cases, resist external economic-cum-political gravity. Combined, they present granular and more explanatorily advanced insights into the contribution made by urban actors to the formulation of entrepreneurial ‘strategies, actions and discourse’ and management of the development process.

Inter-urban competition

Indeed, to the degree that inter-urban competition becomes more potent, it will almost certainly operate as an ‘external coercive power’ over individual cities to bring them closer into line with the discipline and logic of capitalist development.

Given the right circumstances, however, urban entrepreneurialism and even inter-urban competition may open the way to a non-zero-sum pattern of development. This kind of activity has certainly played a key role in capitalist development in the past. And it is an open

question as to whether or not it could lead towards progressive and socialist transitions in the future (Harvey, 1989a, pp. 5).

Entrepreneurial urbanism theory emphasises inter-city competition as the entry point for understanding contemporary urban policies. As mentioned previously, inter-urban competition in the early 1980s was the norm for cities in the US, a shock for those in the UK, and an alien concept for the then limited number of cities in China. However, cities in all three countries today have been familiarised with a competitive rhetoric and policy repertoire. There is no denying that this ‘external coercive force’ caused by ‘reduction in spatial barriers to the movement of goods, people, money and information’ has brought cities ‘closer into line with the discipline and logic of capitalist development’ (Harvey, 1989a, pp. 10). Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how inter-urban competition may contribute to a progressive transition in the future.

On the one hand, there is a widely circulated concern that ‘hyper-mobile’ (Swyngedow, 1989) multinational capital became more discriminating and sensitive to ‘small variations’ (Wood, 1998, pp. 121). Consequently, the ‘beggar-thy-neighbour competition’ (Peck, 2017a, pp. 6) is the ‘only game in town’ and ‘tends to yield pragmatic imitation rather than path-altering innovation’ (Peck, 2014a, pp. 398). On the other hand, cities of footless capital vis-à-vis immobile labour can be a highly exaggerated and ‘underspatialised’ imagining of globalisation (Cox, 2002, pp. 337-348). Actually-existing inter-urban competition necessitates a space, a scale, and is rarely unregulated or uncoordinated. Counter-trends of regionwide cooperation, interlocal policy coordination and interscalar management have always been flanking and mediating the inter-city competition (Brenner, 2002, 2003, 2004; cf. Florida, 1995; Moran, 1997; Amin, 1999, Scott, 2001). At least it would be of help to notice that inter-city ‘diplomacy’ (Lauermann, 2018) is not the opposite but an integral part of the competition.

Analytically, it would be helpful (albeit difficult) to further distinguish between *strong* competition and *weak* competition (Cox, 1995). Here, the former refers to potentially positive-sum attempts to improve the overall (structural) competitiveness of a locality through innovation, while the latter refers to what are essentially zero-sum attempts to secure the reallocation of existing resources at the expense of other localities. Likewise, a contrast between static *comparative* advantages and *dynamic* competitive advantages (Jessop, 1998a, italics by the author) could also be beneficial to separate the ‘uncommon sense’ from ‘dull compulsion’ (Peck, 2014). In this comparison, the former speaks of the Ricardian discourse of comparative advantages built upon broader social conditions, such as cheap wage-labour, while the latter speaks of the

structural or systematic competition achieved through, and resulting in, enduring innovation (Table 2.8).

In China, inter-urban competition has witnessed tremendous economic take-off along with a ‘race to the bottom’ of environmental and labour standards (Rudra, 2008, cf. He, Huang and Wang, 2014). However, what remains underexplored is how (the dark side of) inter-city competition is dynamically mediated, contained, codified and potentially alleviated through ‘deliberate design, institutional learning and chance discoveries’ (Brenner, 2003, pp. 316).

Table 2.8 Static vs. dynamic competitive advantages

Type	Static competitive advantages	Dynamic competitive advantages
Base	‘Natural’ factor endowments	Socially created and socially transformed
Strategies	Enhance the overall efficiency of resource allocation	‘New combinations’ or innovation
Products	Primary products and standardized manufactured goods or services	Customized goods or service
Sustainability	Hard to sustain	Evolve to sustain
Period	Short-term	Long-term
Typical urban strategies	Attract inward investment from mobile capital at the expense of other places through such measures as tax breaks, subsidies, and regulatory undercutting and/or simple, civic boosterist image-building	Introduce economic, political, and social innovations to enhance productivity and other conditions affecting the structural and/or systemic competitiveness of both local and mobile capital; Build a socially dense, ‘institutionally thick’ space for economic reflexivity and the flexible pooling of risks and uncertainties in a turbulent national, regional, and global environment

Source: compiled from Jessop (1998).

Urban entrepreneurship

At this, the saturation stage of entrepreneurial urbanism, what is remarkable is how utterly unremarkable these competitive manoeuvres have become... Life on the neoliberal plateau is dominated by the prosaic churn of routinized, ‘everyday’ entrepreneurialisms (Peck, 2014, pp. 397).

Despite rising localities, the city itself is not an actor. There has not been a shift of power from the state to the ‘urban’ elites in China. Local officials who demonstrate entrepreneurial behaviour are a constituent of the state apparatus (Wu, 2017, pp. 13).

A proper understanding of entrepreneurship has been at the frontline of developing entrepreneurial urbanism theory (see Table 2.9). Drawing upon the analogy built between an entrepreneurial city and a Schumpeterian (1934) enterprise, the entrepreneurial city approach provides a renewed topology of urban entrepreneurship at a lower level of abstraction (Wood, 1998). It paves an accessible pathway for further studies of entrepreneurial governance once on ‘theoretically and empirically impoverished grounds’ (Hall and Hubbard, 1996).

Table 2.9 Urban entrepreneurship in evolution

Urban entrepreneurialism	Entrepreneurial city	Neoliberal/late-entrepreneurial urbanism	State entrepreneurialism
Three characteristics & Four strategies	Three elements & Five fields	US-style	Emerging Chinese cities
Public-private partnership (PPP)	Strategy	Entrepreneurial exhaustion	State dominance for legitimacy
PPP is speculative (often in which the public sector assumes the risk and the private sector takes the benefits)	Fashion	Slow growth	Planning beyond growth
	Discourse	Lean government	Land finance and financialisation
	New urban place/space	Fiscal federalism	Hybrid governance
Place-based rather than territory-based political economy	New methods of space/place production	Austerity urbanism	Urban/rural dualism
	New markets of urban living	Bondholder value	Strategic informality
	New sources of supply (funds)	Debt machinery	
Explore advantages for production within the international division of labour	Redefining the urban position	Technocratic rule	
		Municipal Calvinism	
Improve the position of the city within the spatial division of consumption		Metropolitan Caesarism	
Struggle for of key control and command functions			
Compete for funds from central government			

Source: compiled from Harvey (1989a), Wood (1998), Jessop (1997, 1998a), Jessop and Sum (2000), Peck (2017a), Wu (2016, 2017, 2019, 2020).

Nevertheless, the extent to which a city is analogous to a firm always requires scrutiny, particularly with Harvey’s (1989a) warning that cities should not be treated as dynamic agents when they are ‘mere things’. On this issue, Jessop moved to ‘a higher level of abstraction than that occupied by Harvey’ (Ward, 2003, pp. 118) by highlighting that (i) entrepreneurship does

not guarantee capital accumulation nor necessarily incur economic risk; and (ii) an entrepreneurial city entails collective action but is not confined to a specific style. First, entrepreneurship in the Schumpeterian sense is defined by creating above-average profit opportunities through new ways. Moreover, the economic risk involved in entrepreneurship is a function of capital, not entrepreneurship *per se* (Schumpeter 1934, pp. 137, cited in Jessop 1998a, pp.85). Second, treating an entrepreneurial city as an agent requires the capacities built upon collective social arrangements irreducible to those of individual actors residing, or active, therein (Cox and Mair, 1991, pp. 204; Jessop, 1998a). However, entrepreneurial ‘bootstraps’ strategies need not be neo-liberal, but can be embedded with neo-corporatist, neo-statist or neo-communitarian form or content, so long as they are concerned with the creation of ‘new combinations of economic and/or extra-economic factors which will further urban and regional competitive advantage’ (Jessop, 1997a, pp. 31; 1998a, pp. 2).

Despite the seemingly broad spectrum of collective action an entrepreneurial city can potentially choose from, neoliberalism increasingly saturated the very narrow path of policy repertoires for US cities, even after the financial meltdown in 2008 (Peck, 2017a). Across the Pacific Ocean where ‘state entrepreneurialism’ is emerging from Chinese cities, urban entrepreneurship seems less driven or curbed by ideological motivation and more so by practical issues. Although the trajectory of urbanisation in Chinese cities does not resemble its North Atlantic counterparts, the common challenges of downturn growth, rising public debt, financialisation and technocratic governance offers such a conjuncture for a meaningful dialogue between the two.

Public-Private partnership

Therefore, urban entrepreneurialism emphasizes increasing the importance of business in local politics, and is by no means about local state dominating market operation for its own economic and political gain as mooted in the studies of Chinese cases (Li and Chiu, 2018, pp. 688).

(T)heir [Note: urban investment and development companies] ubiquitous involvement in China’s property-led process of urban transformation combined with their ambivalence as state companies operating along similar lines to private enterprises means that they can be seen as central players in a form of state corporatist urbanism (Jiang and Waley, 2018, pp. 596).

An outward-looking, growth-oriented public-private partnership has been the central notion of entrepreneurial urbanism (Harvey, 1989a, pp. 6), seeing it as a necessary result of the post-

Fordist urban governance transition. Any analysis of collective entrepreneurial actions today would be incomplete without an inquiry into the functioning of the formal or informal partnerships and networks between urban elites (see Raco, 1998). Within a post-Fordist transition of North Atlantic countries, underpinning the establishment of various partnerships at the blurred boundary between public and private sectors was an emerging consensus among the elites to pragmatically ‘get things done’ rather than ‘playing at politics and fighting the government’ (Quilley, 1999, pp. 199; cf. Hall and Hubbard, 1996, 1998). Within a post-Socialist transition of China, the reworking of partnerships had its structural root in the interwoven triad of marketisation, globalisation and decentralisation (Wu, 2003; Wei, 2013).

As already mentioned (Section 2.3), the partnership’s lead agency distinguished the traditional US model from the UK model of partnership. The former was built upon private capital-led ‘growth coalition’ (Logan and Molotch, 1987), while the latter hinged on ‘grant coalitions’ instituted by the central government (Cochrane *et al.*, 1995). Accordingly, the research of US partnerships pivoted around the ‘regime theory’ proposed by political scientists, tracing the ‘informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together to be able to make and carry out governing decision’ (Stone, 1989, pp. 6). The urban-regime approach emphasises the bridge between the state and market because the ‘state lacks direct control over the economic activities it seeks to influence’ (Elkin, 1987; Haughton and While, 1999). In the UK, however, research into partnerships has foregrounded the partnerships and quangos institutions, i.e. urban development corporations (UDCs) and training and enterprise councils (TECs), in order to deliver neoliberal policies engineered by the post-Keynesian central government (Boyle and Hughes, 1994; MacLeod, 2002; Belina and Helms, 2003; Quilley, 1999; Haughton and While, 1999; Young and Lever, 1997).

For post-reform China, the North Atlantic idea of public-private partnership was initially introduced by foreign capital in the mid-1980s as a new type of politically neutral financing instrument that could ease local governments’ pressure of inadequate fiscal resources for funding infrastructure provision. For this practical reason, the existing PPP literature on China is primarily focused on the realm of infrastructure business financing and project management (e.g. Chan *et al.*, 2009; 2010; Chen, 2009; Ke *et al.*, 2009a, 2009b; Shen, Wang and Qiang, 2005). However, with its impact quickly spreading to other fields of regulation, PPP sparked a protracted debate about how to embed the existing partnership in the duplet relationship between domestic and foreign capital, government and market, and central and local government. Before the latest surge starting from 2014, the development of PPP projects in China can be divided into two phases, marked by the breakup with foreign capital following

the notice of the State Council in 2002. This notice culminated in the disagreement the Chinese local governments had with the fix or minimum return guarantee requested by foreign investors, and enforced the modification, or termination, of existing contracts of this kind. After that, the foreign investors lost confidence and domestic enterprises; in particular, the state-owned enterprises became the principal players in the second boom phase of PPP in China starting from the beginning of the 21st century (see Wang *et al.*, 2012).

Embedded in the evolving trajectory of urban governance in China, the Urban Investment and Development Company (UIDCs) has been an important institutional innovation driving the land development and infrastructure provision in China (Pan *et al.*, 2016; Li and Chiu, 2018; Jiang and Waley, 2018; Wu, 2019; Wu *et al.*, 2020). However, UIDCs did not receive much academic attention until the post-financial crisis age, when the mushrooming UIDCs channelled four-trillion stimulus packages (Pan, Zhang and Wu, 2020). Recent research on UIDCs by geographers has found it difficult to peg UIDCs to the pigeonhole of PPP (Wang *et al.*, 2012; Cheng *et al.*, 2018) let alone the theory of entrepreneurial urbanism based on North Atlantic experience. It has been argued that UIDCs were the financing and administrative arms for local governments (Chiu, 2018), or at best they represented an updated form of state corporatism (Jiang and Waley, 2018).

Whether or not the PPP rhetoric, and practice prevalent in Chinese cities, resembles that of North Atlantic cities, the causal explanation provided by the theory of entrepreneurial urbanism for the rising partnership (Table 2.2) is being revised by a new unfolding wave of history and geography. That is to say, if the insights gained from the conceptualisation and use of entrepreneurial urbanism theory are to continue to shed light on contemporary urban governance in China, they have to be understood as an integral part of an open-ended research approach that emphasises:

- (i) a sensitivity to competitive inter-city relation to link both local urban bloc and supralocal processes in the governance of urban economic development;
- (ii) an appreciation of the entrepreneurial city (e.g. Schumpeterian strategies, actions and discourses) formulation, evolution and reproduction; and
- (iii) an account of the historical and contemporary complexities involved in public-private partnership in Chinese urban governance;

2.6 Research issues in the entrepreneurial urbanism approach

Extending entrepreneurial urbanism theory

[T]he rise of entrepreneurial approaches to urban governance has been intertwined with a broader redifferentiation and rescaling of national state spaces (Brenner, 2003, pp. 214)

In tracing an arc from more abstract theory claims through to the specific circumstances of contemporary urban restructuring in the United States, the article sets the stage for the more granular and concrete analysis of 'late-entrepreneurial' Atlantic City (Peck, 2017a).

It has been 30 years since the first publication of entrepreneurial urbanism theory. Over the past three decades, there have been multiple attempts to extend its epistemological scope, methodological claims, and empirical findings, often drawing upon alternative approaches (see Table 2.1). A growing tendency in the existing literature is to take entrepreneurial urbanism theory as a middle-range theory between the grand state theories (e.g. regulation theory and neo-Gramscian state theory) on the one hand, and localised urban theories (e.g. urban regime theory and urban growth machine) on the other (cf. Peck, 2017). Compared with state-focused theory, entrepreneurial urbanism theory falls short of understanding the structural process of state formation (see Brenner 1998a; Sheppard and Barnes 1990; Harvey, 1999). Compared with the urban regime approach, entrepreneurial urbanism theory does not foreground the agency of urban elites making a difference and also lacks theoretical insights into the interior design of partnerships (see Ward, 1996). Out of the numerous attempts to extend entrepreneurial urbanism theory, three analytical elements have been continuously debated in the literature: temporality, spatiality, and scale.

The first issue of Harvey's theory of entrepreneurial urbanism is an implicit theory of time. That is, time serves as an underspecified proxy for capital accumulation. For Harvey (1989b, 1990), contemporary time consciousness is a social construct fundamentally shaped by the force of accelerating capital accumulation, which drives technological advancement of communication and transportation to overcome frictions of distance and finally *annihilate* space. This sense of *time-space compression* also means that capitalism is intrinsically unstable and can only get ephemeral *structured permanences* through compromise with the territorially based class alliance. In achieving this provisional stabilization with capital accumulation, however, the territorially based class alliance is simultaneously threatened by the disruptive force of capital. This is because some fractions of production capital 'can hardly afford to ignore the relative surplus-value to be garnered from moves to superior locations' (Harvey, 1982, pp. 421). *Qua* Harvey (1981, pp. 118, emphasis original), the waves of investment in the built environment

constitute an identifiable cycle of intermediate length ‘somewhere between the short-run movements of the business cycle - the *Juglar cycles* of approximately ten-year length - and the very long ‘Kondratieff’s.’

Despite the time-space compression suggesting a *diachronic* approach of temporality, Harvey’s presentation of entrepreneurial urbanism alludes to those in favour of a *synchronic* approach that cuts the continuum of history into slices of geography (cf. Kurtz, 2009, 2020). Otherwise, it is hard to explain why Harvey’s influential article is widely understood as a city-centric transition model from managerialist city government to entrepreneurial governance (see Peck, 2014, pp. 399). This approach to temporality tend to see ‘crisis’, if any, nothing but an insignificant moment that does not deserve special theoretical treatment since evolutionary capitalism never stops fixing itself. This notion is challenged by those who uphold a ‘punctured evolutionary perspective’ and emphasize the different pace of time-consciousness between crisis and equilibrium (Hay, 2002, pp. 135-165). Calling an episode a crisis also means the decisive moment in question requires critical choices and intervention. The state and government are most likely institutions for such decision making, but Harvey’s (1982, 1985a) crisis theory, epitomised by the three cuts, does not ‘offer a complete theory of the state. Jones and Ward (2004) therefore advocate a fourth theory of crisis, suggesting that the state, for it is not an ‘instrument of the interest of capital’ (Offe, 1984, pp. 51), has a certain capacity to intervene, internalise, and manage the contradiction of accumulation through state apparatus without necessarily worsening the situation into a legitimization crisis (Habermas, 1976). Drawing upon similar resources of thoughts, Jessop and Sum (2000, pp. 2310, 2006, pp. 271, 281) understand the rise of the entrepreneurial city as a ‘relativisation of scale’ in social-economic regulation in ‘the absence of a dominant nodal point in managing interscalar relations.’ Unlike *structured permanences*, they argued that territorial policymakers retained a scale-specific structural coherence by reflectively responding to disruptive changes, and the regulatory reconfiguration could only be triggered when changes (or crises) no longer ensure coherence at that specific scale. Lauermaann (2018) echoed this in a counter-intuitive way, arguing that the emergent more-than-growth politics of entrepreneurial cities displayed ‘the disruptive potential of interventionist forms of municipal statecraft.’

The second epistemological issue of entrepreneurial urbanism theory, often simultaneously mentioned with the first, is a potential under-spatialisation. On this matter, it might be worth revisiting the still-pertinent old debates (and the lack thereof) between the historical-geographical materialism (HGM) and critical realism (CR) (cf. Castree, 2002; Cox, 2013a, 2013b; Yeung, 2019a, 2019b; Cox, 2020b) lurking beneath the development of entrepreneurial

urbanism approach. I use the word ‘lurking’ advisedly, acknowledging that, despite these two kinds of radical Marxisms and their debates continue to stir up repercussions once in a while, CR were no longer to the favour of human geographers after the ‘cultural turn’ (Allen, 2012; Cox, 2013a; Pratt, 2013; Yeung, 2019a).

Undergirding Harvey’s theory of urban entrepreneurialism is HGM’s proposal to interpret urbanisation as an open-ended, conflict-ridden, and global-local dialectical process. However, when taking urban space (predominantly) as an arena of capital accumulation and class struggle, the GHM approach seems to have space ‘dropped out of the picture’ (Cox, 2020b, pp. 65). Put differently, it is one thing to argue that both *structure* and *agency* are ‘simultaneously the medium and outcome of situated class actors, states and firms’, it is another to explain the diversity of place-making human actions (Castree, 2007, pp. 108, emphasis original). For instance, Sayer (2000, pp. 128, 109), once the leading figure of critical realists in human geography, argues that ‘theorising about space largely requires an abstraction from particular spatial configurations’ and yet it is difficult ‘to say much that is specific about space’. Concepts like the *spatial fix* offered by the GHM approach are effectively ‘contentless abstractions’ (Sayer, 1992, pp. 57, 2010, pp. 67) that ‘make claims about necessity in only the most general of senses’ (Castree, 2002, pp. 204). A study of the way ‘processes of capital circulation bring the unique qualities of ... given place ... into a framework of universal generality’ (Harvey, 1985a) says very little about the substantive causality possessed by space as a relational entity. Instead, Harvey’s claims tend to negate the difference space can make in the coming together of independent entities in a particular situation. In a nutshell, Sayer argues that claims to necessity about space usually cannot be made in Harvey’s way, i.e. that space is ontologically necessary to capitalism’s survival.

In a sense, Hall and Hubbard (1996, pp. 153-154) echoed Sayer’s critique by suggesting that ‘a lack of empirical evidence makes it difficult to state with any certainty how entrepreneurial modes of governance succeeded in mediating local capital-labour relations’ conducive to such new regimes of capital accumulation. It is thus out of the demand for the ‘defining features of urban entrepreneurialism’ (Hall and Hubbard, 1996, pp. 154) that emerged the strategic-relational approach (SRA) to defining and interpreting the ‘entrepreneurial city’ (Jessop and Sum, 2000, 2016; Jessop, 1997b, 2001a). The making of Hong Kong into an entrepreneurial city is a causal process that disaggregates the city from a ‘unity of the diverse’ socio-spatial relations to its ‘one-sided’ aspect (Sayer, 2000, pp. 107; 2010, pp. 187; cf. Jessop, Brenner and Jones, 2008). In particular, the analytical focus on *interscalar* entrepreneurial articulations and *chronotopic* governance (Jessop and Sum, 2000) transverses the distinction between the

necessary *space of dependence* and contingent *space of engagement* that presupposed a localized context of the urbanity (Cox, 1998). Instead, the entrepreneurial city sensitises analytical attention to include historically extra-economic and extra-local factors into the *new combinations* or innovation (Jessop, 1997a, 1998a; Jessop and Sum, 2000).

By defining the entrepreneurial city through three interlinking defining features, i.e. entrepreneurial strategy, fashion and discourse, and five Schumpeterian-cum-Harveian entrepreneurial strategies (Jessop and Sum, 2000, pp. 2289; cf. Wu, 2003), the SRA approach presents a particular way of theorising socio-spatial relations. On the one hand, it integrates Harvey's idea of 'spatial fix' into the conventional understanding of cities-being-entrepreneurial, which 'view[s] cities as engines of wealth creation' but fails to capture the role of urban form in this process. Likewise, it feeds Harvey's concept of the 'global-local dialectic' (and Brenner's development of glocalisation) into the growth machine studies with augmented awareness of 'interscalar articulation'. On the other hand, it assimilates the Schumpeterian idea of 'permanent innovation' (and comes up with the concept of glurbanisation) to extend the restricted labour-capital dichotomy (and simultaneously diluting the theme of class struggle), which is buttressing Harvey's interpretation of territorial economy. Therefore, in order to pursue innovation, entrepreneurial cities not only draw upon economic factors but also extra-economic factors 'that are not monetised or do not enter directly into exchange relations' (Ibid., 2288-2292).

Attempts to better theorise scale in entrepreneurial urbanism constitute the third strand of the epistemological critique, which is by all means interwoven with the other two. Despite Harvey (1989, pp. 6) proposing that 'The shift towards entrepreneurialism in urban governance has to be examined ... at a variety of spatial scales -- local neighbourhood and community, central city and suburb, metropolitan region, region, nation state, and the like', he neither did so nor provided a map for further exploration. Also, the scale was then taken as a scale-in-itself instead of a scale-for-itself, referring to the lack of critical engagement with the efforts of local actors to proactively and reflexively incorporate scale into the formulation of entrepreneurial strategies and narratives.

As already mentioned, scale is proposed as an essential analytical element to construe the role of the entrepreneurial city in redefining the national-level *structured coherence* of a post-World-War-II nation-state in North Atlantic countries (cf. Brenner, 2004b; Jessop, 2002a; Peck, 2001, Lim 2017a). It is a structured coherence between the mode of growth and modes of regulation governance (Jessop and Sum, 2000, pp. 2299). This scale-centric argument points towards the

possibility that the rise of the entrepreneurial city does not necessarily disrupt (as prescribed by Harvey). Rather, perhaps counter-intuitively, it reinforces the structured coherence of a territorially-bounded state regulatory regime, particularly when the former is seen as an integral part of the reflective state rescaling response to the *relative discontinuity* of Ford-Keynesianism.

Furthermore, an analytical focus on the role of *interscalar* strategies in making entrepreneurial cities foregrounds the discontinuity and continuity of existing regimes in the neoliberal turn (instead of shift, see Jessop, 2002b). As such, by building horizontal (e.g. virtual regions of non-contiguous locales), vertical and transversal linkages (e.g. export-processing zones) to the broader economy, neo-corporatist, neo-statist and neo-liberal approaches can be selectively fused into the *new combinations* of entrepreneurship, i.e. *glurbanisation* strategies. Though reflective ‘articulations between firm-level, city-level and state-level strategies’ to ‘create local differences to capture flows and embed mobile capital’, an entrepreneurial city takes an active part in shaping the scalar/spatial divisions of labour (Jessop and Sum, 2000, pp. 2293, 2297) and pursues its structured coherence.

A sympathetic critique

As noted earlier, ‘the ability to synthesise practical and theoretical knowledge’ might continuously allude to urban governance research, and this is indeed the case for the theory of entrepreneurial urbanism as long as ‘we are forced to confront difficult epidemiological and political choices’ (Davidson, 2020, pp. 4). Over the past decades, numerous attempts have been made to fuse Harvey’s argument of urban entrepreneurialism with the neo-Gramscian state theory (Jessop, 1997, 1998, 2000), regulatory approach (as well as the Frankfurt School’s reading of political crisis, see Jones and Ward, 2004), and the institutionalism of the regime approach (Ward *et al.*, 2020). These fusions have collectively enhanced, instead of weakened, the circulation of academic currency issued by entrepreneurial urbanism theory. Comparatively, despite the academic turf of entrepreneurial urbanism theory becoming increasingly encroached by other approaches of enhanced analytical sophistication, its impact on the policy makers is barely compromised (see OECD, 2007). It is in this regard the research issues identified for the entrepreneurial urbanism approach are an impetus rather than an obstacle to moving forward.

In the research of China, the distance between entrepreneurial urbanism theory and entrepreneurial urban practice does not necessarily narrow or widen, but often distorts and mutates. For instance, Li and Wu (2012, pp. 95) argue that ‘different from the changing nature

of statehood in Western countries, state rescaling in China is manifested in the changing relations between different levels of government rather than between government, business and civil society.' Similarly, Wu (2017, pp.13) remarks that the understanding of the urban in the 'entrepreneurial urbanism theory' does not apply to China because 'despite rising localities, the city [note: in China] is not an actor. There has not been a shift of power from the state to the "urban" elites in China. Local officials who demonstrate entrepreneurial behaviour are a constituent of the state apparatus' (also see earlier sections in this Chapter).

These critical insights not only echo the need to strip the entrepreneurial urbanism theory and approach from its North Atlantic ethnocentrism, but also foreground some critical 'missing links' in the study of post-1978 urban governance in China. On the first issue, the emerging 'conjunctural approach' could be a constructive building block towards a more reflexive and dynamic framework for the further comparative exploration of entrepreneurial urbanism studies (in China). It is helpful to see cities as 'relational territories' (McCann and Ward, 2010) that are 'constituted through their nears and fars, through their connection and disconnections, absences and presences, given shape through the territorialisation of relations of varying sorts' (Ward *et al.*, 2020; cf. Peck, 2017a, 2017b).

However, the potential of this *conjunctural analysis* cannot be realised before an appropriate coordinate system is established to enable meaningful cross-context comparisons of glurbanisation and neoliberalisation of different shades. Quite plainly, it cannot be ignored that 'neoliberalization has been a vehicle for the restoration of class power' (Harvey, 2005, pp. 31) at the state level when the left has been 'increasingly persuaded that class was a meaningless or at least a long defunct category' (Ibid., 202) and 'given up on the state of meaningful social struggle' (Peck, 2014a, 399; cf. Harvey, 2012). With respect to China, where neoliberalisation 'is not a process whereby the state serves a new bourgeois class, but rather one whereby it maintains its legitimacy' (Wu, 2010, pp. 621), it is equally important to point out clearly that the 'parallel process of economic reforms and market liberalization' in recent decades has precisely witnessed the 'continuous and yet uneven process of ruling-class transformation' that unfolds throughout (Y. Wu, 2019, pp. 157).

From this vantage point, it would be much easier to notice the sporadically addressed issues and misapplications of theories in most existing entrepreneurialism studies of Chinese urbanisation. First, such studies fail to unveil the class issues underlying the transition towards a *new type, urban-rural coordinated, industry-city integrated, and sustainable* urbanisation in China. Second, they underestimate the potential of inter-city competition, which goes hand in hand

with the waning significance of class struggle in the North Atlantic countries, to witness a return of class politics in China's latest wave of urbanisation. Last but not least, they fail to mention that, in many areas, China's state welfare and market freedom are not as incompatible with each other as those in post-welfare and neoliberal countries.

On top of these meta-problems, there remain other theoretical and empirical lacunae. Theoretically, existing enquiry with inter-city competition is often cursory and static. There is a lack of continuous tracking of dynamic codification of inter-city competition around particular forms of policy implementation. Moreover, research into entrepreneurial public-private partnerships tends to underestimate the variety of co-existing strategic partnerships and oversimplify the inter-scale politics. Cities of the lower administrative hierarchy are presumptuously put at the mercy of private capitalistic interest and state-mandated exploitation. Likewise, the amplification of entrepreneurialism fails to bring forth any profound reshuffling of state power and capital in the process of global-national-provincial-urban rescaling.

Empirically, small hinterland cities are blind spots and remain 'off the map' in academia. China has embraced marketisation and globalisation for the past thirty years. With a swiftly-growing economy mediating widespread urbanisation, the stereotype of a thriving entrepreneurial Chinese city is either one taking off via rural industrialisation, or one taking advantage of its political power (Wu, 2000, 2003; Xu and Yeh 2005; Wu and Phelps 2011; Liu, Xiao and Zhang 2011; Liang and Luo 2012; Chien 2013). However, despite several exceptions (see Zhang and Wang 2012; Chien 2013; He *et al.*, 2018; Jin, Y. and Zhao, Y., 2020), numerous small cities remain neglected and marginalised as a general backdrop for these success stories. The ignorance of these small cities leaves the question as to whether the hinterland cities can only emulate or copy their pilot model counterparts in the coastal areas to pursue development.

It is in this complex theoretical and empirical background that this research draws particular attention to the governance of Jiyuan, a sub-prefecture-level city in Henan province. Before the thesis delves into a more empirical analysis of the case, this chapter will conclude with the main theoretical findings to take forward.

2.7 Forward with entrepreneurial urbanism theory (in China): A framework

This chapter outlined entrepreneurial urbanism theory and the principal contributions it makes to the theorisation of urban governance restructuring. Through a comprehensive exposition

of the ideas and issues outlined in entrepreneurial urbanism theory, this chapter also mapped a path towards its application in China. It did this by, first, setting out the context for the conception and development of entrepreneurial urbanism theory, and identifying its contributions to present-day understanding of the urban political economy; second, examining each of the three principal contributions of entrepreneurial urbanism theory: the consequential role of *inter-urban competition*, *urban entrepreneurship*, and *public-private partnership*; third, presenting a sympathetic critique along with pointing out the existing research issues. Engaging with this, key insights from the use of entrepreneurial urbanism were stated.

Table 2.10 Towards an agenda for entrepreneurial urbanism-based research in China

Issue	Abstract concern	Concrete form	Research Questions
Theoretical transfer from North Atlantic to China	Putting space in its place	Institutional, political, and organisational differences	What was the economic and political context in North Atlantic countries, and what processes affect this?
Entrepreneurial urbanism as an ephemeral fix to regulatory failure	Punctured evolutionary perspective of change	To distinguish structural transformation from minor tinkering in the crisis-induced institutional changes	What accumulation crisis triggered the waves of entrepreneurial urbanism as regulatory restructuring?
Potential structure coherence of the entrepreneurial city	Somewhere between glocalisation and glurbanisation and beyond	Place focus of local studies on strategic competitiveness enhancement built upon innovative public-private partnership	What (entrepreneurial) strategies have been formulated and how they evolve?
Scaling of entrepreneurial strategy formulation	From scale-in-itself to scale-of-itself	Need to have scale as an integral element of the means through which partnerships are considered	Map the operating scale of different partnerships and discern whether some are privileging a specific scale
More-than-growth entrepreneurial governance	Entrepreneurial exhaustion or interventionist municipal statecraft with disruptive potential?	Decouple entrepreneurial practices and growth politics and re-theorise the municipal states as entrepreneurs.	Evaluate how entrepreneurial practices are repurposed beyond growth and what the impacts of that disruption entail

Source: Compiled by the author.

Table 2.10 sets out a research agenda that frames the research presented in this thesis, echoing the research aim and objectives outlined in Chapter 1, and this is returned to in the concluding Chapter 7.

The abstract and concrete issues raised in this table also inform the analytical framework to research entrepreneurial urbanism in China, which is expressed diagrammatically in Figure 2.1.

Contra to Lim (2017a, pp. 1585), who maintains that a framework derived from Western developmental experience would be problematic in interpreting the socio-economic evolution in China, I argue that the Western vis-a-vis China difference does not justify a separated analytical framework. Indeed, a taxonomic grouping of the urban process into the West and China can be problematic if this classification only serves to provide a ‘contingent’ context rather than a ‘necessary’ setting towards an explanatory theorisation (cf. Jessop, 2005).




Figure 2.1 Entrepreneurial urbanism in China: an analytical framework

In this dynamic framework, the entrepreneurial city, lying in the central position of this framework, is constituted by interactive tensions between four broad forces: (i) trans-local circulatory capital, of various forms, searching for new locations for accumulation; (ii) territorial developmental agendas geared towards the political-economic goals of extra-local structure; (iii) the strategic selectivity of extra-local structures to prefer temporally-spatially specific policy experimentation (cf. Lim, 2017a); (iv) the recursive strategic calculation of urban bloc to institute interscalar articulation and chronotopic governance (cf. Jessop and Sum, 2000).

Note that these four forces are neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaustive. Apart from the theoretical inspirations drawn from North Atlantic-based literature, the identification of these four forces pays particular attention to two prominent domestic issues in search of a meaningful engagement with the evolving trajectory of urbanisation in China: policy experimentation and land financialisation.

For a long time, policy experimentation has loomed large in much urban entrepreneurialism research in China (e.g. Wu, 2003; He and Wu, 2009; Chien and Wu, 2011; Chien, 2013). That is, many entrepreneurial-like cities in China were granted special licences to do so. As a nascent English concept translated from the Chinese phrase, policy experimentation has been caricatured as a fundamental characteristic of (traditionally national-level) regulation of China in the post-Mao period. This strand of literature argues that a zeitgeist of ‘move first, experiment first’ (*xianxing, xianshi*) has driven the success of many subnational politico-economic state-led developments in China without impairing the national-level coherence manifested in national strategic policies. Instead, national strategic policies in the past decades have been formulated through recursive interscalar negotiations and steered subnational territorial actors (e.g. provincial secretary, municipal mayors) to *competitively align* against national policies in exchange for additional regulatory power devolution (cf. Lim, 2017a). In the case of Jiyuan, a ‘policy experimentation’ narrative was also widely used (see Chapter 4-6). By understanding the policy experimentation ‘as a symptom of potential regulatory failure’, this research aims to mitigate the duality-collapsed analytical separation of ‘(subnational-level) experimental policy’ vis-a-vis ‘(national-level) inherited institutions’ (cf. Heilmann and Perry, 2011; Li and Wu, 2012; Chan, 2018).

Land financialisation is an emerging strand of research that draws upon the various land-based financial innovations in China in search of an updated understanding of the financing of urban development. Building upon its conceptual predecessor, i.e. ‘land finance’, which focuses on the fiscal contribution of land to local public finance (see Wu, 2019; Wu *et al.*, 2020), land financialisation is portrayed as a strategic response to the weakness of China’s export-oriented economy in the face of a Global Financial Crisis. A major finding of the existing research was to highlight the central role of the Urban Investment & Development Companies (UIDCs) or Local Government Financing Platforms (LGFPs) in steering the land financialisation in China. Nevertheless, the explanation built around the UIDCs or LGFPs starts from, but also ends in, their quasi-governmental, quasi-entrepreneurial identities. This kind of abstraction falls short of theoretical depth by either exaggerating or downplaying their ingenuity, by confirming (for instance, Jiang and Walay, 2018) or debunking (Jiang and Waley, 2018) the partnership-nature

of UIDCs or LGFPs. There is a need, as the framework suggests, to delve into the multi-scale, temporal and place-specific interactions that interweave the various partnership-like institutions.

This integrated analytical framework in Figure 2.1 foregrounds the ‘missing links’ in the existing research towards an explanatory theorisation of crisis, space-for-itself, and interscalar articulation. What follows in this thesis is a further exploration into other methodological implications arising from old and new debates, i.e. what kind (e.g. qualitative, quantitative or mixed) of research design for what kind of framework?

CHAPTER 3

Researching urban elites space

3.1 Introduction

This chapter addresses the methodological implications arising from the theoretical and empirical perspectives outlined in Chapter 2, i.e. what approach would be adopted to collect what kind of data to address what kind of research questions. Out of this analysis, a reworked research scheme is presented. The aim of this chapter is, then, broadly threefold. First, to establish and substantiate the analytical focus of this thesis. The Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA) to sociospatial relations is established as being of value (cf. Jessop, 1990a, 1996; 2001a, 2004, 2005, Hay, 2002; Jones, 1997; MacLeod, 2001; Jessop, Brenner and Jones, 2008) and is used to contextualise the methodology used in this thesis. As Chapter 2 argued, lurking beneath (if not underpinning) much of the criticism of entrepreneurial urbanism theory were the ‘old debates’ of ‘continuing relevance’ (Cox, 2013a) between Historical-Geographical Marxism (hereafter HGM, primarily *à la* Harvey) and Critical Realism (hereafter CR, primarily *à la* Sayer) in theorising the role of space in capitalist urbanisation. The SRA, in this regard, displays a potential to make epistemological advancement upon the common ground of HGM and CR, with the additional help of structure-agency dialectic (Cox, 2013a, cf. Sayer, 2013; Yeung, 2019a). This relationship is discussed in Section 3.2 as the chapter seeks to outline an elites-sensitive epistemology that explores the dialectical relation between *strategic calculation* and the *strategically selective* context (cf. Hay, 2002, pp. 209-213; Jessop, 2005, pp. 48-52).

Section 3.3 reflects on whether, and if so how, the SRA approach to entrepreneurial urbanism research entails an *intensive* case study of urban elites space as the primary methodology. Accordingly, three sources of quantitative and qualitative data are identified and collected, of which semi-structured elite interviews are foregrounded. To do so, it first revisits the ontological and epistemological tenets of critical realism (henceforth CR) undergirding SRA. CR is presented as an ontology in search of epistemology; or a natural philosophy in search of methods (cf. Yeung, 2019). The section then proceeds to analyse the existing practices of SRA in applied urban governance research in order to sketch up some methodological guidelines and engage with various social science research methods. The issue here is how these applications set up and achieve valid and rigorous criteria. The SRA is not therefore

proposed unproblematically as a panacea, but as an approach that directs the attention of the case study of local policy experimentation in China towards strategic selectivity of the path-dependency as well as path-sharpening tendencies (cf. Jessop, 2004; Lim, 2017a).

The penultimate section 3.4 continues to critically consider elites research an integral part of the methodology of urban entrepreneurialism research. First, I compose a systematic critique of the existing methods of identifying, accessing and interviewing elites while simultaneously showcasing how this critique feeds into the theoretically reflective and grounded research of elites and elite space. Beyond that, I echo the call for a more reflective engagement with the political-temporal contingency in elites studies and suggest an iterative pursuit of a second reason to make the most out of the interviews with elites. Section 3.5 recaps the findings of the chapter.

3.2 Towards an emancipatory theorisation of the urban

Recent years have witnessed the burgeoning methods and data used in urbanism research in general. Focusing on the literature around Chinese urbanism solely, the range of research techniques include both the classical and new methods, ranging from case studies (Lee and Zhu, 2006; He and Wu, 2009), (semi-structured) interviews (Li and Chiu, 2018), ethnography (Smart, 2018), archive, participatory observation (Huang, Xue, and Li, 2013) and questionnaires (Zhong and Mol, 2008) to discourse analysis (Tan and Altrock, 2016), GIS (Lin, 2013) and new-media data (Zhou and Wang, 2014).

In contrast with these diverse methods, few researchers have demonstrated a due interest to justify their methods on philosophical grounds. Philosophical reticence in geographical and urban studies partly reflects the often-unnoticed divergence of opinion on the relations between philosophy and method in broader social science. Pro-philosophy researchers claim that ‘philosophy is to research as grammar is to language’ (Flowerdew and Martin, 2005, pp. 10), while many others question the vital link between research and particular philosophical stances (e.g. Platt, 1986; Bryman, 1988; Morrow and Brown, 1994). In the face of such an impasse, a recent dialogue in economic and political geographical research has re-emphasized the lost importance of philosophical engagement, and in particular, how further development of theory could be inspired by critical realism (Yeung, 2019a, 2019b; MacLeavy, 2019; Whiteside, 2019). Such fruitful literature and dialogue provide the discursive context for this chapter. It aims to debate the ontological and epistemological foundation of methodological research design and to elucidate how philosophy (i.e. Marxism and Critical Realism) informs

and integrates literature review, data collection, data analysis, and theorisation.

Chapter 2 pointed out that lurking beneath the development of an entrepreneurial urbanism approach, is a debate between the historical-geographical materialism (HGM) and critical realism (CR) in the processual theorisation of urban space, alongside the handling of temporality and scale. In this section, I shall explain in detail how the SRA approach to the entrepreneurial city is an epistemological and methodological tool to split the difference and engage with the ‘common ground’ of the Marxism of Harvey and the Realism of Sayer, in order to develop a granular methodology of urban elites space.

As noted by Castree (2002, pp. 209, 206), Marxism *à la* Harvey and Realism *à la* Sayer seem to be ‘at loggerheads over the question of space’ but share some important similarities in philosophy and method: both see the links between but distinguish (i) thought from reality, epistemology from ontology; and (ii) conceptual from empirical research. Seen through this lens, Jessop and Sum’s (2000) coining of entrepreneurial city no doubt built upon the common ground. But more fundamentally, the building blocks of the SRA approach, i.e. strategy and strategic selectivity, stems from its critical engagement with the structure-agency debate, particularly between Anthony Giddens’s structuration theory and two applications of critical realism by Roy Bhaskar and Margaret Archer (for a detailed critique, see Jessop, 1990, 1996, 2005; Hay, 1995a, 1999, 2002; Hay and Jessop, 1995). This debate, nevertheless, was ‘studiously avoided’ by Harvey (Castree, 2007, pp. 103).

SRA approach takes the distinction between structure and agency as a purely analytical one. That is, neither agents nor structures are real (neither has an existence in isolation from the other), but relational (mutually constructive) and dialectical (‘their interaction is not reducible to the sum of structural and agential factors treated separately’), and their distinction cannot be reified into a rigid ontological dualism. In order to better reflect the relational and dialectical qualities of the ongoing interaction of structure and agency, SRA devises a new pair of conceptual language ‘bringing the situated actor back into the structured context and the structural context to the situated actor’ (Hay, 2002, pp. 127-128): *strategic actor* within a *strategically selective context* (cf. Jessop, 1996, pp. 124; 2005, pp. 50). Through this repeat move, structure and agency are no longer ‘flip-sides of the same coin’ but seen as ‘metals in the alloy from which the coin is forged’ (Hay, 2002, pp. 127).

In a sense, this structure-agency detour equips SRA with a unique set of methodological tools to ‘put space in its place’ (Castree, 2002, pp. 203). On the one hand, SRA claims the emergent

spatio-temporal and *scalar properties* of the structure and agency are inherent and integral to the *structurally-inscribed selectivities* thus any analysis of the latter would be incomplete without a serious engagement with the former. This echoed Harvey's argument that space is necessary for capital accumulation, although capitalism still prefers certain space over others. On the other hand, SRA argues 'immediately and explicitly that the facticity and fixity of structures have no meaning outside the context of specific agents pursuing specific strategies' (Jessop, 2005, pp. 52-53). This resonated with Sayer's critique on Harvey that the difference space can make in capitalism can only be realised through the investigation of dialectical interplay in real contexts of social and political interaction. In summary, any inquiry designed to understand the role of space through the analysis of social and political outcomes has to bear the following in mind: not only are the outcomes 'contingent upon strategic choices, but the context itself also presents an unevenly contoured terrain which favours certain strategies over others and hence selects for certain outcomes while militating against others' (Hay, 2002, pp. 129).

On top of that, SRA proposes that *ideas* and *discourses* provide the points of mediation between reflexive actors and their strategically selective environment. Actors will never be blessed with complete information of their context but they have a certain capacity to learn about it and accumulate knowledge (Ibid., pp. 210-212). Out of the recursive interaction between the strategic selectivities of structures and the reflexive behaviour of agents emerge the social configuration of structured coherence (or in some cases systematic contradictions).

Through this lens, the analytical framework presented in Table 2.1 aims to advance the research of entrepreneurial urbanism through the investigation of entrepreneurial strategies in urban China. It takes the distinction between 'glocalisation' and 'glurbanisation' (see Table 2.4) as a purely analytical one. Thus, the trans-local circulatory capital (typically spearheaded by the private sector) constitutes a strategically selective context, while the territorial development agenda and partnership (traditionally formulated by the public sector) is a strategic calculation. The inter-city competition narratives and ideals thus play as the mediation in-between and point towards a potential structured coherence of entrepreneurial city (see Chapter 4). Meanwhile, as the naming of the two kinds of strategies implies, scale is inherent to the reproduction of entrepreneurial city, the role of which can not only be revealed by exploring the variety of partnerships at different *scale-in-itself* (see Chapter 5), but also entails the examination of specific tempo-spatial policy experiments (see Chapter 6) towards a theorisation of the *scale-for-itself*.

Setting the parameters

The empirical focus of this thesis, informed by the SRA approach, starts from the individual or collective actors engaged with urban economy-relevant innovations, both materially and discursively. Jiyuan has been the spearhead for national and provincial policy innovations since the 1980s. It continues to be the site of political and economic transformations while also being the inspiration behind significant changes in policy direction and implementation (Chapter 4). Like most urbanising municipalities in China, Jiyuan has suffered deep-rooted structural urban-rural inequality within its territory. Besides, and more often seen in the small inland cities, the pressure of population outflow to coastal and bigger cities renders it less likely for Jiyuan to keep pursuing debt-driven expansive growth strategies for *de facto* development. Out of these general trends emerged an urgent issue as regards the health of public finance, particularly after the round of massive governmental investment in the post-financial crisis era (Pan *et al.*, 2017, also see Chapter 4).

The Party-State responded to these structural challenges in strategic ways, both discursively and institutionally. Discursively, the 19th Communist Party of China National Congress has made it clear that ‘the contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life’ becomes the renewed principal contradiction facing Chinese society (Meng, 2017). It is worth mentioning that the previous principal contradiction between ‘the ever-growing material and cultural needs of the people and backward social production’ remained intact since its first proposal in 1981. More practically, the party rhetoric has also led the Chinese government to launch both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ political and economic reforms by introducing into cities a set of new institutions and new policies.

Among others, two reforms under the rubric of an ‘urban-cum-rural coordinated development’ scheme draw the attention of this research because they posit challenging though fundamental questions for understanding the restructuring of Chinese urban governance in an unfolding new epoch of ‘new-type urbanisation’. The first is the latest proposal of public-private partnership by the Ministry of Finance, a top-down reform of governmental investment manner; the second is the shareholding reform of the rural-collective asset, a grassroots-level institutional change to break the dual urban vis-a-vis rural market of land-use.

The structure of the existing ‘urban regime’ or ‘urban bloc’ (Jessop and Sum, 2000), if any, is being altered by the latest round of institutional changes. At first sight, local government’s direct-borrowing capacity is expected to be eroded as a significant portion of civil facilities has to be funded and delivered through partnerships with market players, following the Party-State

rhetoric of letting ‘the market play a decisive role in the allocation of resources’ (Lou, 2019). Meanwhile, the urban vis-à-vis rural divide in terms of land ownership, as well as local government’s decade-long role as the *de facto* land-transaction broker in-between, might be rebuilt by the *de jure* (re)privatisation of the rural-collective asset, which tends to strengthen the villagers’ property right and their bargaining power against the land requisition that results from urban expansion.

Exposure to national and provincial *diktat* does not naturally put the locality merely at the receiving end of extra-local decisions. Indeed, ‘policy experimentation’ was not an unfamiliar phrase in China (Lim, 2017) or Jiyuan (He *et al.*, 2018), where the national discourse of ‘Urban-cum-Rural Coordinated Development’ reciprocates the local policy practices of ‘Industry-cum-City Integrated Development’.

Simultaneously, these policies and structures unfolded themselves in a variegated spatial terrain, strategically favouring some over others. Through this lens, the two recent policy changes have emphasised different elements of urban governance. The creation of the PPP scheme has stressed the importance of space between cities, although the policy was, at first sight, a restructuring of government vis-à-vis market relationship. The rationale that underlies the PPP scheme stresses the need to restrict the borrowing capacity of local government in proportion to its fiscal revenue. Bounded by this ‘redline’, cities aspiring to keep pushing economic growth of urbanisation are more likely to give up proactive debt-driven large-scale territorial expansion while focusing on place-based projects for stable ‘cash flow’. In common parlance, stricter financial restriction tends to solidify the already-existing urban hierarchy, rendering it less likely for lower-tier cities to upscale themselves unless there is to be a dramatic shift in models of economic growth followed by some real innovations.

By contrast, the reconfiguration of rural-collective asset property rights stressed the space within cities. Underpinning the shareholding reform is a competitive philosophy that stresses the need to find locally tailored solutions to rural development problems. Village collectives within the municipality have to vie for their particular features to be recognised, and municipalities have to package projects, couching them within the appropriate regional and national discourse.

Putting the two policy changes together, one can quickly notice the different dynamics of the interaction between institutions and agents. As the partnership scheme tends to form institutional commonality around inter-city difference, the shareholding strategy inclines to

empower equivalent institutions (i.e. rural collectives) to pursue intra-city particularity. Without a doubt, how these analytically separable (while practically inseparable) differences can be processed by the entrepreneurial city approach remains a challenging issue.

3.3 Intensive case study of an entrepreneurial city

Section 3.2 points out that the SRA approach envisages an entrepreneurial city as a possible outcome of the recursive interaction between glurbanisation and glocalisation strategies of entrepreneurial urbanism. However, it is still unclear how the SRA approach can shed light upon the choice of research design and methods, i.e. the question raised at the beginning of this chapter. Put differently: how can ontology, epistemology, methodology, and methods work together in a concrete research project? In order to address this question, this section first introduces the idea of extensive research by problematising the qualitative vis-à-vis quantitative dichotomy. Second, I illustrate how an intensive ‘single-city’ case study of urban elites space gives solid leverage to the research of an entrepreneurial city. Third, I discuss the methods deployed to collect and analyse the data in order to put urban elites in space.

Intensive research

Although qualitative and quantitative methodologies are no longer seen as ‘polar opposites or dichotomies’ but ‘different ends on a continuum’ (Creswell, 2008, pp. 3), this taxonomy relies on a promise of representative generalisation which squares more comfortably with the (post)positivist worldview and phenomenology. Another way to justify the choice of methodology is referring to the type of research question, say, whether the question *per se* is qualitative or quantitative. The latter applies particularly to those proponents of the ‘hybrid’ methodology who argue that the selection of a research method has no less to do with a worldview about the research than a research problem.

Indeed, critical realism (hereafter CR) understood in this thesis is sympathetic to the point that ‘the conceptual must not be placed over the empirical’ (Howe, 1998) upheld by the hybrid methodology proponents. Also, CR does not suggest to go back to ‘tyranny of method’, i.e., the epistemological over the practical (see Creswell, 2008, pp. 20; Creswell and Creswell, 2018, pp. 40). Instead, CR draws renewed attention to the link between ontology and methodology in the hope of eliminating the inconsistency thereof. It is out of this concern that CR cautions against the ‘dictatorship of the research question’ (Tashakkori, Teddlie, C. and Teddlie, C.B., 1998), which tends to deny the ontological dimension of any empirical inquiry. For CR, there

can hardly be any research questions that do not entail an implicit or explicit conception of the nature of reality.

Acknowledging an inevitable ontological-methodological link is a prerequisite for identifying an inconsistency thereof. By doing this, we should have simultaneously discarded the traditional knowledge of representative generalisation that underpins the quantitative vis-a-vis quantitative continuum. This is because, should a scientific inquiry finish itself by identifying the ‘regularities, common patterns, distinguishing features’ of some population from others, the conclusion it draws will inevitably lack the ‘explanatory penetration’ it might have aspired and the capacity of generalisation it might have promised (cf. Sayer, 2010, pp. 164-165). That is to say, regularities built between the research objects do not possess causal power generalisable to other populations once the context (i.e. space and time) is altered. Therefore, unless the difficulty of theorising a context is well handled, there is no ground to believe that pragmatic mixed-methods can achieve their purposes, for instance, the validation of results (see Danermark *et al.*, 2002, pp. 153-154).

Alternatively, CR designates a methodological distinction between extensive and intensive research (see Table 3.1). First, both methodologies share the same ontological precondition that researching heterogeneous, complicated, and polyvalent ‘objects’ always involves a choice between depth and breadth. Second, the intensive and extensive empirical procedures ask different sorts of questions, employ different methods, and define their objects and boundaries differently. Extensive methods are useful to establish the empirical regularities between objects. Although these common patterns are not causal relations, they can inform the abstraction of causal mechanisms. Recalling the discussion earlier, it is only by permitting a common ontology that the classical quantitative analysis can enlighten a qualitative one. Intensive research, on the other hand, is the only way to build (although it does not guarantee) a causal relationship between an *explanan* and a given *explanandum*. Moreover, it is also worth noting that this methodological distinction does not secure any specific methods for data collection and analysis but sets them in a particular metatheoretical context.

Table 3.1 Intensive and extensive empirical procedures

	Intensive	Extensive
Research question	How does a process work in a particular case or a small number of cases?	What are the regularities, common patterns, distinguishing features of a population?
	What produces a certain change?	How widely are certain characteristics or processes distributed or represented?
	What did the agents actually do?	

Relations	Substantial relations of connection	Formal relations of similarity
Type of groups studied	Causal groups	Taxonomic groups
Type of account produced	Causal explanation of the production of certain objects or events, though not necessarily representative ones	Descriptive 'representative generalizations, lacking in explanatory penetration
Typical methods	Study of individual agents in their causal contexts, interactive interviews, ethnography. Qualitative analysis	Large-scale survey of population or representative sample, formal questionnaires, standardised interviews. Statistical analysis
Limitations	Actual concrete patterns and contingent relations are unlikely to be 'representative', 'average' or generalizable. Necessary relations discovered will exist wherever their relata are present, e.g. causal powers of objects are generalizable to other contexts as they are necessary features of these objects	Although representative of a whole population, they are unlikely to be generalizable to other populations at different times and places. Problem of ecological fallacy in making inferences about individuals. Limited explanatory power
Appropriate tests	Corroboration	Replication

Source: Sayer (2010, pp. 164)

Case(s) study

With this alternative ontological-methodological link, we can better understand why case studies have been part of the entrepreneurial urbanism (and entrepreneurial city) theory 'package' (cf Harvey, 1989; Jessop and Sum, 2000; Wu, 2003, 2017; Ward, 2003, 2010a). With so much debate going on pivoting around adopting a case study based research design, the remainder of this section would focus on three crucial and unavoidable decisions made throughout this research, i.e. what cases? How many? Why not other cases? (Or what is the rationale and criteria for choosing them?). In order to do so, I formulate a mutually constructive dialogue between the case studies demanded by the theory of entrepreneurial urbanism and case study in general, e.g. Yin's (2018) case study trilogy, i.e. 'case study research' as a mode, 'case(s) study' as a method and 'case(s)' as the objects of inquiry.

Yin (Ibid.) argues that one research requires a case study more than other methods (experiment, survey, archival analysis and history) when: it asks mainly 'how' and 'why' questions; has little control over behavioural events; and focuses on contemporary instead of historical events. Yin (Ibid, pp. 73-74) also maintains that 'the cases in a case study appear to be more straightforward (e.g. individual people, groups of people, organizations, and neighbourhoods) or more fluid (e.g. decision, processes, social relationships, and sequences of events, such as political

campaigns).⁹ What critical realism might suggest, in this case, is to caution against a flat understanding of the ‘cases’. That is, we should not conflate the events/outcomes (i.e. the empirical domain) with the mechanism that generates the events (i.e. the actual domain) or the intrinsic structures of entities/things which entail those causal mechanisms (i.e. the real domain) (cf. Fletcher, 2017; Alexander, 2013). Having said this, the ‘cases’ dictated by Harvey’s (1989) *entrepreneurial urbanism* still seem somehow different from Jessop and Sum’s (2000) *entrepreneurial city* since the two theories possess different levels of ontological depth (see Chapter 2). As the former draws upon the regularities across all kinds of speculative urban policies in different cities (or, more precisely, municipalities) for an updated understanding of capitalist urbanisation, the latter focuses on the innovative strategies and discourses of one city (or, presumably an urban bloc) in search of permanent innovation.

There is no easy solution to handle the methodological divergence regarding the understanding of a city. In this research, I define the cases on the ‘common ground’ of the two approaches: the individuals and institutions (dis)engaged with urban economy-relevant changes and situate the definition of cases in their corresponding context. *Pave* Yin (2018, pp. 31), any definition of a case entails the second step of temporal and spatial ‘bounding’ in order to determine the scope of data collection and distinguish data about the case (the phenomenon) from those external (context) to it. Recall the empirical façade of research questions outlined in Table 2.10, each of them is mandating a different ‘definition’ and ‘bounding’ process of cases (see Table 3.2).

The strategic-relational approach (SRA hereafter) used in this research has no objection to Yin’s definition-cum-bounding process but offers a more sophisticated analysis of the spatiality and temporality than Yin’s handling of ‘context.’ Notably, RSA suggests that the intersection of these ‘cases’ over spatial and temporal spans does not naturally constitute a meaningful basis for defining or bounding the entire case for two reasons. On the one hand, the process of grouping cases, i.e. telling why some ‘cases’ are less related to others, is part of the process of causal explanation construction that SRA seeks to achieve. On the other hand, the emergence of individual cases or groups of cases is not independent of the specific context in which they are explained. In this light, the choice of the Jiyuan city/municipality (see Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion) with a focus on the post-2012 policy changes in public-private partnerships (see Chapter 5) and rural collective economic shareholding-cooperatives (see Chapter 6) are the results of recursive theoretical-cum-empirical considerations. At the same time, however, based on the previous background descriptive information using an extensive method, each of these cases features some fallible ‘demi-regularities’ that warrant

further exploration. Since there is no established formula, this research has chosen a single city rather than multiple cities for straightforward reasons. It follows the SRA more closely to explore the structural coherence (or patterned incoherence) of an entrepreneurial city to explain the ethos of city-level strategy formulation and to make a finer-scale contrastive analysis of the emergence of (urban) partnerships and (rural) shareholdings. On this matter, a study of multi-city cases is unlikely to expand the analytical breadth without sacrificing the desired depth.

Table 3.2 The definition and bounding of case(s) of inquiry

Research questions	Defining case(s)	Bounding case(s)
What institutional changes triggered the emergence of the entrepreneurial city (in China)?	The city of Jiyuan	Post-1978; the urban/rural difference within the administrative boundary
What (entrepreneurial) endeavours have been formulated, and how have they evolved?	Partnerships and rural shareholding collectives as relational institutions	Post-2012; the <i>de jure/de facto</i> <i>partnerships</i>
Whether interventionist forms of municipal statecraft are to be disruptively redefined by the latest strategies?	The municipality of Jiyuan as a local state organ or territorial agent	Before and after 2012
How different institutions and policies are operating on (and privileging) a particular scale?	Local/regional/national/global actors & institutions involved	Post-2012

The implications of defining and bounding cases in the RSA approach are two-fold. First, as Sayer (2010, pp. 164) put it, in intensive studies, the entire research design and sampling criteria are not entirely decided *a priori* but established ‘as we go along’ and learns about how one object links to another, the learning-by-doing of which contributes to the building up ‘a picture of the structures and causal groups of which they are a part.’ The second is that this case(s) design is different from that of an ‘embedded, single-case design’ (Yin, 2018), which takes the local state, partnerships and shareholding collectives as some ‘subunits’ embedded in the place of Jiyuan. The cases foregrounded on a granular temporal-spatial scale are neither necessarily embedded nor nested in a larger scale in the sense that the subunits cannot exist without the whole. Instead, the subunits (might) possess some liabilities and require different necessary/internal conditions to generate certain events that reveal some particular façade of the whole architecture of urban governance in Jiyuan.

Data sources

This research draws upon three quantitative and qualitative data sources regarding the dynamic policy formation: a) policy and secondary literature documentation; b) statistical collation

compilation and cross-referencing archival records and c) semi-structured interviews with key actors involved in the policymaking process. By using both sets of primary and secondary data sources, I sought to compile a thorough and far-reaching explanation of the governance of Jiyuan. This genre of research could be highly political, with the majority of secondary data being obtained from governmental departments on expenditure, economic indices and changing funding mechanisms. Interviews were undertaken with key economic and political actors within Jiyuan in three phases between October 2018 and July 2019.

These data sources and collection methods are not novel, and their contributions and constraints are well known (see Lim, 2018). Therefore, although some *a priori* scheme of mitigation is proposed (see Table 3.3), what is worth highlighting is the distinct way in which they are organised in the RSA approach.

Table 3.3 Constraints of three data sources and mitigation schemes

Methods	Contribution	Constrains	Mitigation Scheme
Qualitative source I: policy documents and secondary literature analysis (particularly Chinese-language sources)	Establish directions for interviews, statistical collation, and geo-historical analyses	Policy documents may contain jargon and be vague about specific details	Attempt to build up long time connection with policymakers <i>in situ</i> for re-consultation
	Policy documents offer concrete bases for conceptualization and evaluation	Lack of control over questions to key actors	N/A
	Chinese-language articles, books and news reports offer access to otherwise inaccessible views of key political actors	Some Chinese-language sources are not readily available outside China	Carbon-copy the materials before analysing
Qualitative source II: interviews with key actors involved in or with experience of planning/consulting for the government	Offers first-hand information that may not have been published previously	Difficult to access actors with direct involvement in policymaking, especially more contentious cases	Look for a ‘second-best’ option recommended by the available interviewees
	Provides suggestions for further secondary sources to consult	Tendency to refer publicly to the available information	Ask for access to the secondary sources daily used by the interviewees
Supporting quantitative sources: statistical collation, compilation, and cross-referencing	Reveals major trends such as the urban-rural income ratio, fixed capital	Many trends may not be revealed by published statistics and require further	Refer to non-official statistics published by non-public as a supplement

investment, employment rates.	sourcing of secondary and primary data	
Once completed, trends lead to further cross-referencing with published reports, which led at times to additional information	Officially published statistics may not be entirely accurate, which underscores the importance of cross- referencing and research through other methods	Triangulation of data

Source: Adapted from Lim (2018, pp.7).

To better understand this approach, it is helpful to revisit the ‘concurrent nested strategy’ (Creswell, 2003, pp. 218) or ‘concurrent embedded strategy’ (Creswell, 2009, pp. 214; Creswell and Creswell, 2018, pp. 226) of mixed methods. This strategy proposes a simultaneous collection of both quantitative and qualitative data but prioritises one method over the other. Embedding the secondary method within the predominant method, apart from mixing, integrating and comparing one data source with the other, provides us with the possibility ‘that the secondary method addresses a different question than the primary method’ or ‘seeks information at a different level of analysis’ (Creswell, 2009, pp. 215). For example, Lim (2017, pp. 7, emphasis original) defends his preference for qualitative data because of the study’s emphasis on ‘why’.

Cautious against the ‘dictatorship of the research question’ (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998), CR (and hence SRA) favours qualitative data and methods over quantitative ones only when they help with abductive causal analysis. For example, Fletcher (2016) summarized the non-linear three key steps of adopting a CR methodology: (i) (data coding and) identification of *demi-regularities*; (ii) (data analysis through) *abduction* (also known as theoretical redescription); and (iii) *retroduction* (i.e. to constantly move between empirical and deeper levels of reality, thus ‘to identify the necessary contextual conditions for a particular causal mechanism and conditions to take effect and to result in the empirical trends observed’ (Ibid, pp. 189)). *Demi-regularities/demi-laws* are those non-spurious, rough and ready, partial regularities in a restricted region of time-space. Such contrastive ‘demi-regs’ can be identified not least through comparison and difference, the study of social upheavals, crises, disruptions and turning points, and counterfactual analysis (Lawson, 1997, pp. 203-204). No explanation is ever complete. It can always be redefined and questioned by making the explanandum more concrete by increasing concretisation and more complex by introducing further dimensions of a given phenomenon (Ibid., pp. 213-230).

The methodological implications of this approach to that presented in Table 3.1 are two-fold.

First, it is not that major trends tend to be revealed by quantitative data like statistics rather than qualitative data; rather, the identification of trends in the format of ‘if x happens, then y happens’ are mere demi-regularities that need to go through *abduction* and *retroduction* to build up a casual explanation. Second, and more crucially, the triangulation of data from different sources may suffice to find ‘inconsistencies, mis-specifications and omissions’ (Sayer, 2010, pp. 149) but does not necessarily constitute a valid test for the causal explanation (cf. Yeung, 1995). Instead, an appropriate test is seeking to corroborate rather than replicate the identified causal relation. In grounded research, this corroboration process does not exclude and may require revisiting interviewees, documents and statistics.

3.4 Putting urban(ising) elites in space

Although not always explicitly stated, entrepreneurial urbanism theory (and entrepreneurial city) presumes that the power of strategic decision-making and mobilisation is unevenly distributed among actors (and institutions), and as such, mandates the privileging of ‘elites’ in the methodology of a research project like this one. More than that, the nature of elite-centric research made it unwise to trace a causal process by using random sampling (cf. Yeung, 1995; Méndez, 2020). Having said this, the Strategic-Relational approach (SRA) to the defining, bounding and researching of elites cautions against the uncritical equivocation of elites to agents independent of structure and unbounded by temporality and spatiality (cf. Van Heur and Bassens, 2019; Bassens, Van Heur and Waienginer, 2019). Instead, in this thesis ‘urban elites’ refer to individuals who occupy strategic decision-making positions in the city (cf. Hoffmann-Lange, 2018), but the ‘strategy’ and ‘strategic’ is liable to change over time and through space. This definition of urban elites has two major methodological implications. On the one hand, urban elites are not self-contained power holders in the construction of innovative development agenda, and the decisions they make are viewed as ‘structurally-oriented strategic calculation’. On the other hand, researchers have to rely on iterative *retroduction* to make alterable decisions on selecting interviewers through the research process (Jessop, 2005).

Besides, this research also keeps a reflexive attitude to the ‘mode and timing of entry’ (Ward and Jones, 1999) of researchers into the field that might shape the accessibility and positionality between the researcher and the researched. This reflection requires the researchers to realise that the debate of some policies could be more sensitive and polemical at specific time-space than others; and likewise, the inter-elite and inter-organisational relations could fluctuate more away from (presumed) equilibrium at one time than another. The methodological implication

of ‘mode of entry’ is not to ask the researchers to pick up the best timing of entering the field, but rather to caution researchers against a research of elites space that falls short of considering the temporal contingency (cf. Cochrane, 1998; Woods, 1998). To better capture and reflect on these contingencies out of interviews, I recall the need to build ‘contrastive explanation’ in realist research and attempted to pursue a second reason that drives elites’ decisions by referring to the temporal and spatial context, when only one explanation was provided.

As Table 3.4 shows, there are now an array of institutions engaging in the urban policy innovations in Chinese cities, and the local state is not necessarily afforded a less crucial role in the overall framing and devising of these ‘new’ policies (cf. He and Wu, 2009; Chien and Wu, 2011; Chien, 2013; Wu, 2017). Particularly, the centrality of planning in developing Chinese cities (Wu, 2017) made it an ideal entry point, alongside local media coverage and existent academic research, to identify the individuals and institutions active in public-private partnerships and rural shareholding collectives.

Table 3.4 Generic classification of interviewees

Topic	Who	Structurally prescribed role	Number of visits
Industry-cum-City Integrated Development Scheme	Senior officer, Development and Reform Committee (DRC)	The pivotal municipal government organ drafting and organising the implementation of five-year socio-economic planning. It is the national DRC that appointed Jiyuan as a pilot area for Industry-cum-City Integrated Development Scheme through their top-down channel.	Two
	Senior officer, Bureau of Land and Resources	The pivotal municipal government organ drafting and organising the implementation of land use planning	Three
	Bureau of Urban and Rural Planning (BURP)	The pivotal municipal government organ drafting and organising the implementation of city master planning	Interview appointed but indefinitely deferred
	Senior officer, Urban and Rural Planning Institute	Technician department subordinate to the BURP	Two
Public-Private Partnership (PPP)	Senior officer, Development and Reform Committee	Remit changes have forced the municipal government to enter into partnerships with non-governmental institutions, but they remain pivotal in supervising governmental investment projects.	Two
	Senior officer, PPP centre at Bureau of	Another pivotal governmental organ that supervises the PPP programs.	One

Topic	Who	Structurally prescribed role	Number of visits
	Finance	Indeed, it was the Ministry of Finance that PPP that initiated the national PPP framework and applied it to local government through their top-down channel.	
	Senior officer, Bureau of Highway Administration	Earliest and ardent players of local PPP programs: five out of the total fifteen undergoing PPP projects in Jiyuan are in the field of transportation	One
	Executive, Culture & Tourism Investment and Development Company	Former governmental financing vehicle which now decouples to be a financially independent State-Owned Enterprise. A strategic player in carrying out the tourism-related local development.	Two
	Executive, Industrial Park Investment and Development Company	Former governmental financing vehicle which now decouples to be a financially independent State-Owned Enterprise. A strategic player in carrying out the industrial park-based investment and management.	Two
	Executive, Private sector participants in PPP	A representative of the private sector in the state-regulated partnership of embryonic stage	One
	Junior officer, Municipal Financing Office	Coordinator of the governmental investment and SOE-related financing	One
	Junior officer, Jiyuan Branch of People's Bank of China	Regulator of the local financial market on behalf of the People's Bank of China, China's Central Bank.	One
Rural-Collective Asset Shareholding Reform; Urban-Rural Coordinated Development	Senior official, Rural Work office	A former branch of Urban-Rural Integrated Development Office, the government organ that carries out policies pertinent to the rural area, agriculture, and rural <i>hukou</i> holders.	Two
	Senior official, Rural Poverty Alleviation Office		One
	Rural-collective asset trading centre	A newly-founded government organ since the mid-2000s' that registers and facilitates transactions regarding the rural-collective asset.	Two
	Rural cadre, Urban village; Peri-Urban village; Ex-urban village	Leaders of the grassroots self-governing unit.	Six (two/one/three, respectively)
	Senior officer, Sub-district offices or townships governing the villages	Grassroot <i>de jure</i> government	Four (two/one/one, respectively)
	Media	Occupies a discursive and constructive role in the mediation of local activity	Three
	Academics	Researchers on the related topics	Two

Source: Compiled by the author.

In retrospect, the lengthy interviewing period was divided into three phases: a round of preliminary pilot interviews, a round of extensive interviews, and some supplementary interviews. This three-stage design was less a plan in advance and more driven by the methodological necessity to reflect on the cohesive culture of the agents I was interviewing. In the next section, I shall elaborate on the identification of key people, the method to access them, and the choice of interview techniques. Particularly, I shall disclose why I propose ‘number of visits’ as an alternative indicator to effective interviews other than the ‘number of interviewees’ in this research.

Identifying and accessing elites

The identification of elites rests upon a series of assumptions about the structure and mediation of power. Political scientists have provided three methods of identifying the elites, ranging from the most restrictive way to the most inclusive: the positional method, the reputational method and the decisional method (see Hoffmann-Lange, 2007; 2018).

Table 3.5 Positional, decisional and reputational methods in identifying the elites

Methods	Scope	Criteria	Steps	Limits
Positional	Most restrictive	According to formal leadership positions located in institutions and organizations	Determine the approximate number of elite members to be included Determine the societal sectors to be considered Determine the most important organizations in each sector studied	No criteria for specifying the horizontal and vertical boundaries of an elite No criteria for determining the influence of position holders
Decisional	Medium	According to their active involvement in important policy decisions	Choose important policy decisions and domains Identify those who participated in at least one of the decision-making processes Specify most regular and successful participants	Representation of a sample of policy decisions
Reputational	Most inclusive	According to the	Rely on experts’	Not applicable to

	influence resources of elites	opinions to identify elites	relatively large numbers
--	----------------------------------	--------------------------------	-----------------------------

Source: Compiled by the author from Hoffmann-Lange (2018).

As Table 3.5 shows, each method has specific criteria and research steps to identify the elites, but this category does not rule out the possibility of a fusion. In this research, I first adopted the decisional method to narrow down those organisations and participants involved in the key decision-making process by referring to the policy documents, relevant media coverage and academic research. Firstly, I noticed that: the Development and Reform Committee (DRC) of local government has been orchestrating the Industry-cum-City Integrated Development Scheme (*chan cheng rong he*); both DRC and Bureau of Finance exert significant influence on the cooperation of institutions into particular project-based Public-Private Partnership; and that the Office for Urban-cum-Rural Coordinated Development (now defunct) had been actively responsible for channelling funds into the provision of social infrastructure to the rural area, and playing a prominent role in engineering rural-collective asset shareholding initiative. Secondly, I further targeted the individuals of the senior position of that organisation, preferably the director-general or deputy-director. Once an appointment was made and the interview accomplished, I would ask the interviewee to suggest other potential interviewees based on their occupational connection or professional opinions and make me a recommendation to those interviewees, if possible. In my experience, this kind of recommendation typically only required a phone call *in situ*, and the people the interviewee recommended would not refuse the invitation over the phone. From another perspective, a successful recommendation is a reliable indicator of the rapport between the interviewees and me. In this way, the interviewee's reputation becomes a source in further identifying and accessing the potential elites (cf. Welch *et al.*, 2002).

In other words, in my research identifying elites was intertwined with gaining access to elites, the latter of which was often cited as a tricky process given the 'power gap' (Yeung, 1995), 'professional gap' (Welch *et al.*, 2002) or 'status imbalance' (Mikecz, 2012) between the interviewer and interviewee (cf. Schoneberger, 1991, 1992; McDowell, 1992; Hunter, 1995; Cocharane, 1998; Shendon & Hayter, 2004; Harvey, 2011). Instead of choosing the 'insider' or 'outsider' approach *a priori*⁷, I took a reflexive attitude to my 'positionality' (Mikecz, 2012) as a

⁷ In corporate studies, Yeung (1995) finds it useful to employ a business-like or 'insider' approach (e.g. send individually addressed letters to individual respondents on high-quality letterheads supplied by research centres or government departments, signed by the researcher, together with business card) to get access to business elites, while Welch *et al.* (2002, pp. 625) believe that talking like a company manager is of no avail to the nature of the research, and instead 'assuming the role of an informed outsider who is willing to listen may be more effective and less threatening to the organisation'.

researcher and was attentive to the context of the research. As Table 3.6 outlines, I used several practices to gain access to the identified elite groups and individuals. Compared with other alternative contact strategies such as formal mails, email, phone calls (cf. Conti & O’Neal, 2007; Stephens, 2007; Mikecz, 2012), I found the combination of (i) ‘influential sponsor method’ and cascading (Welch *et al.*, 2002) and (ii) snowballing/chain-referral (Méndez, 2020) effectual to get in touch with the elites in the context of causal process-tracing, although they do not come without a cost (cf. McDowell, 1998).

Table 3.6 Accessing the elites in Jiyuan: strategies and tactics

Topic	Individual/Institution	Access strategy and tactics	Length of interview per visit
Industry-cum-City Integrated Development Scheme	Senior officer, Development and Reform Committee (DRC)	Referred to by a high-up officer who used to be the director of DRC	1.5 – 2 h
	Senior officers, Bureau of Land and Resources (BLR)	Got in with some personal connection due to previous research experience	1-1.5h
	Senior officer, Bureau of Urban and Rural Planning (BURP)	Referred to by a veteran local newspaper journalist. I had an oral interview appointment but failed to settle a date.	N/A
	Senior officer, Urban and Rural Planning Institute	Referred to by a senior officer at BLR	1.5-2h
Public-Private Partnership (PPP)	Senior officer, Development and Reform Committee	Referred to by a high-up officer who used to be the director of DRC	1.5-2h
	Senior officer, PPP centre at Bureau of Finance	Referred to by the senior officer at DRC, but ended up less fruitful than expected	<0.5h
	Senior officer, Bureau of Highway Administration	Connect through formal and informal connection	1-1.5h
	Executive, Culture & Tourism Investment and Development Company	Referred to by the senior officer at DRC	1.5-2h
	Executive, Industrial Park Investment and Development Company	Referred to by the senior officer at DRC	1.5-2h
	Executive, Private sector participant in local PPP projects	Referred to by the senior officer at AO	0.5-1h
	Junior officer, Municipal Financing Office	Encounter at a conference venue and built up formal and informal contact	<0.5h

Topic	Individual/Institution	Access strategy and tactics	Length of interview per visit
	Junior officer, Jiyuan Branch of People's Bank of China	Informal contact	0.5-1h ⁸
Rural-Collective Asset Shareholding Reform; Urban-Rural Coordinated Development	Senior official, Rural Work Office	Referred to by a high-up government officer	1-1.5h
	Senior official, Rural Poverty Alleviation Office	Referred to by the senior officer at AO	1-1.5h
	Rural-collective asset trading centre	Referred to by the senior officer at AO.	1-1.5h
	Rural cadres, Urban village	Access through formal and informal connections.	1-1.5h
	Rural cadre, Peri-urban village	Referred to by the senior officer at the corresponding township government	1.5-2h
	Rural cadre, Ex-urban village	Referred to by a veteran local television journalist	1.5-2h
	Senior officer, sub-district offices governing the urban village	Referred to by the senior officer at DRC	1-1.5h
	Senior officer, township offices governing the peri-urban village	Referred to by the senior officer at AO	1-1.5h
	Senior officer, township offices governing the ex-urban village	Referred to by a junior local newspaper journalist	<0.5h
	Media	Individual involved through a formal internship and informal network	1-1.5h
	Local and regional Academics	Informal network	0.5-1h

The gist of the influential sponsor method is ‘essentially... (y)ou get in and get useful data from them if you know others that they know and respect’ (Welch *et al.*, 2002, pp. 614; cf. Ostrander, 1993). This method advises researchers to ‘draw attention to their institutional affiliation, use personal connections where possible, and seek to obtain an influential *sponsor* whose endorsement of the project will ensure the cooperation of the rest of the group’ (Welch *et al.*, 2002, pp. 614, emphasis original). In practice, it highlights the necessity to work from, build up a rapport with, and take advantage of ‘the top’, which tends to quickly boost the

⁸ This is a single case that may warrant a further explanation. The interviewee shared a common working office with two other colleagues, which I did not know in advance. During the interview, the officer showed distinctively higher level of alertness and diplomacy in responding my questions. The typical answer tended to be ‘that is beyond my pay range’ or ‘you can find very clear answers to your concern by looking at promulgated policy documents or online databases, and I am willing to offer help if you have any difficulty understanding them.’ But this insistence on precision of technical details turned out to be less than surprising after my interviews with others working in the financial management sector.

potential curiosity and enthusiasm of the other elites to be interviewed (Ostrander, 1993; Méndez, 2020).

In practice, it took me a while to realise that I need a stronger ‘backup’ or ‘sponsor’ to get connected with the two identified key institutions, i.e. the municipal Committee of Development and Reform and the Rural Work Office (an integral part of the now-defunct Office of Urban-cum-Rural Integrated Development). Recent urban studies in China tend to acquiesce that government officials as ‘actual’ decision-makers are much less accessible (Li and Chiu, 2020, pp. 2567), more ‘tight-lipped’ and thus less helpful than scholars or business consultants (Lim, 2017a, pp. 9). Fully aware of the situation, I chose to reflect on the positionality of researchers and mode of entry to alleviate these difficulties in-between, instead of bypassing the interviews with state-linked actors altogether. In practice, I first successfully built a connection with a retired government officer with personal contact and paid a personal visit to his/her house, elaborating my research intention and content face to face and expressing my wish to get connected to the wanted government department. Before I explicitly mentioned it, he soon proposed that low-rank staff at these institutions were unlikely to properly answer my questions, and I needed to speak to the director or deputy director. One week later, this retired government officer connected me with an incumbent high-up government officer who used to direct the Municipal Development and Reform Committee (DRC). After seeing him at his office and outlining my research, I was then referred to a senior incumbent officer at the DRC of Jiyuan responsible for the issues of my interest through a phone call *in situ*. In a similar vein, I also got connected with a senior government officer at the Rural Office via the reference from another incumbent higher-up officer.

I am also aware of the potential negative impact such tactics may incur. On the downside, McDowell (1998, pp. 2136), talking about a similar situation involving herself, cautioned that ‘it is impossible to know whether some people refused to speak to me because of antipathy or competition, perhaps, between them and my sponsors.’ Yeager and Kram (1990) cautioned that following the sponsor’s advice and aligning with immediate concerns of the interviewees may dilute the focus on actual research questions. Although I did have a not-so-pleasant experience of interviewing an officer at the Municipal Bureau of Finance (see the footnote of Table 3.6), I still incline to note that these concerns regarding the validity and reliability of data do not quite apply to this specific research for two main reasons. First, I had already done ‘homework’ (Mikecz, 2012, pp. 487) and targeted most of the institutions I was interested in *before* requesting references from interviewees. Second, I feel the need to talk a little about how I obtained these references *in situ*. With very few exceptions, most of the recommendations I

got from these ‘elites’, interviewed by me or not, were instant phone calls to other targets I had to hand. It was unwise to assume, therefore, that potential interviewees at the other end of the call had more time than that to decide whether or not to accept my interview request. Rather than worrying that using chain referral sampling would skew the research process and exaggerate the bias and incredibility involved, I prefer not to assume that the elites would answer my questions as unreservedly as they could once the appointment was made. Taking a step back, ‘without gaining access, there can be no research’ (Cochrane, 1998, pp. 2124).

Furthermore, I took other precautions measures to identify and access elites and alleviate the unwanted impact ‘influential sponsor’ and ‘snowballing/chain-referral’ tactics may incur, i.e. not to put all my eggs in one basket. For example, I registered a one-month unpaid internship at the local TV station affiliated with the municipal government. This is somewhat different from Li and Chiu’s (2020) participatory observation of the planning process through a two-month internship in Shanghai (Li and Chiu, 2020), I clearly expressed my research intention in the first place to all the colleagues and managerial staff at the TV station in order to avoid unnecessary conflict of interest or ethical issues. After deepening the mutual trust, these experienced journalists showed a generous willingness to help. They took me as an assistant to governmental conferences and congresses that were not often open to the public. These meetings might not pertain to my research topics but allowed me to form a general impression, at a close range, of the local elites taking significant political and economic positions, and sometimes facilitating my first contact with them. My initially informal or formal contact with local journalists at the TV station and newspaper did not necessarily end up in a formal interview with any of them, nor did they offer specific advice on what to do and what not to do with my elite interviewers. However, they have provided helpful references for me to access the institutions I have targeted. Beyond these, my connection with some middle-level government officers at the technical departments (e.g. Municipal Bureau of Land and Resources) and rural cadres accumulated from past research experience (Zhang and He, 2009) also made different entry points to gather data and triangulate with the information obtained through the ‘top-down’ manner (cf. Ostrander, 1993).

Interviewing elites

On interviewing elites, I worked on Harvey’s (2011) detailed suggestions on reducing the power gap between interviewer and the interviewee in communication through ‘elasticity of positionality’ (Rice, 2010). Here, I would like to reflect on several major or minor advancements I have made upon the existing literature on interviewing elites through fieldwork

in China.

First is the warm-up conversation. Needless to say, basic homework such as a pre-designed semi-structured interview outline and background check of specific interviewees and correspondent institutions would help. Particularly, I found questions regarding the elites' professional career change, e.g. why they changed from one department or place to the current one (which was very common for higher-up governmental cadres in China), tend to leave an initial good impression and enhance trust. That was because: (i) they could immediately realise that you had done some homework (cf. Zuckerman, 1972); and (ii) they generally felt comfortable talking about their experience (of 'climbing the ladder').

Second is on the anonymity of data collected from the interview. Sitting face-to-face with the interviewees, mostly in their working offices (cf. Mikecz, 2012), I usually opened the conversation by being transparent and succinct in introducing myself, briefing the general content and purpose of the research and how the information would be used. The anonymity of data might not be stressed unless the interviewees tend to dodge the questions because in a face-to-face talk rather than over the phone, raising concerns around data confidentiality seems to imply to the respondents that the requested information may go against their interests (cf. Harvey, 2011, pp. 435).

Third is the length of each interview and, more importantly, the necessity of a revisit or follow-up interview. Most interviews took one to one-and-a-half hours (see Table 3.6), and the rounds of months-long staying in the field allowed me to be flexible in extending or compressing the time of an individual interview if necessary. In fact, it turned out in my case that the length of an interview corresponded with the level of interest of the interviewee. Besides, constant reflection on completed interviews tended to foreground some 'juicier' interviewees. Also, it was not uncommon when coming back to my base and reviewing the interview notes that I realised the need to pay another visit to clear up any confusion about an interview or to pursue the situation further. In doing these follow-up interviews, I developed Méndez's (2020) 'chain-referral elites access' method, noting that 'saturation' of both data and theory does not necessarily require interviewing more elites but may require interviewing some key elites more than once. This awareness also compelled me to propose the 'number of visits' as an alternative indicator to effective interviews other than the 'number of interviewees' in this research (see Table 3.4). The same awareness also reminded me to leave the interviewee an impression that there might be a follow-up visit. To do this, I emphasised to interviewees that I would stay 'in the field' long enough and looked forward to developing mutual trust through frequent contact.

Last but not least is the ‘age gap’ between the (junior) interviewer and (senior) respondents in elite research, which has gone largely unnoticed in the existing literature. As an effectual indicator of the ‘power gap’, the age gap cannot be changed or easily alleviated. In my case, where the interviewees of powerful positions at their late-40 to late-50, in other words, at least 15 years senior to me, presenting myself was inevitably challenging. Adding up to this challenge is the East Asian cultural norms that younger people are expected to be respectful to the aged and not cut into the latter’s speaking (Kim, 2006, pp. 243), while it would not raise much concern were the aged to interrupt the young. Although no interruptions occurred in my case, it was not uncommon for interviewees to ask me questions back before expressing their opinions. In this instance, it was not just about how to adjust my style (e.g. ‘playing dumb’, ‘brusquely efficient’, ‘sisterly’ or ‘superfast and well-informed’, see McDowell, 1998, pp. 2183) to make the respondents feel comfortable (cf. Harvey, 2011, pp. 434). Rather, it was also about how to send off the visual and verbal clues to respondents that projects ‘positive impression to gain their respect and therefore improve the quality of their responses to my questions’ (Ibid. pp. 434). Although there might not be a universally applicable manner to tackle the issue, I found it very helpful to ‘think here through elsewhere’ (cf. Robinson, 2016). Simply put, when being asked my question back by the elite, I candidly acknowledged my insufficient understanding of the local situation (implying that this was the very reason why this interview was needed) but also stressed that I knew some discursively or institutionally relevant information about other places (to moderately present my expertise in this realm without baiting the respondents and simultaneously setting the scene for them to respond comparatively).

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has explored and examined the methodology, and the set of methods to collect and analyse both primary and secondary materials, including semi-structured interviews, non-participatory observation, government policy documents and statistical data compilation. Rather than seeing the selection of method as dictated by the research questions or necessitated by some philosophical basis *a priori*, the *strategic-relational approach* adopted in this chapter understands the methodology as a recursive process of synergising the theoretical and empirical in an attempt to eliminate the inconsistency in-between. In this light, a rigorous and granular explanatory analysis of urban entrepreneurialism (in China), entails not only a dynamic synergy of an array of data sources and a variety of research methods in a case study but also an iterative reconceptualisation of both theory and praxis.

In a dialogue with the analytical framework proposed in Chapter 2, a critical reading of the literature on *case study* and elites research revealed several key themes, which were developed into the *intensive case study of the urban elites space* section of this research project. Simply put, an *intensive case study* takes a case as a part that contains within it the ‘essential principles’ or causal process of the whole (Burawoy, 1982, pp. xiv-xv), and these causalities can be extracted through understanding the relationship between the bounded case institution, i.e. partnership and rural collective, with other institutions (cf. Burawoy, 1998). Accordingly, this methodology requires researchers to always be reflective on their positionality in identifying, accessing and interviewing the elites in the context of causal process-tracing. For instance, I found the combination of (i) ‘influential sponsor method’ and cascading (Welch et al., 2002) and (ii) snowballing/chain-referral (Méndez, 2020) effectual to get in touch with the elites. Also, I am compelled to propose the ‘number of visits’ as an alternative indicator to the effective interview of elites other than the ‘number of interviewees’ in this research.

In a nutshell, this chapter has spun a causal explanation-oriented yarn of collecting, using, interpreting and re-using quantitative and qualitative data. It also unveiled the problematic nature of case study and elite research in the package of entrepreneurial urbanism theory, and proposed the possible way out. The discussion then moves on to the layered impact of experimental urban agendas, the ‘waves of crisis-driven urbanism’ concept and a first exploration of the political economy of Jiyuan.

CHAPTER 4

Waves of crisis-driven urbanism

4.1 Introduction

Since the reform of the late 1970s, Chinese cities have experienced unprecedented growth and restructuring. However, the gradualist, exploratory reform —exemplified by Deng Xiaoping's slogan 'crossing the river by feeling the stones'—makes Chinese cities constantly change without clear directions for future development (Gu, Wei and Cook, 2015, pp. 905).

Throughout the past 30-plus year of continuous exploration for reform and opening up, we have held high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics and rejected both the old and rigid closed-door policy and any attempt to abandon socialism and take an erroneous path (President Hu, 2012).

In Chapter 2 it was argued that a refined entrepreneurial urbanism approach should better conceptualise the punctured temporality and spatiality of the urban process as well as the scale-sensitive nature of socio-spatial relations. Accordingly, I proposed an analytical framework in Figure 2.1 to steer a rigorous and granular explanatory analysis of urban entrepreneurialism (in China). This chapter is the first step to apply that framework towards a periodized and grounded exploration of the decades-long urban policies, institutional transformation and shifts in China's urban transformation, of which Jiyuan has been an integral part.

Section 4.2 outlines the theoretical structure of this chapter. It first introduces 'waves of crisis-driven urbanism' that would be used to steer an alternative reading of the decades-long urban policies in China. This conceptualisation is a tentative fusion of Henri Lefebvre's metaphor of social space as a *mille-feuille* and Doreen Massey's metaphor of 'rounds of investment' on the one hand and Habermas and Offe's notion of the economic and political crisis on the other. By doing so, it echoes the need to theorise the punctured temporality and spatiality of urbanism imbued through policy changes; while distinguishing the necessary policy changes from contingent ones. With this concept, section 4.2 then revisits China's major urban policies since the early 1980s in order to tease out an alternative reading of the post-reform Chinese urbanisation process, caricaturing it as a layered and polyphonic process punctured by some rapid and intense moments of crisis-induced transformation pivoting around the central-local

relationship.

Particularly, ‘waves of crisis-driven urbanism’ problematised the temptation to presuppose a neoliberal transition in the post-reform China (Lim, 2017a) or caricature China as an authoritarian nation-state that ruled unbridled capitalist competition market (Žižek, 2019) with urbanisation as a byproduct. Instead, the uneven process of urbanisation of Chinese civilisation arguably feeds into the building of a communist party-state whose legitimacy rests on identifying and coping with governance crisis on the one hand, and the ideology of the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ on the other. Each unfolding wave of urbanisation started from a strategic-selective response to the predominant crisis of the previous waves. Policies of each wave tend to opt for specific (new or old) institutions and privilege specific modalities of development, which meaningfully frame the options available for local agencies. Through interpreting the accumulation, identification, and displacement of the crisis, three key relationships constituting the urban process in China are foregrounded, including the state vis-à-vis the peasantry, the state vis-à-vis enterprise, and the central state vis-à-vis local state. Likewise, exploration of these overlapping relationships in China under the triple process of decentralisation, marketisation, and globalisation, can equip entrepreneurial urbanism theory with more substantial explanatory powers.

Section 4.3 critically explores the local effects of accumulative waves on Jiyuan. The urbanisation genealogy of Jiyuan was assembled under two themes, i.e. partnership and dichotomy, with elements of nationwide change on the one hand and concrete local examples on the other. Section 4.4 concludes this chapter by arguing that two undergoing policies in Jiyuan, i.e. industrial-cum-city integration (*chancheng ronghe*) and urban-cum-rural coordination (*chengxiang yiti*), offer an updated opportunity to link the often asynchronous and path-shaping general tendencies of the urban process sweeping across the nation, to those path-dependent features more unique to Jiyuan. The emerging attributes in-between will be further detailed, disentangled, and contested regarding the role of partnership in Chapter 5, and that of the rural collective’s debt-wish in Chapter 6.

4.2 Waves of crisis-driven urbanism

Social space, and especially urban space, emerged in all its diversity—and with a structure far more reminiscent of flaky *mille-feuille* pastry than of the homogenous and isotropic space of classical (Euclidean/Cartesian) mathematics. Social spaces interpenetrate one another and/or superimpose themselves on one another (Henri Lefebvre, 1991[1974], pp.

86, emphasis in original).

Whether state power is able to manage and reproduce the highly oppressive, irrational, and self-contradictory capitalist system is of course an open question (Offe 1984, pp. 257).

To understand how a city appears to formulate agendas, select policies, pursue strategies and privilege or marginalise institutions, its position within the broader spatial economy needs to be considered. Henri Lefebvre's (1991[1974], pp. 86) culinary metaphor of social space as a '*mille-feuille*' (i.e. a thousand layers) is a useful analogy for polymorphic analyses of uneven spatial development (see Brenner, 2019; cf. Peck, 2017), and so does Doreen Massey's work on the 'rounds of investment' (1978; 1984) and 'combination of layers' for a structured analysis of urban policies (see Peck, 1996, pp.156). Drawing upon these useful notions, I argue there is an urgent need to fuse them with crisis theory (see Jones and Ward's, 2002, 2004) in order to better capture urban processes in China. In this regard, the coining of 'waves of crisis-driven urbanism' not only responds to the theoretical requirement of granular theorisation of 'punctured spatiality and temporality', but also draws particular attention to the increasingly neglected (while possible return of) class politics lurking in the glistening socio-spatial development in China. Moreover, 'waves of crisis-driven urbanism' aims at an alternative reading of urbanisation in China that goes beyond *diachronic* or *synchronic* approaches (see Chapter 2.6). Notably, it attempts to keep a prudent distance from the crisis-free phase analysis of urban development in China (e.g. Jiang, 2001; Wu, 2002; Zou, 2004; Yeh, Xu and Yi, 2006; Gu, Yu and Li, 2008; Chen, 2009; Xu and Zhou, 2009; Li and Wang, 2012; Gu, Yue and Chen, 2015); and also those well-rehearsed but easily-misread narrative of 'the end of China's rise' which spent little effort understanding why this crisis-ridden process continued to evolve without collapsing (e.g. Etzioni, 2012; Lynch, 2016; 2020).

Despite the possible tension in-between, I argue that a fusing-together of those strands of literature in the 'waves of crisis-driven urbanism' has the potential to advance the analytical framework of entrepreneurial urban policies presented in Chapter 2 and the methodological orientation outlined in Chapter 3. On the first matter, this analogy develops the framework by pointing out the still crisis-ridden nature of entrepreneurial urban policies as a strategic-relational response to the previous state-regulatory failure. On the second matter, it allows a state-centric analysis of (entrepreneurial) urban policies, for the belief that the state can internalise and displace the contradictions of accumulation through multifarious modes of intervention and policy repertoires (Habermas, 1976) without falling into the pitfall of 'methodological nationalism' (Pow, 2011).

Accordingly, the remainder of this chapter shall present a step-by-step periodisation of the decades-long urbanisation process by stressing not (only) the economic crisis *per se* but (also) the state's response to the economic crisis. In order to do so, this analysis acknowledges the need to distinguish 'structural' transformation (as 'overhaul') from conjunctural strategies (as 'minor tinkering') (Hay, 1995b, pp. 94), where the former refers to a structural transformation of the state apparatus and its relationship with the economy (Offe, 1985, pp. 223–227), and the latter looks for 'a resolution to crisis within pre-existing state structures, political administrative systems, and institutional practices' (Ward and Jonas, 2004, pp. 506). Beyond that, this analysis further considers how the expanded functions and coordination problems within both the administrative and political systems (Offe, 1984) may embroil the interventionist state into a political crisis of crisis management, and thus the state becomes an extra victim and source of dysfunction and crisis.

With those crisis moments underscored, the analysis then delves into the 'layering' of crisis management (i.e. urban policies) in a specific time-space (e.g. a city) as a non-natural sedimentation process. Each wave is strategically layered upon an uneven terrain of existing institutional alliances (or antagonisms), selectively reshaping some institutions through specific policy initiatives. There is no denying that only by referring to this structurally selective context can we better understand how a locality can 'co-evolve' (Ang, 2016) with the ethos of urbanisation waves by constructing agendas, selecting policies, pursuing strategies or marginalising institutions; and also, why a certain locality wins in some wave while loses in others (see also Peck, 1996). Nevertheless, this analysis aims to enrich the existing flattened understanding of a 'winning' or 'losing' locality, including the local state. Without specifying the conditions, existing literature tends to exaggerate and generalise the (local) state's reliance on economic growth while underestimating its aversion to a crisis; and accordingly, often imply an ascending capacity of the local state to pursue growth in contract to its declining capacity to contain crises.

As presented in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2, this chapter structures China's post-Mao urban policies through three waves that I have termed: *anti-migration urbanism*, *anti-settlement urbanism* and *just-in-time urbanism*. This periodisation attempts to forge an alternative state-rescaling narrative through critically engaging with other attempts that draw upon the macro-economic performance (such as unemployment, fiscal deficit and land use, see Wen and Yang, 2010; cf. Lu and Wang, 2014), land development model (Zhou *et al.*, 2018), city size distribution (Chan, 2018), spatialisation of economic transition (Yeh, Xu and Yi, 2006; Yeh and Chen, 2019) and spatial planning rationale (Zhang, Chen and Wang, 2019).




Figure 4.1 The unfolding of the crisis-driven urbanism in three waves

The first period begins with the National City Planning Work Meeting in 1980, as an integral part of the series of subsequently endorsed ‘reform and opening-up’ policies. Devoid of an urban policy *per se*, this wave was characterised by a decentralising state and a loosening of the central-local government relations in response to the acute economic-cum-political crisis generated after the decade-long ‘Down to the Countryside’ movement and ‘Cultural Revolution.’ This phase witnessed a rapidly growing industrial sector in contrast with the slowly-urbanising built environment. Meanwhile, it also sowed the seed for a sharpening incongruity of central-local relations, which resulted in a state economic and political crisis around the 1990s—the second wave thus started by the introduction of the Tax Sharing Reform in 1994, which systematically re-calibrated the central-local state responsibilities and duties. This wave contained within it the lift of restriction on rural-to-urban migration and the separation of the fiscal and banking systems. Consequently, this wave had witnessed accelerated urbanisation of the built environment as opposed to the permanent settlement of the migrant population in cities. Concurrently, China became the ‘world factory’ but also bore the resultant social and environmental cost, exemplified in the increasingly uneven development and fragile social welfare system. These challenges would not have evolved into an abrupt economic crisis without the 2008 financial crash, which was also the prelude to a new wave of urbanisation initiated by a new ‘people-oriented’ urban agenda. This chapter now turns to the first wave.

Three waves of urbanism




Figure 4.2 Three waves of crisis-driven urbanism

Wave One: Anti-migration urbanism (till 1992)

For most of the time since the founding of P.R. China, urban policies were merely a spatial layout of industrial policies and thus subordinate to the latter. The leading party adopted a ‘pro-industry while anti-urban’ philosophy (Kirkby, 2018), according to which the ideal city should be a centre of production with numerous manufacturing factory chimneys (Sun, 2015) filled with the working-class instead of a place for bourgeois leisure and luxury because the latter could only exist by exploiting the underclass. A series of policies concretized this ‘Soviet socialist’ ideology by promoting industry expansion while controlling migration (see Ma, 2002; Zhou and Ma, 2000). Many existing consumption-based cities were intentionally converted into production-oriented - yet dysfunctional - cities (Yeh, Xu and Yi, 2006; Xue, 2013). As such, it is not surprising that prior to the 1980s, urban residents in China had never exceeded 20% of the national population. In 1979 there were only 216 (now over 660) cities that were home to over 100,000 registered urban population. In a sense, when the fifteen-million ‘educated youth’ returned to their city homes, years or decades after they were ‘sent down to the countryside’ to rectify their ‘pro-bourgeois thinking’ (Dong and Wen, 2008), they might not have found their cities to be much different from what it was. Viewed through this angle, China had a genuinely different starting point before launching its ‘pro-market reform’ almost simultaneously with the UK and US at the beginning of the 1980s (cf. Harvey, 2005).

The Summaries on National City Planning Work Meeting in 1980 approved by the State Council under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership marked a qualitative turn in city development by introducing a size-based guideline. That is,

Control the size of big-sized cities, reasonably develop the middle-sized cities, and actively promote the growth of small-sized cities (State Council, 1980 [No. 229], Section 1).

As one of many efforts to restore social order, this meeting resurrected city planning, which was abolished in 1961 (see Li, 2012; Gu, Wei and Cook, 2015), but did not disclose much new understanding of urban life. In other words, few would doubt that ‘the old and rigid’ path was out of fashion, but any consensus regarding the future is yet to emerge.

It is only in this apparent vacuum between ideology and practice that we can understand how the ‘qualitative turn’ was achieved via various ‘quantitative changes’, e.g. the size-based city development and planning proposition. This proposition drew upon a comparatively de-

politicised expression that ‘domestic and international experience has shown that the excessive size of cities brings many disadvantages that are difficult to solve’ (State Council, 1980 [No.299], Section 2). The proposition entailed some reflection upon the production-centred development of cities, e.g. acknowledging the shortage of ‘housing and public facilities’ but still conformed to the fundamental argument of socialist theories, which promised an even spatial distribution of productivity (Wu, 1983). The city master plan remained primarily a spatial and temporal arrangement of (i) medium and large industrial construction projects; (ii) urban functional areas; and (3) urban transportation and infrastructure (Gu, Wei and Cook, 2015).

China’s city planning has been abolished for a long time, causing severe consequences: the size of big cities has been out of control, but the small towns remained underdeveloped; the construction of many cities and industrial and mining areas irrational, the factories randomly located, and construction funds and land wasted; unauthorised construction common, and cityscapes disordered; ‘bones’ are disproportional with ‘fleshes’ in that housing and public facilities are of severe deficiency; wastewater, waste gas, waste residue and noise has caused severe pollution, many gardens, parks, green space and scenic spots have encroached, and many cultural relics are damaged. All these have affected not only the improvement of people’s lives but also the development of industrial production. Meanwhile, many leading comrades in localities and departments lack an understanding of the status and role of city planning in socialist construction. City planning and construction plans are isolated from each other. The implementation of planning lacks legal protection. There is a severe shortage of city planning technical workforce, and the institution is morbid. This situation needs urgent change (Ibid., Introduction, emphasis in original).

Moreover, the diagnosis of urban problems did not resemble a social pathology prevalent in the UK or the US (Matthews, 2010). Social problems such as unemployment in China were not enrolled as urban problems to which ‘urban policies’ had to respond. Thus, this meeting reiterated rather than withdraw the state’s ambition to achieve an equal regional economic landscape resembling Spatial Keynesianism (cf. Brenner, 2004b). Only by accepting this premise can we approach the following question: how can one attain the onus of Spatial Keynesianism in a failing and largely agrarian state on the cusp of financial bankruptcy (Yang and Wen, 2010)?

No doubt, the response went far beyond the scope of urban policies *per se*. Instead, it was a strategic rescaling and reconfiguration of the Maoist state, including (cf. Shen, 2006):

- (i) decentralisation of decision-making power from the central state to lower-tier government and state-owned and town-village enterprises;
- (ii) setting up special economic zones for international capital;
- (iii) firmly sticking to the *de jure* public ownership of the means of production; and
- (iv) maintaining leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

In revisiting the intentional and unintentional impacts of these policies, three key processes interweaving the driving forces of urbanisation are highlighted: decentralisation, marketisation, and proletarianization.

Decentralisation of power or responsibility?

Unlike the mixed opinion regarding the role of political centralisation, there were fewer doubts that the economic growth in China, since the 1980s, was the result of the decentralisation of fiscal governance (e.g. Qian and Roland, 1998; Huang, 1999; Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001; Zhang, 2006; Chien, 2010). Recalling Tiebout's (1956) theory of 'voting with their feet', fiscal decentralization was believed to play a sorting and matching role that prompts efficient local public goods provisions under the inter-jurisdictional competition in China.

In 1980, the State Council (1980 [No. 33]) replaced a financial system epitomized by 'unified collection and allocation of funds by the state' (*tongshou tongzhi*) implemented since the 1950s with 'dividing revenue and expenditure between the central and local governments and holding each responsibility for balancing their budget'. Following the same line of thought, an array of concurrent reforms initiated and codified the devolution of economic power to state-owned enterprises in terms of revenue. The local governments and SOEs were allowed to keep and spend the fiscal or financial 'surplus' after paying a fixed amount to upper-level state authorities (see Zhang and Li, 1998).

Harvey (2005, pp. 121) remarked this devolution was 'astute' because it avoided confrontation with traditional power centres in Beijing and allowed local initiatives to pioneer and benefit from better economic performance. In contrast, Yang and Wen (2010) pointed out that the devolution of fiscal deficit and certain decision-making power had shirked the national state's responsibility to social crisis. The pressing issues, such as the employment of fifteen million 'returning educated youth' (Ibid.), fell on the shoulders of the localities, most of which only had a minimal industrial base.

Compared with the once-rigid ‘big rice bowl’, the crisis-driven reform undoubtedly injected into local governments the incentive to accrue fiscal income for their benefits. However, this devolution is not solely responsible for the socio-economic development in the 1980s, as we shall see in the next section. More crucially, the ‘contracting out’ of fiscal power from the central state left many responsibilities unattended and was therefore inherently contradictory regarding the state’s rhetoric of equal spatial and social development, and setting the stage for the crisis that followed.

Marketisation of investment or debt?

The policy dividend of devolution was apparent: local governments in the 1980s became spearhead investors in fixed assets, sometimes in alliance with existing local state-owned enterprises (Zhou *et al.*, 2018). Heavy investment helped alleviate urban unemployment but did not enhance the lasting profitability of state-owned enterprises in general. The taxation system before 1994 was also facilitating this debt-driven investment. That is, fixed-amount value-added tax (VAT) on manufacturing enterprises, the single most important tax for local and central government, was arranged such that enterprises were not held accountable for their profitability but explicitly encouraged to keep borrowing from the banking system to maintain the investment in fixed assets and employment (Sun and Zhou, 2013).

Apparently, this strategic coupling between local government and public enterprises entailed not only the specific taxation system but also assistance from the banking system. Under the big picture of ‘devolution and profit-making’ in the 1980s, China’s central bank authorised the local government to approve the establishment of local financial institutions (Ning, 2018). In practice, this approval power of the local government gradually expanded into strategic steering of local financial institutions. Therefore, local governments found the last piece of the jigsaw in order to outperform peers in the inter-jurisdictional competition, which promised self-discipline (see Zhang, 2006). Moreover, before the 1990s, there was no meaningful separation between the fiscal and banking systems in China, each only playing the left or right pocket of the central or local state. The fiscal deficit accumulated at the local government can only end up with the central bank’s cyclical inflationary monetary policy (see Yang and Wen, 2010).

In addition to that, the development of domestic or international private capital often had to cooperate (at least nominally) with public capital for development. Judging from the national statistics, the private economy made up merely 12 per cent of GDP in China in the year 1992.

However, the classification of enterprises in China into four main ownership types, including state-owned enterprises (SOEs), town and village enterprises (TVEs), foreign-invested enterprises, and privately-owned enterprises, which significantly underestimated the degree of *de jure* de-nationalization of the Chinese economy. This negligence was best exemplified in the fleeting yet explosive growth of TVEs.

Restoration of petite bourgeoisie or proletariats?

Even with identifiable loopholes in the reform policies, the latent tendency towards another crisis was well-contained in the 1980s. The post-Mao China did not witness a repeat of the ‘down to the countryside movement’, not only because no one enjoyed the personal cult-like Mao for this to happen, but also because grassroots peasants shared the fruits of development (Yang and Wen, 2010). Ironically but fundamentally, this development occurred when rural-to-urban free migration was strictly forbidden. In a period often marked by all-round progressiveness, I argue urbanism at this time was distinctly delineated by an anti-migration regime.

Although the state’s top-down decentralisation reform gained inspiration from the preceding ‘contract-responsibility system’ initiated by a grassroots peasant community, few could predict rural China’s productive potential. Between 1978 and 1994, the secondary industry witnessed unprecedented growth from 15 to 60 per cent of the national GDP. In contrast, the growth of the urban population ratio was significantly slower, only rising to 30% from 20% of the total population (Zhou *et al.*, 2018). In this period, the explosion of town and village enterprises (TVEs) in rural China significantly overshadowed State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the urban area. In terms of industrial-production value, the former achieved a six-fold increase instead of the latter’s forty-six-fold. At the end of 1993, the TVEs has made up 60% (Zhou *et al.*, 2018) of the national industrial output (see Cai, 1995; Li, 2003, pp. 1-2)

The significant socio-spatial divergence between industrialisation and urbanisation drew wide attention (see Oi, 1992, 1995). It fueled the argument that China had achieved phenomenal industrial takeoff without urbanizing the working class (see Pun and Lu, 2010). This ‘under-urbanisation’ (Zhang and Zhao, 2003) with Chinese characteristics was vividly caricatured as ‘leaving the soil without leaving the village and entering the factories without entering the city’ (*lìtu bù lixiang, jinchang bù jincheng*). Out of the intensive research and theoretical debates centred around the comparative advantage of TVEs emerged the efficient ‘ownership-contract’ theory proposed by economists and polished by sociologists (Li, 1995, Cai, 1995; Zhou *et al.*, 2018).

This theory situated an enterprise in a dual-level ‘principal-agent contract’: first between the local state and the enterprise, and second between the enterprise and labour. TVEs, through this lens, appeared publicly owned in their relationship with the affiliated local government, while possessing the quality of private ownership in its contract with peasant labour. This hybrid nature allowed TVEs to enjoy structurally comparative advantages over the other three types of enterprises in China, including state-owned enterprises (SOEs), foreign-invested enterprises, and privately-owned enterprises (see Oi, 1992; Cai, 1995; Li, 1995; Zhou, 2005; Yang and Wen, 2010).

Surprisingly, the real merit of this strand of explanation, including Oi’s (1992) famous coinage of ‘local state corporatism’ has been overlooked. That is, just because the economic miracle of TVEs were more determined by its local ‘*guanxi*’ networking, rather than the inter-firm market contracts that embedded the TVEs (Liu, 1999; Qu, 2015, 2016) does not mean that the state or the market was playing their due roles. For instance, Li (1995) noticed that TVEs, mostly of small size, were highly reliant on debt-financing and state-owned bank loans. The main reasons for this include that TVEs generally lacked formal channels of equity financing while the interest of bank loans was significantly subsidised by the central state, thus being lower than other ‘informal’ channels. These findings significantly reduce the difference between TVEs and SOEs, while foregrounding both the upper-hand and drawbacks of a then-emerging ‘administrative region economy’ (see Chan, 2018, pp. 79). This kind of territorial economy rested upon strict control of the movement of labour between rural and urban sectors within an administrative area through the local state apparatus. Further, it tends to retain self-interest for the urban sector while pushing systematic risk upward to the state or downward to rural communities (see Li, 1995; Yang and Wen, 2010).

Not to mention that the umbrella term of TVEs includes a variety of existing and newly-formed phenomena generated under a different context. Zhou (2018) broadly differentiated the development of TVEs into two phases (Zhou, 2018). The first climax of development appeared in the early 1980s in three coastal areas of China, including south of Jiangsu Province (*Sunan*), Wenzhou in Zhejiang province, and Pearl River Delta (PRD), in Guangdong Province. Each area defined a qualitatively different ‘model’ in TVEs’ in their relation to SOEs, private households, and diaspora capital (see Ma and Fan, 1994, Liu, 1992; Vogel, 1990; Sit and Yang, 1997). The second flourish of TVEs appeared at the end of the 1980s in hinterland provinces like Shandong, Henan, and Hebei in a wish to copycat the success of processors, but failed to do so (see Zhou, 2018). In this sense, the institutional legacy of TVEs as a public-private partnership was also spatially and temporally specific, as we shall see in Jiyan, which failed to

emulate the TVE-led growth in the 1980s but instead carved out a growth trajectory upon local SOEs. Therefore, an ownership-privatisation perspective did not suffice as an explanation for the diversity of local economic growth in China.

Towards the second wave

Chinese cities kept burgeoning despite the scarcity of urban-specific policies in this wave of *anti-migration urbanism*. Here I recall Lefebvre's (1996, translated by Kofman and Lebas, pp. 180) 'permanent cultural revolution' in theory vis-à-vis China's cultural revolution in reality. For Lefebvre, 'the city itself is the supreme oeuvre, which enters into conflictual, ambiguous and dialectical relationships with its institutional form' (Ibid, pp. 20) but 'the logic of the market has reduced these urban qualities to exchange and suppressed the city as *oeuvre*' (Ibid, 19, emphasis in original). Thus, the realisation of urban society and its oeuvre calls for, 'apart from the economic and political revolution (planning oriented towards social needs and democratic control of the State and self-management), a permanent cultural revolution' (Ibid, 180). In this regard, China's first phase of anti-migration urbanisation did uncover some spatio-temporal (im)possibilities different from its advanced capitalist counterparts, but it was far from complete. After a decade-long traumatic and overdone 'cultural revolution', China turned back to make up for the missed economic and political reform to unleash its oppressed urban potential. The significance of this wave was to reactivate the negated dialectic relationship between *oeuvre*, exchange and the state. Although at that time, few would expect China to blaze any 'anti-Eurocentric' urbanisation trail (see McGee, 1991a, 1991b).

Moreover, both central and local governments were on a steep learning curve with regard to the governing of cities. The turnover of supreme leadership from Mao to Deng did not immediately bring about an earth-shaking ideological change, i.e. from anti-urbanism to pro-urbanism. Instead, a step-by-step quantitative change, although not without setbacks, accumulated a qualitative transformation. A remarkable difference might be that when the 'unexpected' (Lin, 2014) development of cities took place, the ideology was adapted to couch rather than directly oppress it.

The revision of city-planning guidelines based upon population size in 1989 also manifested this ideological tolerance (or impurity). In the promulgation of the first edition of the 'City Planning Law', a new clause of size-based planning rationale replaced the old one:

Control the sizes of large cities, moderately develop middle-sized cities, and actively develop

small towns (City Planning Law, 1989).

The slightest discursive tweak from ‘reasonably’ to ‘moderately’, compared to its predecessor, acknowledged the necessity to develop middle-sized cities retrospectively. What remained unchanged is the doubt cast upon the sustainable governing of big-size cities. Upon examining census data, however, it can be seen that Chinese cities ‘walked the walk’ while City Planning Law ‘talked the talk.’ From 1978 to 1990, a smaller ratio of urban *hukou* holders lived in big cities (with over 500 thousand population), dropping from 62.7% to 54.3% (Yeh, Xu and Yi, 2006). In contrast, super big cities (with a population size of more than 1 million) accommodated an unprecedentedly high share of urban residents, even before considering the unregistered rural migration. The intent to control big-sized cities was far from fulfilled. More fundamentally, the assumed link between city size and maladies would undergo more stringent academic examination and a no less sophisticated political manoeuvre, which we shall see in the sections to come.

Wave Two: Anti-settlement urbanism (till 2012)

While our national government enjoys virtually unlimited credit, the initiators of urbanization projects, local governments, have little. Public faith in the economic success of governmental undertakings in the area of urban renewal and revitalization is not yet to the point that significant securities issues of pending or completed projects can be floated on capital markets (Chen Yuan, governor of China Development Bank, on CDB Web site, 2005, translated by Sanderson and Forsythe, 2012, pp.1).

In line with the ideas proposed in the previous section, I have titled this wave anti-settlement urbanism to emphasize how these unfolded policies (see Table 4.1) were still based on tight restrictions upon people’s right to settle in cities (i.e. *hukou* system). That said, there is no denying that these policies had made significant improvements on both state welfare and market freedom. Still secondary compared to the industrial policies, urban policies started to display a growing level of independence at this stage by regulating the emerging urban land market and inflow of migrant workers. Since its first appearance in the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1991-1995), urbanisation gradually made a larger dent in the national strategies, as evidenced in the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) and Eleventh Five-Year Planning (2006-2010). The sixteen years between 1995 and 2011 had borne witness to an unprecedented urbanisation ratio growth from 29 to 51.27 per cent, of an annual average of 1.39 percentage, meaning that there was an annual increase of 16 million urban population, mainly from rural-to-urban

migration. Meanwhile, the peaking gap between industrialisation ratio and urbanisation gradually narrowed and crossed over in 2003 to enter an era when the urbanisation rate exceeded that of industrialisation (see Li and Wang, 2012; Zhou *et al.*, 2018).

That said, raising the curtain of the second wave of urbanism was a series of profound institutional changes in response to the acute economic and political crisis at the turning of the 1990s. The chain of the crisis revealed itself in many facades, including nationwide economic stagnation, unprecedented inflation ratio (24 per cent in 1993) driven by easy credit in emerging land and real estate market speculation (see Zhu, 2005) particularly on then newly-founded Hainan special economic zone (see Zhang, 2015), in conjuncture with sharp deflation of Chinese *yuan* in the international currency market (see Yang and Wen, 2010).

As mentioned previously, this sudden and prominent crisis had been lurking beneath the ‘local state corporatism’ and ‘administrative region economy’ (*xingzheng qu jingji*, cf. Chan, 2018) since the 1980s. A byproduct of this debt-driven local growth mechanism and one of the most substantial pieces of evidence of this crisis is the culmination of central-local tension concerning fiscal power. That is, the entire decade of the 1980s saw a steady drop of ‘two shares’ (*liangge bishong*) in China since the fiscal decentralisation, namely the share of government revenue in national GDP and the share of central government revenue in total government revenue⁹ (see Zhou *et al.*, 2018). The double decline considerably weakened the central state capacity in tackling the uneven development between regions, thus threatening the ‘bottom line of decentralisation’, i.e. the unity of the sovereign (see Wang, 2005).

⁹ Seen through the same lens, China had gone much further compared with the UK and the US which also claimed to decentralise fiscal power around 1980 (Wang, 1995).

Table 4.1 Anti-settlement urbanism in China (till 2012)

	Land Management Law	Urban Investment & Development Corporation	End of Food Grain Rationing	(Economic & Technological) Development Zone	Tax Sharing Reform	Chinese Development Bank (CDB) Loan	Housing Reform
Established	1986	1986	1992	1992	1994	1994	1998
Spatial scope	National	Shanghai	National	Four pilot cities ¹⁰	National	National	National
Remit	(Local) state monopoly of (rural) land conversion for sale on the first-tier market	Physical regeneration of the built environment	Free urban-rural migration	Stimulation of economic growth and job creation	Tax sharing between central and local government	Long-term non-commercial loans	Welfare housing provision replaced by real estate markets
Key agencies involved	Rural collectives, local authorities, and national government	Local authorities and CDB	Local authorities and national government	Local authorities and national government	Local authorities, national government, and enterprises	Local authorities and national government, CDB, and UIDC	
Method of financial allocation		Grants to UIDCs		Capital allowance and rate revenue foregone		Bank loans to UIDCs	

Source: Compiled by the author

¹⁰ Wenzhou, Yingkou, Weihai, Fuqing- Rongqiao

Recentralisation with leeway & Marketisation through monopoly

The array of decisive top-down reforms following the stagnation had lasting impacts on the subsequent trajectory of China's socio-spatial development. Zhu Rongji, then governor of the People's Bank of China (1993-1995) and later Premier (1998-2003), prescribed a then-unpopular prescription to the overheated macroeconomy, adopted some 'anti-market' and stringent cooling measures, earning him the international nickname of 'economic czar.' First, China overhauled its currency system, pegged the Chinese *yuan* to the US dollar at the end of 1993, and issued *yuan* per China's foreign capital inflow. This currency reform led to a one-third drop of offshore RMB overnight. Simultaneously, Zhu wielded administrative power to cut off new (and speculative) investment in fixed assets by all tiers of government and state-owned enterprises, busting the real estate market bubble and leaving many unfinished projects derelict all over the Hainan Island. In addition, a vast number of nonperforming bank loans were handed over to several newly-designated asset disposal companies. Following those, Premier Zhu, taking office in 1994, introduced a 'Tax-sharing Reform' prior to the banking system overhaul, which had a series of tremendous impacts on the trajectory of the second wave of land-centred urbanisation (see Zhu, 2011; Cheung, 2010; Lim, 2017b).

The tightened money policy in 1993 and credit preference for large SOEs abruptly strangled the once-reciprocal 'local state corporatism' between many small-sized manufacturing TVEs and SOEs and local government prevalent in the previous wave. Later, the overhaul of the national economy fundamentally shattered the institutional and financial foundation of earlier corporatism. Through the 'Tax-sharing Reform', the single most essential and business-oriented Value Added Tax (VAT), regardless of the ownership of the enterprise, became a shared tax more weighted to the central (75%) than local (25%). After that, the banking system reform brought about more intense supervision of local borrowing. The state officially promoted the privatisation of public enterprises in 1995 under the rubric of 'seizing the big fish and letting go of the small shrimps.' The local government, therefore, became more calculating in developing local economies. The courtship of FDI gradually became economically preferable and politically sound.

In order to reorient the urban development in the service of the international market, the local government was equipped with additional power in developing urban land and providing needed urban infrastructure (particularly in the economic development zones), despite the tax share cut. In the early 1990s, coastal municipalities such as Shanghai had noticed the urgency

to break the bottleneck of urban infrastructure to better court foreign capital (Wu, 1999b). However, the Chinese municipal governments' funding channel was significantly curtailed compared with its international counterparts. They have not introduced property tax until today and were deprived of the right to issue municipal bonds (by the Budget Law - 1994), borrow directly from the bank (by the General Rules on Loans - 1996), or provide guarantees for loans (by the Guarantee Law - 1995). Still, they had an exclusive upper hand in that they owned all the urban land within the administrative territory on behalf of the (central) state. Also, the Tax-sharing reform had intentionally left leeway for a land conveyance fee, which was not included in the central government's accounting of local budgets, meaning there was little oversight on its use (see Zhu, 2011).

Table 4.1 shows the range of urban initiatives introduced in the second wave and highlights the emergent centrally-prescribed localism underwritten through urban land-centred financialisation. Initial change centred on the promotion of Development Zones, which did not flourish until the early 1990s, despite its precursors of Export Processing Zones originated in the early 1980s (see Gallagher, 2011). The opportunities offered by reducing land rates and favourable planning regimes nurtured a 'zone fever' (Cartier, 2001) which led authorities to queue up for Development Zone status. The Development Zone resembled an Enterprise Zone in the UK, which represented an unconventional response to economic and social ills and an aspiration to realise the potential for urban development. First established as an innovative policy tool to promote export-oriented processing industries since the 1980s, this portfolio of tax breaks and discretionary planning powers was also behind the creation of the first proto-type Urban Investment and Development Company (UIDC) in 1992, Shanghai Urban Construction Investment and Development Company (Jiang and Waley, 2018)

With reference to its counterparts, i.e. Urban Development Corporations in the UK (see Lawless, 1988; Li and Chiu, 2018), the UIDCs in China were born first in Shanghai in a similar situation of public fiscal austerity (Wu, 1999b). Instead of leveraging domestic private funds (Barnekov *et al.*, 1989), Shanghai Urban Construction Investment and Development Company borrowed foreign capital (from International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank) to fund the infrastructure provision in Pudong New Area and prepared to repay the loans with the urban land conveyance fee (Wu, 1999a).

The proto-type urban land financialisation (*tudi jinrong*) mechanism that emerged from the development of Pudong New Area kept evolving and generating significant economic momentum in this wave. It beheld an updated version of 'local state corporatism' built between

UIDCs and financial institutions in the second wave, which I have termed ‘municipal corporatism’ in Figure 4.2 (cf. Jiang and Waley, 2018). Partly funded and granted previously unavailable statutory power by supralocal government, UIDCs in China bore the expectation of acting as catalysts, attracting, facilitating and stimulating economic activities within and beyond their remitted area just like UDCs once did in the UK. Different from their Anglo-liberal counterparts, nevertheless, UIDCs in China were financially funded neither by a central government grant (as in the UK) or the financial market (as in the US), but through cooperation between local fiscal revenue and a bank loan issued by a centrally designated ‘policy bank’. In addition to this, the statutory power of UIDC was not limited to a single project within a small geographical boundary but could extend to both profitable or unprofitable projects within and even beyond the administrative border of local government. Not to mention that UIDCs were *de jure* state-owned enterprises at arm’s length from the local government instead of a *de jure* partnership between the public, private and the third sector. In this regard, the UIDC-led urban (re)development resembled neither the ‘central localism’ in the UK nor ‘civic boosterism’ in the US (see Boyle, 1997; 1999).

Together with UIDCs, the ‘policy banking system’ spearheaded by the China Development Bank (CDB) was another essential institutional creation to close the loop of land financialisation (cf. Wu, 2019). As an integral part of the overhaul of the banking system in 1994, CDB was designed as a ‘policy lender’ to provide long-term, non-commercial, development-oriented financing for high-priority government projects under the direct jurisdiction of the Chinese State Council and the Central Government¹¹. Unlike commercial banks, CDB was financed by issuing long-term bonds to commercial banks instead of deposits from the public. Those bonds were assigned a zero-risk weighting along with sovereign bonds by domestic and international financial institutions, although the Chinese central government took no overt responsibility for the lending (Sanderson and Forsythe, 2012, pp. 70).

Against the imperative of developing urban infrastructure and the state control of credit expansion, CDB collaborated with local governments to craft the replicable UIDCs as the innovative local government financing vehicles (LGFVs). LGFVs helped the local government bypass the ban on direct borrowing and became the ‘best match’ for CDB, who needed a trustworthy partner to lend the loan (Gao, 2010). More than a policy bank, CDB saw itself as

¹¹ A CDB loan recalls the UK’s Urban Development Grant (UDG) (Martin, 1989), both of which were earmarked funds for qualified mid-term and long-term investment. However, the CDB loan allocation did not require independent open bidding as with UDG but necessitated the internal risk-rating of government credit.

a market creator in assisting the creation of UIDCs. The leadership of CDB believed that LGFVs will ‘put local government funding on a market footing by setting up independent companies that could finance construction and raise funds, thus improving the credit and market discipline of the local government’ (Sanderson and Forsythe, 2013, pp. 6).

Chen Yuan (2005), then governor of the CDB, held an overriding belief in urbanisation as ‘the most important and enduring motive force in stimulating consumption and investment in China’s domestic economy’. Still, it took a few steps to leverage the future value of the public land use right into large up-front loans. The corporatism between CDB loan and LGFV experienced two rounds of co-evolution since 1998, from the so-called ‘Wuhu Model’ to ‘Tianjin Model’, and then ‘Chongqing model’.

In 1998 the Wuhu government stuffed the LGFV with different state-owned assets to acquire ‘facility-bundled loans’ from CDB. This loan innovated the conventional single-project-based financing mechanism, allowing the LGFV to bundle together profitable (e.g. land development and toll roads) and non-profitable infrastructure projects (e.g. non-toll road, subway construction and sewage disposal). Still, the local government made the promise to use future fiscal revenue to repay the loan after ten years if the land would not be sold (Zhan, 2014).

In 2003, Tianjin further upgraded the Wuhu model by engagement with the local land bank. The local land bank collateralized all the developable land use in 15 years before the UIDC collateralized the land appreciation value in development. Also, under a new regulation, the proceeds of land conveyance belonging to the land bank would pay straight back into its account at Tianjin’s CDB branch before being transferred to the municipality’s account in the same bank. CDB could thus automatically take the money it was owed, supervise and adjust the speed at which funds were transferred (Sanderson and Forsythe, 2012, pp. 23; Guo, 2013; Wang, 2016).

Table 4.2 Evolving models of CDB-UIDC corporatism

Location	Established	UIDC/LGFV	Remit	Other agencies involved	Financing and repayment method	Cost
Wuhu	1998	Wuhu Construction Investment Co.	Infrastructure construction	N/A	Wuhu government established a repayment reserve fund and promised to use its future fiscal revenue to pay back the loan after ten years if the finance platform could not sell the land	Ten-year bundled loans with a total worth of RMB 1.08bn (\$130.4mn)
Tianjin	2003	Tianjin City Infrastructure Construction and Investment Company Ltd	Infrastructure construction and land reserve and consolidation	Tianjin Center for Land Reserve and Consolidation	Fifteen years of land usage rights sales to secure the infrastructure loans, including 96.35km ² of central city land and 100.9 km ² of suburb land, both to act as collateral and as a source to pay back the funds. The city government also promised to use its infrastructure fund to pay back the loans if land usage rights sales ran into difficulties	Fifteen-year loan of 50bn yuan which was 8 per cent below the standard interest rate of loans
Chongqing	2004	Chongqing Yufu Asset Management Group	Debt restructuring of local SOEs	Chongqing State Asset Administration and Supervision Commission	Yufu took CDB funding to buy bad assets off the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited (ICBC), caused by bankrupt local state-owned companies. Many of them had their factories on; Yufu sold valuable city-centre land for these SOEs, moved them out to the suburbs, and used the money to buy their bad loans from ICBC.	15 billion yuan 'bridge loan'

Source: Compiled by the author from Sanderson and Forsythe (2013) and Wang (2016)

The financialisation scheme was taken further in Chongqing in 2004, in an active engagement with underperforming state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In particular, the UIDC in Chongqing firstly borrowed a 'bridge loan' from CDB to buy lousy assets off the book from the commercial banks. These bad loans were caused by some underperformed or even financially bankrupt SOEs who had their old factories on valuable city-centre land waiting for renewal. After bailing out the SOEs, the UIDC then helped to sell their land, moved them to the suburbs, and used the money to pay back the loan to the CDB (Ren, Wang and Liu, 2005; World Bank, 2009; Zhang, 2011). In 2006, land financialisation contributed to circa 60% of infrastructure investment in Chinese cities while fiscal input made up only 10% and land conveyance made up 30% of the investment (Jiang *et al.*, 2007).

Despite the *de facto* proliferation, LGFV did not get a *de jure* recognition until March 2009, when the People's Bank of China and China Banking Regulatory Commission (2009) issued a joint statement. In this statement, local governments were encouraged to diversify investment financing channels by establishing LGFVs and the issuance of bonds through existent LGFVs. In other words, LGFVs became the strategic actors in implementing the 'four trillion' stimulus package announced by the State Council in an effort to tackle the Global Financial Crisis. Meanwhile, the stimulus package brought three significant changes to the development of LGFVs: including their number, level, and funding channels. Between 2007 and 2009, the number of LGFVs mushroomed from circa 360 to 822. Meanwhile, newly founded LGFVs were mostly established by county-level governments in smaller-sized cities and towns. On top of that, the corporate bond issued by the LGFVs surpassed bank loans to become the major financial resource (Pan *et al.*, 2016).

Continuing unfinished proletarianisation

The creation *ex nihilo* of new local institutions and the realignment of state policy per the socialist market economy (SME) reshaped the *modus operandi* of urban development. *Qua* then-President Jiang Zemin (2006), the SME was premised upon the dominance of public ownership and state-owned enterprises within a market economy. In retrospect, the implication of SME is not only a co-evolving relationship between the state and market, as suggested either by 'statecraft' (Pike *et al.*, 2019) or 'marketcraft' (Vogel, 2018). Instead, it is an example of crisis-induced state rescaling and local partnershiping that only manages to displace a crisis rather than overcome it.

In terms of statecraft, the emergence of LGFVs stemmed from the loophole of Tax-sharing Reform. It left local governments with huge spending responsibility but no sustainable channel to raise funds apart from leasing out state-owned land to international and domestic investors. Moreover, the proliferation of LGFVs neither took place in a bureaucratic top-down compulsory manner nor in a *laissez-faire* market fashion. Since its infancy, it was an example of rescaled central-local state corporatism between a (re)centralised financial system and local authority-affiliated SOEs. For the central state, the re-centralised fiscal revenue won back the capacity to reshape the national economy, but also took on the unprecedented responsibility of making full use of the abundance of available capital. In this regard, establishing policy banks like CDB signified an institutional breakthrough or compromise that expanded the state's intervention toolkit while blending the necessary competition. For the CDB, the initial trial in Wuhu seems to be based upon overriding confidence in the burgeoning foreseeable urbanisation-driven economy and the capacity to bear any potential loss. For the local state, the foundation of LGFVs played a reliable channel to leveraging infrastructure construction's daunting cost with a cut share of fiscal income.

In terms of marketcraft, neither the CBD nor UIDC was a typical example of a private or public market player. Nevertheless, their strategic coupling worked with a level of efficiency while catering to both the state *diktat* as well as local needs. Its efficiency rested not on *de jure* private ownership but *de facto* inter-locality competition for economic growth. After all, continuing local economic development was the only sustainable way to collect enough fiscal revenue to get a higher credit rating by CDB and pay back the loan. In this sense, CBD and LGFVs may have rewritten 'the rule of finance', but they did not rewrite the 'law of finance' (Sanderson and Forsythe, 2013). Not to mention that local GDP growth would also benefit the local cadres, who aspired for 'achievement in office' (Pan *et al.*, 2017), to excel in the 'promotion tournament' (Zhou, 2007). In this regard, the local government had to ensure infrastructure provision could effectively contribute to the prosperity of industry and commerce on the market.

Nevertheless, the achievement of the 'LGFV+CBD' model was deeply embedded in a foreign capital-cum-migrant labour regime (Pun, 2005) mediated primarily by inter-jurisdictional competition (Cheung, 2014; Pan *et al.*, 2017). In addition to the incentives for investment underwritten by the government, the abundant and docile labour supply was another offer to attract foreign capital. The demand for labour from foreign capital indirectly accelerated the lifting of controls on rural-to-urban migration control, despite the eventual abolition of 40-year food grain rationing in 1992 had some other reasons (see Yang and Wen, 2010). In the

following year, China saw an increase in migration of 40 million people (mainly from rural to urban areas). In hindsight, the rapid migration inflow caught many cities off guard, the governments of which wished this would be a temporary trend. They levied social welfare fees from the migrant labour wage and capital gain but only provided exclusive access to social housing, (compulsory) education, and publicly funded medical care to local urban *hukou* holders. The channels to get a local *hukou* were limited and based more on identity rather than economic status (Chan, 2018, pp. 82-84).

After all, it is in this period that China erected its international reputation as the world factory. The introduction of FDI had played a triple role in the opening of China to the world market (Gallagher, 2011):

- (i) as ‘competitive pressure’ which stimulated inter-region and inter-firm competition and ownership-change of SOEs and TVEs;
- (ii) as ‘laboratories for change’ in terms of labour employment, social welfare and enterprise management; and
- (iii) as ‘ideological change’ of the party-state, shifting from certain archaic principles (‘state ownership, the elevated role of the working class, notions of economic justice’) to new ones (‘nationalism, Chinese industry, and the ability of China to compete in the international economy’) (Ibid., pp. 9-28).

Through this lens, the governing of the local economy in Chinese cities was a delicate balance. On the one hand, localities competed fiercely to court the FDI to secure economic development and indirectly promote SOE reform. On the other hand, ‘national industry’ (*minzu gongye*) became a catchword in contrast to foreign industry, the debate around which took over the heat that once belonged to the contrast between private and public ownership.

The ‘national industry’ recalled a lurking aspiration for ‘self-reliance’ in deciding the Chinese nation’s fate through rapid economic and cultural development, which dated back to the Eighth National Congress of the Party in 1956 (Weber, 2020). This principle was resurrected in 1981, in the monumental document which put an official end to the cultural revolution and started the Reform and Opening-up, viz. ‘Resolution on certain questions in the history of our party since the founding of the People’s Republic of China’ (Chinese Communist Party, 1981).

(T)he principal contradiction within the country was no longer the contradiction between the working class and the bourgeoisie but between the demand of the people for rapid

economic and cultural development and the existing state of our economy and culture... The Party indicated that economic construction must be carried out in the light of China's conditions and in conformity with economic and natural laws ... that active efforts must be made to promote economic and technical cooperation with other countries on the basis of independence and self-reliance (Ibid.).

Nevertheless, we cannot underestimate the possibility that FDI helped China to complete 'unfinished proletarianization' (see Pun, 2005; Pun and Lu, 2010). In this process, economic growth was credited to the reforms and the opening-up of Chinese socialism. At the same time, the suffering of migrant labour was imputed to the very nature of (mostly foreign) capitalism. Once the patriotic 'independence and self-reliance' recalled 'the century history of humiliation' only in order to stir up nationalism against foreign capital, the state seemed less responsible for the uneven development. Quite counteractively, some people believe it is part of the truth of Deng Xiaoping's popular proposal:

(S)ome areas and some people can get rich first, lead and help other regions and people, and gradually achieve common prosperity (Lanteigne, 2019, pp. 58).

Needless to say, the ideology undergirded by nationalism, can hardly defend itself when it comes to 'conflicts among the people' (*xenmin neibu maodun*) rather than 'those between ourselves and the enemy' (*dijiao maodun*) (see Mao, 1957), such as the conflict-ridden rural land acquisition and conversion. The tug-of-war between the central and local authorities over land management, often under the rubric of food security vis-a-vis economic development, witnessed a skyrocketing real estate price vis-a-vis generous industrial land use in the city centre and suburban (Ho, 2001). In contrast to this, it was until the late 2000s that the compensation scheme for the landless and sometimes displaced peasants started to acknowledge the fact that the rural land (on the urban fringe) was no longer a means of agricultural production but played a role of 'welfare' exclusive to rural *hukou* holders, including the seasonal-proletariat migrant workers who were excluded from urban welfare provision (cf. Wen, 2000).

The limit of race-to-bottom inter-jurisdictional competition

Municipal governments of emerging and existing cities in this wave more actively engaged in pursuing a land-centred growth-oriented agenda. So long as the inter-city competition for hyper-mobile international capital in the US or centrally-prescribed grants in the UK for urban regeneration could find their resemblance and replications in Chinese cities, the actually

existing scenario in the latter was much more systematic, profound, and dramatic than the former (Tao and Su, 2021).

For the majority of the duration of this wave, mayors in China were *de jure* landlords. They could transfer land-use rights at zero or even negative prices, as long as the transaction was deemed strategically valuable to local development (see Cheung, 2014). This development ethos was fundamentally different from the piecemeal, project-based entrepreneurial urbanism in the Anglo-liberal world. Nevertheless, this ethos resonated with neoliberalism when the municipal government used local *hukou* as a legal excuse to shirk its obligation of providing duly welfare for migrant workers. The mass congregation in cities, recalling the doctrine of size-based city planning and the regulatory system, were seen as both labours for production and the source of disorder (cf. Friedman, 2018).




Figure 4.3 Circulation of capital in the second wave of urbanisation

Source: Drawn by the author

In a nutshell, the second wave of anti-settlement urbanisation was an ‘unintentional

consequence' (Sun and Zhou, 2013) triggered by an institutional transformation to cope with the state-political crisis caused by the preceding economic crisis. The reconfiguration of the interlaced institutional relations during this wave was absolute, be that central vis-à-vis local, inter-local, intra-local, infra-state or state vis-à-vis market. In many cases, existing networks or arrangements were entirely bypassed by the policy before they collapsed as the institutional terrain was restructured.

At the local level, land use rights became the policy nexus around which the incumbent and newly arrived institutions and agencies networked. Instead of creating more spontaneous and bottom-up corporatism, institutions were invested with local power and then coerced to follow the tighter central guideline. The state ambition was to create a 'socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics' (see Jiang, 2006) or embrace the market without universal private property. The due importance attached to this antithesis, i.e. both the incorporation of the market competition and the hold to public ownership, led to urban development as well as capital initiatives. Local networks were often formed from scratch.

Addressing social problems through the promotion of economic growth gave rise to the financialisation of land use right and foregrounded the private sector's central position in localities but did not disenfranchise local government. This is, to some extent, because the private sector in China was primarily led by FDI which could exert massive economic influence through purchasing power but less obviously through political impact owing to the 'self-reliance and independence' narrative adopted by the state. Previously, the incentive for foreign capital involvement was primarily confined to a few Special Economic Zones and development zones authorised by the central state; in this wave the 'small number early adopters was joined by a rush of emulators, culminating in mature-phase saturation' (Peck, 2014a, pp. 397).

China's march towards being the world's factory exposed the country to periodic global fluctuations like the financial crisis in 1997 and 2008, which coincided with the birth and proliferation of UIDCs. This coincidence was only possible when UIDCs represented financial corporatism between the central and local states, which hinged upon the land use quota (see Zhu, 2005). Overlapping institutional remits and shifting power with established relationships did not directly result in the network's restructuring. Justified by the very nature of SOEs, which served the hardcore of socialism, a quick-fix transformation of national and local economic terrain was achieved regardless of underdevelopment and the breakdown of local networks within and beyond the state.

Centrally-prescribed municipal corporatism produced indirect economic and social spin-offs. On the one hand, the enclosure movement with Chinese characteristics (see Zhang, 2015) witnessed many landless peasants, migrant workers and laid-off SOE employees. On the other hand, the covert crony-capitalism between state power elites and foreign capital was no longer a secret (Pearson, 1997; Wank, 1999; Wu, 2007; Dickson, 2008; Pei, 2016). Not to mention that all of these were unevenly expressed in time, space, scale and territory. Nevertheless, to address these spin-offs before they gathered enough momentum to endanger the party state's leadership, partnerships between the state and market were remade.

Wave Three: Just-in-time urbanism (till ?)

Since the second half of the 2000s, a series of urban-entitled initiatives were introduced to strengthen the seemingly sustainable elements while mitigating the problematic aspects detectable in the previous waves (see Table 4.3). Nevertheless, it was not until the 2008 worldwide financial crash that the very nature of these initiatives was laid bare.

To alleviate the detrimental impacts of the financial crisis and the Sichuan earthquake on the domestic economy, the Chinese central government rolled out a 'four trillion RMB' investment package in two successive years since late 2008. Few would doubt that this stimulus provided a 'soft landing' for the suddenly-crashed domestic and (world) economy (cf. Harvey, 2016). Meanwhile, wide criticism also pointed out that the 'economy-wide massive stimulus' (*dashui manguan*) only exacerbated and delayed the emergence of many existing tricky problems entrenched in the debt-driven municipal corporatism formed between UIDCs and the financial market (cf. Shen, 2013). The pressing conundrum manifests in a variety of forms: excess capacity in many manufacturing sectors; a speculatively-high leverage ratio in the financial market; and unemployment in migrant labour (cf. Vice Premier Liu, 2018). Notable examples of these issues include the excessive consumption of cement (cf. Harvey, 2016) and property over-speculation in 'ghost towns' where the provision of space had decoupled from actual needs. Not to mention the increasingly unbearable environmental cost.

Out of the urgency to tackle these problems emerged the consensus that 'urban development is a natural and historical process with its own laws' (Central urban work conference, 2015). As an integral part of this 'law' and the central mechanism engineering the anti-settlement urbanism in the last wave, *hukou policies* remains the focus of reform and debate. Drawing from the actually-existing policies towards a 'people-oriented urbanisation', as has been claimed, it might be more appropriate to call this wave 'just-in-time' urbanism (cf. Friedman, 2018).

Table 4.3 Just-in-time Urbanism (till ?)

	Urban and Rural Planning Act	Shantytown Area Renovation	Public Private Partnership	New-type Urbanisation Planning (2014-2020)	Local Government Special Bonds	Taxation Reform	Real Estate Investment Trust
Established	2008	2008	2013	2014	2008	2016	2020
Location	National	National	National	National	National	National	Pilot cities
Remit	Rural areas are included in the legal master planning system	Stimulation of economic growth and job creation		Coordinated regional development and 19 national city-clusters		Replace business tax with VAT and allocate 50% of VAT revenue to localities	Infrastructure asset securitisation
Agencies involved	Local and national planning authorities	Local authorities and national government, the Banking system	DRC, MoF, Bank	State council.	MoF	MoF	China Securities Regulatory Commission, National Development and Reform Commission
Method of financial allocation		Pledged Supplementary Lending	Specific bank loan				

Source: Compiled by the author from Zhang *et al.* (2015); Ministry of Finance (2015 [No.64], 2015[No. 83], 2020[43]); State Council (2019 [21]); China Securities Regulatory Commission (2020 [No. 40])

In this wave, settling down ‘three 100 million’ people before 2020 became the focus as a result of the initial proposal by Premier Li Keqiang (2014) in the 2014 Report on the Work of the Government. More specifically, this ambitious endeavour includes

- (i) granting urban citizenship to 100 million rural people who have moved to cities;
- (ii) rebuilding rundown city areas and villages inside cities where around 100 million people live; and
- (iii) guiding the urbanization of around 100 million rural residents of the central and western regions in cities there.

The path towards ‘people-oriented urbanisation’ (see 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 2013) did not involve eradicating all the restrictions on migration settlement. Instead, this ambitious agenda, as it could be best called, built upon the size-based management scheme and acknowledged the differences in inter-regional development. ‘National New-type Urbanisation Planning (NUP) 2014-2020’ (State Council, 2014) spatialised this scheme by suggesting the development of 19 city-clusters, while also foreshadowing other changes:

- (i) orderly empowering equal entitlement to public services for rural-urban immigrants by fully removing *hukou* restrictions in small towns and cities, and relaxing them in middle-sized cities;
- (ii) coordinating the development of city clusters by strengthening the leading role of core cities while rapidly developing small and medium-sized cities and towns;
- (iii) encouraging compact urban development by reducing per-capita construction and land use, and optimising the internal spatial structure of cities by promoting the renovation of the inner-city and regulating the building of new towns;
- (iv) improving essential public services and, by enhancing public transport, affordable housing and the social safety net;
- (v) mitigating the urban vis-à-vis rural dichotomy by gradually unifying the construction land use market in urban areas and that in rural areas under integrated planning; and
- (vi) diversifying the funding channel of urbanisation by encouraging government bonds, property taxes and the introduction of private capital.

‘Partnership’ is just another word

Disguised as a clear-cut action plan regarding people-oriented urbanisation, these guidelines lay bare the failures of previous waves. In this regard, it would be futile to grasp the causal relationship between a diversified funding channel and people-oriented urbanisation proposed in the last entry. Rather, the real question is how did non-diversified sources of funding contribute to the failures of previous attempts?

As shown diagrammatically in Figure 4.3, the success of new local state corporatism between CDB and UIDCs was dependent on the sustainable inflow of FDI. When the financial crisis in 2008 struck China's export-oriented industry and led to massive unemployment amongst migrant workers, the central government responded with a four-trillion stimulus package. The stimulus policy through the UIDC helped China and the world economy to have a soft landing, but also tended to exacerbate the existing problem, i.e. the local government's debt-driven development (Deng and Todd, 2016; Zhengxin research institute at Central University of Finance and Economics., 2017). As most UIDCs' corporate bonds entered maturity after four years since 2009, the low profitability of most UIDCs started to draw wide attention (Pan *et al.*, 2017). This 'underperformance' has everything to do with UIDCs' very nature of being the financial vehicles of local government and lacking operational capacity. Nevertheless, neither the local and central government nor the financial sector would like to see widespread insolvency, which might result in systematic economic turmoil.

Only in this context can we understand why people-oriented urbanism requires a diversified channel of financing. Likewise, the refashioning of Public-Private Partnership (PPP), this time initiated by the Ministry of Finance in 2013, was also a strategic response to the selective institutional environment. Lou Jiwei, then Minister of Finance, outlined how the partnership and the competitive allocation of resources would feed off each other, bringing a new zest to the sustainable development of cities. He argued that:

PPP is not simply a financing method for the government. Instead, it is a new way of state governance, a governance model renovation with a high fusion of government and market, and it contributes to the transformation of government functions, deepening the financial system reform and letting the market play a decisive role in the allocation of resources (Lou, 2019).

Upholding the decisive role of the market might sound bland for other market economies but this reflected the Chinese government's sense of urgency to recalibrate its duty boundary and envisage its future role in the national economy. In this vision, the local government should be

(i) less obsessed with local GDP growth; (ii) have a less off-balance-sheet budget, (iii) stop borrowing via affiliated financing vehicles, but (iv) provide more public services to help settle down the migrant population (State Council, 2014 [No. 43]). In practical terms, the problem became one of who was to pay for the gap in expenditure on social services. A new-type developmental PPP was such a solution, according to Lou (2019):

The urbanisation ratio in China is 59.58% according to the permanent resident population, but only 43% according to the household registered population, so there is a big room for improvement in filling in the gap, but relying only on government input is far from enough...Some areas have boldly innovated, actively practiced and carved out developmental PPP as a new type of partnership between government and non-governmental capital, which efficiently solved both the underinvestment of the public and incentive compatibility of the private. Unlike the single project-based PPP, developmental PPP is a new type of PPP based upon the holistic development and management of the area. In this partnership, social capital is responsible for providing industry development-centred integrated service including infrastructure, public service, investment courtship and urban management. Also, a certain ratio of newly added government revenue would be allocated to the non-governmental capital as the return of investment (Ibid).

Recalling the second wave of municipal corporatism pivoting around UIDC, one cannot help but wonder what is genuinely new about PPP (beyond merely being yet another descriptor). In terms of public finance, this round of urbanism focused on strengthening local fiscal revenue to pay back the *interest* of various formats of governmental debt, viz. the principal. The local government-affiliated financing vehicles were requested to decouple from their affiliated government organs to become independent (state-owned) enterprises, after resolving the debt relationship with the local government. The central government also introduced special bonds in 2015, 20 years after banning municipal bonds since 1994, to swap some stock debt of the local government and support specific social welfare purposes.

Meanwhile, policy banking also became the foci of market-oriented reform. Indeed, it was because of the financial crisis in 2008 that CDB turned away from ongoing commercialisation reform (cf. Anderlini, 2009; Xu, 2017). Before that, CDB's increasingly ponderous scale, resulting from the *de jure* back of state credit on one hand, and the participation of *de facto* commercial urban development on the other, drew wide criticism. Some even argued that this was, in essence, financial arbitrage (see Gao, 2007; Guo, 2008; Zhang, 2007). In tackling the aftermath of the financial crisis, CDB has played an incomparable role which brushed against

many critics' impressions, to the extent that full commercialisation prototyped on western financial institutions was no longer an ideal option for its reform. It was not to indicate a return to the 'old path' of policy banking. Instead, the post-stimulus developmental loan realigned more closely with specific purposes, such as the PPP program and the shanty area renovation, thus putting an annual cap on the support for commercial projects. Meanwhile, since 2014, CDB had started to undertake the central bank's mortgage supplement loans as an additional funding source. This move did not shake the fact that the Ministry of Finance remains the majority shareholder but is still attempting to offset the aftermath of the fiscal stimulus with innovative monetary policy (see Zhang, 2019).

This round of PPP was not a simple renaming of UIDCs, nor a refashioning of the franchising already existent in China (see Wang, Ke and Xie, 2012). The most significant difference lay in the establishment of a nationwide integrated PPP platform. After intense preparation, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) promulgated the 'Operational Guide for PPP (trial)' in November of 2014. This top-down state initiative heralded the first explosion of PPP projects. To better supervise the whole life cycle of PPP projects and establish a unified, standardized and transparent PPP big market, the Ministry of Finance built the China Public Private Partnerships Centre (CPPPC) as a national, comprehensive, online PPP information platform in March 2015. This centre had implemented online supervision, dynamic data analysis and case sharing of all PPP projects nationwide since 2013. Up to December 18th, 2020 (CPPPC, 2020), 9822 projects have passed the assessment and entered into implementation period with a gross investment of 152117 billion yuan (roughly £1553 billion British pounds). Compared with the UK, where 'PPPs have delivered £56 billion of private sector capital investment in over 700 UK infrastructure projects' in more than three decades (see Government of United Kingdom, 2017), the speed and magnitude of Chinese PPP are unrivalled.

Except for the 'carrot', there is also a 'stick' that contributes to the rise of PPP. In early 2014, the State Council (2014 [No. 43]) issued several opinions on the administration of local governmental debts, which (i) forbade the local government from continuing borrowing via the affiliated SOEs such as UIDCs; (ii) allowed the local government to issue Local Government Special Bond through the platform administered by the provincial government; (iii) encouraged the local government to adopt PPP; and (iv) suggested the local government free UIDCs from the role of LGFVs. Understandably, some scholars focused on governmental debt argued that this stipulation signalled the real commencement of the PPP.

As we shall see in the case of Jiyan, the centrally-prescribed PPP has non-linear and

sometimes unexpected implications on local political economy. Except for a few cases, most emerging partnerships are established between the public agency and state-owned enterprises (see Table 4.5). The projected developmental PPP with Chinese characteristics found its counterpart in Jiyuan, but not in the prescribed format (see Chapter 5). The outstanding issue is, whether or not the name of a partnership has swayed the deserved attention towards more fundamental change. After all, the alien innovation of PPP is a prerequisite of its inherent paradox: connoted in its name is a *de jure* supply-side policy which invites profit-driven capital and competition; however, the expectation from policy designer is a *de facto* demand-side policy that fills in the gap between the demand and supply of social services.

Urbanisation: Just in time, right in place?

Friedman (2018, pp. 506) remarked that ‘any capitalist urban state oriented toward accumulation and domination’ hopes to ‘precisely deploy specific kinds of labour power as needed, at as low a cost as possible, while avoiding waste, overpopulation and (presumed) attendant political chaos’ (Ibid., 503). By granting migrants ‘access to local citizenships ... if they fulfil a specific, state-determined, need in the labor market’ (Ibid, 503); Friedman goes on to explain that, China is attempting to develop a form of technocratic biopolitics and ‘just-in-time’ (JIT) urbanisation, recalling the ‘just-in-time’ Toyota production system.

Friedman's observation gained vast repercussions, particularly when the attention of research into Chinese urbanisation was directed towards the continued reluctance of megacities to grant *hukou* to migrants. Furthermore, it feeds into the decades-long debate on size-based city management guidelines (see Zhao and Zhou, 2002; Zhao, Zhou and Cao, 2002; Xiao and Liu, 2018). However, the JIT perspective's real value would be much underplayed if taken as an ahistorical and aspatial portrayal of the status quo or the end-goal of China's urbanisation. Instead, there is a need to zoom out from these megacities to the overall picture of Chinese urbanisation and then zoom in on the emerging ordinary cities that are home to the most urban population but are often left off the map.

Moreover, the changing tides of urbanism also pose an essential question for urban entrepreneurialism: is it necessary to continually remodel this approach if we are to understand the new urban policies which appear beyond the scope of the orthodox theory, e.g. the rural collective asset shareholding in following sections? A short answer: yes, there is always a need to keep the approach adaptive and not to refuse dialogue with any localised ‘new’ wave of urbanism. Beyond that, it entails equal, if not greater rigour to rule out the possibility that

underlying successive waves lie some continuing yet unrevealed ethos. The merits this approach continues to bring are summarised in the following two points.

First, strategy, agent behaviour, institutional form and partnerships are four overlapping categories through which we can observe the uneven local effects of three waves. Policies redistributed power across institutions and interacted selectively with existing asymmetries to produce new relationships. Few, if any localities would like to be left reeling when a new tide arrived; even that tide may require an alternate set of institutional and political arrangements. The cumulative effect of successive waves of local restructuring rendered the institutional landscape partially resembling that observed in some UK or US cities (see Figure 4.2). This left room for explaining China's changing urban political economy with the UK or US-born theories (see Chapter 2). However, each wave's mutually distinct and disruptive feature, and the likelihood of orchestrating them into one narrative of a 'Chinese model of urbanisation', continues to defy the easy analogy.

Second, implicit in this approach is a caution against the under-theorisation of 'people' in a 'civilisation-state' (cf. Coker, 2019), which is evident in the narrative of China's urbanisation. If policy rhetoric entails this strategic ambiguity, similar taciturnity in academic research begs further explanation (cf. Zhou *et al.*, 2018). No doubt that there have been many obstacles blocking such an attempt, particularly with the persisting institutional unequal treatment of the peasants, be it the under-priced agricultural product before 1978, migration restriction until 1992, or unjust acquisition of rural land with negligible compensation until the late 2000s. Nevertheless, given the popularity of the catchphrase that 'I am a child of peasants' among both high-level Chinese civil officials and communist party cadres (Fu, 2016), one may refrain from imaging Chinese peasants as 'a sack of potatoes (Marx, 2008 [1852], pp. 124) or taking their self-sacrifice for granted.

4.3 The city assembled

Section 4.2 teased out the evolving *ethos* of urbanism in China through iterative encounters between the concepts in the proposed framework and the more 'native language' (cf McGee, 1991) used to caricature the same process. This reworked analysis of forty years of urbanisation highlighted the crisis-driven and state-engineered reforms, their discursive-cum-institutional impacts on the local landscape and the formation and dissolution of, as well as shifting power geometries within, partnerships. This section zooms in on the municipality of Jiyuan, an emerging city whose urbanisation has been an integral part of that of China. Instead

of seeing the emerging city as a passive recipient of supralocal changes, this section explores the ‘local effects’ of global and national changes in such a strategic-relational manner that supralocal policy effects combine with local conditions to produce contingent consequences at particular conjunctures (see Figure 2.1). It foregrounds how different scale-specific articulations coexist in one place and emphasises both the relational and territorial nature of the local state restructuring. In this sense, the two contemporary urban policies in Jiyuan, which will be investigated in greater detail in Chapter 5 and 6, is better contextualised at the frontier of ongoing urbanisation, because they have to orchestrate the pre-existing historical context and incoming challenges.

Jiyuan

Being listed as a national demonstration area of industry-city integration put Jiyuan at the forefront of the third wave of people-oriented urbanisation. Prior to this few outsiders of the city would know that Jiyuan got its name as the Fountainhead (*yúán*) of *Jǐ* river, one of the four largest ancient rivers stretching across China. *National New-type Urbanisation Planning* provides a strategic opportunity to Jiyuan, for that Jiyuan has not accumulated the dramatic urban *vis-a-vis* rural dichotomy but has nurtured an urban economy relatively friendly to rural-to-urban migration. Since the beginning of the new millennium, Jiyuan has outperformed most of the other seventeen intra-provincial municipalities in both the per capita rural resident income and urban-rural resident income ratio (see Figure 4.4).




Figure 4.4 Jiyuan’s intra-province performance in terms of urban-rural integration

Source: Original data from Henan Province Statistical Yearbooks (2002-2019), calculated by the author.

Note: Urban-rural income ratio = urban residents' disposable income per capita / rural residents' net income per capita.

The comparatively balanced development is not natural sediment of the accumulative waves of urbanism. Likewise, being listed as a provincial and national pilot field for the latest top-down policy experimentation does not guarantee a prosperous future. Nevertheless, this event might have an instant impact on visions for local development, as other significant historical events have done since the 1980s (see Table 4.4).

Table 4.4 Jiyuan's evolving development vision since 1981

Year	Key event	Development vision
1981	Third-front movement	A new socialist industrial town based on supporting the agricultural industry and led by chemical coal and building materials industry
1988	Upgraded from a country to be a county-level city	A regional core city with low-pollution industries and tourism-oriented development
1994	First entered the top 100 economically strong counties in China	A provincially renowned historical and cultural city, a regional trade, transportation and economic centre in northwest Henan and southeast Shanxi Province, a national energy base, a modern industrial and tourism city
1998	Upgraded to be a sub-prefecture-level city ¹²	A national energy base, a renowned historical and cultural city and a core city in northwest Henan and southeast Shanxi Province.
2006	Designated as one of the pilot cities implementing urban-rural integration	A national energy base, a provincial renowned historical and cultural city, and an emerging industrial and tourism city
2012	Joined the Central Plains Economic Zone plan approved by the central government	A burgeoning core city, an advanced manufacturing and energy base; a model city for urban-rural integration in the Central Plains Economic Zone.
2019	Listed as a national demonstration area of industry-city integration	Industry-city coordinated, urban-rural integrated development

Source: Urban-rural master planning of Jiyuan City: 2012-2030; Government Work Report of Jiyuan City: 1997-2019.

By no means complete, the development visions outlined in the six rounds of master planning still provided a significant entry point to understand the trajectory of the territorial economy of Jiyuan. It is worth highlighting here that the administrative upgrade constitutes a crucial

¹² Note: Sub-prefecture-level city is an unofficial administrative rank of Chinese cities. It is officially considered to be a county-level city, but the cadres assigned to its government are half a level higher in rank than those of an ordinary county-level city, yet still lower than those of a prefecture-level city. While county-level cities are administered by prefecture-level cities, sub-prefecture-level cities are often administered directly by the provincial government.

reason to renew the horizon of development, apart from the needs of/for economic growth and spatial expansion and the need to align with extra-local policy conditions (see Figure 4.5). Understood in this way, the urbanisation of Jiyuan has been associated with its evolving administrative position in the intra-provincial urban hierarchy. Before 1988, Jiyuan was registered as a rural county. Upgraded to a county-level city in 1988, Jiyuan then moved on to become a sub-prefecture-level city in 1997, equipped itself with prefecture-level city leaders in 2008¹³, and obtained its *de facto* prefecture-level treatment as ‘national demonstration area for coordinated industry and urban development’ (*chan cheng ronghe shifanqu*). As is suggested (see Cartier, 2015; cf. Chien, 2013; Li, 2015), Chinese cities have to be understood within the system of party-state administrative divisions, where local cadres directly benefit from the upgrade of a city’s administrative level. Therefore, the making of Chinese cities is deeply entangled with the (re)production of state power.

In a sense, the trajectory of administrative upgrade epitomized Jiyuan’s urbanisation process as a dynamic result of the reciprocal interaction between the general context of decentralisation and local development. With every round of administrative upgrades came the local government’s additional discretionary power (see Party history research office of Jiyuan, 2016), which contributed to Jiyuan’s economic growth and fed back into another upgrade. Since 1988, Jiyuan’s built-up area expanded from 6 km² to 41 km² in 2010, and 56 km² in 2017 (Figure 4.5). Meanwhile, its GDP per capita in Jiyuan frequently ranked in the top two since 2010, second only to Zhengzhou, the capital city of Henan province. In 2012, for the first time in history, Jiyuan’s urban population outnumbered its rural population, and the ratio of urbanisation kept climbing rapidly, reaching 61.05% in 2017. Of the total population of over 720,000, 440,000 are permanent urban residents compared to 290,000 urban *hukou* holders.

¹³ China’s party-state system comprises four major bureaucratic hierarchies: provincial/ministry level (*Sheng-bu ji*), prefecture/department level (*Di-ting ji*), county/division level (*Xian-chu ji*), and township/section level (*Xiang-ke ji*).




Figure 4.5 The spatial expansion of urban Jiyuan city since 1988

Source: Compiled by the author from different sources.

Jiyuan's growing economic prominence and urbanisation rested upon its specialisation in the smelting industry. Widely known (or stigmatized) as China's 'lead city', Jiyuan smelted and produced a quarter of the country's lead and a significant share of its silver (Zhang and Cheng, 2018). In 2019, the secondary industry made up over 60% of the city's GDP, down from a high of 76% in 2011. By contrast, agriculture still dominates local labour, employing nearly 150,000 people, more than manufacturing (over 130,000), retail trade (over 40,000) and construction (over 30,000) (Henan Provincial Statistical Yearbook 2019, pp. 112-113). The five

largest non-governmental employers in the city of Jiyuan are Foxconn Precision Electronic (the contract producer for Apple Inc.), Henan Jiyuan Iron & Steel (Group), Henan Yuguang Gold and Lead Group, Jiyuan Wanyang Smeltery Group, and Gongyi Xinghua Machinery Manufacturing, all of which are large manufacturing companies.

Despite its intra-provincial advantage compared to other county-level cities which did not get upgraded, Jiyuan does not seem to possess the potential for becoming a big city-region. Seated in northwest Henan province and bordering Shanxi province to its southeast, Jiyuan remains the smallest municipality in terms of both territory area (1931 square km²) and population (720,000) among its intra-provincial counterparts (see Figure 4.6). Geomorphically, 88 per cent of Jiyuan's landscape is mountainous or hilly. As the only sub-prefecture-level city in Henan Province, Jiyuan does not have a subordinate district-tier government and is comprised directly of eleven townships and five street offices (*jiedao banshichu*)¹⁴.

Henan province is one of the most populous (with circa 100 million permanent residents) and agricultural provinces, contributing to one of the most considerable troops of migrant workers in China. Under pressure from large-scale population outflow to coastal and more developed regions, Jiyuan's gradual population growth was impressive at an annual average of 1.73% between 2000 and 2010. Nevertheless, a decade average growth ratio might fail to reveal the much more dramatic urbanisation of the population. From 2003 to 2008, the proportion of permanent urban residents in Jiyuan accelerated at an average annual rate of 2.8 per cent, compared to an average annual rate of 1.5 per cent between 2009 and 2014 (Jiyuan Bureau of Statistics, 2016). Meanwhile, the real estate market had been lukewarm until 2015, even with the continuous effort of local government to move the peasants upstairs into high-rise housing under the name of 'new type rural community'. First hitting 3000 *yuan* in 2015, the real estate price of Jiyuan doubled in 2018 to over 6000 *yuan* per square metre. In the same year, residents' per capita disposable income was just over 2000 *yuan* per month.

¹⁴ Although rare, similar administrative (re)configurations can be found in the city of Dongguang and Zhongshan in Guangdong province in south-eastern China.




Figure 4.6 Location and administrative boundary of Jiyuan City

Source: Compiled by the author.

Recall that the three waves of crisis-driven urbanisation unfolded in a temporally and spatially uneven way. Situated in Henan province and China, the economic and spatial development of Jiyuan is an assemblage of many strands which have not always been in tune with the extra-local trend. To name a few, in the 1980s Jiyuan did not outrun intra-provincial counterparts by developing TVEs. Instead, sticking to local SOE development in the 1990s witnessed the local economic takeoff, against a massive trend of local SOE privatisation. Moreover, there has not been any significant engagement with FDI inflow until 2008, when Foxconn, the Fortune Global 500 Taiwanese multinational electronics contract manufacturer, decided to move westward from coastal China. In turning to the opportunity and challenge brought by the latest wave of urbanism to Jiyuan, we can better appreciate these localised histories and geographies beneath the standardised institutional form of (public-private) partnership and (urban-rural) dichotomy.

Table 4.5 China Public Private Partnerships Centre-listing PPP programs in Jiyuan

No.	Project ame	Listed since	Contract period	Gross investment (million yuan)	Payment mechanism	Shareholding structure of special purpose vehicle (government/local SOE/local private firm/non-local SOE/non-local private, %)	Financing ratio	Executive body
1	Jiyuan Sewage Disposal Plant	2016/2	25 years	262.29	Government payment	0/0/0/100/0	≤80%	Bureau of Housing and Urban and Rural Construction
2	New campus for Jiyuan Vocational College	2016/2	17 years	281.72 with earmarked funding	Viability gap funding	0/89/0/11/0	80%	Jiyuan Vocational College
3	Foxconn public rental housing	2016/2	30 years	257.88 with earmarked funding	Viability gap funding	35/65/0/0/0	70%	Bureau of Housing and Urban and Rural Construction
4	Jiyuan-Luoyang West highway	2016/4	30 years	2471.00	Viability gap funding	25/0/0/75/0	80%	Bureau of Transport
5	Jiyuan's rural domestic sewage disposal project: Phase 1	2016/10	30 years	190.56	Viability gap funding	10/0/0/90/0	79%	Office of Urban-Rural Integration (later changed to Bureau of Housing and Urban and Rural Construction)
6	Urban domestic waste treatment	2018/5	20 years	337.14	Government payment	0/0/100/0/0	80%	Bureau of Housing and Urban and Rural Construction
7	S308 road reconstruction	2018/5	15 years	155.60	Government payment	0/NA/0/NA/0	80%	Bureau of Highway
8	Five bundled road projects	2018/5	17 years	318.54	Government payment	0/100/0/0/0	80%	Bureau of Transport
9	S306 road reconstruction	2018/5	15 years	233.02	Government payment	0/NA/0/NA/0	80%	Bureau of Highway
10	Municipal pipe network	2018/5	17 years	344.70	Government payment	0/30/0/70/0	80%	Bureau of Housing and Urban and Rural Construction

11	A bundled project of municipal roads in 2017	2018/5	16 years	712.28	Government payment	0/0/0/0/100	74%	Bureau of Housing and Urban and Rural Construction
12	S230 road reconstruction	2018/6	15 years	487.69	Government payment	0/40/0/60/0	80%	Bureau of Highway
13	Yugong road primary school	2018/6	12 years	120.58 with earmarked funding	Government payment	0/99/0/1/0	75%	Bureau of Education
14	S240, S310 road and bridge reconstruction	2018/6	15 years	515.89	Government payment	0/NA/0/NA/0	80%	Bureau of Highway
15	National reserve forest base construction	2019/02	30 years	192.162	Viability gap funding	0/NA/ NA / NA /0	N/A	Bureau of Forestry
16	Jiyuan Passenger hub station	2020/7	20 years	101,053	Viability gap funding	Not disclosed yet	N/A	N/A
17	Urban central heating project (phase II)	2021/2	30 years	37.4532	Viability gap funding	Not disclosed yet	N/A	N/A

Source: Jiyuan of Finance (2019) and CPPPC (2020a)

Re-visioning partnership

Jiyuan did not demonstrate a proactive response to the calling of PPP by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) before the State Council (2014) issued several opinions on the administration of local governmental debts. After all, the model of developmental PPP in Gu'an, of which Minister of Finance Lou spoke highly, was more like an outlier than a precursor (Xiong, 2019). There are currently fourteen partnership-based projects listed in the China Public Private Partnerships Center (CPPPC) administered by the MoF (Table 4.5).

Much like the rest of China (CPPPC, 2020b), ongoing PPP projects in Jiyuan stay in the comfort zones rather than the developmental cutting edge, focusing on providing conventional municipal facilities. Funding-wise, four of the fourteen projects were partially funded by government fiscal expenditure and partially funded by long-term user fee charges. The other ten projects were fully covered by government revenue¹⁵. In the Special Purpose Vehicles for bidding and undertaking these projects, the private side is dominantly represented by SOEs, except a listed local private company. Similar situations prevail nationwide according to the data released by CPPPC.

As requested, the local UIDCs, which played the financing vehicle for local government had to decouple from the affiliated government before joining the Special Purpose Vehicles (also see Chapter 5). Nevertheless, not every decoupled UIDC relied on PPP projects for survival. Also, a more transparent financial boundary between the UIDCs and local governments does not mean the former plays less strategic roles in local developments. Therefore, it is too early to say whether this round of self-proclaimed PPP indicates a phase-change in local corporatism between the government, public enterprises (earlier TVEs and later SOEs, including UIDCs & LGFVs) and financial sectors. What is certain is that it selectively draws upon existing 'local municipal corporatism' in Jiyuan, and to whose underexplored genealogy we now turn.

As I have briefly mentioned, the local real estate market in Jiyuan remained lukewarm until 2016, despite the speedy expansion of built-up areas. Before that and perhaps until now, the 'municipal corporatism' in Jiyuan has pivoted around the manufacturing industry. In a sense,

¹⁵ It is worth noting that projects fully covered by government payment were put on stricter regulation by the MoF (2017 [No. 7]) since the promulgation of 'Notice on resolutely stopping local governments from illegal and unlawful financing in the name of purchasing services' [*Guanyu jianjue zhizhi difang yi zhengfu goumai mingyi weifa weigui rongzi de tongzhi*].

the seeds of ‘local state corporatism’ germinated anachronistically in the late 1980s in Jiyuan. During the golden time of TVEs development nationwide, the short boom of TVE between 1984 and 1987 in Jiyuan quickly came to a halt. Some argued that rural urbanisation in Pearl River Delta and Yangze River Delta in coastal China did not replicate their success in Jiyuan due to a ‘lack of skill, equipment, talent and infrastructure facilities’ (Research Team, 1996). With few other options, local cadres had to redirect the industrial policy to favour those small-size but potentially competitive SOEs affiliated with county government (Yang and Wu, 1995). This move made Jiyuan an unnoticed outlier in 1992, as one of the eighteen counties selected out of 108 intra-provincial counterparts by Governor Li Changchun (2016, pp. 473-681) for policy experiments. However, Jiyuan took good advantage of discretionary power¹⁶ and quickly outperformed another seventeen pilot counties during the Eighth Five-Year Plan period (1991-1995), with fiscal revenue soaring six-fold. Since 1994, Jiyuan became the first county in Henan Province to enter the Top 100 Counties by fiscal revenue, among over 2000 counterparts nationwide.

The heritage of that fast but ‘counterintuitive’ development period is twofold. In terms of ideology, it nurtured a belief that enterprise performance was a function of many factors beyond nominal ownership. Institutionally, it fostered a setting centred around the development and management of local SOEs. More counterintuitively, the grouping of the ‘too big to fall’ local SOEs, often through various mergers and acquisitions, foregrounded the role of the semi-official and semi-entrepreneurial SOE managers, who pushed the *de facto* privatisation further and further.

Recall that a series of economic reforms since 1994 drew the curtain for the second wave of anti-settlement urbanism by restricting the borrowing capacity of local government. The by-product of these reforms, i.e. the sweeping restructuring of SOEs and significant inward foreign investment, did not occur until the 21st century in Jiyuan.

Jiyuan’s leading SOEs, Henan Yuguang Gold & Lead Co. (YGLC) and Jiyuan Iron & Steel (Group) Co. (JISC), then the biggest single employers and fiscal revenue contributors, came into *de jure* ownership restructuring in 2002 and 2004, respectively. Nevertheless, their fates were genuinely different. Founded in 1958 in the nationwide ‘Great Leap Forward’ movement,

¹⁶ Discretionary power includes expanded approval rights of county government, stabilized tenure of the top leaders within counties, direct cadre management of county party secretaries and county magistrates by the provincial government, and direct submission of county projects to provincial departments for examination and approval.

JISC grew to be the largest local SOE in asset value, employee number, and tax contribution at the beginning of the 2000s. In the belief that ownership reform would be inevitable sooner or later with regards to the long-term development of the enterprise, the chairman of JSIC applied to the local government to launch the reform. After a year-long, conflict-ridden transformation, the state-owned equity was fully withdrawn via JSIC's employee buyout (EBO) scheme. Detailing the plan could be a task beyond the scope of this research. However, it is still worth mentioning that JSIC had kept their promise of not 'laying off workers, shirking workers' social insurance, or escaping the liabilities. This reform won the support of both municipal and provincial State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) and employees' congress. JISC became 'the first crab eater'¹⁷ of SOE privatisation in the iron and steel industry among one-hundred peers nationwide (Fu and Liu, 2003), and received credit as the 'provincial model' for SOE reform.

By contrast, two years later, Henan Yuguang Gold & Lead Co. (YGLC), the first-ever listed enterprise in Jiyuan and the world's second-largest lead smelting plant (BBC News 中文, 2009), became, without warning, the first 'victim' of a turn in state policy regarding SOE reform. With no specific explanation provided by central SASAC, much speculation (Peng, 2004; Wang, 2004) saw this as an early herald to central SASAC's subsequent pausing of the management buy-out (MBO) of large SOEs under public pressure. Questions around SOEs' privatisation were not about its necessity *per se* but the way to do it. Some pointed out that MBO lacked a legal framework and, in many cases, allowed SOEs' managers to shirk their responsibilities to their employees and the general public for their own benefits (Lang, 2004). Moreover, 'the nannies of a public asset borrow money from the bank to buy the owners out' or 'the chef monopolizing the communal pot' was not a brand-new question (see Qin, 1998; 2013[2004]; 2017).

Beyond that, the significant inflow of foreign investment spearheaded by Foxconn Inc, and the huge backflow of migrant labour, took place in the post-financial crisis period. Unlike coastal counterparts in the second wave of urbanism, local governments in the hinterland such as Henan Province and Jiyuan municipality could not wield the *hukou* system to shirk their responsibilities towards intra-territorial migrant labour. Consequently, they needed to more carefully balance the quadruple pressure of underemployment, underinvestment, industrial upgrade, and rising social expenditure. This did not mean that they would not fight as hard to court foreign capital, particularly judging from the case of Foxconn Inc., of which then

¹⁷ A Chinese phrase to portray the first mover in trying something new, with dauntless courage.

Provincial Governor Guo Gengmao himself took the lead, but maximum concessions were made in terms of land provision, taxation, and employment service, in exchange for overnight growth of jobs and export (see Chen, 2010). Besides, they had to make sure these backflow workers spent enough income on local service consumption. Therefore, the circulation of capital in Jiyan was somewhere in-between the scenarios portrayed diagrammatically in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.7.




Figure 4.7 The emerging ideal-type circulation of capital in the ‘people-oriented’ urbanism

Source: Drawn by the author.

Rebalancing dichotomy

In Harvey’s (1985a, pp. 15) theorisation, the development of entrepreneurial urbanism is simultaneously a process during which the once clear-cut division between the urban and rural spheres has softened, blurred, and even disintegrated. In empirical research, nonetheless, the urban-rural interface might warrant more meticulous attention than ever (e.g. India, see Smitha, 2016). In contrast to the sweeping calls for a New-type Urbanisation agenda to heavily invest in uplifting rural infrastructure and welfare, the once-prioritised rhetoric of integrated urban-

rural development in Jiyuan has given way to the current coordinated industry-city development scheme.

Back in 2005, Jiyuan has become Henan's pilot area for integrated urban-rural development. In retrospect, even though the second wave of urbanism was about to hit its sudden end nationally in 2008, Jiyuan's rural area revitalisation was pivoting around then well-tested urbanisation mode. Through tilted investment in agriculture and rural infrastructure and compensatory expenditure on peasants' welfare, underemployed rural labour was encouraged to take non-agrarian occupations in the township or city. Jobs were mainly provided through then fast-developing secondary industries (Duan, 2009). Critical economic interventionist decision-making and fiscal spending power were further delegated from the municipality to the township government, along with raised growth goals, and an increased personnel promotion incentive (see Guo, 2008; Wang, 2008; Mayor Zhao, 2009).

The majority of these policies echoed the new-type urbanisation, making up for the sacrifice made by agriculture, peasants and villages in the previous waves of (anti)urbanism. Nevertheless, the once well-established mechanism of urbanisation suddenly lost momentum in 2009, when Mayor Zhao Suping openly confessed the difficulty of further pushing urbanisation numerically through village consolidation and relocating peasants to multi-storey urban buildings provided by the government (Ye and Zhao, 2010). The mayor's complaints laid bare that trading land ownership for urban hukou and basic social welfare, or in another sense, unidirectional proletarianization was not an ideal option for a considerable number of peasants. Needless to say, land acquisition has become more laborious and controversial, despite increasing demand for land from inward investors.

The monodirectional, cheap rural labour and land potential-focused 'urban-rural integration' scheme faded out of fashion in late 2009 when Jiyuan experienced the painful aftermath of the global financial crisis and municipal leadership change. These changes also heralded a rhetoric and policy transition toward 'city-industry integration.' Credit-boosted by the central state (see Section 4.2), the Jiyuan municipality quickly abandoned City Master Planning of Jiyuan (2006-2020) and pushed through a much more ambitious Urban and Rural Planning of Jiyuan (2012-2030), under the leadership of Mayor He (2016), the successor to Mayor Zhao, and his then-deputy and later Mayor Wang (2016). This future-oriented planning expected to expand the planning land area to 80 km² compared to the 47.8 km² of its predecessor. This ambitious planning projected Jiyuan to accommodate a population of 760,000 in 2015, 840,000 in 2020, and 980,000 in 2030, with a steadily-increasing urbanisation ratio of 60%, 70%

and 85%, respectively. The new one did not keep the promise of spending over one-third of fiscal expenditure in agriculture, peasants and rural areas made by the previous government. Instead, intensive investment was injected into the fixed asset, focusing on demolishing and relocating urban and peri-urban villages for the sake of three industrial parks and city centre expansion (Jin, 2013).

Seeing another round of ‘enclosure movements’ looming, the new administration pushed forward the rural ownership reform and innovated rural financing, which was left unattended in the previous integration-oriented policy. Undergirding this policy redirection was the notion that a real urban-rural integration should premise on the equal exchange of urban and rural production factors; even if this was not the reality (He, 2013). The then-mayor, now Director of Henan Provincial Development and Reform Commission also argued (Ibid.) that the rural financial sector, which should be at the heart of the modern rural economy, remains perpetually underdeveloped, primarily because of a lack of institutional settings to make rural ‘assets’ legitimate collateral for financing.

According to this line of thought, the momentum of future urban-rural integration comes not only from continuing fiscal input to fill in the gap between basic public services, but the rural community’s self-enhancement through capitalisation. Shareholding reform of rural collective assets was thus proposed to cultivate new rural-market operators. Supposedly, these new market players would adopt the shareholding & cooperative structure internally, register as township and village enterprises (TVEs) externally, and be funded through the market-facilitated assetization of rural land, house, and other productive ecological resources.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter presented a genealogy of (entrepreneurial) urbanism in China and the city of Jiyuan that differs from those generated out of the contexts of North American and Western Europe. Drawing upon the additional concept of ‘waves of crisis-driven urbanism’, the evolving trajectory of post-Mao urbanisation in China was periodised into successive temporal and scalar containment-by-displacements of crisis tendencies. Building upon the framework presented in Figure 2.1, this chapter foregrounded two primary storylines: first, the partnership between government, the financial sector and enterprises; and second, the dynamic dual-track handling of the rural and urban sector.

The laying process of each wave constituted a necessary-cum-contingent background for local

agents' policy formulation. Through the strategic-relational reading of Jiyuan's concurrent urban initiatives, highlighting their (in)convergence with the extra-local trend, the discretely-scaled, aspatial reading of entrepreneurial urbanism theory is questioned. Therefore, two undergoing policies in Jiyuan against the wave of 'just-in-time urbanism', i.e. the Public-private Partnership and Shareholding Cooperatives of the rural collective asset, were both the result and the medium of central orchestration and local discretion.

The tentative causal explanation of Jiyuan's urban policies developed here will be further examined in the following chapters. Instead of presuming a (pseudo)partnership between the public vis-à-vis the private sector, Chapter 5 will explore the scale of the partnership by juxtaposing and comparing the strictly-defined PPP projects with a broader picture of existing partnerships in Jiyuan. On top of that, Chapter 6 will investigate the Shareholding Collective reform with a view towards an updated articulation of the urbanizing governance of the rural. The debt-wish of the rural collectives was cast back to the uneven topology of Jiyuan's urbanisation through a comparison of the selected urban village, peri-urban village and ex-urban village.

CHAPTER 5

Scaling and rescaling partnerships

5.1 Introduction

Stones from other hills may serve to polish the jade of this one (Chinese Proverb).

The most dangerous thing in politics is to fall captive to one's own formula that yesterday was appropriate, but is bereft of all content today (Leon Trotsky, 1933, *To Build Communist Parties and an International Anen*).

This chapter examines the role of partnerships in emerging forms of governance, focusing on the role of partnerships in formulating entrepreneurial urban policies and developing an entrepreneurial city in Jiyuan. This chapter builds upon Chapter 4, where I argued that the latest wave of private-public partnerships should be seen as an example of scale-specific chronotopic governance restructuring. This chapter takes that argument further by juxtaposing and comparing the narrowly-defined partnership with the other two actually-existing partnership variants. The intention here is to place partnerships, in the broadest sense of the word, at the centre of the explanation, and to follow a reworked methodology prescribed through the reworked theory of entrepreneurial urbanism (see Figure 2.1).

The purpose of this chapter is fourfold. First, it teases out generalisable, ideal types of partnerships from the account of political and institutional rescaling outlined in Chapter 4. Integral to each wave of local economic development since the 1980s was a series of partnership-inducing policies. Evolving scale-based practices or strategies, such as those used in the development of TVEs, UIDCs, or PPPs, underpins the importance of the state-market alliance. Meanwhile, economic and political actors have been more accustomed to stressing the importance of partnership in discursive claims. Attempting to understand the urbanisation process (in China and Jiyuan) without partnership is deemed incomplete. Second, the scale-centric interpretation of different forms of partnerships has much to say about how local strategies are formulated and prioritised. Third, I argue that entrepreneurial urbanism theory's reliance on a 'transition model' presumes a flat causality. The last section of this chapter renders problematic the underspecified form of, and over-reliance on, partnership in conventional entrepreneurial urbanism theory.

First, however, in section 5.2, I consider the scale of partnerships in theory and practice. The concern is not to provide a tight analytical definition of a ‘partnership’ (or ‘corporatism’, cf Jessop, 1996). Instead, the concept of the partnership is invoked to capture the multi-dimensional changes experienced by a given municipality. These changes represent temporally and spatially specific local responses to extra-local economic and political changes. Partnerships exist between institutions and agents, across spatial scales and through particular moments. Recent alterations in the *modus operandi* of urban governance proposed by the central government have rested a locality’s economic and social sustainability on strong and formal partnerships (cf. Xi, 2016). In contrast to the steady growth of theoretical enquiries into the necessity and mechanism behind this implied causality, the dramatic rise and fall of the partnership movement since late 2013 has shaken the interest of once-fervent practitioners (Wang and Wang, 2017). Returning to the discussion set out in Chapter 2, the effects of the strategically selective use of partnerships in entrepreneurial urban governance are delineated.

Section 5.3 moves on to construct three ideal types of partnership, pivoting around the concept of state rescaling. These types assemble several processes, the two most essential being the national politico-economic interpretation of global change and the form of business involvement in local strategic development, which was to create a new set of local institutions and induce local agents and institutions into ‘partnerships.’ These processes fused, producing particular sets of relationships in particular localities, making them norms and then promoting their replication. Due to their space-dependent and space-shaping characteristics, however, the geography of partnerships can be more granular and multidimensional than that prescribed by conventional urban entrepreneurialism. Three cases of partnerships in Jiyuan are examined to foreground their scale-contingent nature and highlight the variety of formulations around local strategy.

Finally, section 5.4 concludes that much work remains to be done to supplement the insights offered through existing urban entrepreneurialism analyses. The existing theory foregrounds the temporal phase-change in capital accumulation at the expense of the spatial heterogeneity of (public-private) partnerships. In the standard accounts, partnerships work within a model of transition towards the ‘annihilation of space by time’, e.g. the withering away of the urban vis-à-vis rural difference, as well as the dimming prospect of inter-locality cooperation in the face of inter-locality competition.

In this regard, the investigations into partnerships in Jiyuan have produced two achievements. First, they have enriched our knowledge of the role played by the *state* and *scale* underspecified

in conventional entrepreneurial inquiry, resonating with the recast framework in Figure 2.1. Second, they have challenged the proposition that the emergence of (speculative) partnerships necessitates uncapped growth aspiration and a shrinking public budget. To further elucidate the explanatory power of entrepreneurial urbanism theory, this section concludes that the partnership should be theorised both

- (i) in the recursive conditioning, mutually coupling and co-evolving approach that goes beyond flat duality, i.e. the duality of public and private, territory and place, actor and institution, and urban and rural (cf. Jessop, 2005: 40); and
- (ii) in a refutable manner that abstracts the necessary mechanism from the contingent process (cf. Yeung, 2019)

This leads to an exploration of those institutional forms that aspire towards growth in rural Jiyuan, i.e. the shareholding cooperatives detailed in Chapter 6.

5.2 The partnerships in their scale and the scale of partnerships

The following section sketches a brief outline of partnerships and partnership theory. To begin with, I contextualise the notion of a partnership before providing an analytical definition of one. Second, I gauge the insights provided through partnership analysis. Third, I discuss the partnership as an integral component of entrepreneurial urbanism theory. Finally, I present the three partnership types which frame Jiyuan's cases. The chapter then goes on to observe each type in turn before returning to the meso-level power of partnership-based explanations.

In all its guises, the partnership paradigm has been remaking the political, economic, and social landscape of the post-industrial (and still industrial, albeit for a shorter period) economies for decades (e.g. Mackintosh, 1992; Hastings, 1996; Quilley, 1999; Clarke and Glendinning, 2002; Lerner and Craig, 2005; Ball and Maginn, 2005; Wakely, 2020). 'As practical awareness grows of the seemingly ever more interdependent and contingent nature of the processes of social, political and economic change and their implications for institutions and institutional capacities, the benefits of' partnership 'modes of coordination have increasingly been recognized' (Hay, 1998, pp. 33). Forming partnerships seemingly offers the potential to establish parameters of resource availability and policy stability within an environment that is otherwise lacking in resources, unpredictable, and rapidly changing (McQuaid, 2000). They seem to be omnipresent in explanations of contemporary governance practices and are deemed necessary for the success of spatial economic activity (Cox, 1997).

What then is a partnership? Oxford Dictionary (2020) defines a partnership as ‘an association of two or more people as partners for the running of a business, with shared expenses, profit, and loss.’ This definition reveals very little of how the term has been used. It does, however, offer a starting point. Partnership analysis consists of many disparate strands and builds upon debating analytical definitions of a partnership¹⁸ (e.g. Elander, 2002; Greer, 2019). Central to most approaches to partnerships are three mutually constructive concerns, although these are often presented in a tendentious form. The first maps the individuals and institutions involved onto a partnership structure (see Mackintosh, 1992). The second explores the broader institutional contexts in which the actors of a partnership are embedded and formulated (see Harvey, 1989a; Grabher, 2006). The third is the processual delineation of partnerships, including partnership formation, evolution, transformation and termination (e.g. Hastings, 1996; Hay, 1998).

The multiple approaches to classifying partnerships suggest that the realities of partnerships are expressed well by partnership theories. For instance, Mackintosh (1992, also see Bailey, 1994) notably provided three theoretical models of partnerships: ‘synergy’, ‘transformation’, and ‘budget enlargement’. Linder (1999) outlined six different uses of public-private partnerships: management reform; problem conversion; moral regeneration; risk-shifting; restructuring public service; and power-sharing. Li and Akintoye (2003) provided a continuous spectrum for public-private partnerships, including ‘service contract’, ‘leasing’, ‘joint venture’, ‘concession’ and ‘privatisation’, indicating an ascending level of private sector involvement in the provision of infrastructure facilities and services. Fundamentally, the public-private partnership remains the metaphorical cornerstone of entrepreneurial urbanism theory and not less so in the entrepreneurial city approach. What keeps changing, though, is the once taken-for-granted demarcation between the public and private sectors (cf. Cox, 1996). Moreover, the entrepreneurial city approach further questions the under-theorised prerequisite for this state vis-à-vis market division (cf. Hess, 2004).

In order to pursue an updated theorisation and contextually-provincialised understanding of partnership practices, this thesis highlights the necessity of exploring two underexplored conjunctures in existing research. First is the under-specification of scale in defining a

¹⁸ Diving into the variegated partnership analysis soon confronts another concept of network. There might be some debatable difference between these two concepts, for instance, the longevity, the inclusion of the third sector and voluntary groups, and the interest-based or agenda-oriented visions (see Elander, 2002). However, this discrepancy has never been the pivot points that separating the overlapping theorising or policymaking of partnerships or networks. Therefore, this thesis takes them as exchangeable theoretical synonyms and draws on theoretical insights from mainly partnership and some networks theorists.

partnership and a lack of interactive analysis of partnerships vis-à-vis state rescaling (see Li and Chiu, 2018; also, Edwards *et al.*, 2001; Bayirbağ, 2010 as two commendable exceptions). Second is a homogeneous understanding of business elites, premising an *a priori* class unity and corporate responsibility (see Stone, 1989, pp. 241). Together, these two ‘blind spots’ together lead to a questionable conclusion that businesses could only play a significant role in partnerships on a local level (see Davies, 2003). In the case of Jiyuan, where the stratified market environment in China has been characterised by the strategic domination of pillar industries by SOEs and fierce competition in export-oriented sectors among numerous small businesses (see Peck and Zhang, 2013), there is a pressing need to rectify this tenacious oversight.

It is upon considering these different theories and realities that the central elements of the partnership are recognised as worthy of reconsideration, as a critical weapon in the explanatory armoury of entrepreneurial urbanism theory:

- (i) The rise of public-private partnerships in cities represents an alliance of the urban ruling class at the expense of producing more underclass.
- (ii) The cross-party and cross-state consensus on public-private partnerships indicates that an increasingly international bourgeoisie exercises economic and military command over space relations.
- (iii) The public-private partnership subsumes working-class movements within inter-urban competitions.
- (iv) The public-private partnership emerged on a specific local scale rather than a national or federal one, demonstrating the failure of the local state to contain urban unrest through redistributive policies and then coordinate strategic interests of capitalist development.

It is the contention of this thesis that partnership analysis has something to say about the functioning of the urban political machinery. Grant (1996) suggests that the keys to the successful functioning of a partnership are shared authority and responsibility, joint investment, shared liability/risk-taking, and mutual benefit. These positions might not sit squarely on Harvey’s (1989) preoccupation with speculative and entrepreneurial PPPs as an inevitable process of transition undertaken by the local state. Nevertheless, there are more general benefits to be gleaned from an entrepreneurialism-inspired, partnership-sympathetic reading of the local urban political configuration.

First, the mapping of the intricacies of each actor's action allows some purchase on how cooperation begins and proceeds to unfold temporally and spatially. Second, interrogating the trajectory of a partnership unveils the continuous interaction between the autonomy and combined effects of local actors and the structure they are exposed to. Third, more attention within research should be paid to those conjunctures ('moments' and 'space') that decide the content and form of partnerships to a greater extent than others. Fourth, there is a scale at which the interests and agenda of the partnerships are negotiated and coordinated. Therefore, the strategic-relational reading of partnerships could be enlightened by taking a close look at cross-scalar connections. Fifth, the examination of partnership discourse as an integral part of the partnership process does not mean that it adequately represents the 'actually-existing partnerships.'

A partnership-centric approach may result in the assumption that partnerships are essential to the urbanisation process in China, and cities or regions would be prosperous regions once they form partnerships. There might be an element of truth to this claim, but it is still fallible and warrants further investigation. As Massey (1995: 4) reflected in her discipline-defining work, 'particular causal relations are seen as enabling rather than as determinate in their effects, and forever liable to be altered in their implications or even nullified, by other sets of relations existing in the particularity of their occurrence at that precise point in time-space.' This research now turns to the theorised and actually-existing partnerships.

5.3 The varieties of partnerships

This section discusses three forms of partnership: extra-local, authority-centred (ELA thereafter) partnerships, local authority-centred (LA thereafter) partnerships, and cross-scalar (CA thereafter) partnerships. Each type favours some particular scale in tilting power relations between the central and local authorities and between state institutions and market agents. That said, each ideal type finds different manifestations in a different time and place, dependent on the combination of the geographies of previous initiatives and the existing institutional terrain. The analysis concentrates on particular conjunctures that exemplify a form of partnership. Table 5.1 schematically depicted how the varieties of actually-existing partnerships, under three ideal types, are co-governing Jiyuan. Each has distinct temporal and spatial features, but they are neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaustive. Instead, they are in a constant state of flux.

Table 5.1 The varieties of actually-existing partnerships in Jiyuan

	Timing	Spacing	Placing	Initiator	Vision planner	Territory demarcator	Peer pressure	Service users	Fiscal expenditure	Financing channel
Extra-local authorities-centred partnership	2008-2012-	Special zones → City district	Industry → City → Integration	Upper-tier authorities	Upper-tier authorities	Upper-tier authorities	Strong	Firms	Only for government employees	Policy and business loan
Local authorities-centred partnership	1985-1987, 1992-2000; 2013-	Manufacturing factory → Tourism spots	Rural → Urban → Synchronisation	Local SOEs and local authorities	Local authorities	Local authorities	Low	Customers	N/A	Earmarked policy and business loan
Cross-scalar partnership	2016-	Properties → Utilities	Urban → Rural → Coordination	Upper-tier authorities	Upper-tier and local authorities	Local authorities	Medium	Citizens	≤ 10% of the annual expenditure budget	PPP loan, earmarked bond, real estate investment trust

Note: → refers to the phase-change of priorities.

Source: Compiled by the author.

For the ELA-centred partnership in Jiyuan, Table 5.1 shows how it initially preferred industrial development in enterprise zones before later turning its attention to spatial integration between industry and the city. Chapter 4 pointed out that proactive provincial authorities acted on behalf of the central government to promote the ‘best practice’ in local development. In response to the 2008 global financial crisis, Henan province has actively encouraged the expansionist development of enterprise zones. At the beginning of 2012, the development of enterprise zones underwent a subtle change, as the provincial authorities echoed the central government’s call for infill development and tightened distribution of the newly added land quota for construction. Consequently, enterprise zones in Jiyuan have been forced to redirect themselves towards fully equipped townships or city districts. Nevertheless, the reorientation process has been far from smooth.

The local authority-led partnership in Jiyuan found its earlier manifestations in the development of township and village enterprises (TVEs) in the mid-1980s and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the 1990s. Chapter 4 mentioned that the strategies pursued by the proactive local authority were aligned with, but sometimes also superseded, what higher-tier government saw as ‘best practice’ in local development. However, these partnership practices dwelled on a strict urban vis-à-vis rural dichotomy and focused on manufacturing development. Since 2013, Jiyuan’s attempt to become a ‘holistic tourism destination’ has witnessed the rise of an updated LA-led partnership, which orchestrated the development of urban and rural tourism through a more profound engagement with the business sector.

The cross-scalar partnership is a recent phenomenon in Jiyuan initiated by the State Ministry of Finance in 2014. Widely seen as a state-led reconfiguration of the mechanism surrounding the provision of public infrastructure, the *de jure* public-private partnership introduced a series of new institutional settings that presaged an array of changes in how government agencies, SOEs, banking system and private businesses collaborate. Although this type of partnership can only exist after being initiated by local authorities and licenced by upper-tier authorities, what differentiates this type from others is how the business sector rescaled itself.

Extra-local authority-led partnership

In an ELA-led partnership, the central, provincial, or other regional government organ is the dominant institution. They provide strategic guidelines, essential resources (e.g. land use quotas, financing support, tax remits, etc.), and critical performance evaluation indicators to

orchestrate competitive learning between local partnerships. That is, the dominant institution often installs these partnerships into a competitive relationship in order to encourage mutual learning and alignment, with winners rewarded and losers punished.

The central dynamic of ELA-led partnerships is the ‘strategy formulation & alignment’ by the ‘special purpose committee’ (see Figure 5.1) and ‘integrated & competitive allocation’ of strategic resources. Central to this dynamic is the committee’s capacity to break down a grand vision into prescriptive targets for individual localities. Local institutions, agencies, individuals and organisations are selectively coerced into the partnership according to these targets. This coercion often stems from extra-local authorities for two fundamental reasons: exclusive control of some strategic resources lies in the hands of extra-local authorities; and the conventional bureaucratic channel of distributing these resources may impede localities from pursuing developmental strategies. In this sense, ELA-led partnerships represented a redrawn demarcation between state and market triggered by a scalar re-division of labour between local and extra-local authorities. An ideal result of such coercion is that some formerly fragmentary aspects of hierarchical authorities are strategically selected, clearly thematised, and territorialised. Meanwhile, relations between individuals and institutions at the local scale were intentionally left unspecified to attract the best practices that could then be emulated.

The best examples of these partnerships might be ‘special purpose zones’ with an exclusive remit licenced to a particular geographical area for a specific timespan, aiming towards some quantifiable development. Therefore, via Tigeridge enterprise Zone in Jiyuan, the following section explores such partnership by mapping the necessary and contingent link between internal and external relationships.

Provincial formulation

Reminiscent of then-President Hu Jintao’s remark on the Eighteenth Congress (see the quotation at the beginning of Chapter 4), the newly-elected Provincial Governor Guo Gengmao (2009) proposed a ‘third road’ towards an alternative future of modernisation for Henan province, i.e. the Enterprise Zones. To paraphrase him, the ‘western road’ of mass production and mass consumption and the ‘old road’ of mass production resulting in high pollution only led to ‘two dead ends’, neither of which would be viable given the limited carrying capacity of the resources, environment and society in Henan. The development of enterprise zones is a new road towards more sustainable and efficient development.




Figure 5.1 Extra-local authority-led (ELA-led) partnership

Nevertheless, the third road started with reflecting the experience of past decades when it came to industrialisation and urbanisation. The name hides the fact that the enterprise zone is a comprehensive and multi-step agenda, including ‘industrial parks’ (*chanye yuangu*), ‘industrial agglomeration zones’ (*chanye jijiu qu*), and ‘new towns’ (*xincheng*), each representing a stage towards modernisation. Municipalities were encouraged to develop ‘new towns’, county-level cities to set up ‘industrial agglomeration zones’, and the counties to erect ‘industrial parks’. Each of these three types represented a stage of industrial and urban development. The ‘industrial parks’ were intended to instigate industrialisation in the counties; the ‘industrial agglomeration zones’ to strengthen the industrial base and coordinate the land used for industry and town planning; and the ‘new towns’ to integrate industry and city into a compact area with a self-reliant and innovative system.

Ensuring reflection on this were the key indicators used to evaluate the building process, of which business income, employment, tax income and permanent residents are four primary threshold criteria. Out of 312 applicants from all the municipalities, county-level cities and counties in Henan province, 180 enterprise zones got licensed and classified into three tiers. Besides, an annual assessment shows the way forward by considering several indicators evaluating the quality of economic growth: land-use efficiency, pollution reduction, and high-tech contribution (see Table 5.2).

Table 5.2 Promotion and relegation criteria for enterprise zones in Henan (2009-2012)

Indicators	Business revenue (100,000,000 yuan)	Employment (person)	Tax income (100,000,000 yuan)	Permanent residents (10,000 people)
New urban district (NUD)	100	15000	10	30
Industrial agglomeration zone (IAZ)	20	7500	2	10
Industrial park (IP)	10	300	0.5	5
IAZ-NUD promotion & annual assessment	$\geq 100\%$ growth 1. Investment intensity 2. Reduction of energy consumption per gross industrial output value above designated size 3. SO ₂ and biochemical oxygen demand per unit of land use 4. Newly built area 5. The proportion of high-tech enterprises revenue in total operation revenue			

IP-IAZ promotion	$\geq 100\%$ growth	$\geq 100\%$ growth	$\geq 100\%$ growth	$\geq 50\%$ growth
Bonus	$\geq 130\%$ growth	$\geq 130\%$ growth	$\geq 130\%$ growth	$\geq 65\%$ growth
Warning	$\leq 60\%$ growth	$\leq 60\%$ growth	$\leq 60\%$ growth	$\leq 30\%$ growth
Delegation	Not meeting the threshold standards			

Source: General office of the People's Government of Henan province (2010 [No. 83])

Note: In 2010, 6 NUD and 180 IAAs were reviewed and approved by the Henan provincial government. The six NUDs lie in Zhengzhou, Luoyang, Kaifeng, Xinxiang, Xuchang, and Jiaozuo, six northeast municipalities with a solid industrial basis.

Moreover, the provincial government innovated the financial support for enterprise zones by assembling many exclusive 'franchises' (cf. Ang, 2016), including (i) subsidizing the interest of enterprise zone financing; (ii) rewarding the courtship of significant direct foreign investment by waiving their administrative fee; and (iii) reducing business tax of high-tech enterprises in the zone (People's Government of Henan Province, 2009 [No.62]; 2010 [No.34]). Further, the provincial government promised a generous tax rebate scheme in order to stimulate the rapid growth of these enterprise zones. For example, the provincial-level share of value-added tax, business tax and corporate income tax generated in enterprise zones between 2010 and 2012 would be fully refunded as a bonus to local public finance once the tax revenue of that zone had surpassed that of 2009 (General Office of the People's Government of Henan Province, 2010 [No.30]).

Table 5.3 Rating system of enterprise zones in Henan (2013-2020)

	6-star	5-star	4-star	3-star	2-star	1-star	Entry
Added Value (100 million <i>yuan</i>)	500	400	300	200	80	40	10
Tax Revenue (100 million <i>yuan</i>)	50	40	30	20	8	4	1
Employment in the zone (10 thousand people)	15	12	9	6	2.5	1.5	0.3
Permanent Residents in the township or urban district (10 thousand people)	50	40	35	30	20	10	5
Number							Total
2013	0	0	0	2	11*	49	62
2014	1	1	0	0	24*	81	107
2015	2	0	0	3	34*	93	132
2016	2	0	0	3	34*	93	132
2017	2	0	0	6	59*	73	140
2018	0	2	0	8*	48	54	112
2019	1	1	1	11	44*	54	112

Note: * refers to the ranking of the Tigeridge enterprise zone.

Source: Peoples' Government of Henan Province (2015 [No. 20], 2016 [No. 25], 2017). Office of the Joint Conference of Enterprise Zones of Henan Province. (2014 [No. 2], 2018 [No. 6], 2019 [No. 5], 2020 [No. 5]).

Since its establishment, the policy framework has based its sustainability upon dynamic evaluation and updates to criteria. From 2013, a six-tier rating system replaced the three-tier system and raised its standards in the development of 180 enlisted zones (see Table 5.3). Also, the provincial authorities increasingly focused on environmental sustainability and technological innovation, caring not only about output performance but also input intensity (see Table 5.4). Since 2017, the evaluation unit, from the entire enterprise zone to the individual enterprise in the zone, was further refined. To facilitate the iterative upgrade of the evaluation method, the provincial governor personally led the team in paying an annual visit to representative enterprise zones, observing their development and encouraging mutual learning.

Table 5.4 The evaluation criteria for enterprise zones in Henan (2010-2020)

	Unit	Indicators and weight
2010-2011	Enterprise zone	1. Economic aggregate (20%): Business revenue 2. Social benefits (25%): Tax revenue (15%); Employment (10%) 3. Development quality (25%): Investment intensity (15%); Energy use efficiency (5%); Pollution emission (5%, SO ₂ and biochemical oxygen demand per unit of land use); 4. Construction speed (20%): Newly built area 5. Technology innovation (10%, % of high-tech enterprises business revenue in total amount)
2011-2014	Enterprise zone	1. Business revenue (20%): Total volume (10%) and growth rate (10%) 2. Tax revenue (15%): Total volume (7%) and growth rate (8%) 3. Employment (20%): Total volume (7%) and growth rate (8%) 4. Fixed-asset investment (20%): Investment intensity (5%), total investment (7%) and growth rate (8%) 5. Energy use efficiency (5%) 6. Environmental Protection (10%): Wastewater Centralized processing ratio (6%); Pollution emission up to standard (2%), Industrial solid waste processing ratio (2%); 7. Newly built area (5%) 8. Technology innovation (5%)
2013-2015	Enterprise zone	1. Economic aggregate (50%): Added value (15%), fixed-asset investment (13%); employment (10%); tax revenue (12%). 2. Agglomeration development (25%): % of R&D expenditure in total added value (7%); % of leading industries in total added value (9%); % of leading industries investment in total investment, and actually-used foreign capital (9%) 3. Efficiency (25%): input-output efficiency (12%), energy use efficiency (7%), wastewater and solid waste centralized processing ratio (6%)
2015-2017	Enterprise zone	1. Economic aggregate (45%): Added value (15%), fixed-asset investment (12%); employment (8%); tax revenue (10%). 2. Agglomeration development (25%): % of R&D expenditure in total added value (7%); % of leading industries in total added value (9%); leading industries investment and actually-used foreign capital (9%)

		3. Efficiency (30%): input-output efficiency (17%), energy use efficiency (7%), wastewater and solid waste centralized processing ratio (6%)	
2017 (trail)	Enterprise above- designated size in the enterprise zone	1. Tax revenue per unit of land (/average*30, ≤36) 2. Main business per unit of land (/average*15, ≤ 18) 3. Profit per unit of land (/average*15, ≤18) 4. R & D input intensity (/average*20, ≤24) 5. Output per unit of energy use (/average*10, ≤10) 6. Environmental protection (/average*15, ≤18) Bonus item: Listed company, firms in the strategic emerging industry, high-tech firms; provincial or national R & D platform; provincial or national quality award winner; intelligent manufacturing firms; provincial or leading national firms in water use efficiency.	Remark: A level: (top 15%) priorities of development B level: (others) C level: (last 10%): action-forcing to transform
2018-	Enterprises in the enterprise zone	1. Tax revenue per unit of land (/average*30, ≤ 36) 2. Profit per unit of land (/average*20, ≤24) 3. R & D input intensity (/average*20, ≤24) 4. Output per unit of energy use (/average*15, ≤18) 5. Pollution emission per tax revenue (/average*15) Bonus item (≤10): Version 2017 + industry-standard participant	Remark: Version 2017 + several specific clauses

Source: General office of the people's government of Henan province (2010 [No. 33], 2011 [No. 9]); General Office of Henan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China (2014 [No. 2]); Office of the Joint Conference of Enterprise Zones of Henan Province (2015, 2017 [No. 11], 2019 [No. 1]).

Compared with the explicit criteria for evaluating the input-output performance of enterprise zones, the provincial government has been less clear about the ideal structure of governance. As displayed in Table 5.5, despite the presence of management committees in every enterprise zone, its form, function and power boundary have been under constant exploration. One central point of contention, on which I shall also elaborate in the case of Tigeridge Enterprise Zone in Jiyuan, is the boundary between government and enterprise within the management committee. This controversy has taken different forms at different stages of the development of the enterprise zones: it could be the issue of cross-functionality between the zone and the township government where the zone is located (i.e. 2010-2014); it could also be a question of whether to set up or introduce an investment and development company separate from the administrative body to be responsible for land development, infrastructure construction, investment attraction and other services of the enterprise zone (i.e. 2017-2019); or it may be whether to adopt purely corporate management and operation of the enterprise zone (i.e. 2020).

Table 5.5 Guidelines for the governance of enterprise zones in Henan (2009-2020)

Year	Guidelines or recommendations
------	-------------------------------

-
- 2009 Establish a *management committee* as a permanent management body for the enterprise zones that enjoys management functions at the local government level. Its specifications, institutions and staffing are set up scientifically by the local government according to local conditions, with reasonable configuration.
- 2010 Establish a *joint office meeting system* for the enterprise zones led by the main leaders and attended by the relevant functional departments, focusing on the major issues of enterprise zone construction and development, and coordinating enterprise zone matters outside the areas.
- Establish a *'through train' system* between the zones and the municipal management departments, so that matters requiring the approval of competent county-level departments are handled directly by the zones' management bodies, and matters requiring the approval of higher-level management departments are reported directly by the zones' management bodies.
- Each place can take the *necessary administrative division adjustment*, etc., to properly solve the problem of cross-function between the enterprise zone and the township government where the zone is located.
- 2012 Rationalize the management system of enterprise zones and the townships where they are located. For enterprise zones where municipal governments assign management committees, entrust all villages within the planning area of enterprise zones to the management committees for the unified management of related affairs. For enterprise zones where county (county-level city or district) governments assign management committees, actively promote the adjustment of zoning, adjusting the villages in the enterprise zone, merging several townships into one township, and realising the spatial integration of the enterprise zone with the administrative areas;
- Support the adoption of *unified leadership and separate management* mode, with the management committee and the township where it is located implementing *one set of staff and two branches*, with the management committee concentrating on development and construction, and the administrative system performing social management functions to achieve effective control and unified management of resource allocation in the region by the management agencies of the enterprise zones.
- Promote *functional departments* such as planning, land and resources, housing and urban-rural construction, environmental protection, statistics, quality supervision, etc. to *station personnel in enterprise zones*, under the dual leadership of the sending unit and the management committee of the enterprise zones. The relevant administrative approval and work matters are handled by the dispatched personnel according to the internal process or authorized to handle directly, realising the 'through train' system between the industrial enterprise zones and the municipal functional departments.
- 2014 Caution against the bureaucratisation of managing enterprise zones.
- 2016 Explore the development of corporate operation of enterprise zones. Encourage enterprise zones with a good industrial base to set up or introduce *investment and development companies*, explore the development and construction mode of a 'management committee + company', coordinate and promote the development of land, infrastructure construction, financing and investment in industrial clusters, and accelerate the transformation of business entities into enterprises and industrial service providers.
- 2017 Support qualified enterprise zones to *separate government from enterprises and government from capital*, explore the construction of a government-led, market-oriented and enterprise-operated model of development and operation, and *set up or introduce investment and development companies* that are separate from administrative agencies to be responsible for land development, infrastructure construction, investment promotion and other services in enterprise zones.
- Promote the *market-oriented transformation of government investment and financing platforms in enterprise zones*, support cooperation with financial institutions and provincial investment and financing platforms and establish new financing models with risk and benefit sharing. Encourage the construction of public services and infrastructure projects in the PPP (government-social capital cooperation) mode.
- 2018 Support qualified enterprise zones to explore development and operation modes such as 'management committee + company', 'zone + venture capital', etc., and set up or introduce investment and development companies or venture capital funds that are separate from the administration and management bodies and are responsible for the integrated development of the industrial agglomerations or part of their parks. The company will be responsible for land development, infrastructure construction and investment promotion in the enterprise zone or part
-

of it. Encourage the establishment of *a mechanism for the exchange of cadres* between the management committee and the investment and development company or venture capital fund by means of market-based selection and recruitment.

- 2019 Implement the reform of the personnel and remuneration system, such as the appointment system for all cadres at the middle level and below in the management committee of the enterprise zones, the competitive posting system and the performance pay system.

Promote the establishment of market-oriented operating companies in enterprise zones or transform investment and financing platforms into market-oriented operating companies through *the introduction of strategic investors*, etc. to undertake the development and construction, investment and operation, investment attraction and professional services of enterprise zones. The *operating company* of the enterprise zones may issue bonds, set up funds, equity investment, listing financing and other means to improve its investment and operation capacity.

- 2020 Adopt management systems in conjunction with the actual situation, such as management 'committee (working committee) + specialised company', 'unity of government and enterprise zone+ company', pure corporatization, etc.

Source: People's Government of Henan Province (2009 [No.62], 2010 [No.34], 2012 [No.34]); General Office of the People's Government of Henan Province (2014 [No.49], 2016 [No.63]; 2017 [No.159], 2019 [No. 43]); Office of the Joint Conference of Enterprise Zones of Henan Province (2018, 2020)

Beyond that, the provincial policy formulation has not left the rural villages and peasant workers unattended, although they remain passive, marginal and subordinate at the receiving end of policies. Table 5.6 provides a selective list of guiding provisions concerning rural communities and land-expropriated peasants involved in developing enterprise zones. A brief review suggests that it does nothing more than lays bare the priorities of this agenda: industrial growth first, then employment, and then urban welfare provision. Nevertheless, the actual implementation of this scheme was not immune to unexpected interruptions.

Table 5.6 Village resettlement policies for developing enterprise zones in Henan (2009-2020)

Year	Provisions
2009	Steadily promote the reallocation and congregation of rural settlements. Collective construction land replaced by rural residential areas and village environmental remediation can be prioritised for the construction of enterprise zones, on the premise of retaining the land for rural public welfare undertakings and public facilities.
2010	Land conveyance fee retained by the municipalities and counties can be prioritised on the construction of infrastructure in the enterprise zones, on the premise of ensuring compensation for land acquisition and demolition and the subsidy to social security expenditures and legal expenses of the land-expropriated peasants.
2012	<p>1. Peasant workers and their families who have been working in the county's industrial enterprise zones for more than one year and are willing to convert to urban hukou will be given priority to go through the relevant procedures per the relevant regulations, and enjoy the same treatment as urban residents in terms of pension, medical care, affordable housing, and child education treatment</p> <p>2. Take overall consideration of the employment of land-expropriated peasants and the employment of enterprises in enterprise zones. Give priority to the employment of relocated villagers in industrial enterprises. All eligible land-expropriated peasants who start their own businesses can enjoy preferential tax policies per state regulations.</p> <p>3. Encourage the adoption of multiple land acquisitions and resettlement models such as reserved land resettlement, the shareholding of collective construction land use rights, and land-stock</p>

	cooperation to ensure the long-term benefits of relocated peasants.
2014	<p>1. Increase financial support for large resettlement communities with reference to the urban shantytown reconstruction policy. Strive to start 300 village relocation projects throughout the year, with 160 000 new resettlement houses started and 120,000 units basically completed. Encourage all localities to combine land acquisition compensation and resettlement, actively expand social security funds channels, and adequately protect the interests of relocated peasants.</p> <p>2. Promote the urbanization of the agriculture-transferring population. Include public rental housing construction projects in the enterprise zones in the province's affordable housing construction plan and prioritise affordable housing for stable employees in the enterprise zones. Priority will be given to converting the employed population as well as the agricultural population in the villages in the enterprise zone into urban residents.</p>

Source: People's Government of Henan Province (2009 [No.62], 2010 [No.34]); General Office of People's Government of Henan Province (2012 [No.33]; 2014 [No. 49])

The evolving compensation scheme for land-expropriated peasants and rural collectives involved in the enterprise zones provides the best footnote to these assertions. Before 2012, the provincial authorities avoided providing incentives for large-scale land acquisition, instead proposing 'legal' compensation and subsidies for those peasants. Since 2012, land-expropriated peasants were granted the option of converting their rural *hukou* to urban *hukou* after working in the enterprise zone for more than a year. Rural collectives were also encouraged to secure their long-term interests by choosing flexible land conveyance and resettlement schemes. After 2014, to further accelerate the development of enterprise zones, provincial authorities included the resettlement of land-expropriated peasants in the 'urban shantytown reconstruction' (*penghuqu gaizao*) scheme, which used to be exclusive to specific urban residents and supported by earmarked funding from the central government.

However, since 2014, enterprise zone-focused policies no longer propose large-scale resettlement of rural villages. Underlying this change was the increasing reliance on continually-upgrading enterprise zones on technological and financial innovation rather than on land and labour input (see Table 5.3, where the promotion of 3-star level enterprise zones can be seen to have slowed down since 2014). This tendency became more evident in 2017 when the Henan provincial government attempted to adjust existing enterprise zones to align them with the requirements of national-level development zones (*guojiaji kaifa qu*, see General Office of People's Government of Henan Province, 2017 [No. 159]; General Office of the State Council, 2017 [No. 7]). Recalling the 'closing-down, suspension, merging and switching the production line' of SOE reforms since the 1990s, the first step of reshaping enterprise zones in Henan was to cut down on the number of zones on the principle of 'one zone per county (or prefecture, or municipality district)' (General Office of People's Government of Henan Province, 2017 [No. 159]). Similarly, the provincial authorities left some leeway in order to allow no more than three plots under the name of any given enterprise zone, meaning that three existing zones could be merged into one (Table 5.5). Besides, higher-rated enterprise

zones were encouraged to apply for and then switch to national-level zone catalogues, including the ‘economic and technological development zone’ (*jingjai qu*), ‘high-tech industrial development zone’ (*gaoxin qu*), and ‘special customs supervision zone’ (*haiguan teshu jianguan qu*), all of which enjoy national preferential policies.

Municipal strategy

The establishment of Jiyuan’s Tigeridge Enterprise Zone dates back to 2003, when the growing local demand for land available for construction collided with tightened central control over the conversion of agricultural land (Mayor of Jiyuan, Duan, 2006). Between 1997 and 2007, the built-up area of Jiyuan expanded from 18.75 km² to 26.18 km². Meanwhile, agricultural land shrank by over 10 km², further minimising what was already a below-provincial-average provision of agricultural land *per capita* (Yuan and Liu, 2007). Added to that concern was the deteriorating quality of air in Jiyuan due to the ingrained structure of industrial production, which ran counter to the unfolding ideology of the then-new central administration. Against this backdrop, an initiative of ‘industry coming out of town, and projects going into the mountain’ (*gongye chucheng, xiangmu shangshan*) appeared on the local politico-economic terrain. To the north and east of the city proper, two enterprise zones were planned on the mild slopes at the mountain foot. The idea was to make use of the uncultivated land, thus slowing down the conversion of agricultural land within the municipal jurisdiction (Liu, 2009). One of these zones was the predecessor of Tigeridge Enterprise Zone in order to accommodate the influx of new industrial investment and the relocation of existing factories in the town.

The initial plan of the enterprise zones was cursory. In 2007, the municipal government launched the first on-site governing framework, the 531 Enterprise Zone Management Committee (People’s Government of Jiyuan Municipality, 2007 [No. 14]). This zone got its name because it was based on approximately 1 km² of land and derelict buildings left behind after the evacuation of the bankrupted 531 arsenal factory (Yuan and Liu, 2007). Located in the long ravine 15 km west of the city centre, this arsenal factory was a legacy of Mao’s call for the defence industry to hide and disperse in the mountainous area during the Cold War.

Table 5.7 Enterprise zones in Jiyuan

Enterprise zones	Since	Location	Planning area	Specialised industries	Revenue from the main business	Tax revenue	Number of firms
High-tech*	2002	Southeast Jiyuan	3.99 km ² (changed to 15.09 km ² in 2012)	High-end mining equipment manufacturing, new energy vehicles	5.8 billion (2015)	0.16 billion (2017)	110 (2016)
Yuchuan	2007	2 km north to the town, south of Taihang Mountains	11.6 km ² (changed to 26 km ² in 2012)	Non-ferrous metal, solar photovoltaic, new energy and chemical	46.2 billion (2019)	1.03 billion (2019)	110 (2019)
Tigeridge	2007	Southwest Jiyuan	8.1 km ² (changed to 18.97 km ² in 2012, and 30.4 km ² in 2018)	Equipment manufacturing, coal chemical industry, electronic appliances, steel processing	64.3 billion (2019)	3.12 billion (2018)	350 (2019)

Source: Compiled by the author.

Note: * The high-tech industrial development zone was merged into the Tigeridge enterprise zone in July 2017.

The prototype of Jiyuan's enterprise zones was further concretised in the 11th Five-Year Industrial Development Plan (2006-2010), which proposed a spatial layout of 'one park and two belts' and outlined the planning area and dominant industries for each zone (People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality, 2007 [No. 52]). The guiding principle of this planning has had a lasting impact on the later development of these zones. The high-tech enterprise zone, located in the southeast of downtown Jiyuan, was to concentrate on the manufacture of high-end mining equipment as well as vehicles reliant on sustainable fuel that occupies less land and produces less pollution as a result. Yuchuan enterprise zone, which had the largest planning area, focused on relocating and upgrading the production chain of the highly-pollutant, non-ferrous metal industry. Tigeridge enterprise zone expanded at its original site, majoring in electronic equipment manufacturing and coal chemical industry (see Table 5.7).

The fortunes of these zones started to change once the newly-elected Provincial Governor, Guo Gengmao, took office in 2009. Drawing upon his earlier experience in Hebei province, Governor Guo prioritised enterprise zones as the key vehicle for achieving sustainable and efficient economic growth and incubating an independent innovation system and a modern urban system (Wang, 2009; Li and Dai, 2013). Out of 300 province-wide applicants, the Provincial Joint Office of Enterprise Zone shortlisted 175 (now 182) enterprise zones,

including three from Jiyuan. The Joint Office also provided an updated framework for development and preferential policies regarding taxation, utility fees, investment and financing. It was from then that the development of Tigeridge started to gather momentum.

The provincial framework provided key indicators for industrial growth but little guidance for the governance structure. In 2007, a management committee for Tigeridge was created by the municipality and chaired by a deputy mayor. However, it was no more than a *de facto* temporary construction command, with members seconded from different departments and levels of local government, as well as from affiliated *shiye* units and SOEs. Until some established positions (*bianzhi*) were permitted by the municipality in 2012, the management committee was concerned that it was only a temporary body with an uncertain future:

At first, people from different government departments and affiliated organizations were temporarily borrowed to work on-site depending on necessity.' (JY-09-E, Executive of Tigeridge Enterprise Zone, 2019)

Similarly, although the management committee of Tigeridge Enterprise Zone registered a local state-owned enterprise, i.e. Jiyuan Yuyang Industrial Development Company, injected 20 million *yuan* with municipal financial revenue, and exchanged land-use rights to this enterprise by agreement, thus making the enterprise responsible for land development, infrastructure construction and investment promotion:

[A]t that time, it was merely a construction contractor with a separate account (for the government) (JY-09-E, Executive of Tigeridge Enterprise Zone, 2019).

In mid-2013, the committee was finally granted permanent positions by the local government, setting another milestone in the development of the Tigeridge enterprise zone (Jiyuan Municipal Committee of Communist Party of China and People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality, 2013 [No.44]). Since then, enterprise zones can be found in a separate entry in the Jiyuan Yearbook. Meanwhile, Tigeridge Enterprise Zone formalised a two-level structure, the top of which was a Party working committee led by a township-tier cadre with several public employers holding *xingzheng* and *shiye* positions (see Ang, 2016). Beneath the management committee was the *Tigeridge economic development group*, an SOE (and UIDC) headed by a general manager and a large group of contract employees. The committee is responsible for spatial planning, land acquisition and compensation on behalf of the municipal government. Meanwhile, the UIDC oversaw the organisation of construction teams, the

levelling of land, the laying of pipelines and the erection of utilities. The UIDC enjoyed autonomy in hiring contract employees and making operational decisions while remaining under the direct financial and personal purview of the Party Working Committee.

Different roles, however, led to different expectations for the future development of Tigeridge within the administrative committee of the executive leadership. A looming question for the local government was whether to fully equip the committee with the full range of administrative capacities of a township or city street office, thus ending the shared functionality between the enterprise zone and the township in which it was located. Jiyuan had gone through three stages predicated upon this issue.

As mentioned previously, Jiyuan started the enterprise zone by consolidating uncultivated land rather than expropriating arable land (Duan, 2006). Therefore, despite an enclave of the municipal government, the enterprise zone did not come into direct conflict with corresponding townships in its first few years. Even with piecemeal land acquisition, the Municipal Joint Conference and Management Committees sufficed to arrange grassroots mobilisation and resettlement compensation. However, the conflict was soon intensified when the enterprise zone became a spearhead of industrial development steered by provincial authorities. Further, its planning area began to consume a considerable portion of arable land distributed in different townships. Echoing the provincial proposal for a ‘unified leadership’, in 2013, the municipal government (Jiyuan News, 2013) decided to let enterprise zones fully ‘take over’ the job of social service provision for fifteen rural communities. This had previously been undertaken by corresponding townships. Tigerridge thus annexed fifteen villages that had previously been governed by three independent townships in an attempt to facilitate land acquisition and ameliorate any potential conflict between the management committee, the original township, and the villagers (Senior officer, Development and Reform Commission of Jiyuan, 2019). This reform marked the beginning of the second stage, preceded by a series of changes in fiscal configuration to address the tax-sharing and fiscal expenditure issues between the municipality, townships and enterprise zones (People’s Government of Jiyuan Municipality, 2012 [No. 96], General Office of People’s Government of Jiyuan Municipality, 2013 [No. 90]).

The taking over of social affairs entails, in the long run, another configuration of township-tier government for as long as the enterprise zones keep incorporating rural villages. In this sense, it would only be counterproductive to delay or deny this prospect by not granting the management committee of Tigeridge Enterprise Zone more permanent public employment positions. At best, the reluctance would only guarantee a vague outlook that neither favours

government officials who expect a clear career path ‘in the office’, nor would it benefit contract employers of the UIDC who cannot be distracted from pursuing their goal of purely economic growth.

Think about it, on the one hand, we were courting the investment; on the other hand, we were also taking care of all the civil affairs like marriage and litigations mediation. How could we concentrate?’ (JY-09-E, Executive of Jiyuan Tigeridge Enterprise Zone, 2019)

When proposing the annexation of villages into the enterprise zone, we were mainly thinking about facilitating the land acquisition and gave little thought about the long run’ (JY-02-G, Senior officer of Jiyuan Development and Reform Commission, 2019).

On the other hand, and perhaps more fundamentally, setting up another township government requires approval from the central government, which has always been wary of expansions to local governmental administration.

It requires a re-coding of the communities, which needs the approval of the Ministry of Civil Affairs. The municipal government has persistently inquired about the possibility and found it nearly impossible in the short term (JY-09-E, Executive of Jiyuan Tigeridge Enterprise Zone, 2019).

In a nutshell, a ‘unified leadership’ of Enterprise zones such as Tigeridge can neither be achieved by rezoning the zone to match the jurisdictional boundary of an established township, nor can it be achieved in the opposite way. Equipping Tigeridge management committee with an additional Social Affair Office (Jiyuan Municipal Committee of Communist Party of China and People’s Government of Jiyuan Municipality, 2013 [No. 44]) only sufficed to skew rather than balance its staffing structure in a way favourable to economic growth instead of social service. Often the enterprise zone still counted on the stamp of the former townships to meet the needs of annexed villagers. Predictably, townships bereft of villages were only suppressing their complaints ever since the handover. When the time ripened, township cadres expressed their discontent without concern:

They messed up our villages governance before returning them to us township government... It is not about the negligible fiscal compensation we got when they took over the villages; it is about how careless they were handling the rural issues. (JY-24-G, Senior officer of the township bordering Tigeridge Enterprise Zone, 2019).

The ripe timing came in early 2018 when the potential carelessness, coupled with other undercurrents, amounted to an urgent challenge which required the municipal government to hastily launch a third-phase-opening initiative of ‘enterprise zone-township coordination (*qūzhèn liándòng*)’ (People’s Municipal Government of Jiyuan, 2018 [No. 22]). Instead of a detailed plan, this initiative concisely underscored two points. First, enterprise zones would hand back all the annexed villagers to their former townships and refocus on industrial and economic growth. Second, the mayor would take the lead in holding a regular joint conference to coordinate issues of ‘enterprise zones’, with the general office of the joint conference based in the Municipal Development and Reform Commission, following suit with its provincial-level counterpart. Consequently, the former Office of Social Affairs was adjusted to the Office of Zone-Township Cooperation and Comprehensive Governance.

With that said, the subsequent reconfiguration of the fiscal revenue-sharing scheme provides a vantage point from which to view the phase-change on this issue. Table 5.8 shows the division of primary sources of budgetary revenues between key stakeholders in three phases. The first stage (2008-2012) witnessed a devolution of the municipal-level revenue to townships compared to its previous (cf. Wang, 2008). In comparison to this, in the second stage of (2013-2017), an Enterprise Zone-leading Township scheme tilted fiscal revenue towards the Enterprise Zone and cut (a small part of) the municipality and (a big part of) Township share. At the same time, the expenditure on the social affairs of the villagers in the Enterprise Zone planning area fell on the shoulder of the Enterprise Zone, in contrast to the first stage. The third stage began in 2018 when the ‘zone-township cooperation’ scheme replaced the increasingly complicated sharing method with a simplified version dependent on the enterprises’ location. Also, the guiding principle of this stage is to keep municipality-level (and hopefully the township-level) revenue no less than that of 2017 as the base year. In addition, the municipal-level joint office (2018 [No. 15]) reconfigured the mechanism of investment attraction, providing a one-off reward to the township that attracts investment instead of a share of the attracted investment’s fiscal contribution. This correspondingly kept the promise made when courting inward investment became the responsibility of the Enterprise Zone. Finally, the management of the villages’ social affairs was handed over to original Townships while the expenditure came from municipal earmarked funding that transferred from the Enterprise Zone’s revenue.

Table 5.8 Financial management system of enterprise zones in Jiyuan (2008-2018)

2008-2012	Existing	Existing	Added	Added	Expenditure
-----------	----------	----------	-------	-------	-------------

	municipal enterprises	public facilities	investment by municipal enterprises	investment through attraction	on the villages' social affairs
Municipality	40%	30%	60%	0	0
Township that provides land	60%	50%	20%	10%	100%
Enterprise Zone	0	20%	20%	10%	0
Township/Enterprise Zone that attracts investment	0	0	0	80%	0
	Existing municipal enterprises	Existing investment through attraction	Added investment by municipal enterprises	Added investment through attraction	Expenditure on the villages' social affairs
2013-2018					
Municipality	40%	0	50%	0	0
Township that provides land	30%	80%	25%	0	0
Enterprise Zone	30%	20%	25%	30%	100%
Township/Enterprise Zone that attracts investment	0	0	0	70%	0
2018-present	Existing revenue	Added revenue above the base-year amount of 2017		Expenditure on the villages' social affairs	
Municipality	A fixed amount with 2017 as the base year	30%		0	
Township that provides land and built enterprise park	Enterprise in the township-built enterprise park	49%		0	
Enterprise Zone	All the other revenue generated in the enterprise zone	21%		100%	
Overlapping area	Divided proportionally by enterprises' footprint	0			
Township that attracts investment	A fixed amount with 2017 as the base year	One-time reward at the end of every financial year			

Source: People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality (2009 [No. 21], 2012 [No. 96], 2018 [No. 15]); General Office of People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality (2013 [No. 90]).

Note: This is a simplified summary of the documents listed and omits many other details.

Local authority-led partnership

The second form of partnership is LA-led. This partnership is typically not under the full oversight of the higher-tier authorities; hence the local authorities generally have full autonomy to allocate the necessary resources and develop a strategic agenda for the partnership. More than that, the local scale defines this type of partnership because the realisation of the partnership's essential interests depends upon some localised, place-specific social relations

with few, if any, substitutes elsewhere (cf. Cox, 1998). This dependence on localised space also means that the partnership has a more-or-less experimental nature. Thus, it is not easy to measure their performance with a widely acceptable input-output ratio. In Jiyuan, some traces of this partnership dated back to the 1980s or 1990s in developing State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the manufacturing sector. Today, this type of partnership finds its best example in the rapidly evolving service industry, particularly in the place where neither the pure public nor private sector has made a real difference.

The leadership of local authorities in this partnership can be subtle. For instance, it could be framing from behind the scenes while foregrounding other institutions or actors at the centre stage. The next section explores the LA-led partnership in Jiyuan, citing the example of the Jiyuan Cultural Tourism Investment Group. Emphasis is placed on its internal and external institutional configuration in (re)assembling the public and private sectors.




Figure 5.2 Local authority-led (LA-led) partnership

Partnership experiment: trial-and-error

‘Develop manufacturing to prosper the city and develop tourism to enrich the people’ (*gongye qiangshi, luyou fumin*)” was a concise slogan widely believed to summarise the secret of Jiyuan’s success in urbanisation. In retrospect, rounds of master planning since 1988 (see Table 4.4) also reiterated Jiyuan’s aspiration to be a ‘central city’ with both a prosperous manufacturing base and appealing scenery. For many, the underlying logic is simple: manufacturing contributes more tax to the municipal government while the service industry, such as tourism, creates more employment.

There has been a dearth of debate on the internal logic of this slogan, let alone any potential tension it may produce. Besides, the situation as it stood seemed to suggest that it was misleading to juxtapose manufacturing with tourism in Jiyuan. Ever since the industrial output statistics became available in 1990, (heavy) manufacturing has dominated the local industrial base and employment. In contrast, the first round of municipality-level investment in what was at the time state-owned and state-operated scenic spots did not occur until 1997. Nevertheless, after a brief boom in the development of Jiyuan’s tourism industry at the turn of the millennium, a shipwreck tragedy at one of the most popular tourist resorts in 2004 prompted a sudden suspension of governmental investment in tourism (Cheng, 2004; Jiyuan Bureau of Statistics, 2010; Li, 2020).

In 2005, with a 44.8% jump in municipal revenue in the general public budget thanks to the manufacturing industry operating at full swing, Municipal Party Secretary Zhou Chunyan refrained from putting more money into tourism development. Instead, the municipality decided to arrange a 50-year transfer of the management rights of three indebted state-owned tourist spots at zero cost to more competent market players. Once made public, this decision drew wide attention because it was an unprecedented step in the management reform of public tourist spots (Sang and Chen, 2006). In a tourism development conference held in April 2005, Secretary Zhou remarked that (Ibid.)

For the purpose of development, based on the principle of separation of ownership, management and operation, we are reforming the management and operation institutions of Mount Wangwu resort, Wulongkou resort and Jiuligou resort with a 50-year entrusted operation for free.

According to this plan, the contractor must take responsibility for resorts and invest above a

specified amount of money to develop these resorts within the first three years after signing the contract. Zhang Chunfeng, then director of the municipal Tourism Bureau, expected this transfer to fill in the historical gap in infrastructure and improve the quality of the local tourism industry (Zhang and Yang, 2006). Openly disobeying the stipulation made by the Ministry of Construction in 2005, which forbade the transfer of management from the public sector to private firms, Jiyuan soon made itself the subject of public debate (Chen, 2006; Nie, 2006). However, the municipal government remained determined. What delayed the transfer of management rights was that a high bar had been set for business partners. It was not until late 2009 and early 2010 that the Jiyuan government contracted out the management and operation right of Nine-mile Valley to a private company (Li, 2009), as well as that of Mount Wangwu and Wulongkou to Henan Investment Group, an SOE affiliated to the Henan provincial government (Liu, 2010).

In early 2013, management of both Mount Wangwu and Wulongkou resorts was taken back over by the municipal government, acknowledging the failure of the contracting experiment. In general, the leapfrog development of tourism that had been anticipated did not come to pass. Instead, Mountain Wangwu, the crown of local tourist and cultural property, lost its unique glitter when compared to up-and-coming resorts in neighbouring cities (Li, 2020). Besides, an entrepreneurial management restructuring of the *shiyue* unit formerly managing the resorts only marginally improved the reputation and service of the tourism resorts, while Henan Investment Group did not keep its promise of investing 250 billion into the resort. (Jiyuan Yearbook, 2011, pp. 365; Li, 2020).

Out of the gulf between expectation and the reality of the diminishing fame of a once-proud tourist resort came the municipal leadership's determination to reform. In 2013, on behalf of the municipal government, the Tourism Development Committee set up two administrative committees at Mount Wangwu and Wulongkou resorts in order to better supervise the former subsidiary companies of the Henan Investment. Meanwhile, the municipal State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) registered the Jiyuan Cultural Tourism Investment Group (JCTIG) with all the manageable assets of the Mount Wangwu and Wulongkou resorts. Thus, a two-tier interwoven partnership structure emerged. The upper level of this partnership refers to a JCTIG-pioneered joint conference with Municipal Tourism Development Committee. The lower level includes two resort development companies supervised by corresponding administrative committees (Jiyuan Yearbook, 2014, pp. 368).

Partnership discourse: the flag to rally around

Imbuing ancient fables with new meaning, or projecting them onto a modern context, is a gift of humanity, and sometimes it is difficult to tell whether the old or new definition is more important (cf. Mao, 1965 [1945]¹⁹; Xi, 2014²⁰). In the case of ‘*The foolish old man who removed the mountains*’, a household fable about the virtues of perseverance and willpower, it is hard to credit its popularity only to its original transcription in *Liezhi*, a Daoist text of the 4th century BC. Especially for mainland Chinese who received their primary education during the Cultural Revolution (now in their 50s’ or above), the title quickly reminds them of an essay they were obliged to recite (*Lao san pian*) in the textbook authored by Chairman Mao. In this short manuscript, written for a speech and published in 1947, two years before the foundation of P.R.China, Mao maintained the importance of ‘raising the (political) consciousness of the entire people’ so as to topple the two mountains of ‘imperialism’ and ‘feudalism’.

Such rich historical contexts allowed Jiyuan to proudly claim itself to be the City of *Yugong* (the name of the ‘foolish old man’) *Spirit* (see People’s Government of Jiyuan Municipality, 2018) because the two mountains mentioned in the fable meet geographically in Jiyuan. Therefore, Mount Wangwu has been appropriated as a City Icon and is supposedly its most well-known tourist attraction. Nevertheless, its recent decline in popularity represented a failure in finding ‘a modern presentation of traditional culture’ according to Mr Chiu, the Founding Chairman of Jiyuan Culture & Tourism Investment Group (JCTIG).

Our understanding of the old tale, including the presentation of its spirit, has fallen out of fashion and disconnected with time. If you randomly asked some kids in Shanghai about Mount Wangwu, they would probably tell you I knew that, and it was a fairy tale and not real!

¹⁹ “Our aim in propagating the line of the congress is to build up the confidence of the whole Party and the entire people in the certain triumph of the revolution. We must first raise the political consciousness of the vanguard so that, resolute and unafraid of sacrifice, they will surmount every difficulty to win the victory. But this is not enough; we must also arouse the political consciousness of the entire people so that they may willingly and gladly fight together with us for victory... There is an ancient Chinese fable called “The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains” Today, two big mountains lie like a dead weight on the Chinese people. One is imperialism, the other is feudalism. The Chinese Communist Party has long made up its mind to dig them up” (President Mao, 1945).

²⁰ “You might have heard of a Chinese fable describing an old man trying to remove the mountains. Thousands of years ago, there was an elderly named Yu Gong, meaning Foolish Old Man, who lived in a remote village surrounded by high mountains. He resolved to remove the two mountains obstructing his access to the outside world. Relatives and neighbours all cautioned him against the idea, but Yu Gong was undeterred and continued with the job with his children and grand-children day in and day out. He said that the mountains would not grow any bigger or higher, but people would have children, and there would be no end to their posterity. So long as people persevere, there will be a day when the mountains are removed. Yu Gong’s perseverance had the Heavenly God moved. With the joint efforts of man and God, the mountains are removed, and connectivity of Yu Gong’s village with the outside world realized... Connectivity has been a yearning of mankind since ancient times. Our ancestors braved extremely harsh conditions to create wonders of connectivity. The Silk Road was just a case in point, giving the Asian peoples the well-deserved title of connectivity pioneers” (President Xi, 2014).

If we do not find a new and modern way to present it, then we are at most entertaining ourselves (JY-08-E, Chairman of JCTIG, 2019).

In this regard, revitalising the dormant cultural asset of Mount Wangwu entails both added investment into renewing infrastructure and a more contemporaneous narration of the Yugong Spirit. Six years after its foundation, JCTIG has transformed itself from a company with 70 million *yuan* in debt to one with 5 billion *yuan* in assets, spearheading the industry's transformation and the upgrade of Jiyuan city (Pinchain Tourism, 2019; Mayor Shi, 2018). This achievement would not be possible without 'consciousness', a key idea in JCTIG's re-reading of 'The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains' (JY-08-E, Chairman of JCTIG, Jiyuan, 2019).

Looking back, Chiu (Ibid) argued that it was 'consciousness' that led him to proactively step down from his role as the Director of Municipal Development and Reform Commission to oversee the institution of JCTIG in his late fifties. Few but he believed he had made a wise decision: before him, many ex-directors in his position had been promoted and had retired as deputy mayor-level cadres. However, he insisted that he never regretted the choice, maintaining that his consciousness and vision made him a less than ideal option for officialdom, and more competent than others to start up the company. Keeping his Communist Party of China (CCP) cadre identity and salary, Chiu started to steer the newly-founded JCTIG with three other founding members of the board of directors nominated by the Organizational Department of the CPC Jiyuan Municipal Committee. Facing him on the founding date at the end of 2013 were a couple of poorly-run scenic spots with ¥70-million-*yuan* debt on the balance sheet (Pinchain Tourism, 2019), growing from 50 million *yuan* in 2009 (cf. Chen, 2006).

No banks were willing to lend us money because on balance sheet we were basically bankrupt. There is nothing to blame about that. However, I was also aware that we could not borrow from the bank, not because we were in debt but because we lacked a clear business plan. I was Director of Municipal Development and Reform Commission [and have familiarised myself with government project-financing], so I know how to initiate such a plan (JY-08-E, Chairman of JCTIG, 2019).

Against a backdrop of increasing fame over the past six years, at least three things remain unchanged. First, with 282 million *yuan* in registered assets (see Figure 5.4), the JCTIG still keeps their office at the local state-owned Guest Hotel bordering the municipal offices, never trying to cover up the close relationship between the municipal government and enterprise.

Upon entering the working office, it required no effort to recognise that it had been renovated from its previous form as a hotel room. Beds had been replaced with desks and computers while the toilet and bathroom were kept intact. Second, ever since it was established, the state-owned enterprise, formed with former civil servants and contract employees, was granted only one day off every week²¹, utilising all available time to realize its initial ‘corner overtaking’ goal (Pinchain Tourism, 2019; Chairman, JCTIG, Jiyuan, 2019). Third, even with rounds of loans and asset inflow, their balance sheet still sees a widening liability.

Partnership Financing: asset and capital

Recall that the most significant challenge faced by the ELA-centred partnership, built upon developing enterprise zones, was the separation of its administrative function from its economic one. By contrast, the LA-centred partnership, pivoting around underdeveloped cultural assets, has to synergise its two functions in unprecedented manners. On the one hand, this burden has everything to do with the municipal development agenda of boosting the reputation of the tourism industry and turning debt into profit. On the other hand, this burden reflected the failure of both prior, locally resort-based *shiye* units, and the provincial, government-backed investment group.

Even so, the internal challenge of competitive synergy is deeply rooted in conflicting methods of managing both people and capital, i.e. governmental vis-à-vis entrepreneurial.

For a local SOE bearing a strategic burden, we can not only act when asked and funded by the government. Meanwhile, we cannot run the enterprise only by watching our balance sheet. The existing laws and enforcement are far from adequate in telling us what we can or not do (JY-08-E, Chairman of JCTIG, 2019).

In terms of hiring staff, JCTIG strives to defend its independence from unwanted interference by the Municipal Government. JCTIG hire employees through three types of contracts, including the *xingzheng* contract, the *shiye* contract and the corporate contract. *Xingzheng* contracts are for those who used to work in governmental organs, including mainly those founding members of the board of directors. *Shiye* contracts are for those who used to work in *shiye* units, i.e. the tourism resorts management committees, including several deputy managing directors sitting on the board of directors. The category of corporate contract

²¹ To my initial surprise, I contacted Chairman Chiu on a Friday to schedule an interview time next week, but he offered to meet me on Saturday of the same week for the convenience of both.

employees refers to the many technical workers and clerical staff, excluding a few deputy managing directors. Unlike the corporate contract employees supervised only by the internal rules of JCTIG, *xingzheng* and *shiye* contract holders are further overseen by the Organization Department of the Municipal Party Committee. Therefore, even after restructuring the former self-funded *shiye* units into subsidiary corporations of JCTIG, the new appointment of leadership remains a ‘hot potato’ because both sides have leverage over the decision. In some cases, this underlying tension would end up in a dispute (Chairman, JCTIG, 2019).

In terms of budgeting, JCTIG must maintain its strategic role by proactively reaching out for all potential resources, avoiding the ‘contractor mindset’ and conflict with vested interests. As previously mentioned, JCTIG relies on public funding for financial stability. This financial dependence easily feeds into what could arguably be described as a ‘contractor mindset’, i.e. JCTIG should take care to refrain from formulating independent agendas or acting unless asked and funded by the government (Ibid.). However, there is an apparent ceiling of financial support available for JCTIG from local finance, not to mention any potential conflict with other expenditure channels. It is against this background that the development of JCTIG can be divided into two stages, starting around 2016. In that year, Jiyuan received a long-term, earmarked loan of nearly 200 million from the Henan Branch of the China Development Bank after entering the first batch of national pilot areas for holistic tourism destination (*quanyu lvyou shifanqu*) construction (cf. Jiyuan Finance Bureau, 2017, 2018; Pinchain Tourism, 2019). Rallying around the flag of ‘holistic tourism destination construction’, Jiyuan’s municipal finance government set up a special fund and promised to add 20 million *yuan* each year. Coordinated funding had previously been channelled through different conduits, e.g. transportation, housing, agriculture, forestry and sports, requiring corresponding government departments to align their current construction plan with the ‘Holistic tourism destination planning (2016-2030)’ (cf. Li, 2017; Liu, 2017; Jiyuan Planning Bureau, 2017). In the same year, JCTIG further took over the management of several key local tourist resorts and cultural heritage sites previously under the jurisdiction of other (quasi)government arms, strengthening its role as the spearhead of tourism development in Jiyuan.

Contrary to the impression that JCTIG suddenly rose to fame in 2016, the silent exploration that took place over three years under a tight budget requires more attention, particularly for the sake of understanding its inventive reconfiguration of the public-private relationship. In this research, I would like to highlight two situations: the first pertains to the increasing provision of small-scale tourist facilities, and the second concerns the capitalisation of the rural collective-owned property.

Since its foundation, JCTIG has borne in mind the goal of ‘corner overtaking’ and practised one day of rest per week from top to toe, compared to the two days enjoyed by government organs and most local SOEs. Likewise, they also wanted to utilise time as efficiently as possible in the employment of their project contractor and construction teams. To do so, JCTIG offers microloans to a qualified contractor that would invest and accomplish the engineering and construction projects according to the requirements and under the supervision of JCTIG. Once accomplished, the contractor would sell the project back to JCTIG and repay the corresponding loans. This type of loan-build-purchase-repayment model differs significantly from a standard business build-transfer (BT) in that no service procurement contract was signed between the two parties. Despite the potential risk involved, this arrangement could bypass the standard and relatively time-consuming government procurement procedures and speed up the provision of necessary facilities for JCTIG.

Equally ground-breaking was the innovative ‘lease contract’ between JCTIG and the rural collectives with regard to the rural land. Without infringing on original land ownership rights – the land belongs to the rural collective – JCTIG ‘bought’ the use rights of the rural land used for forestry and ponds or construction for 40 years under a mutual agreement (Village leader 1, Jiyuan, 2019; cf. Ma, 2019; Wu, 2019). Meanwhile, the rural collective registered a shareholding cooperative and invested the ‘lump sum’ back into JCTIG, which paid annual interest to the collective for the annual dividend. However, this ‘interest’ actually plays the role of ‘rent’ in this ‘contract’ because the ‘lump sum’ never really left the account of JCTIG, and may well not even exist; that is, JCTIG made significant ‘savings’ in making this deal happen. More than that, the rural collective successfully capitalised on their construction land and some homestead land while avoiding conflicting with existing regulations. Through this arrangement, the rural shareholding cooperative took a stake in JCTIG with collective land. Further, JCTIG secured their long-term interest over the land by blurring the legal boundary between a lease contract (which has a maximum duration of 20 years according to *Contract Law of the People's Republic of China 1999*) and a purchase contract. This intentional ambiguity was vital because that marketization of rural collective construction land was not legitimate until January 1st 2020, when the newly amended *Land Administration Law of the People's Republic of China* took effect (cf. Zou, Zhao, and Mason; Wang *et al.*, 2017; Zhang, 2020). Before that, all rural collective construction land had to be converted by the government to state-owned land before entering the market. Besides, there is still a lack of a national legal or administrative framework detailing how the use rights of rural construction land could be priced or transferred today.

Partnership ahead: the people and municipality united?

As previously mentioned, JCTIG now has become a giant group managing a total asset worth over 5 billion *yuan* thanks to the follow-up injection of more local-state owned assets. Meanwhile, there remains concern about the mismatch between profit and liability in JCTIG from both its leadership and the municipality (see CPC committee of JCTIG, 2020; Pinchain, 2019).

To their credit, the asset surge of JCTIC rested upon the fact that this local state-owned enterprise has enjoyed encouraging prospects surprising to municipal leaders (see Shi, 2017). Take the example of the flagship project of Wangwu Old Street on the foot of Mount Wangwu, which has a floor area of 140,000 m² and has nostalgically reproduced folklife in Northwest Henan and Southeast Shanxi as it would have been during the Ming and Qing dynasty (see Xinhua Interview, 2020 for a visual presentation). Except for a few local rural houses, most examples of antique architecture were dismantled, transported and restored from century-old houses bought from surrounding cities and villages around Jiyuan in Henan and Shanxi Province. These exquisitely designed traditional residences are interspersed with the opera stage, tea house, suspension bridge, and Buddhist pagoda, and appeal to both the general public and the professional designer. The Old Street offers visitors a full range of entertainment and participation experiences from eating, drinking, hotels and shopping. On the first two days of its opening, Wangwu Old Street welcomed over 100 thousand visitors per day, in contrast to the developer's estimation of an annual 1.825 million visits (State Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2018, pp. 40). More importantly, its stylish design was not provided by an external contractor but was independently accomplished by JCTIG 'from the use of brick and mortar to the entire layout' (Chairman, JCTIG, 2019). This project started early in 2014, and JCTIG purposely put it only 20 metres away from the protective planning boundary of Mount Wangwu Scenic Area (State Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2018, pp.14) to make full use of its proximity to the new World Geopark while avoiding top-down planning control.

With great capacity comes great responsibility. Following JCTIG's command of more assets and funding sources, doubt arose from local government leadership concerning its operation strategy and efficiency in making use of state funding (Chairman, JCTIG, 2019). After all, JCTIG was a 100% state-owned enterprise: 6% was funded by the central and 94% by the local government (*National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System*, 2019). To counter this doubt, JCTIG referred to the long investment cycle innate to the tourism industry and the necessity of investing in infrastructure.

Tourism is nothing like to hog industry where one can immediately see the output after 3 years. Tourism is more like bringing up a daughter; after 18 years of nurturing, you get a ‘water lotus’ (*chushui furong*)²²

If we were a private company that only aims at a profit, we would not be bothered to make the infrastructure investment. However, how could Jiyuan become an unmissable tourist destination without high-quality infrastructure? (JY-08-E, Chairman of JCTIG, 2019).

Without a breakdown of the expenditure readily available, one cannot help JCTIG to calculate a more accurate input-output ratio excluding those spent on public facilities. However, this discourse unveils the fluid nature of JCTIG that manages state-owned assets in an entrepreneurial style. As much as it was designed to combine the right elements from both sides, it has been tackling various tensions in daily practice, not only in a path-dependent manner but also in a pathbreaking way.

For a long time, the channel between urban and rural is closed. This is out for legal and institutional reasons but also out of the limited scope of our government officials... How many years have we seen the No. 1 Central Document focusing on ‘three rural issues’ (Note: agriculture, rural and peasants), but the problem remains unsolved. Many of our cadres comrades have been trapped by their conventional mindset and spend much time knitting the ‘embroidered pillow’.²³ For instance, the money was spent to paint the wall of rural housing white or to equip the rural villages with fitness equipment that are barely used, only for the visual pleasure of high-tier leaders. Far more than enough attention has been paid to enhance the industrial base... In recent years, the state has again started to discipline and punish the cadres who were going through the motions. But for a long time, our government officials have stuck to this mindset.

In recent years, there have been attempts and trials in slightly opening the once-closed channel, allowing the rural housing to enter legally into the housing market. Once the channel is finally opened, the peasants and rural collective have their assets and rural issues would be solved. But beyond the legal and institutional modification, government officials’ consciousness and vision have to catch up... None of the well-written documents released

²² Water lotus is a phrase widely used for praising a pretty girl in Chinese. Also please refrain from assuming there is any misogynist connotation here.

²³ A Chinese phrase used to describe things what are impressive in appearance but disappointing in substance, and an English saying of similar meaning would be “many a fine dish has nothing on it.”

by the central government can be directly applied to the locality, and it requires vision and morality more than courage to try first...This age no longer asks everyone to be selfless, but one still needs to walk a fine line. (JY-08-E, Chairman of JCTIG, 2019).




Figure 5.3 A bird's-eye view of Wangwu Old Street at Yugong village

Source: Google Earth (2021); Luo and He (2020).




Figure 5.4 Shareholding structure of Jiyuan Culture & Tourism Investment Group

Source: Compiled by the author from National Credit Information Publicity System (2019).

Cross-scalar partnership

So far, we have analysed two ideal-types of partnerships with a defining focus on the leading role of public authorities on a particular scale. Teasing out an analytical concept for this third type, instead, requires us to sway attention towards the involvement of the business sector that operates at, but also beyond, the locality. Of course, this is not to say that the role of public authorities is marginal or negligible in this type. A re-division of labour between the central and local governments is the prerequisite to the surging rise of cross-scalar partnerships.

The structure of this partnership follows and enriches a framework promulgated by the national government, which regulates the use of fiscal revenue at the local level and (to a lesser extent) the financing sources available to business sectors. Compared to the other two types, the role of partnership as a set of rhetoric and material relations is perhaps best illustrated by this third type. Both the public and private sectors have some independent and irreplaceable leverage in this partnership. Once formed, the partnership is not exposed directly to the pressure of inter-locality or inter-company competition. Both sides are obligated to have a long-term view regarding the partnership project and keep the negotiation and cooperation dynamic alive to keep calibrating the common goals and objectives. Nevertheless, the sudden rise, fall and slow resurgence of this type of partnership in China necessitate more examination, to which this section now turns.




Figure 5.5 Cross-scalar partnership

Partnership boom: Containment, implosion and explosion

There is clear evidence that this type of partnership resembled that of the UK the most. For instance, this is the only type of partnership that registers as a *de jure* public-private partnership (PPP) in the official language. British Embassy's prosperity fund has also cheered about their impact on the initial formulation of the PPP framework by China's Ministry of Finance, including the 'Value for Money' evaluation model (Foreign & Commonwealth Office of UK, 2016; HM Treasury, 2017). Besides and perhaps more fundamentally, both governments were vying to contain the aftermath of the post-financial crisis credit expansion, and the rolling out of PPP was an integral part of China's austerity policy portfolio to do so.

So far, so good. Unlike British Embassy's prosperity fund (Ibid), few practitioners in China would take *The Instruction on Promoting and Using the Model of Public-Private Partnership* issued by China's Ministry of Finance (MoF) (2014 [No. 76]) at the end of September as the *de facto* beginning of the latest PPP wave. Instead, they first felt the determination of central government two months later when MoF (2014 [No. 113]) issued the *Operational Guidelines for Public-Private Partnerships (Pilot)*. Among these guidelines, MoF made it clear that local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) and other SOEs affiliated to the same local government do not qualify as private partners in the partnership. Another half a year later, the State Council (2015) forwarded *The Notice of Instruction on Promoting Public-Private Partnerships in Public Service* jointly issued by MoF and People's Bank of China (PBoC). In this document, LGFVs no longer qualified as private partners unless:

- (i) they have established a modern enterprise system and realised market-oriented operations;
- (ii) the government debts undertaken by them have been included in the government budget, properly disposed of; and
- (iii) they explicitly announced that they would not assume the role of local government borrowing in the future.

Notably, MoF and PBoC strictly prohibited LGFVs from disguise financing for local government by participating in PPP projects through minimum return guarantees (MRG). This is not the first time China's central authorities displayed concern for 'minimum return guarantee', a widely adopted risk-mitigation strategy in PPP contracts (see Chiara, Garvin, and Vecer, 2007; Wang, Gao, and Liu, 2019). When foreign investors dominated the first boom

phase of private participation in infrastructure development in the 1990s, inexperienced local or central government were often requested to guarantee fixed or minimum returns (Wang, Ke and Xie, 2012). When this arrangement reduces the motivation for foreign investors to improve the operational management and tilted disproportional risk to the public sector, State Council promulgated the '*Notice on Relevant Issues Concerning the Appropriate Handling of the Existing Projects Guaranteeing the Fixed Return of Investments by Foreign Parties*' in 2002 and forced a renegotiation of the PPP contract with a fixed or minimum revenue guarantee. As a result, foreign investors faded away in the second round of PPP contracts as they distrust the local governments in keeping the written promise in the concession agreements (Jin and Rial, 2017). Since then, SOEs and LGFVs led the second boom of *de facto* PPP projects as principal partners of local governments in the 2000s.

Viewed through this lens, the notice issued by State Council in 2015 indicated that SOEs and LGFVs have gradually 'replaced' the foreign investors to be a potential danger to local fiscal instability. Their connection with local government, in a sense, guaranteed a 'fixed or minimum return' while accumulating debt for local governments. Therefore, to promote a renewed environment for the third boom of PPP, the first step is to request LGFVs decoupling from local governments. At the other end, MoF (Finance Department, 2015 [No. 21] introduced a Fiscal Affordability Evaluation as the policy tool to discipline the local government expenditure on PPP projects, stipulating that government expenditure on PPP projects should not exceed 10% of the annual general public budget.

Even with the tight regulation, PPP has become a buzzword since mid-2014. By the end of 2017, there were over 14000 projects with a total investment of 18 trillion *yuan* listed in China Public-Private Partnership Centre's integrated platform (CPPPC, 2018a). In this latest PPP boom-phase, Jiyuan was undoubtedly a latecomer which did not have a CPPPC-listing project until late 2016, although coming late was not intentional.

The experimental nature of PPP made it more time-consuming for the expertise to trickle down to the small and peripheral cities like Jiyuan. Luckily we did not enter too late because shortly after, in 2017, the central government started to stamp out public-private partnership abuse. (JY-07-S, Senior officer of Jiyuan Bureau of Highway Administration, 2019).

Since the end of 2017, MoF (Finance Department, 2017 [No.92]) stepped up efforts to close loopholes in the PPP initiative exploited by some local governments to borrow more money

through banned channels. For example, MoF ruled out Buy-Transfer from the acceptable PPP models due to its lack of long-term operation and management by the partnership. Besides, PPP projects relying solely on government procurement for return of investment would receive tighter supervision. Local governments whose expenditure responsibility for PPP projects accounts for more than 5% of general public budget expenditure were not allowed to participate in more PPP projects of government procurement. Consequently, in the first season of 2018, 1160 projects worth 1.2 trillion were withdrawn from the national platform, while another 2000 projects worth 3.1 trillion were rectified (CPPPC, 2018b). For the same reason, 2017 is a gap year for PPP projects in Jiyuan (see Table 4.5).

The zest in PPP from local governments and other practitioners, despite being disrupted by the tightening supervision from the central government, had its structural root in the local government investment-led development mode:

We are undoubtedly concerned with the unforeseen uncertainty in cooperation with the companies out of our control, but the constrained fiscal budget left us no choice. My working experience said that this situation applied to most of the cities and local government, who had very limited fiscal capacity to develop local economy after recurring general and administrative operating expenses (JY-02-G, Senior officer at Jiyuan Development and Reform Commission, 2019).

Therefore, instead of displaying a regained interest in the international well-trialled mode of public facility provision from both the state and market, the recent surge-phase of PPP (notably the later withdrawn ones) laid bare the otherwise off-balance-sheet government debt that found no better way to survive. In the same vein, many other vestiges of the existing social service procurement methods of government transferred to PPP. It was just the local government (and perhaps the market as well) that underestimated the central government's determination to make PPP a long-term strategy.

We were not very fervent even after applying for entering the PPP platform of the Ministry of Finance. Many were expecting this wind to blow away quickly, just like many others. However, the scrutiny and removal of unqualified PPP projects changed our mind that this is for real (JY-07-S, Senior officer of Jiyuan Bureau of Highway Administration, 2019).

Unlike in the UK, where the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and Private Finance 2 (PF2) contracts are kept as business secrets under the cloak of commercial sensitivity and

confidentiality, CPPPC collects and makes public the Value for Money Evaluation, Fiscal Affordability Evaluation reports, and contract text on the China PPP Integrated Information Platform Management Database. On the one hand, this transparency level facilitated the MoF's promotion of 'best examples' to local government officials and market practitioners. On the other hand, the promotion of best examples drove the fast business expansion of the certified large enterprises and the mundane emulation from prudent local governments. Within a compressed time span, a cross-scalar partnership between the two sides emerged to characterise the partnership trend.

This emerging cross-scalar partnership has its manifestation in the shareholding structure of special purpose vehicles (SPVs), an umbrella legal entity of the partnership in charge of bidding, designing, constructing, financing, and operating the PPP projects. A SPV is formed through formal contracts and informal networking between shareholders. Therefore, the financial share in the project capital base of a SPV fund gives an index to the stake and responsibility of each shareholder in the partnership. For analytical convenience, Table 4.5 classifies the shareholders of SPVs of PPP projects in Jiyuan into five subcategories, including the local government agency, local SOEs decoupled from local government, local private firms, non-local SOE and non-local private companies. Out of the eleven SPVs with clear equity structures, four were equity-dominated by local SOEs, six by non-local SOEs, and one by a local private company. In this sense, the role of local government was downplayed in the partnership, just as expected by the top-tier designer of PPP. But the freed-up space in the partnership were primarily taken by non-local SOEs rather than private companies.

I argue that the defining feature of the latest PPP wave, compared to domestic predecessors and international counterparts, is the 'private' side *rescaling*. Precisely speaking, it is the *scaling-down* of a specific group of business players dominated by non-local and publicly listed SOEs. The best evidence lies not in the State Council's (2017 [No. 79]) encouragement of private capital participation in PPP by promising support in terms of public utility tariff adjustment, financing, and market access. Instead, it lies in the tightened supervision of Central SOEs' participation in PPP by the State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC, 2017 [No. 192]). More specifically, SASAC (i) requested the latter to transfer all investment approval authority for PPP business upward to the headquarters; (ii) put a rigid constraint on the total PPP investment by the latter; (iii) cautioned the latter against investing in PPP business with debt-based funding; and (iv) implemented a lifetime accountability system for the latter's major decisions on PPP business.

Prior to the promulgation of these two documents, the proportion of private companies participating in PPP continued to decline since December 2015, both in terms of deal size and the number of deals. By July 2017, the former dropped from 47.8% to 37.2%, and the latter fell from 60.5% to 56.22%. Meanwhile, the share of central SOEs was steadily growing (see Table 5.9). Seeing from these numbers and the policy documents aforementioned, we can only conclude that: underlying the infrastructure provision realm, upon which most PPPs were built, was a selective environment favouring central SOEs (and to a less extent the local SOEs) over the domestic private enterprises. This advantage was so (and very likely remains) systematic that it went much beyond the regulatory scope of the Ministry of Finance, and this advantage was so inherent that it would ‘naturally’ expand without intervention.

Table 5.9 Participation in PPP projects in China by enterprises of different ownership

Time	Proportion of total investment (%)			Proportion of total landed projects (%)		
	12/2014	12/2015	07/2017	12/2014	12/2015	07/2017
Central state-owned enterprise	45.14	46.15	52.19	31.71	25.13	28.47
Local state-owned enterprise	37.68	18.35	22.29	31.71	19.12	23.31
Domestic private enterprise	17.18	35.5	24.77	36.59	55.75	47.62

Source: Zhang and Xiao (2017).

After all, when CPPPC chose ‘social capital’ (*shehui ziben*) as the Chinese translation of the ‘private’ sector or the other way around, adopting the ‘private’ as the English translation of *shehui ziben*, SOEs were never excluded. The dominance of large SOEs in infrastructure construction and operation also predated the PPP initiative and even the post-crisis fiscal stimulus package (see Pan *et al.*, 2017).

Considering PPP projects in Jiyuan (and of China as a whole) are focused on the field of wastewater treatment and road construction, and wastewater treatment has a transparent user-pay model thus better align with the PPP mandate, we might take Jiyuan’s *Rural Domestic Sewage Disposal Project: Phase I* as an example (2017). According to the Value-for-Money Assessment and Fiscal Affordability Evaluation accomplished by Beijing Gauging Consultants Company (2016), a not-local private company, this project aimed to improve the environmental quality and secure the drinking water quality of rural residents in Jiyuan. In Phase I, the Office for Urban-Rural Integration selected 60 administrative villages and 100 natural villages, covering 16,910 rural households and 67,800 people in 13 township-level administrative divisions in

Jiyuan. To align with the holistic tourism destination planning, the selection of villages focusing on the big-size villages and those specializing in ecotourism.

We select both the villages in the plain, in the slope and the mountainous area. Also, we consider the actual demand of the villages, focusing on the settlements with a certain amount of residents and business activities, now or in the planning (JY-14-G, Senior officer at Jiyuan Rural Work Office, 2019).

Within the expected 30-years of contract duration, 3-year would be devoted to constructing 100 sewage treatment stations, laying 450-kilometre pipelines, and another 27 years to operation and maintenance of the infrastructure. After 30 years, all these infrastructures would be handed over to the Jiyuan government. This project chooses the Viability Gap Funding mechanism, meaning that rural users would pay daily use fees besides government expenditure in infrastructure construction and maintenance.

Table 5.10 Quoted price from two suppliers in the bidding

		Rate of return (%)	Pipeline maintenance fee (<i>yuan</i> /km/year)	Sewage charge: Class A (<i>yuan</i> /m ³)	Sewage charge: Class B (<i>yuan</i> /m ³)	Estimated gross investment (million <i>yuan</i>)	Evaluation Score (/100)
	Value for Money Assessment			1.05	0.80	190.5583	
Round 1	Beijing capital	7.85	7780	1.03	0.78	190.5583	
	Beijing originwater technology	7.9	7880	1.04	0.79	190.5583	
Round 2(final)	Beijing capital	7.85	7700	1.02	0.78	190.5583	89.7
	Beijing originwater technology	7.85	7880	1.04	0.78	190.5583	76.73

Source: Jiyuan's rural domestic sewage disposal project: Phase 1 (2017).

Since the Value-for-Money Assessment has set out key technical indicators and estimated price for the service provider (see Table 5.10), the competition result among bidders was more dependent on the evaluation expert group's overall evaluation after potential rounds of competitive negotiation. In this case, four suppliers showed interest in the bidding: Beijing Capital Co., Ltd, Beijing Orient Landscape Co., Ltd., Beijing Originwater Technology Co., Ltd, and Henan Qingshuiyuan Technology Co., Ltd. All of these four are Shanghai Stock

Exchange-listed enterprises of which Beijing Capital is a non-local state-owned enterprise (SOE), Beijing Orient Landscape and Beijing Originwater Technology are non-local private enterprises²⁴, and Henan Qingshuiyuan Technology is a local private company in Jiyuan. Both Beijing Capital and Beijing Orient Landscape made offers for the bidding, and Beijing Capital finally stood out after two rounds of competitive negotiation.

Despite the minimum return guarantee remaining one focus of supervision, the Jiyuan branch of Beijing Capital Co., Ltd was not bothered by this. The PPP contract promised a minimum use volume instead of guaranteed a minimum return by stating:

If there could be an insufficient inflow of sewage, this contract designs a guaranteed minimum volume. In the first three years of operation, the minimum volume was 60%, 80%, and 93%, respectively, of the designed processing capacity. From the fourth year till the end of the franchised period, the minimum volume was 93% of the designed processing capacity. The sewage processing fee will be charged according to the minimum volume if the inflow of sewage does not meet that (Jiyuan Government and Beijing Capital Group, 2017, pp. 32)

Instead, soon after the contract was signed that both sides realised accomplishing the construction in three years was a non-realistic plan:

The PPP contract was only a framework with many details undecided for engineering construction and management. The pre-project feasibility study was too sketchy, and many details were inaccurate. We had to redo the construction survey and design and renegotiate with the government. The executive government body has changed from the Office of Urban-Rural Integration to the Bureau of Housing and Urban and Rural Construction

Many of our local government cadres have not realised the significance of PPP, despite it has been inscribed in the centrally promulgated policy documents. It is not merely to outsource infrastructure construction to the project company, and then the job is done (Jiyuan government and Beijing Capital Group, 2017, pp. 32).

²⁴ Ironically, Beijing Orient Landscape and Beijing Originwater Technology both experienced debt crises in 2019 due to the mishandled fast expansion of PPP projects, and the debt crises were only smoothed by the introduction of strategic state-owned capital (see Cai and Chen, 2021).

5.4 Conclusion

Scale suffices as an important explanatory element in understanding the role of various (quasi-) partnerships in the economic governance of Jiyuan. The ‘role’ refers to the process of establishing the framework to formulate strategic goals and deliver investment or procure funds. This chapter has explored three types of scale-based partnerships currently active in Jiyuan, each playing a profound effect in a due spatial and temporal context. In Economic Development Zones, the extra-local authority-centred partnership has been responsible for articulating the economic growth goals, strengthening regional competitiveness and courting industrial investment. In the construction and promotion of holistic tourist destinations, the local authority-centred partnership has recently been synergizing all funding sources to promote an updated city image based on resort-led redevelopment. In infrastructure provision during a fiscal austerity period, cross-scalar partnerships bear high expectations from many parties while are still struggling to recover from a rollercoaster ride of upsets and downs.

Public-Private Partnerships reconfigure the interface between state and market in China. However, an urban governance phase-change from managerialism to entrepreneurialism or the other way around cannot be abstracted without specifying the scale of partnership formulation. Each type of scale-specific partnership represents a distinct structure to (re)assemble the ideas of competition, efficiency and order under the rubric of sustainable development through a Schumpeterian (re)embedding of state vis-à-vis market into the society.

In a similar vein, Public-Private Partnerships shape inter-urban competitions, but in various ways. A fierce inter-urban competition entails a form of partnership very different from that prefigured by a mild one. In the case of Jiyuan, I find that an extra-local authority-led partnership feeds into a fiercer inter-city competition through introducing and updating the rating system of enterprise zones. In comparison to this, despite a local authority-led partnership being formed under pressure to catch up with the neighbouring forerunners in cultural tourism development, JCTIG, the pioneering institution of the partnership, draws broader concern regarding its under-qualifiable efficacy of using funds. On top of all of these points, the Chinese central government proactively introduced the *de jure* cross-scalar partnerships to contain the rising municipal debt as a negative consequence of the previous wave of inter-city competition for foreign investment.

To conclude, although partnerships have become the *modus operandi* of contemporary urban governance in China and beyond, how they can account for shifts in the latter remains

underexplored. There is a need to articulate the scale in the (re)classification, typologies, and transition models of partnerships were we to better understand the *causes* and *effects* of the shifts (or turns) in urban governance. Moreover, the recent analysis of partnerships in China privileges the dual role of Urban Investment and Development Companies (UIDCs) while failing to ask what selective environment warranted their activities. Their amphibious role is as the government's political and administrative arm on the one hand, and a market player on the other (Li and Chiu, 2018). As such, they could sidestep restrictions from both sides while retaining the state's ultimate control of the economy (Jiang and Waley, 2018). This rests upon a time and space-specific trajectory of urbanisation in China that remains underexamined. They represented a disruptive moment of interventionist (municipal) statecraft, situated in the broader picture of an evolving state-market relationship in China and beyond.

In a sense, it is tempting to propose that UIDCs rewrite the *role* of the public-private partnership with its distinct historical genesis, institutional setting, internal structure, and capitalisation method. They do not replicate the US or UK models that were often presented as a strategic alliance of previously strictly separated local boosterism and local governmental powers (Harvey, 1989a; Brenner, 2004). Nevertheless, they delivered strategic goals that neither the state nor the market had done with traditional methods. However, UIDCs have not rewritten the *law* of the public-private partnership. The gap between a city's uncapped debt wish and the limited liability remains far from being filled. The tension between the social and economic remains unsettling within and beyond the partnership. It is this gap and tension that steers Chapter 6 into an exploration of the rural collectives impacted by the urbanising governance.

CHAPTER 6

Busting and booming debt-wishes

6.1 Introduction

Chapter 5 presented a partnership-centred explanation of urban governance and underlined the scalar and statist specificity of different partnerships in Jiyuan. In particular, it foregrounded the places where one type of partnership occupies a central position in the orchestration of local industrial and urban development. By comparing the trajectories of different partnerships, that chapter unveiled both the advantages and disadvantages of partnership-based conceptualisation of the urban political machinery in China. This chapter will continue to ‘unbound’ (Pow, 2011) narratives on urban China from the North Atlantic conceptualisation of urbanisation undergirding the conventional entrepreneurial urbanism theory. More precisely, this chapter presents a more dialectical and conjunctural theorisation of urbanising governance practice.

The chapter is divided into three main sections. In section 6.2, I trace the epistemological root for treating the Chinese urban process as the outlier and sometimes antithesis of the West, which was briefly mentioned in Chapter 2, to the hollowing-out of the urban-rural dialectic that underpins (most of) Harvey’s theorisation of entrepreneurial urbanism and (some of) Jessop’s articulation of the entrepreneurial city. In order to revitalise this debate, I suggest an investigation of the recent governance practice of shareholding cooperatives in urbanising Chinese rural collectives would be a good empirical entry point.

In sections 6.3 and 6.4, examples from the case studies are used to illustrate changes brought by the shareholding cooperative reform to the rural collectives’ *self-governance*. Evidence from selected villages in Jiyuan is used to examine how each of the four alternative meta-theoretical positions considered in this chapter: *state entrepreneurialism*, *state corporatism*, *urban territorialism* and *desakota* explain urbanising governance of the rural collectives in China while the empirical material also contributes to the constructive critiquing of each position. Running through each section are three interconnected themes: the shareholding cooperative as (i) an emerging grassroots society governance structure in the cracks between the state and market; (ii) an unfolding topographically uneven process; and (iii) a debt-tolerant economic association

liberating its borrowing potential. Each section explores the subtle but critical differences in the explanations offered over the agency of grassroots actors in the production and articulation of in-situ strategies. This is important in three senses. First, it casts into question the understanding of rural as a coherent, passive and class consciousness-free shell of identity in China's transition to 'people-oriented urbanisation'. Second, it understands the shareholding cooperative as a response not only to the state, market or rural cadres' calling *a priori* of wresting away the economic growth function from the incumbent rural governance structure, but also to the villagers' aspiration for welfare and freedom. Third, this understanding feeds into the vibrant while vision-bounded debates over 'entrepreneurial state', 'state entrepreneurialism', 'municipal statecraft', 'grounded city', and the 'municipal entrepreneurialism' (see Mazzucato, 2013; Wu, 2017; Lauermann, 2018; Pike *et al.*, 2019; Thompson *et al.*, 2020)

Section 6.3 explores two theoretical stances to investigating the changing form and function of *corporatism* in urbanising governance. Corporatism in this research encapsulates the broad agreement on the 'inevitability of both market forces and state institutions and seeks to limit, modify and guide their operation by linking them formally and substantively to functional representation' (Jessop, 2007 [1993], pp. 503). The first, *state entrepreneurialism*, interprets China's urbanisation as a process in which the state planning keeps its centrality by actively employing market instruments for strategic objectives beyond short-term growth (Wu, 2016b, 2017, 2020). Reconstruction of the countryside in rural China, very much like the urban regeneration in the city centre, development of new towns in the suburban, requires a delivery of the state planning project that innovatively engages with market means. Local efforts to govern the rural have to align (at least nominally) with the 'new socialist countryside' vision of the central state in China, despite that neither the local government (without enough fiscal power) nor the private sector (under tightened land development control) could afford to fill in the gaps in rural social service provision. Adopting this approach necessitates the abandonment of the epistemological state-market dichotomy based on neoliberalism. Meanwhile, this approach highlights the permanent state ownership of land and the state control over rural-urban mobility in China as the methodological point of departure. The second position, local *state corporatism*, affords the local rural cadres a higher level of autonomy in governing and developing the countryside by highlighting their amphibiousness (Oi, 1992). Rural cadres were claimed to play the dual role of state officials and businesspeople in erecting and managing township and village enterprises (TVEs). Similarly, the county-level government acted like an independent entrepreneur rather than a local arm of the central government, coordinating

economic enterprises in its territory to their best growth potential, resembling ‘a diversified business corporation’ (Oi, 1995, pp. 100). Some evidence also suggested that the local state corporatist behaviour extends beyond the public enterprises to private enterprises (Edin, 2003; Oi, 1999); beyond the rural sector to the urban sector (see Jiang and Waley, 2018). This extended use of local *state corporatism* raises not only theoretical issues around the extent to which a thriving market economy in urban China can resort to the ‘loosening of central control in a Leninist system’ (Oi, 1992, pp. 101), but more practical issues of why the parochial, protectionist, and cellular rural Chinese society failed to buttress the continuous prosperity of rural economy since the turning of 21st century.

Section 6.4 presents two theoretical approaches to exploring the traits of syndicalism defined as ‘corporatism without capital or the state’ (Jessop, 2007 [1993], pp. 509). Unlike the first two stances, this strand of approaches proactively pursues a de-centralised and anti-Eurocentric theorisation of urbanisation. Theorists of this genre acknowledge the socialisation of labour but question the necessity of the statist or capitalist mode of production. The first, *urban territorialism*, postulates the city as a territory agency that possesses a power geometry among all the actors based upon the social and spatial division of labour, e.g. local state, landowners, planners, financiers, builders and peasants. This power geometry is (re)produced through social actors’ physical, discursive, and ideological strategies for accumulation (Hsing, 2010, pp. 5-18). Urbanisation in China since the 1990s, through this lens, is a land-centred accumulation process in which the local state struggles with other social actors in defining, legitimising and consolidating its territorial power. Like *state entrepreneurialism*, the *urban territorialism* approach divides a metropolitan area into three types: urban core, urban fringe, and rural fringe (see Chapter 2). However, unlike the former, this typology was delineated by three types of the territorial struggle between state (as a ‘multiple centres of authority-building,’ see Ibid., pp. 8) and non-state actors. Last but not least, this approach upholds that peasants and rural communities in China, despite their seemingly disadvantaged position ‘in the increasingly urban-centred metropolitan governance’, still have the opportunity to ‘carve out a space of autonomy’ (Ibid., pp. 127) against state and market actors. The second, *desakota*, represents an uncompleted effort to articulate the urban process beyond the North Atlantic from a more culture-sensitive and rural-urban continuum lens (see Ginsburg *et al.*, 1991). As a combination of the Indonesian words *desa* for village and *kota* for town, McGee coined *desakota* to stress the ‘need to look for terms and concepts in the languages of the countries one was studying’ (McGee, 1991a, pp. 341). Meanwhile, *desakota* defines a particular urban frontier in Asian peri-urban zones characterised by rampant informality and intensely mixed land use (see Figure 6.2

for a conceptual visualisation). A central enquiry of *desakota* is to understand to what extent these social, spatial, cultural and political hybridity represents not an ‘inherently transient or unstable’ form of organisation in urbanisation, but ‘a distinct form, evolving on trajectories that have significant degrees of autonomy from both urban and rural influences’ (Koppel, 1991, pp. 67).

Table 6.1 summarises these four particular interpretations of the workings of urbanising governance in China. In each cell, the defining *transitive* and the *intransitive* (cf. Jessop, 2005) features attempt to capture philosophical and methodological differences. All four attempt to explain the shifting state-market relationship and urban-rural linkage in urbanising China. They are chosen not only for their sustaining academic resonance over the past decades but also for their still-underestimated potential to expand the increasingly *bounded* vision of cosmopolitanism underpinning most North Atlantic urban theorisation. Using these alternative approaches to the governance of urbanisation in China, I conclude by arguing that the *just-in-time desakota* position has the most to say about the shareholding cooperative reform of the rural collective economy in Jiyan but that each position illuminates something about the nature of contemporary governance of urbanizing villages. Furthermore, I argue that an augmented theory of entrepreneurial urbanism demands an urgent re-examination of the *common ground* of these alternative theorisations rather than an exaggeration of the differences in-between.

Table 6.1 Approaches to the urbanising state, market and society in China

	<i>Corporatist</i> accept the legitimacy of both market force and state institutions	<i>Syndicalist</i> anti-capitalist and anti-statist
<i>Centralist</i> accumulation urban/rural dichotomy top-down	<i>State entrepreneurialism</i> urbanisation in China is an accumulation process in which the state strategically adopted market instrument was to deliver strategic state goals via the help of planning	<i>Urban territorialism</i> urbanisation in China is a conflict- ridden process in which local state competes with the market and other social actors to build up its authority and territory for accumulation and distribution
<i>De-centralist</i> embeddedness urban-rural continuum bottom-up	<i>State corporatism</i> urbanisation in China was driven by a merger of state and economy in localities to the extent that local government cadres coordinated economic enterprises in its territory, resembling a diversified business corporation.	<i>Desakota</i> the possibility of an alternative and sustainable urbanisation that draws upon but goes beyond the Eurocentric paradigm.

6.2 Refill urban-rural dialectic with China

The coinage of ‘entrepreneurial urbanism’ built upon Harvey’s work since the late 1970s, where he embarked on a fruit-bearing theorisation of the urban process as an integral part of capitalism (Harvey, 1985a, 1985b). Harvey’s (1985a, pp. 88) theorisation of the ‘urban’ extended Henri Lefebvre’s idea of urban revolution by unpacking the ‘ensemble of transformations through which industrial society comes to be superseded by urban society’. The investigation of Baltimore’s housing market and suburbanisation drew his then prescient attention to financial capital and fed into his geographical reworking of Marxist historical materialism. Quite blatantly, Harvey (1976, pp. 289) never tried to deny his reductionist understanding of the urban process under capitalism by maintaining that ‘the surface appearance of conflicts around the built environment — the struggles against the landlord or urban renewal — conceals a hidden essence that is nothing more than the struggle between capital and labour.’

As per Harvey’s articulation, the rural does not constitute an antithesis to the urban. Instead, in a purely capitalist mode of production, the urban-rural dichotomy is just a particular geographical expression of the division of labour (Harvey, 1985a, pp. 14-15). Four years after the 2008 financial crisis, Harvey (2012, pp. IV) rehashed this aspatial understanding of urban-rural difference, arguing that the ‘pell-mell urbanisation of China’ resulted in ‘the fading of the urban-rural divide.’ In other words, China was nothing but another example where ‘the clear distinction that once existed between the urban and the rural was gradually fading into a set of porous spaces of uneven geographical development under the hegemonic command of capital and the state’ (Ibid: 19).

However, applying the ‘fading of the urban-rural divide’ argument to China without modification is oversimplified and problematic in many ways. It goes without saying that any theorisation of Chinese cities cannot ignore the astonishing fact that China used 40 per cent more cement between 2011 and 2013 than the United States had consumed in the entire 20th century (Harvey, 2016, pp. 1). Nor can we forget to enquire about the environmental, social and economic consequences of cement usage. However, an exclusive emphasis on changes in the built environment risks flattening the understanding of urban, which, as Harvey himself acknowledges, has always been a conflictual and multi-layered process (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 3). More than that, few theorists would deny that even after the decades of speedy urbanisation, China is still nowhere close to ‘an advanced capitalist country’, or a pure ‘capitalist mode of production’ where ‘the urban-rural distinction has lost its real economic basis’ and

only lingers ‘within the realm of ideology’ (Harvey, 1985a, pp. 15). On the contrary, China’s rurality has co-evolved with, rather than been erased by, the making of urbanity. It is only in this sense that we can understand the rolling-out of ‘urban-rural coordinated, new-type urbanisation’ as a response to some inevitable (rather than accidental) tension that arises from continuously transforming the countryside into the end state of an urban society moulded on existing advanced capitalist countries.

Becoming rural (collective) in contemporary China

Apart from all the other universally identifiable features of the countryside, contemporary rural China inherits a unique layer of collectiveness to land ownership from its Maoist past. In contrast to urban land, which is owned by the state, rural land is owned by the rural collective, and this arrangement has been codified in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China since 1982 (cf. Lin and Ho, 2005). Henceforth, an array of post-Mao rural land reforms, starting from the introduction of the Household Responsibility System and the demise of the People’s Commune System, applied only to the realm of use right and not ownership.

In practice, there has yet to emerge another clearly defined, united legal subject to represent the rural collective in the same way that local governments represent the state to exercise land ownership. Notably, rural collective economic organisations and village committees have played mutually overlapping and collective incomplete roles in managing rural land on behalf of the villagers. For instance, before the promulgation of the Civil Code of the PRC effective in 2021, *Rural Land Contract Law* stipulated that rural collective economic organisations and village committees had the right to give out contracts of communal land to peasant households in the said village. Meanwhile, the *Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees* instructed that villagers’ committees were the only legal agents of the rural homestead. The latest Civil Code of PRC, for the first time, makes it clear that the village collective economic organisation and the villagers’ committee exercise collective ownership on behalf of the said collective. However, it does not put to rest the long-standing debate concerning the vague legal status of rural collective economic organisations: is it a private institution (see Yuan and Liu, 2016)?

This ‘deliberate institutional ambiguity’ (Tilt, 2016, pp. 101) was used to arguably secure the flexibility and efficiency in handling complex rural land issues while adhering to the supreme principle of collective ownership. It also witnessed the rise of rural enterprises (i.e. TVEs) in the 1980s and 1990s (Wong, 2016). However, entering the 1990s, accelerated urbanisation and encroachment on rural land further problematised the virtualisation of rural land collective

ownership, incoherence of land use rights system, and lack of financing rights (see Huang and Guo, 2019). The ambiguity failed to defend the interest of average peasants against the predatory state or market forces. On this conundrum facing the development of the rural economy, the ‘separation of the three rights of rural collective land proposed in the No.1 Central Document of 2014 represented the latest wave of policy response (Gao, 2018). Vital to the proposal was to separate the operation right from the existing household right of contractual operation built upon the fundamental right of collective ownership. Once separated, the operation right was expected to stimulate the free transfer, monetization and redistribution of farmland rights (Qian and Zhang, 2017). Nevertheless, the elusive statement on the legal status of operation rights (as well as the collective economic organisations) in the long-awaited Civil Code seemed to suggest that the form and method of developing a sustainable rural collective economy remain to explore.

Despite the shift of urbanisation foci in China entering the 1990s, marked by the severe decline of TVEs, rural shareholding cooperative ‘as a specific ownership and organisational structure continued to thrive in the urbanising villages’ (Wong, 2016, pp. 690). With several variants, the rural shareholding cooperatives represented a promising (bottom-up self-)governance method to secure the long-term benefit for peasants increasingly detached from agricultural labouring *per se* and those worrying the bitter fruit of governmental land acquisition. For instance, Po (2008) found that shareholding reform has clarified individual villager’s property right under the collective ownership structure and facilitated land-related interests redistribution. Chen (2016) argued that shareholding cooperatives could contribute to the democracy of village governance by empowering the individual peasant.

In contrast, Xue and Wu (2015) claimed that the rural shareholding cooperative represented a grassroots entrepreneurial governance and a root reason for mounting village debt in Dongguan, one of the biggest beneficiaries of globalisation in southern China over the past decades. In their study, the rural shareholding cooperatives in Dongguan have spearheaded the investment and speculation in the local export-oriented economy by renting housing and industrial properties to factories and migrant workers since the 1980s. However, the 2008 financial crisis hit the local economy hard and brought many cooperatives to the brink of bankruptcy and in search of government relief. This issue drew huge attention when then Guangdong provincial party secretary, now Politburo member Wang Yang, compared the village financial crisis in Dongguan to that of Greece in 2012. Wang accused many indebted rural cooperatives of unrestrained borrowing money from different channels to meet the welfare promise to the cooperative shareholders (i.e. villagers) but only to make the situation

worse.

Even with a large volume of existing research, many fail to mention that neither the rural shareholding cooperative (SC) nor its debt wish is a brand-new thing in China (cf. Clegg, 1996; Levi, 1998; Li, 2003; Zhao and Yuan, 2014). Therefore, they also fail to account for the actual new thing in the latest wave of state-promoted shareholding cooperative reform, i.e. the repositioning of rural to redirect the route of urbanisation. Among the very few exceptions, Wong (2016, pp. 703) remarks that the series of shareholding reforms of rural collective economic organisation, via the case of Guangzhou Luogang District, are dynamic institutional arenas where both top-down and bottom-up initiatives are combined to reconfigure the ‘contestation among the local state, village cadres and ordinary villagers in grassroots governance.’

In a nutshell, the shareholding cooperative of rural collective organisations constitutes a zoom lens to examine the restructuring of grassroots governance in urbanising China. Hence, an investigation of ongoing shareholding cooperative reforms in Jiyuan has the potential to refill the hollowing urban-rural dialectic underlying the conventional theory of entrepreneurial urbanism. In order to do so, the empirical enquiries would focus on three overlapping façades of the SC reform: (i) as a strategic grassroots response to the broader alteration of urbanisation mechanism; (ii) as an unfolding process of reshaping uneven rural geography; and (iii) as a temporally and spatially selective developmentalist experiment.

The topography of shareholding reform in Jiyuan

Before diving into the detailed SC practice in three selected villages, there is a need to characterise the generic features of the 525 administrative villages (*xingzheng cun*) in Jiyuan. As displayed in Figure 6.1 and Table 6.2, the *status quo* of the population and socio-economic activities distribution in Jiyuan have adapted to the topographical condition, so does the average rural household income of each village. By 2018, urban villages in the plain area have significantly higher per capita disposable income than those in the mountainous areas, with few exceptions.

Jiyuan is divided into sixteen township-level administrative divisions, including five urban subdistricts and eleven townships. Meanwhile, Jiyuan has a total number of 525 village committees as grassroots self-governing bodies, of which 72 are located in the five urban subdistricts and the other 453 in the townships or city subdistricts. Before the blanket

shareholding cooperative reform since 2013, some villages had developed collectively-owned or managed businesses. For instance, some urban villages have developed a rentier economy, while some mountain villages cooperated with agricultural enterprises to develop farmland. Meanwhile, these villages also met with different issues in developing a robust collective economy. For example, some villages have been suffering the decline of rentier income just like those in Dongguan. At the same time, some others have been through difficulty financing and commencing collective business (Duan, 2018; Shang, 2012; Duan *et al.*, 2018).




Figure 6.1 Jiyuan's topography and population density by township in 2018

Note: People per square kilometre.

Source: Jiyuan Government (2020).

The content of the SC reform of collective ownership includes three major steps, including (i) collective asset and capital verification, (ii) collective economic organisation membership confirmation, and (iii) shareholding cooperative organisation legal registration. Although the latest SC reform in Jiyuan did not make a legal breakthrough by defining the SC as a *de jure* private company for profit, it undoubtedly betrayed a renewed understanding of the rural collective economy. That is, the collective economy not only acknowledges the union of labour but also allows the union of labour and capital and respects private property right (Yuan and Liu, 2016). Although there remains a distance between the *ought* and *is*, the newly registered rural economic organisations became the standardised channel for the government to distribute financial resources or policy loans for rural economic development. The contract between private capital and rural collectives regards the use of collective property, once reliant on the oral agreement, and is expected to receive better legal protection and market recognition if stamped by a registered SC (Senior officer of Public Resources Trading Center, Jiyuan, 2019).

Nevertheless, the shareholding reform is unlikely to be a panacea for the different problems that hinder the development of rural collective economies. The annual municipal rural work

congress, attended by municipal cadres and village committee representatives rolled out some 'best practice' based on six earliest pilots villages (see Huang, 2015; Duan, 2019), but it did not convince all the villages to display an equivalent level of enthusiasm for the reform. In the paperwork, all the 525 villages have registered the rural collective organisations by 2015 (Huang, 2015).

The selection of the villages for detailed exploration took account of their location and SC-prompted changes²⁵. Of the three villages, Waterstone, located in a peri-urban township, was one of the 'best practices' selected from the local state-promoted pilots. Northgate, once the wealthiest village in Jiyuan per capita and overall, has bogged down due to mounting collective debt in recent years. Last but not least, Cypress was one of the mountain villages that suffered severely from labour and brain drain, but was not poor enough for extra governmental support. Together, these three cuts into the blanket SC reform would unveil the reshuffling relationships between local government, rural elites (chief decision-makers of corresponding collectives), individual villagers, and the market capital. At the same time, the SC reform of these villages is contrasted to reveal that different villages strategically adopted 'shareholding' to deal with different indigenous problems. Thus, the reshuffling of power geometry has not followed one single trajectory as 'reconsolidation of state power into urbanising villages' (Wong, 2016). Instead, it is 'a strategy for governance' (Ibid.) that offers an opportunity for strategic coupling between the rural collective and the local state but does not guarantee its success.

²⁵ Note: All village names are pseudonymised for ethical reasons.

Table 6.2 Jiyuan's socio-economic development by topography in 2018

	Number of street offices or townships	Land area (km ²)	Jiyuan hukou holders (thousand people)	Regular residents (thousand people)	Indigenous village hukou holders (thousand)	Numbers of villages or neighbourhood committees	Per capita disposable income (yuan)	Income growth rate (%)
Urban subdistricts	5	80	197	273*	128	72	23423	8.1~8.5
Foothill area	6	784	385	360*	351	267	19921	8.6~9.0
Mountainous area	5	1035	144	100*	143	186	10922	9.0~12.4
Jiyuan	16	1899	726	733*	622	525	18446	8.9

Source: Compiled by the author from the Bureau of Statistics of Jiyuan (2019) and Jiyuan Government* (2020)

Table 6.3 Characteristics of selected villages

	Location	Registered Population	Permanent Residents	Land Area (km ²)	Farmland (km ²)	Per capita disposable income in 2018 (yuan)	Income ranking in the township	Income ranking in rural Jiyuan	Growth rate (%)
Northgate	Urban district	2831	5800	1.4	0	28498	2/8	13/525	8.5
Waterstone	suburban township	710	800*	4.3	0.6	24111	8/49	41/525	10.2
Cypress	Exurban township	892	350*	N/A	0.8	12800	1/44	327/525	13.1

Source: Compiled by the author from the Bureau of Statistics of Jiyuan (2019) and *interviews.

6.3 State entrepreneurialism and state corporatism

Unlike the welfarist Trans-Atlantic countries at the turn of the 1980s, the recent resurgence of the public-private partnership in China is not an effort to camouflage a systematic failure of welfarism nor is it the rise of neoliberalism. The underlying causes of this phenomenon are not as straightforward as pro-welfare and anti-neoliberalism theorists suggested. Simply put, China was not a neoliberalist country after 1978 not because of its strong state intervention in the economy, but because of the unjustified elite privatisation of public assets. Likewise, China was not a welfarist country before 1978, not due to the state's preference for economic growth over social redistribution, but owing to the unsolicited local statisation of *de jure* private property (see Qin, 2013). This understanding is not to deny the improvement China has made in both welfare provision and market economy. Rather, it is to attribute the progress made *a posteriori* to the incremental enhancement of 'common baseline' in terms of 'civil rights, freedom, and procedural justice' (Ibid.), despite their seemingly antagonistic relationship in the post-welfare countries.

Bearing this starting point in mind, the partnership-driven 'new-type urbanisation' will be of less significance as an innovative ecological response to the 'two dead ends' laying ahead of 'the old path and detour' (see Chapter 5). More fundamentally, it should be another sublation of (and simultaneously a diversion from) the *hukou* identity-based welfare system and unjust collusion between local government and private business. Similarly, migrant workers-oriented 'urban-rural coordinated development' points less towards some end state of a 'flat world' free from urban vis-à-vis rural difference. Instead, by breaking the institutional bulwark that exacerbates the *hukou* identity-based urban vis-a-vis rural dichotomy, the scheme contributes to the restoration of class politics that permits urban vis-à-vis rural division of labour.

Beyond all of those above, the rural collective shareholding reform is (or can be) both welfarist and liberal. It is welfarist in that it further delineates and safeguards the private share of property rights to the collective-owned asset. It is liberal because it strengthens the legal basis for the transfer of land management rights to third parties.

State entrepreneurialism

State entrepreneurialism in urbanizing rural governance hinges on several often unspecified or under-specified theoretical and empirical assertions about what can be feasibly achieved on a

local scale. In theory, central to this approach is the claim that urban transformation could be a strategic state project rather than a neoliberal market project. For instance, the Chinese state has strategically tailored urban space for courting foreign capital, although its ultimate aim is to improve industrial capacity rather than economic profit. In practice, foreign investment-oriented urban making entails both relaxations of state regulation and innovative adoption (and sometimes invention) of market instruments in China. Therefore, this approach adopts the following chain of reasoning between the theory and practice (see Wu, 2017, pp. 1-3):

- (i) the state legitimacy in China stems from the delivery of industrial productivity rather than purely economic growth;
- (ii) industrial productivity catch-up entails foreign investment more than domestic capital, and further needs international market over domestic demand;
- (iii) foreign industrial capital courtship requires lower-cost land, cheap labour, fixed assets and infrastructure;
- (iv) industrial land supply builds upon the state's monopolistic position in land acquisition; and
- (v) the provision of low-cost labour justifies the exclusion of rural migrants from the social provision and maintenance;

Meanwhile, this approach has a series of spatial and temporal implications on local urban governance, including:

- (vi) investment on fixed asset and infrastructure relies on the land value capture by the investors;
- (vii) as the principal infrastructure investor, the local government is rational in capturing the land value by acquiring agrarian land at minimum cost, selling them cheaply to industrial investors but expensively to the commercial and residential investors;
- (viii) emerging fragmented urban space scattered with planned development zones and informal housing mirrors the preference for industrial production over peasant labour's reproduction of the different tier of local governments;
- (ix) the fragmented urban space gradually becomes obstacle for further capital accumulation and demands a spatial fix; and
- (x) planning occupies a central role in the spatial fix, but it responds ultimately to the state legitimacy, sometimes even at the cost of short-term financial revenue and GDP growth.

By foregrounding the state in the making of urbanism (in China), the *state entrepreneurialism* approach does not explicitly reject a ‘city-centric transition model’ (Peck, 2014: 399) that caricatured Harvey’s theorisation of entrepreneurial urbanism. However, it does suggest an alternative explanation of the urban, that is, the making of urban (in China) is contingently necessary for capital accumulation but necessarily contingent on state reproduction. A logical extension of this argument leads to an updated interpretation of rurality reproduction in an urbanising China. Over the past decades, China has dispossessed the countryside for the benefit of the cities, facilitating the accumulation of (international) capital but ultimately serving the vested interests of the (Chinese) state. The recent shareholding reform of rural collective asset under the rubric of urban-rural coordinated development is still an integral part of state planning through this lens. The following narrative is quite illustrative:

The idea of urban-rural coordinated development firstly took root in Jiyuan when Municipal Party Secretary Duan took office in the first half of the 2000s. He suggested that Jiyuan needed a strategy to outperform other counterparts with its unique advantage, and this idea was widely discussed and accepted. Since 2004, the municipal government had secured a 30 % annual increase in the financial expenditure on the *three-rural* realms. (Senior officer of Rural Work Office, Jiyuan, 2019).

It is worth noting that 2004 was the first year when China (i.e. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council) issued the Central Document No.1 (*yibao wenjian*) on the ‘three rural issues’ (*sannong wenti*), a tradition that has continued for 18 consecutive years until 2021. Henceforth, Jiyuan’s initiative to coordinate urban-rural development echoed the shift in central policy winds, the landing point of which has been to lift the income of rural households. Apart from this, the seemingly welfarist and distributive policy contained a vital competitive element suggestive of an entrepreneurial spirit. ‘Coordinated urban-rural development’ was seen as a potential arena for Jiyuan to outperform its provincial counterparts and thus strengthened its unique position.

Jiyuan’s outstanding performance on this matter (see Figure 4.4), owing to its relatively small population and booming industrial development, quickly drew the attention of the Henan provincial government, which needed to align with the vision of the central government. Consequently, Jiyuan was designated as the only provincial pilot area for ‘coordinated urban-rural development’ in 2005 and made its unique dent in the provincial development blueprint.

Despite the support from the provincial government, the policy focus of the Coordinated

urban-rural development initiative in Jiyuan underwent several major shifts between 2005 and 2017, when the Working Office of Urban-Rural Coordinated Development was erected and dismissed, respectively (see Table 6.4).

Table 6.4 Evolving priorities of ‘Coordinated Urban-Rural Development’ in Jiyuan

Phase	Rural betterment priority	Fiscal & financial support	New rural communities building focus
2005-2009	Physical infrastructure	An annual increase of fiscal expenditure	Exurban uninhabitable village relocation
2009-2012	Township enterprise zones	Fiscal power devolution to the townships	Periurban new rural communities building
2012-2017	Ownership restructuring	Financial innovation and fiscal rebalancing	Urban villages renovation
2018-present	Feature-based rural rebranding	Earmarked funding	Rural shareholding cooperative enhancement

Source: Compiled by the author.

‘Made up by staff temporarily redeployed from Rural Work Office and Poverty Alleviation Commission’ (JY-15-G, Senior officer at Jiyuan Poverty Alleviation Commission, 2019), the Office of Urban-Rural Coordinated Development) served to strategically converge the fiscal expenditure of two government branches. Bearing the obligation to alleviate rural poverty and improve rural household income, the office not only channelled subsidy into the household pockets or providing social security or Medicare benefits (see Xu, Zhou and Yu, 2009; He and Li, 2018)²⁶. Instead, from 2005 to 2009, they prioritised some substantial investment in funding physical infrastructures in the rural area, paving hard-packed roads to every natural village and secured mains water to every rural household, especially those in the mountainous area (Tian, 2012). A considerable amount was also spent in uplifting the physical environment, such as the centralised disposal of the garbage generated in rural communities. Motivating the infrastructure investment was a rationale that rural poverty had a lot to do with the lack of a development-friendly built environment (Duan, 2009). Nevertheless, they soon realised that further rural income growth entailed more job opportunities in the non-agrarian sector than more roads and garbage disposal stations.

It is pitiful to notice that these newly constructed roads were barely used but cost a considerable amount of maintenance fee every year (JY-14-G, Senior officer of Jiyuan Rural

²⁶ To fill in the urban-rural welfare gap, Jiyuan municipal government extended basic living allowance to rural households in 2005, covered every citizen with urban or rural medical insurance in 2007 and with an urban or rural pension in 2008, and finally integrated the urban and rural Medicare insurance system in 2011.

Work Office, 2019).

Therefore, from late 2009 to 2011, the work priority turned to stimulate township-level industrial development for more non-farm employment. The municipal government devolved a series of fiscal and personnel appointments and removal power to the townships²⁷. Within one year, town-level local fiscal revenue, industrial value-added above the scale and fixed asset investment grew by 27.9%, 27.5% and 72.3%, respectively (People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality, 2010; also see Table 6.6). Meanwhile, peri-urban township-level enterprise zones were strengthened or started up (People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality (2009 [No.21]), along with the boom of three municipal-level enterprise zones. Out of the 'three concentrations' (*sange jizhong*) spatial development formula presented by the local government (Cheng and Fan, 2010), 'concentration of industry into enterprise zones' reciprocated with the 'concentration of rural residents to towns' and 'concentration of scattered land for large-scale development', in order to further promote 'Urban-Rural Coordinated Development.' Again, this approach soon ran into a bottleneck since not every rural people were ready to exchange their rural entitlement for urban life, as then-Mayor Zhao remarked:

Moving the peasants upstairs is like revolutionising their lives...We found that that many and even the majority of peasants were not willing to trade their rural housing land for yearly urban basic living allowance...It was harder and harder to acquire land from peasants. One of our measures earlier was to allow rural collectives to hold some equity of the factories built on the acquired land for peasants to gain some stable income. Recently we noticed some emerging factories co-founded with rural collectives. It might catch people by surprise due to the inconsistency with current laws. However, it was accepted earlier by the peasants who preferred visible and tangible assets over equity (see Ye and Zhao, 2010, pp. 52-53).

An additional difficulty of sustaining the 'three concentration' spatial scheme came from the quickly spreading aftermath of the financial crisis in 2009, which halved the annual growth of local general budget revenue (see Table 6.6). However, credit-boosted by the centrally prescribed 4 trillion *yuan* stimulus package, the Jiyuan government adopted a counter-cyclical response to the post-crisis economic contraction by raising debt to expand. In order to free

²⁷ In detail, the municipality (i) reclassified urban land use tax, land value-added tax, and real estate tax previously belonged to the municipality-level income as township fixed income; (ii) adjusted the municipality and township fiscal revenue share ratio from 6: 4 to 4: 6 in terms of construction business tax; (iii) allocated 20% of the increase in value-added tax, business tax, and corporate income tax of the project to townships were municipal state-owned enterprises to requisition land for construction projects in the township territory; (iv) equipped townships with the power to appoint and dismiss deputy section-level cadres; and (v) add 5 to 10 staff positions for each township (see Wang, 2008).

up land quota to expand three municipal enterprise zones, tens of peri-urban villages were dislocated with their land expropriated (cf. Chapter 5). Also, then *City Master Planning of Jiyuan* (2006-2020), audited and approved by the provincial government in 2007 were shelved by newly appointed Mayor Xiong He (2016), under the leadership of whom the Bureau of Planning pushed through a much more ambitious *Urban and Rural Planning of Jiyuan* (2012-2030). This future-oriented planning expanded the planning land area to 80 km² from 47.8 km² in its predecessor. It boldly projected Jiyuan to accommodate 760 thousand people in 2015, 840 thousand in 2020, and 980 thousand in 2030, while the urbanisation ratio marching towards 60, 70 and 85 per cent, respectively (Mayor Wang, 2016). To align with the predicted speedy population growth, the Bureau of Land Resource applied for an amendment to the Land Use Master Planning of Jiyuan (2010-2020) in 2014. In contrast to its former version, this amendment allocated more land quota for construction but predicted a less-intensive land use in the long run (see Table 6.5).

Table 6.5 Land use planning in Jiyuan

	2009	2014	2020 Planned in 2009	2020 Planned in 2014
1. Per capita urban industrial and mining land use (m ² /person)	232	224	163.2	165
2. GDP per construction land use(yuan/m ²)	115	178	260	222.5
3. Urban construction land use (10,000 m ²)	7767	9159	10917	11359
4. Rural construction land use (10,000 m ²)	10030	10314	9580	9698

Source: Amendment to Land Use Master Planning of Jiyuan (2010-2020) (Jiyuan Government, 2017)

By formally incorporating rural into the naming of master planning, the municipal government retroactively legitimised and expand its power to reconfigure the rural (cf. Qian and Wong, 2012). After all, a central theme throughout the *City Master Planning of Jiyuan* (2006-2020) and *Urban and Rural Planning of Jiyuan* (2012-2030) is to raise rural households' income, and it was through the identification and classification of income levels that, since 2008, these plannings attempted to seize and contain the momentum of capital accumulation and rural betterment.

[We] classify 526 rural administrative villages into three levels according to the physical condition and economic development...and speed up the building of new socialist countryside. Those where individual annual income exceeded ¥5000 should keep economic and ecological development to surpass 10000 *yuan*. Those between ¥2000 and 5000 *yuan* should focus on strengthening the infrastructural weakness. Those below 2000 *yuan* are the

foci of rural village consolidation and poverty alleviation subsidy (Jiyuan government, 2008 government working report).

Between 2005 and 2014, the urban-rural income ratio in Jiyuan kept narrowing from 2.32:1 to 1.9:1 (Zhao, 2016, pp. 171). Between 2008 and 2019, the disposable income per capita had a higher growth ratio than that of local GDP. When the national government selected twenty-nine county-level administrative units to carry out a pilot project for the rural collective asset reform in 2015, Jiyuan again was the only pilot designated in Henan Province. Suffice it to say that planning has a role in guiding state intervention and capital accumulation to fill in the urban-rural income gap. However, it is not to forget that planning easily falls victim to its own 'success'. In order to reproduce its legitimacy, the planning has to promise a bigger unrealised potential for both the state intervention and capital accumulation, which necessarily entails a denial, or in a milder tone, problematisation of the *status quo*. When this paradoxical tendency became too obvious, as in the case of the *Jiyuan Urban and Rural Plan (2012-2030)*, which predicted unrealised linear population growth, raised land use per capita (breaking state guarantee for long-term sustainable development), and lowered GDP per unit of construction land (reducing expectations for industrial upgrading and faster capital accumulation), the reliability of the plan was inevitably weakened. At that time, it was not only the technical manoeuvre or turnover of municipal leadership to blame.

Table 6.6 Coordinated Urban-Rural development in Jiyuan

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Village consolidation and relocation (households)*		269	233	696	666	874	712	925	483	267							
Newly provided social housing (flats) *									2729		2189	2621	2775		1500	2759	3363
Employment in the primary sector (%)									35	31	29	30	31	32	32	30	30
secondary sector (%)									30	42	36	38	35	37	37	39	36
Urbanisation ratio by residence (%)*	29.3	36.2	40.0	42.1	45.0	47.6	49.0	49.4	51.4	53.4	54.8	56.4	58.0	59.6	61.1	62.4	63.6
by hukou (%)																42.0	
Built-up area (km ²)	22		29		35	34		41	42		40	--	40	55	56	55	55
GDP growth (%)*	16.2	20	18.5	28	18.6	14.8	14.2	12.2	14.8	11.6	12.0	10.0	6.0	8.0	8.3	8.3	7.8
Rural disposable income per capita growth (%)*	6.8	18.1	14.5	16.0	18.5	15.3	10.7	10	20.0	13.99	12.31	10.1	9.5	7.4	9.0	8.9	9.7
Local general public budget revenue growth (%)*	23.5	42.3	44.8	30.3	39.1	20.2	10.6	11	14.9	13.1	19.9	11	0.5	9.1	9.8	24.1	13.8
Municipal level growth (%) #							2.5	5.8	13.8	15.5	25.1	9.5	-2.5	6.2	9.2	26.1	3
Township level growth (%)#							27.9	19.8	16.2	9.6	11.9	14.1	6.6	14.7	10.8	20.3	34.9
Land revenue (100 billion <i>yuan</i>) #		1.1 ⁺			1.5 ⁺	2.3 ⁺	4.3 ⁺	4.9	6.7	>1.8	14.4	>10.4	>0.7	3.4	5.4	14.6	13.3
Government debt balance (100 billion <i>yuan</i>) #													63.2	64.9	72.1	75.8	77.7

Source: *Jiyuan government work report: 2004~2020; #Jiyuan government financial budget implementation report: 2004~2019; ⁺compiled by the author from interviews.

Going hand-in-hand with the alteration of land use planning is the subtle change of the development narrative. 'Industry-City coordination' dethroned 'Urban-rural integration' to be the highest waving rubric. The financial change was more significant than it appeared.

For us, the difference is not trivial but enormous. There is no more promise to increase the expenditure on our urban-rural integration scheme. The municipality decided to redirect the foci of development back to the industry and the city. (JY-14-G, Senior official of former Jiyuan Office of Urban-Rural Integration, 2019).

Some unexpected political turnover made the water muddier. A visit from the central government designated inspection team to Jiyuan at the end of 2016 directly resulted in the closure of the Office of Urban-Rural Integration. The dismissal of a specific office did not technically leave ongoing work unattended but inevitably further lowered down the significance of this project. For instance, some undergoing PPP projects of rural domestic sewage disposal contracted out to business enterprises by the former Office of Urban-Rural Integration had to re-sign the contract with the Bureau of Municipal Construction.

The Office of Urban-Rural Integration was dismissed in 2017 following the central government's latest instruction that local government could not add executive branch without formal approval. Then I came back to the Rural Work Office. (JY-14-G, Senior official of former Jiyuan Office of Urban-Rural Integration, 2019).

The shareholding reform of rural collective assets started in 2013 was a highlight of the leadership of the Urban-Rural Integration Office. One major milestone of this reform was establishing the Rural Property Transaction Centre in 2014 (Wang and Cheng, 2015). However, the added value of the Transaction Centre was minimal. For one thing, it was due to the already active farmland subcontracting transaction in rural villages. For another, many constituents of a prosperous rural ownership transaction are beyond the capacity of this centre.

We can only provide service to the transaction of rural farmland use rights and wood management rights. The issues of rural construction land and rural housing are beyond our capacity because there is no clear guidance from above. (JY-17-G, Junior officer at Jiyuan Rural-collective Asset Trading Centre, 2019)

Until today, when we are talking, I have found no evidence to substantiate whether the rural

land and property use right clarification, registration and certification is good or bad. We just cannot tell, because there is neither legal cases nor general complaint in which the certificate was used as valid proof (JY-16-G, Senior officer at Jiyuan Rural-collective Asset Trading Centre, 2019).

In short, the shareholding reform of rural collective assets in Jiyuan built upon a series of rural reforms and comprised an essential part of the local state planning towards ‘coordinated urban-rural development.’ However, the content and priority of the planning *per se* have been in constant change. These changes stemmed not only from the changing socio-economic outlook but also responded more directly to the political will of the supralocal government. When the higher-tier government tended to centralise the veto power, it might also compress the room for trial and error for the local government. Hence the first pilot might end up being a white elephant project. Not to mention that the present successful cases that cater to the state interest tend to fall out of the focus of previous planning.

State corporatism

In contrast to *state entrepreneurialism*, the thesis of *state corporatism* originally explained how rural China could become a powerhouse for industrial production rather than merely a space of consumption (see Oi, 1992; 1995). It is *thus* regrettable to notice that, although subsequent researchers of this approach inherited the analytical focus on the local cadres’ dual role as state officials and businesspeople, they unconsciously downplayed the difference between rural and urban China (e.g. Walder, 1995; Duckett, 2011; Jiang and Waley, 2018).

In hindsight, the reorientation of the *state corporatism* approach corresponded with China’s urban transformation from the first wave to the second wave, particularly with the marginalisation of the township and village enterprises (TVEs) against the rise of domestic and foreign private enterprises. The second wave led many to believe that China’s urban transformation would end up resembling that of its trans-Atlantic counterparts. In many ways, this was true. What was forgotten to ask, though, was what kind of future ‘rural’ China was envisioned in the urban transformation. This theoretical omission failed to perceive what is genuinely new about the making of ‘socialist new countryside.

Central to the explanation provided by Oi (1992, 1995), for the massive upsurge in the rural industry in China in the 1980s on the edges of agriculture and state industry are one dual-role actor (i.e. local government as entrepreneurs), one institutional change (i.e. de-collectivisation

of agricultural production and fiscal reform), one path-dependency (i.e. centralised political and organisational capabilities inherited from Maoist state), and one social basis (i.e. cellular nature of traditional Chinese rural society).

The implications of this reasoning are worth considering: (i) governments can play entrepreneurs who contribute to economic growth as long as they have secured property rights and sufficient incentives to pursue economic growth; (ii) economic growth requires a commitment to a market economy but does not entail the abolition of central planning or complete privatisation; (iii) to play the role of entrepreneurs and spearhead local growth, local governments need to treat enterprise within their jurisdictional purview as one component of a larger corporate whole, to allocate scarce resource to the local enterprises deemed most capable of generating maximum benefits; and (iv) entrepreneurial interest of local governments may compromise their role as agents of the central state but reinforce parochialism and protectionism, which squares with the cellular nature of Chinese rural society.

Despite the change of the overall institutional environment compared with the 1980s, the latest shareholding reform bears some similarities with the institutional alteration in the early 1980s highlighted by Oi. At face value, shareholding reform tends to further de-collectivise rural land ownership and strengthen individual entitlement and autonomy of land contract and management rights. By extension, it tends to inject some new incentive for the individual peasant to pursue economic gain. In the best scenario, the reform would pave the way for a new wave of rural land capitalisation and further free rural labour from low added-value farming. The growth of rural income thus became a predictable result of this reform, following Oi's line of thought.

However, this understanding has two major flaws: it inclines to exaggerate the capacity of modernised agriculture to engine economic growth or generate jobs and overlooks the potential of rural space to become an ecological service production centre. For the first issue, there was barely any evidence to suggest that a lot more peasant labour could be squeezed out from the primary sector just due to the marginal liberation of land ownership. Besides, Henan Province, where Jiyuan is located, once one of the largest sources of inter-provincial migrant labour in China, has witnessed a significant and seemingly irreversible backflow of migrant workers since 2009 due to the job loss in coastal cities (Zhang, 2016; Li, Liu and Lin, 2020).

Cypress Village is the best example on this matter. It first caught my eye because the rural collective was reported by local media to possess some asset worthy of over 20 million *yuan*

(Dong, 2018) after verification demanded by shareholding reform. However, the real productive asset was almost nothing but a few acres of farmland.

The media misrepresented what I said. The calculation of collective assets counted those unproductive assets like cement roads for vehicles and other infrastructure under the purview of the village committee (JY-22-V, Party Secretary of Cypress Village, 2019).

In fact, the village was anything but vibrant or wealthy because, during most of the year, over half of its working-age population was out working in the township centre or city. Sitting on Mount Wangwu, Cypress enjoyed some of the beautiful scenery of this World Geopark from afar but was not a hotspot for tourism development. The shocking amount of the registered collective asset was the result of continuous government investment in improving the facilities for agrarian production and transportation. However, there was only a minimal level of economic cooperation in Cypress since villagers failed to see much prospect of the collective economy and household contract responsibility system having secured old generations' attachment to agrarian land. This was very clear in the decade-long liaison between village committee, rural household and external agrarian business company in planting and harvesting tobacco and Cruciferae seeds (Ibid., cf. Tian, 2018). The village committee played as the *de facto* middleman between the private agricultural company and individual households in facilitating the accomplishment of the production and sales goal, but the village committee did not bear any legal liability in the (mostly oral) contract between private companies and individual households:

It was not a formal or legal contract but an oral purchasing promise concerning the future harvest of tobacco or Cruciferae seeds. Collective had an obligation to mediate the aroused disputes when some households sold the commercial harvest to some other purchasing company at a competitive price. Later, some big companies entered the village to lease the vast swath of farmland from the rural collective for a lengthy contract period by paying annual rent. Also, the external companies hired some of the aged peasants to cultivate the land when machines were not sufficient or cost-effective. (JY-22-V, Party Secretary of Cypress Village, 2019)

At Northgate Village, the shareholding cooperative reform did not offer much help to the fatigued collective economy either. Unlike Cypress, the result in Northgate was out of the villagers' will. Located right in the old city centre, Northgate enjoyed an exclusive advantage for villagers to run small businesses and for rural collectives to speculate in the spillover of the

growing urban economy. Early in 2000, the rural collective has pioneered all the counterparts in Jiyuan to pool funding from both villagers and beyond to erect the first commercial estate on the collectively-owned construction land. In 2004, Northgate was undoubtedly the wealthiest village in Jiyuan city, making more than 6 million in revenue. In 2019, the rural collective developed a rentier economy with ¥25-million-*yuan* annual rent income on some five-time larger building area of commercial estate. Against the slowing-down income growth was rapid collective debt accumulation stemming from the post-2009 estate speculation, which presaged a ‘debt for equity swap’.

The ‘debt-to-equity swap’ was bottom-up wisdom facilitated by the top-down initiative of shareholding reform. It not only alleviated the collective fiscal situation but also created a tentative institutional buffer between the land used for social welfare and that for future investment. The local state-led SC reform since 2016, which aimed to set up a *de jure* enterprise framework for SC independent from the original leadership, however, received a lukewarm response from collective cadres in Westgate. The local state did not provide extra support to the collective. Instead, the reform suggested developing an independent leadership of SC from the incumbent village governance structure. Therefore, the rural cadres passively followed the procedures provided by the local state to appraise assets and make an independent stamp of the SC.

Different from the villages in Dongguan, the collective debt at Northgate was not owing to the bank but fundraisers within and beyond the village *per se*. In order to mobilise villagers to pool funding for developing the North China Plaza, collective leaders guaranteed a quite competitive fixed yearly return. The deals were made on a conventional oral or written promise. However, the rising cost of construction of the mall, unexpected delays, and underperformed market made the rural collective incapable of keeping the promised interest of funding. Hence the debt started to roll like a snowball (Rural cadre I of Northgate Village, Jiyuan, 2019).

As the debt amount became more and more unbearable, the Northgate collective firstly announced to tune down the fix return ratio to half and then to a quarter before going down to zero. Simultaneously, the collective stated the reform into the *de facto* shareholding cooperative by asking every household who has the contract right of collective land to ‘buy’ their share with a certain amount of money (see Table 6.7). The share price was fixed and unnegotiable, and it was primarily decided by the amount of collective debt instead of future profitability. With an influx of new funding, the Northgate collective announced a due date, requesting all the previous investors to withdraw their principal input and interest. After the

clearance of debt, the Northgate villagers equally became the exclusive *de jure* and *de facto* shareholders of the collective owned commercial properties.

When we came up with the idea of the debt-to-equity swap in the village committee meeting, we considered accomplishing the swap in one go. However, some worried that the liquidity needed was beyond the cash affordability of many households. To break the overall goal into five-stage, we set the price of each share based on the urgency to pay debt and interest and also alleviate households' burden of expenditure. (JY-19-V, Village committee representative of Northgate Village, 2019)

Although the swap was not compulsory, the difference in share price and subscription rate might immediately cause inequality between villagers and stirred conflict. To preclude the unwanted scenario, village cadres spent much time persuading villagers into believing that this was the only way they could avoid a worse situation in a slumpy economic environment. Besides, they followed the suggestion given by the local government in shareholding reform and ossified the share rights by keeping the number of shares the same with the population registered in Northgate, saying no to further adjustment due to population fluctuation. 'This secured fairness of distribution and align with the reform spirit' (Rural cadre II, Northgate, Jiuyan). On top of these, some small-scale properties were reserved for future collective running expenditure.

Table 6.7 Shareholding reform of Northgate

Property	Land area/ m ²	Floor area/m ²	Price per share	Dividend per share	Shares issued	Certificate issue date	Dividend payment dates			Ratio of return
Northgate Restaurant	3765	--	5000	720	2913	2015.10.31	N/A			14%
Northgate Mall	--	--	3000	540	2910	2016.3.18	4/2016	4/2017	6/2018	18%
Northgate Building Material Market	30000	12750	3500	665	2952	2016.12.28	12/2016	1/2018	1/2019	19%
Emperor Mall	3154	--	5000	860	3040	2017.10.31		12/2017	1/2019	17%
North China Plaza	4180	--	3100	775	3113	2018.12.30			1/2019	25%

Source: Compiled by the author from the interview.

The skeleton of the scheme sounded reasonable but still stirred a lot of grudge among villagers in the beginning. Many, particularly those who did not participate in the pool funding for now non-profitable North-China Plaza, mentioned that they were unwilling to pay off the unsolicited debt caused by the mishandling of collective business incumbent leadership (Senior villager and shareholder, Northgate, Jiyuan). This complaint pointed out a nuanced difference between the previous borrowing for investment and the recent fundraising for debt-to-equity swap. Previously, if some villagers had reservations about the prospect of project development, they could refrain from joining the fundraising to avoid potential loss. Their entitlement to collective-owned construction land was revealed through the basic welfare provision rather than extra investment dividend, although both were distributed in monetary terms. In the latest shareholding reform, however, villagers had to spend money to redeem the shares to which they were entitled without strings attached. Although the collective promised to ossify the number of shares and distributed them evenly to all qualified villagers and froze the shares for those not willing or incapable to buy the share until future decisions, there was no denying that some villages felt that their welfare was compromised. The fundamental reason for this dispute was the lack of a mechanism restraining the borrowing capacity of rural collective economic organisations, recalling the case of Dongguan (Xue and Wu, 2015). It was perhaps the fact some wealthy villagers were more than happy to buy shares from others that changed the latter's minds because data showed that an average ratio of 98 per cent of the more than 3000 villagers had 'purchased' all five share certificates (Rural cadre I of Northgate Village, Jiyuan, 2019; also see Table 6.7).

Compared with the other two villages, Waterstone Village was the only one that has experienced a remarkable transformation of the built environment in recent years, along with the shareholding reform. In five years since 2015, Waterstone has fundamentally changed from a village living on farmland leasing to a vibrant shareholding cooperative managing several countryside recreation projects with several million annual cash revenue. Waterstone was not the forerunner in the reform, but it quickly outperformed other peri-urban pilot villages of shareholding reform in terms of asset management led by the acumen committee secretary. Moreover, it drew more and more strategic and unprecedented government and financial resources as it raised to be a star village. Initially, the village did not conform to the government's proposed shareholding structure, nor did it receive support from township officials. It was the momentum of the broader market that allowed the village to realise the promise of state reform.

In summary, SC reform is an institutional amendment that tends to provide a strategic opportunity to develop the rural collective economy, but its energy was much limited due to the overall change of economic and institutional environment. Even if we envisage these cooperatives as a component of a ‘diversified business corporation’ steered by the local state in the jurisdictional fiefdom, as the *state corporatism* approach dictates, the component is yet to play the expected significant role correspondent to the effort devoted by the local state in this reform. Otherwise, we would see many more star villages that have not only escaped poverty but are running into prosperity. The marginal effect of the prompted shareholding reform in further strengthening rural collective economy reveals that what the latter needs were not a standardised, blanket institutional change. For mountain villages that can only look to modern agriculture driven by external capital to escape poverty, the SC does not necessarily improve the collective bargaining power. For urban villages that have figured out a way of handling their pressing needs, a formalisation of the SC would bring minimal, if any, extra benefit. The top-down reform as a tentative pilot program to echo the central government’s calling, if enforced, could only slightly touch the veneer of the established rural economic governance structure. Last but not least, the SC reform displays some preference for the peri-urban location to realise its promise of growth but also requested strong vision and practice of rural cadres and villagers.

6.4 Urban territorialism and desakota

Urban territorialism

Urban territoriality highlights urbanisation as a ‘territorial dynamism’ (Hsing, 2010, pp. 12) in which agents of different social power blocs compete over the control of space. This competition pivots around the accumulation, legitimisation, and distribution of land value. Out of this competition emerged the dominant role of the local state, and above which the hierarchical administrative order sets the parameters of restructuring of local state power. ‘Establishing new cities and enlarging and merging existing ones, and even eliminating others’ (Cartier, 2005, pp. 294) entails the adjustment of bureaucratic rank ranks and jurisdictional boundaries of the local state power. Therefore, the boundary of a metropolitan region is contingent upon internal economic integration but also necessarily corresponds with the jurisdiction of the local state (Hsing, 2010, pp.12)

Seen through the perspective of ‘territorial dynamism’, the uneven internal typology of the urban core, urban fringe, and rural fringe can coexist in a metropolitan region as long as the

multiple centres of local state keep reproducing its dominance in accumulating, legitimising, and distributing land value. As local accumulation is dependent on land development, local state cadres push through urban land development agendas and do not mind playing ‘landowners, planners, financiers and builders all at the same time’ (Hsing, 2010, pp. 7). Meanwhile, the production of physical, discursive and ideological capacity of the local state relies more on urban expansion. Through this double-movement, urbanisation is not led by the state but becomes an integral part of state-building (Wong, 2016)²⁸. Despite their seemingly weak position, social actors can also mobilise territorial strategies to protect their entitlement to property, place and livelihood ‘in the cracks between the state and market’ (Ibid: 218). This dynamic of ‘civic territoriality’ typically revolves around the resistance towards the displacement, dispossession and deterritorialisation incurred by the state-driven or market-sponsored urban projects. For instance, ‘corporatist villagers’ in China can be such social actors that achieve ‘relative territorial autonomy for the village by reinforcing the village’s collective economy, organisation, and identity, which, in turn, fortifies successful territorialisation’ (Ibid: 218).

In Table 6.1, I juxtaposed *urban territorialism* with *state entrepreneurialism* not because they all provide a typological division of a metropolitan area but because they share a centralist understanding of the urban. For both, urbanisation is a unidirectional process with ‘repeatable’ patterns (Hsing, 2010, pp. 13) of transforming the countryside into some (despite underdefined) end-state of urban. Still, urban territorialism differs significantly from *state entrepreneurialism* because the former questions the authority of both the state and market, and seeks to find ‘a welcome alternative to the wholesale destruction of the peasantry’ that can survive ‘the long-term modernist impulse toward the territorial integration of urban economy, polity, and society’ (Ibid: 224) through the investigation of corporatist villagers in China.

Following this line of inquiry, this section examines how the village corporatism manifested in the local state mandate of shareholding cooperative reform by different rural communities. Three interrelated questions navigated the following discussion: (i) does a corporatist village demand a shareholding cooperative structure?; (ii) does the shareholding cooperative reform in Jiyuan strengthen or weaken the civic territoriality of the corporatist villages in terms of collective ownership, organisation, and identity?; and (iii) what constitutes a ‘strategic location’

²⁸ Although this ‘urbanisation of state-building’ links to the articulation of ‘New State Space’ by Neil Brenner (2004), the former differed from the later in arguing that deterritorializations on one scale does not entail re-territorialization on the other scales (see Hsing, 2010, pp. 29)

(Hsing, 2010, pp. 25, 141, 224) to enhance a corporatist village's territorial autonomy?

Table 6.8 Territorial restructuring of villages in the shareholding cooperative reform

	Pre-existing shareholding	Pre-existing external funding	Source of income during reform	Post-reform external funding	Independence of economic governance
Northgate	✓	✓	Property leasing	✗	✗
Waterstone	✓	✗	Ecological tourism	✓	✓
Cypress	✗	✗	Agriculture	✓	✗

Among the three selected villages in Jiyuan, Westgate has the most elements defining a corporatist village. It is a village located in the oldest city centre that resists the dislocation or relocation potentially wanted by the expansionist urban government. More than that, it has proactively participated in the accumulation and distribution of land development by investing in many collectively-owned commercial estates and lived upon a rental economy. However, the downturn of the rental economy, owing much to do with the macroeconomic environment and the relocation of the city centre pioneered by the leapfrog of municipal government, has laid a rolling burden upon the village economic governance. Arriving at such a conjuncture, the mandate of shareholding reform stirred up a new round of scrutiny of collective ownership, particularly in terms of two prominent issues: (i) whether the collective should involve external funding sources to tackle the debt issue or to realise the debt wish, and (ii) whether the collective need an independent economic entity from the established governance structure? For the first issue, both village cadres and villagers steadfastly refuse to share their land rent with ‘outsiders’ and even the bank.

Why should we borrow money from the bank and pay the interest when we can raise the funding by ourselves? ... Leasing the commercial complex for 30 years to others? That is not even an option (JY-19-V, Village committee representative at Northgate Village, 2019)

We all know that the guaranteed higher-than-bank return of individual shares is not sustainable in the long run, but even if the estate rent collapse, the property still belongs to the collective and will not go away, right? (JY-21-V, Senior villager at Northgate Village, 2019)

Put differently, despite rolling collective debt elicited broad disappointment, villagers were convinced that they should not borrow from outsiders unless pool funding is not enough. Besides, the land use right and commercial estate on the top could be collateral to the bank

only when the land ownership would not be deprived even in the default. There is thus a dividing difference between borrowing from the bank and borrowing from individuals outside the village.

On the other hand, the village cadres have, to some extent, promoted the ‘debt-share swap’ by drawing on the mandate of top-down shareholding reform. As many may fail to notice, most of the previous lump-sum investment in developing the speculative real estates was also pool-funded by then villagers, but on a pay-more-to-collect-more basis. That is, more affluent households were allowed to invest more than others. At that time, the oral commitment between the rural collective and the individual villager-as-investor did not include explanation as to how one deals with the asset should the business run into deficit. When the rural collective ran out of cash flow and proposed the ‘debt-share swap’ to ease the financial difficulty, this resulted in the argument that ‘it is unfair to use the collective financing that is equal to all to pay off the debts owing to the unequal investment among villagers’ (Villager, Northgate Village, Jiyuan). Underlying this argument was a rationale that each villager’s entitlement to the annual dividend of collective economy revenue was based upon a collective land right equal to all. This entitlement should not be deprived even if villagers refuse to add investment into their shares. As the perpetual tension between equal land rights and unequal investment willingness (and capacity) persisted, a top-down initiative of shareholding cooperatives helped narrow down the options to solve their financial issue. In order to align with the government guidelines, rural collectives were required to assess their asset value, clear up the historical debt, register the shareholding cooperative legal entity, and distribute the shares equally to all villagers. More than that, villagers in Northgate were inclined to believe that the government guidance on the restructuring of the collective asset did not impinge upon their interest but sufficed necessary supervision upon the village cadres’ behaviour (see Wong, 2016 for a comparable discussion).

When it comes to the separation of economic function from the established governance structure, the operational viability seems more decisive than the preconceived notion. The end goal of shareholding reform is to make the shareholding cooperative more like a formal business firm. However, even the street office official, who represents the urbanised state and tends to extend power to rural governance, acknowledges the difficulty of ‘setting up a new faction’ (*ling li shanton*).

If we stipulate that the SC leadership must be different and independent from the rural party branch secretary and committee director, how would the incumbent rural cadres live without

the leverage into village business? (JY-25-G, Junior official at Subdistrict Office administering Northgate Village, 2019)

Compared to Northgate, Waterstone proactively seized the strategic opportunities provided by shareholding reform to participate in the accumulation and distribution of urbanisation-incurred wealth. Over the past five years, Waterstone has greatly leapt forward the shareholding economy by transforming the farming-based village into an ecological tourism resort, drawing upon grassroots creativity and government-backed banking financing. Unlike the villagers in Northgate, where ‘the city came to them’ (Hsing, 2010: 144), Waterstone villagers used to commute 10 kilometres to the city for extra income beyond farming in the past decade. Aged villagers who lost their competitiveness in job markets also returned to the village to cultivate a few acres of arable land and spent their pension-less retirement life. Before 2008, the rural collective at Waterstone had little to develop the territorial economy. In 2008, the (re)elected village cadres promised the village to court external agrarian investment companies for enhancing the collective economy. They problematised the fragmented land ownership structure that was *de jure* collectively owned but *de facto* individually cultivated and mobilised a round of land re-collectivisation. Waterstone re-collectivised all the 880-*mu* farmland and transferred the land management right to four companies specialising in plantation, cultivation, and rural tourism. In exchange, every individual of the villagers was allocated a 350-kilogram grain ration per year.

In hindsight, courting external capital to liberate the village labour was only the first step to realise the ambition of Waterstone under the leadership of the village party secretary. Appointed as a pilot village for deepening the shareholding reform, Waterstone carried out a reappraisal of its collective asset in early 2015, registering some business assets worthy of more than half a million. In August, the collective established a formal shareholding cooperative with all the business assets. At the end of 2015, the shareholding cooperative pooled funding from villagers to convert an uncultivated slope to be an outdoor ski slope. Opening for two months since the spring festival of 2016, the ski slop generated over ¥ one-million-*yuan* net revenue, recovering over 60 per cent of its total investment (Dong, 2019). Having tasted the sweetness of business operation, Waterstone did not stop the ball rolling but continued to invest and construct more tourism projects on its farmland and construction land. It has gained a considerable reputation for countryside recreation and has been praised as a provincial model for rural revitalisation (see Zhang, 2019; Wen, 2020).

Despite ‘a well-trying state tactic to portray the shareholding cooperative as a spontaneous,

grassroots institution to justify the necessity of its reform policy' (Li, 2009), both the state rhetoric and media coverage trivialised the earlier steps in making Waterstone a rising star village. Each successful step of assetization, shareholding, and securitisation entailed some inventive leveraging of state and market power. Two issues worth highlighting here is the clarification of individual property rights to issue the shareholder certificate, and the second is the breakthrough of bank financing, following a U-turn of the local government's attitude from objection to promotion.

A starting clarification of individual villager's entitlement to collective land and asset could be extremely troublesome, even with the government-issued guidelines. Unlike Northgate, which had much more experience in handling the restructuring of collective ownership, Waterstone had to handle the issue in a compressed time to take advantage of supportive government policy. Married-out women, married-in men, the divorced, current state-organ employees, college students and military soldiers who kept *hukou* in the village are six identities prominently challenging the premise of rural land ownership (also see Lin and Zhang, 2017):

Initially, we organised the meeting among village committee members and party committee members in the village. Whenever any representative proposed some debatable ideas, some others would covertly contact the potential stakeholders. Then it would end up with a chaos of quarrelling after the immediate arrival of the villagers who believed the decision was unfair. With few alternatives, we moved the meeting to a hotel in the city centre, requesting every attendant to turn off the phone and debate and openly vote to make decisions on the controversial issue. (JY-18-V, Village party secretary of Waterstone Village, 2019).

Among others, the party secretary (Ibid.) often proudly cited the communal decision that 'the second wife of a male villager could not become the shareholder if the first wife remained living in the village.' Consequently, less than 700 of the over 800 registered villagers became the shareholder with 'ossified' share right, meaning there would be no more shares added afterwards (cf. Wong, 2016). At this stage, individual shareholder's economic right was not independent of their political right through voting. Besides, the shareholding structure only secured individual villager's right to harvest collective economic growth but did not guarantee their willingness to invest in a business like a ski slope. To make the name right for the project-oriented crowdfunding, the village committee leadership borrowed the state rhetoric to promote the economic operation's independence from the incumbent political governance structure and registered an independent Waterstone Village leisure & tourism cooperative. Facing the hesitation from the villagers, the village party secretary and village head led the

crowdfunding with ¥100,000 yuan from each and mobilised another 21 founding shareholders, most of whom were village party members, to finally raise nearly ¥ one-million-*yuan* capital at the end of 2015. Meanwhile, the slope land management right owned by the village-wide 700 shareholders was converted into 200 thousand as part of the equity of this project-based cooperative.

Before deciding to establish the ski slope, I had self-funded many visits to other ski slope businesses in neighbouring cities. I was confident to make this a success and had convinced several village council members. However, the majority of the villagers were still waiting and seeing. We understood that the funding might not be a small number for some of them. We also understood the bystander mentality of some who waited to see how we make fools of ourselves. (JY-18-V, Village party secretary of Waterstone Village, 2019)

Notwithstanding, the doubt was not only from the villagers but also township government officials. When the funds came to the point where construction could begin, a phone call from some township cadre demanded the party secretary return the money to the shareholders for fear of causing social unrest.

I thought we finally got the chance of following the state calling of rural reform and making some difference, but the township cadre told me that the reform was just a slogan rather than a real opportunity, so I should not take it too seriously. He also asked me to refund all the crowd funds before I made more serious mistakes. I was so upset but still asked my wife to call everyone to take back their money. I cannot fall asleep that night, sitting on the slope of the village and weeping tears. To my surprise, few people wanna take their money back, saying that even if the business fails, they would not complain. (JY-18-V, Village party secretary of Waterstone Village, 2019)

Therefore, the construction and business promotion started despite the lack of support from the township government. On the opening day of the ski slope safari, which was the second day after the 2016 spring festival, township cadres cast their vote of non-confidence by not showing up or delivering a speech in the opening ceremony. What was worse, the visitors were few. The party secretary's nerves stretched to near the breaking point in that he had carefully chosen the date to get off on the right foot.

I asked the ticket seller to message me every hour, telling me how many visitors had arrived on the first day, but the information was frustrating. I turned off the phone and attempted

to sleep earlier than usual because I cannot bear more mental pressure. On the next morning, when I turn on the phone seeing numerous unanswered phone calls, I was amazed. I noticed the number of the township cadre and called back, and he asked me to come to meet him immediately at the village entrance because the road to the ski slope was jammed with hundreds of vehicles waiting to visit (JY-18-V, Village party secretary of Waterstone Village, 2019).

Despite an undeniable storytelling talent, the party secretary had never shared these secret stories with the media reporters or high-tier government officials. However, ‘developing a collective economy and improving the livelihood of peasants’ credited the ‘Waterstone model’ more media spotlight and won some unprecedented governmental support. For instance, with the cooperation between the municipal government and Rural Commercial Bank, Waterstone pioneered the mortgage financing of the shareholding cooperative collective asset in Henan province and borrowed 900 thousand *yuan* from the bank. When this sentence is written, another bank loan of 2 million *yuan* is waiting for permission (Zhang, 2019).

Compared with Northgate and Waterstone, Cypress's situation is much less sophisticated in that the state support and market opportunities have been less than necessary to disagree with each other. Therefore, there are very few cracks in-between for the corporatist village to demonstrate its bargaining competence.

The environmental regulation has ruled out the possibility of us developing some rudimentary polluted industries. But if we successfully courted some investment to the industrial parks, the collective can earn some commission ... Our urgent need recently is to win the competition of living environment renovation organised by the township. The top three villages would win a bonus for collective expenditure. (JY-22-V, Party secretary of Cypress Village, 2019).

To conclude, the corporatist village does not necessarily entail a pre-given structure, e.g. a shareholding cooperative, but needs constant review and reproduction. On the one hand, there is no denying that some elements of a shareholding or cooperative structure tend to spontaneously emerge out (cf. Wong, 2016, pp. 693) of the daily collective economic practice in some villages, such as Northgate. On the other hand, even under a top-down guideline for a shareholding cooperative structure, none of the existing self-claimed ‘shareholding cooperatives’ resembles the ideal form of shareholding nor a cooperative (see Clegg, 1996; Levi, 1998 on the discussion of shareholding cooperative in China as a multi-stakeholder

cooperation). Under the name of the cooperative, the tension between labour, capital and consumers is such handled in each village that not a universal *modus operandi* can be easily extracted.

Besides, the top-down shareholding cooperative reform did not necessarily weaken or strengthen the civic territoriality of a corporatist village, especially when the success or failure of territoriality was judged upon the accumulation and distribution of wealth instead of the resistance against state intervention. Despite Hsing (2010, pp. 132-140) and Wong (2016) pointed out that collective land ownership remains at the centre of the villagers' collective identity and solidarity, they fail to acknowledge that this collective land ownership might not stem from lineage but state mobilisation. In fact, even if we were to accept the conclusion that corporatist villages were more successful in southern China because there was a long history of keeping communal land there before the communist revolution than their northern counterparts (Hsing, pp. 132-140; also see Qin, 2005), there is no room to underestimate the tendency to self-organise in the contemporary northern villages, such as these in Jiyuan, selectively drawing upon external resources from either the state or market. A clearer-delineated entitlement towards communal land & asset and transparent state & market purview over the management of these assets, as the state-initiated reform tend to deliver, could provide otherwise unlikely opportunity to strengthen village solidarity.

Last, if there were a 'strategic location' (Hsing, 2010, pp. 25, 141, 224) to enhance a corporatist village's territorial autonomy, it does not have to be the urban core. As seen in Northgate Village, adopting developmentalist strategies in rural governance exposes the cooperative economy to unprecedented uncertainty due to change of state planning or market fluctuation. This uncertainty is not limited to villages in Jiyuan. Xue and Wu (2014) have documented how the market shrinkage had 'bankrupted' those villages in Dongguan, which got quickly rich for renting property to export processing factories and migrant labours. In comparison, Waterstone Village has taken advantage of their locational disadvantage in developing an urbanised rural economy.

Desakota, just-in-time

In the coinage of *desakota*, McGee (2015 [1991b], pp.135) argued that 'the crucial issue is how long rice growing, for example, will persist in desakota regions as economic growth proceeds.' At the national scale, the Chinese central government has responded to this question by proposing and roughly sticking to a controversial 'red line of 1.8 billion mu arable land' (*18-yi-*

mu gengdi hongxian) since 2006 (see Liu, Fang and Li, 2014; Chen, Liu and Lu, 2016). Meanwhile, the overwhelming urban growth worldwide over the past thirty years has been increasingly endangered by food security. The role of small and medium-sized cities in shaping agriculture and food systems are thus foregrounded against this background because they are closer to food production but more susceptible to food insecurity than their large-sized counterparts (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2020). We can now read off another meaning implied in McGee's (2015 [1991], pp.135) argument, how long rice growing will persist in desakota regions as economic growth proceeds 'is' the crucial issue.




Figure 6.2 Desakota in a hypothetical Asian country

Source: McGee (1991, pp.6)

Certainly, we cannot say Jiyuan is a desakota region because there is a considerable amount of food crops (mainly corn) growing in the municipal territory. Nevertheless, *desakota* points out the possibility that mixed land use and hybrid employment structure surrounding a small or middle-sized city has an indispensable role to play in the urbanising world of the 21st century. On this point, just-in-time (JIT) urbanism (see Friedman, 2018) provided another reason on behalf of wealthier megacities, saying that city governments dictated by urban elites there must adopt a technocratic and biopolitical method of labour control to pursue economic expansion while avoiding overpopulation and ensuing political disorder. Seeing through this perspective, people stay in the small-sized towns and desakota region not because they choose to, but because they have to (be the warehouse of labour for megacities).

A synergy of *desakota* and *just-in-time* (JIT) urbanism thus becomes a promising project since these two concepts share a fusion-ready epistemological line of thought. *Desakota* feeds into the ontology of JIT urbanism in that neither of them specifies or precludes defining spatial features of the urban. Both acknowledge that ‘urbanisation is the process of condensation of human settlement under conditions of capitalist transformation of both city and countryside’ (Ibid, pp. 509). JIT urbanism reciprocates the *desakota* method by engaging with and problematising the contemporary urban biopolitics in China in order to facilitate a theorisation of urban exclusion and inclusion.

The *JIT desakota* has some thought-provoking implications for the contemporary ‘people-oriented urbanisation’. China’s transition of urbanisation paradigm is moving towards an increasingly rigid class society in the sphere of social reproduction:

- (i) the rigid exclusion based on urban or rural *hukou* status is being replaced by segmented inclusion based on megacities or small cities’ citizenship; and
- (ii) the status-based spatial duality between rural and urban is being replaced by a class-based biopolitical distinction between population and surplus population.

Following this line of inquiry, *JIT desakota* inspires us to understand the coordinated urban-rural development scheme in Jiyuan as the tactic of a small urban government to attract an influx of population to the city by lowering the social reproduction threshold. Underpinning this tactic must be a perception that Jiyuan city is below its optimal population size, let alone its maximum ‘carrying capacity’ (cf. Friedman, 2018, pp. 507).

Although we have not conducted a thematic study, we consulted many experts on urban development who maintained that the minimum economical size of a city requires a population of 400,000 or more. Therefore, our target expectation for the urban population of Jiyuan is 500,000²⁹, a size at which infrastructure support, schools, healthcare, and public transport can be better maintained without threatening the health of public finance and efficiency of energy use. (JY-02-G, Senior officer at Jiyuan Development and Reform Committee, 2019).

Guided by this rationale, the Jiyuan government has been generous in extending infrastructures like roads, plumb water, and sewage disposal to the rural area, but more astute in laying out

²⁹ Note: In 2020 Jiyuan had an estimated number of 457,000 permanent urban population.

education and healthcare facilities (Ibid.). Along with the removal of other privileges attached to urban *hukou* over rural *hukou*, the ‘coordinated urban-rural development scheme’ has made such an achievement that (i) Jiyuan has been the second highly-urbanised municipality Henan since 2005 by permanent residents; (ii) Jiyuan’s urbanisation ratio by *hukou* has been 20% stably lower than that by residence since 2013 or even earlier (see Table 6.6); and (iii) Jiyuan has not been a city of immigrants since the latter only made up 14.9% and 17.2% of the permanent population in 2011 and 2018, respectively (Management Committee Office of Jiyuan Industry-Urban Integration Demonstration Zone, 2020). Piecing this information together, we have to conclude that the coordinated urban-rural development has attracted the desired population influx to Jiyuan city while simultaneously render the *hukou* per se gradually irrelevant for accessing the once exclusive public service.

It is in this background that we can understand the very subtle difference in *urban hukou* registration criteria between non-Jiyuan immigrants and local rural *hukou* holders since 2007, when the first of a series of follow-up *hukou* reform policies were issued (People’s Government of Jiyuan, 2007 [No.48], 2007 [No. 91], 2011 [No. 60], 2014 [No. 36], People’s Government of Jiyuan, 2011 [No. 124], 2015 [No. 14]). From 2007 onwards, both in-migrants and local rural *hukou* holders could apply for an urban *hukou* in Jiyuan as long as the applicant had a legal and stable residence and occupation in Jiyuan. Before these reforms, transferring rural *hukou* to urban *hukou* generally meant that the applicants voluntarily gave up their rural land entitlement to join the urban welfare system. Since 2007, however, the Jiyuan government introduced the resident *hukou* to replace the previous binary urban or rural *hukou* system. Meanwhile, the deprivation of rural homestead and arable land entitlement became an unnecessary prerequisite to enjoy urban public service in terms of healthcare, family planning, old-age insurance and compulsory education for children. The only difference was the right to apply for social housing and employment support, which only started to cover landless peasants in 2012 in a joint effort with the provincial government to promote enterprise zones building (see Chapter 5).

As much as we accept that in Jiyuan, the urban-rural coordinated development scheme is making ‘urban citizenship’ (see Friedman, 2018, pp.510) rather than *hukou* decisive for getting public goods for social reproduction, we are forced to take a new look at the implication of the rural collective asset shareholding cooperative reform. Particularly whether the reform contributes to establishing a class-based sorting mechanism in terms of people’s right to urban space, as predicted by the *JIT desakota* position. On this point, I argue that, if anything, the shareholding reform tends to unveil the already existing ‘class composition’ (Ibid., pp.514) in

the rural sector that is often mistaken as a homogenous community. However, the reform not necessarily amplifies the uneven distribution of communal good within an individual rural collective.

For the first issue, there is no point denying that the decades of urbanisation and marketisation in China have created a biopolitical distinction between affluent and laggard rural *hukou* holders and that among different rural collective economic organisations. Despite the recent downturn of profitability, the collective economy established at Northgate has much larger operational assets than the other two latecomers. Prior to aligning the economic governance structure with governmental guidelines, Northgate has developed its collective economy by rounds of crowdfunding from the villagers, while the investment from households was often unequal. While at Waterstone Village, the first *de facto* operational asset, i.e. the ski slope, were initially crowdfunded unevenly by 38 willing villagers in varying proportions. Some of these founding villagers were not *de jure* shareholding cooperative members and had stable jobs and accommodation elsewhere. Since the business proved profitable and thus attracted more funding from villagers, the project-based tourism cooperative set a cap on investment in newly issued shares to guarantee the interests of the founding shareholders (Party secretary, Waterstone Village of Jiyuan, 2019). At Cypress village, although the collective operational asset is yet to develop, there was barely any doubt that the village cadres were more capable of leading the investment, both with their leadership and financial capacity.

For the second issue, although the reform aims to enhance the liquidity of the rural collective asset and opens up channels for the transmission of cultural, economic, and social capital from both members and non-members, within and outside the village, shareholding cooperatives do not necessarily fall prey to inward capital. For instance, the shareholding cooperative reform did not necessarily break up the initial equal distribution of land ownership, e.g. at Northgate and Cypress; nor did it exclude the non-members of village-wide shareholding cooperative to participate in the village-based economy, e.g. at Waterstone Village. Perhaps more evidently, despite clarifying the personal entitlement by issuing the cooperative shareholder certificate tend to incur disputes among the village residents, between members and non-members (yet still potential stakeholders), it has not resulted in non-negotiable conflicts in the three villages. Quite the opposite, the shareholding reform can be a chance to allow the villagers to review the internal tacit understanding in making decisions and organise the group of people with a shared vision.

To conclude, the state-initiated reform might not feed into the entrepreneurial enthusiasm or

the fast growth expectation of the rural collective economy; it raises new challenges for the existing governance. After all, rural and urban elites sometimes do not disagree with each other on the construction of socialist new countryside:

The decades of urbanisation have demolished our countryside. Why cannot we rebuild the villages as beautiful as those in Switzerland and England? (JY-08-E, Chairman of Jiyuan Culture & Tourism Investment Group, 2019).

I am confident of surpassing the Culture & Tourism Investment Group in providing funnier eco-cultural service and yielding a higher return on investment at a much lower cost (JY-18-V, Party secretary of Waterstone Village, 2019).

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter critically examined four theoretical stances on urban-rural disruption and continuity in an urbanising China against empirical evidence from the shareholding reform of the rural collective economy in Jiyuan. Specifically, a series of contrasting analyses drew upon the first-hand observation of three selected villages in Jiyuan municipality: Northgate in the urban core, suburban Waterstone, and Cypress in exurban. The emphasis was not just on exploring how urbanisation is shaping rural governance but on assessing the strengths and weaknesses of each theoretical position. With this in mind, this chapter has aimed to work through the complex processes of interventionist municipal statecraft (cf. Wong, 2006) and rural collective entrepreneurship (cf. Xue and Wu, 2015) towards a ‘coordinated urban-rural development.’ By comparing and contrasting the (re)productive process of hybrid governance structure in each village under the same rubric of shareholding cooperative reform, this chapter illustrates how the ‘actually-existing’ urban-rural dichotomy in China is not just a particular geographical expression of the division of labour (cf. Harvey, 1985a) but a layered process intertwined with state participation and collective economic-cum-organisational restructuring.

As Table 6.1 reveals, the four theoretical positions interact intricately. In a methodological sense, dividing the four positions into two sections tends to overestimate the difference between them. In actuality, they not only overlap but share some characteristics. The notion of entrepreneurial governance that assumes ‘fair competition’ (and thus critiques ‘anti-competition pseudo-fairness’ and ‘unfair pseudo-competition’, see Qin, 2013) in the state-market synthesis is part of each theory, despite often being taken for granted. The restructuring

of the state has gone hand-in-hand with the restoration of rural elites in post-Mao China. Indeed this urban-rural restructuring has taken place through the elites. Institutions such as rural shareholding cooperatives formally acknowledge the role of rural entrepreneurs in the grassroots governance structure, while informally, they are heavily involved in shifting policy aims. By aligning with the state guidelines that mandated certain forms of public-private alliances to deliver rural revitalisation, they won support from these policies.

After considering four positions, I argue that a rigorous analysis of urban governance in China needs to highlight their common ground rather than exaggerate their differences. As previous decades of globalisation and ‘planetary urbanisation’ culminate in a deviation between global and local, between urban and rural, between the one per cent and the rest, there is a pressing need to rethink the premises of convergence and unthink the taken-for-granted cosmopolitanism.

Pushed further, I argue that the *just-in-time desakota* exhibits the best potential to inspire an internationally ‘comparative analysis’ (cf. Peck, 2015) of entrepreneurial governance in urbanising China. It enriches the theorisation of ‘urban entrepreneurialism’ through an examination of the economic and organisational restructuring of rural China. In this approach, the process of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey, 2007) is contextualised alongside the villagers’ aspiration for welfare and freedom. Instead of understanding the rural as a class that is homogeneous, passive and an aspatial division of labour in China’s transition to ‘people-oriented urbanisation’, this approach conceptualises shareholding cooperative reform as a response to the calling of state, market and (not all) rural elites, i.e. to wrestle away the economic growth function from incumbent rural governance structure. This is to be contrasted with the centralism that accompanies the explanation of the competitive allocation of resources in local socio-spatial transformation. Both *state entrepreneurialism* and *state corporatism* add to the insights this approach generates. The first allows the particular forms of market instrument-based policy intervention to be ‘couched’ within the urban-rural dichotomic planning by the state; the second revisits the local state as a set of locally embedded growth machine as opposed to a local representative of the state apparatus. Combined, a granular theorisation of state (re)scaling supplements entrepreneurial urbanism theory that under-specifies the role of the state.

Out of all the approaches examined in this chapter, the *Urban territorialism approach crossed the most paths with entrepreneurial urbanism theory. Accordingly, although it highlights the importance of social actors’ capacity to defend a territory for accumulation and distribution, thus influencing and at times shaping*

the path of urbanisation, it suffers from the same theoretical weakness that I delineated earlier in this chapter: too much emphasis is placed on the necessary dispossession of rural space for urban accumulation. As Chapter 5 sought to demonstrate, even when a city does converse rural land for urban development, it is often not adequate to solve the deeply entrenched problems it faces.

To conclude, this chapter combines a conceptual and empirical analysis and argues for an enriched entrepreneurial urbanism theory in order to present an updated account of evolving urban-rural relationships. This in turn aims to inspire more ‘politically effective’ (Harvey, 2006, pp. 158) actions. In Chapter 7, I will consider the conclusions of the preceding chapters in order to establish what a more rigorous theory of entrepreneurial governance might look like.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

This thesis has considered the theoretical leverage of entrepreneurial urbanism theory in explaining the governance of ‘new-type’ urbanisation in China via the case of the Jiyuan municipality. Three themes have run through the analysis: (i) an evaluation of the capacity of entrepreneurial urbanism theory to help explain Chinese urban governance; (ii) the local actors’ policymaking and points of intervention are contingent upon the supralocal governments’ economic-cum-political interpretation of crisis in conjuncture with the pre-existing local historical context; and (iii) that the strategic-relational research of entrepreneurial city in China requires a methodology that is sensitive to the urban-rural dialectic. This conclusion revisits the key arguments of previous chapters to explore the extent to which this thesis realised its objectives (see Chapter 1) and contributed to existing literature. In summary, in this thesis, I have:

- (i) proposed a renewed analytical framework and an updated operational research agenda of entrepreneurial city, towards a strengthened explanation of temporality, spatiality and scale via entrepreneurial urbanism theory and granular handling of worlding-cum-provincialising dialectic in its application;
- (ii) suggesting the intensive case study of urban elites space as the methodology to operationalise the new research agenda, guided by the strategic-relational approach;
- (iii) investigated urbanising governance in Jiyuan, a small and emerging city lying ‘off the map’ of academic attention, foregrounding the recursive interaction between extra-local conditions and local politico-economic responses over time;
- (iv) examined different types of partnerships in Jiyuan’s ‘coordinated urban-rural development’ scheme, highlighting the need to articulate the scale in the (re)classification, typologies, and transition models of partnerships were we to better understand the causes and effects of the shifts/turns in urban governance.
- (v) provided a dialectical and conjunctural exploration of urban-rural difference through rural collective shareholding reform in Jiyuan, echoing the critique of cosmopolitanism underpinning entrepreneurial urbanism theory.

The following section presents the substantive findings of the thesis, draws attention to the *worlding* and *provincialising* of entrepreneurial urbanism theory and argues that this is an interscalar and relational formation of urbanism. In order to better understand the causes and effects of evolving urban governance, I argue that entrepreneurial urbanism theory needs to reclaim some of the insights offered by accounts of state rescaling and pay greater attention to how urban policies and politics are discursively mediated and manipulated by urban-rural linkage. The final section returns to the emerging Chinese city of Jiyuan, reflecting on what the urban entrepreneurialism theory and Chinese cities have to say about each other.

7.2 Geographies of the entrepreneurial city

Entrepreneurial urbanism theory first entered China academic debates towards the turn of the 21st century. The waves of unfolding ‘urban’ policies and institutional innovations have brought existing accounts into question and led to claims that the socialist government was being replaced by a process of post-socialist governance (see Wu, 2003). In the US and UK (despite the difference in-between), entrepreneurial urbanism theory was developed to explain historical reorientation of city governing towards inter-city competition, entrepreneurial policies, and public-private partnership refashioning, primarily revolving around the extent to which a growth-oriented coalition has replaced the once class-based urban politics. Dissatisfaction in China with existing state-command-centred theories, or free-market-oriented theories of institutional change imported via post-socialist countries, focused on how they left little room for explaining a ‘strange’ growth stemming from the combination of a decentralised state and pervasive technocratic biopolitics (cf. Friedmann, 2018).

The change in the distribution of decision-making power across geographical scales in the past decades led to a sense that profound political changes were underway in emerging Chinese cities, alongside their significant economic growth. The continuous import of North Atlantic policies created conditions in China that at first glance appeared to mirror those in the North Atlantic urban institutional system. UIDCs, Enterprise Zones, CBD loans, and PPPs all find their counterparts or prototypes in the US or UK, although it is only until the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee held at the end of 2013 that the Communist Party of China firstly explicitly stated that it would ‘let the market play a decisive role in the allocation of resources.’ Similarly, no policy statement on the urban (re)development since the early 2010s was complete without reference to the ‘revitalising’ and ‘entrepreneurial’ logic of the market and the benefits that would accrue as ‘social capital’ participated in the road ahead towards ‘new-type’ urbanisation.

In practice, while the CPC-led Chinese government realised that the ‘old path of urbanisation’ was marching toward a dead end, those updated policies suggestive of ‘just-in-time desakota’ urbanism have yet to navigate cities to a ‘new road.’ Instead, as the population size-based city planning and managing system still looms large, there is little consensus regarding handling structural challenges – particularly those facing small cities in hinterland China. On one level, Chapter 4 outlined different trails of developmental partnerships in Jiyuan. However, it was not simply that the partnerships are acting independently: each is struggling to adapt to the same ‘new normal’ of slowing-down economic growth. As local governmental debt raises a broad concern and additional borrowing receives tightened scrutiny, the *de facto* partnership is increasingly an area where local actors could make a difference. It is these intertwined theoretical and empirical issues that compel this study to rethink the theoretical leverage of entrepreneurial urbanism theory in explaining the governance of urbanisation in China.

To start with, Chapter 2 produced a stylised genealogy of entrepreneurial urbanism theory and examined the extensibility of this concept. I argued that it brought the following (by no means mutually exclusive) aspects to the study of urban governance: (i) an awareness of the fundamental challenge to local strategy brought by global change; (ii) a sensitivity to the still under-theorised interactive relationship between *strategic calculation* and *the strategically selective context*; (iii) a critical look at the partnership between public (institutions) and private (actors); and (iv) a means of plotting place-based competitive strategies through temporal and scalar dimension; (v) an underestimation of the contingency of outcomes generated by the same global trend. I argued that although entrepreneurial urbanism theory seemed to offer an insight into the reworking of governance in Chinese cities, its (mis)application and undue ethnocentrism had foreclosed a fruit-bearing cross-country theoretical engagement. While the generation of varieties of entrepreneurial actions undoubtedly enriches urban governance studies, on their own, they do not represent a means of examining the internal principles of entrepreneurial urbanism theories. I returned to this issue in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 where I questioned the *synchronic* temporality and role of partnerships in entrepreneurial urbanism theory, respectively. This analysis in Chapter 2 revealed the extent to which entrepreneurial urbanism theory in its classical form could continue to shed light upon the explanation of partnership-based urban governance (in China). The conventional insights could then be returned to and extended, (perhaps) by fusing them with other theories of urban process or augmenting it with a theory of crisis and state rescaling in theories of local governance. These theories provide a means of developing entrepreneurial urbanism theory while keeping its positive insights and contribute to the proposal of an updated analytical framework in Figure 2.1.

Based on Chapter 2, where I argued that over/under-spatialised, synchronic, and scale-discrete explanations of urban governance were short of explanatory power, I claimed in Chapter 3 that the entrepreneurial urbanism theory needed to be reassessed against other changes in the political economy. Researching the space of partnerships in different guises draws attention to the strategic-relational approach to the entrepreneurial city as well as the ‘old debates’ between Historical-Geographical Marxism (*à la* Harvey) and Critical Realism (*à la* Sayer) that have threaded through some areas of social-spatial theory in Human Geography. Typically, the research that accompanied entrepreneurial urbanism theory adopted an epistemological stance that implicitly accredited capital with hypermobility while bounded spatial dependence with a particular scale. Meanwhile, most of the empirical work done in conjuncture with the entrepreneurial city approach presumed uncritically that a city’s governance is a *structured coherence* between the mode of growth and regulation. Implicit in these two types of analysis is that the city governance is of ephemeral *structured permanences* within which both local actors and extra-local structures have adapted to each other so quickly that spatial (e.g. urban vis-a-vis rural) difference is no longer relevant. In reality, nevertheless, the urbanising governance in China has barely achieved any *structured coherence* in a similar vein with its North Atlantic peers, i.e. built upon chronotopic governance and interscalar articulation and immune to urban-rural dichotomy. Instead, the current wave of urban policies only serves to lay bare rather than solve the problems lurking underneath the previous waves. So, in Chapter 4, I considered how Jiyuan rises to the favours of the latest ‘people-oriented urbanisation’ scheme. That is not necessarily because of how closely the local actors have aligned with the supralocal policies but is contingent upon the fact that the municipality ‘survived’ the disadvantageous extra-local forces with its small-size population and swift coping and delivered ‘coordinated’ urban-rural income gap.

Chapter 3 explored the methodological tools of entrepreneurial urbanism theory to process the information gleaned from sources including elite interviews, data from policy documents, think tank reports, and summit, government, committee and partnership minutes. Inspired by this, this thesis uses materials from interviews in Jiyuan. Drawing on this, the thesis proposed an ‘intensive case study of urban elites space’ as the methodology towards a renewed, causality-based worlding of the theory and provincialising of the empirical material. Highlighting the need to eliminate the inconsistency between philosophy and method in favour of a thorough theorisation of causality, this methodology dethroned the ‘normal’ use of data sources based upon quantitative vis-a-vis quantitative dichotomy when ‘applying’ entrepreneurial urbanism theory. Instead, it adopted an intensive research procedure, maintaining that the causal power possessed by research objects can only be revealed by putting (demi)regularities observed in

data into the necessary context that giving rise to them.

There are a series of method implications of this renewed methodology. First, in order to provide a robust causal analysis involving the research objects, semi-structured elites interviews serve not only to provide the bulk of first-hand quantitative materials but also inspire the strategic collection and appraisal of other secondary data, especially the quantitative data. Second, in order to further distinguish necessary ‘mechanism’ from contingent ‘process’ in studying the role of space in capitalist urbanisation, existing explanations must be seen as ‘contrastive demi-regs’ that necessitate comparison, difference and even counteracts (cf. Lawson, 1997; Fletcher, 2017). Therefore, public-private partnerships from place to place must be researched differently (as presented in Chapter 5) while within an overall research structure (in Chapter 4). Meanwhile, an alternative understanding of ‘urban’ can be achieved through observing urban-rural interactions, as latter evidenced in Chapter 6 through the investigation of rural shareholding cooperatives. Third, the iterative interrogation of ‘demi-regs’ meant that these places of changes are affecting each other so that interview material must be compared across institutions while the research was ongoing to capture (not without reinforcing) the geography as *process*. Last but not the least, this methodology requires me, as the researcher, to always be reflective on my positionality in identifying, accessing and interviewing the researched in light of the ‘strategic-relational contingency’ (Jessop, 2005) and ‘mode of entry’ (Ward and Jones, 1999). For instance, I found the combination of (i) ‘influential sponsor method’ and cascading (Welch et al., 2002) and (ii) snowballing/chain-referral (Méndez, 2020) effectual to get in touch with the elites. Also, the ‘number of visits’ was considered a better indicator of effective interviews with elites than the normally used ‘number of interviewees.’

Chapter 4 pulled together the issues of urban development and the ‘crisis of crisis management’ of the state. The ‘waves of crisis-driven urbanism’ concept allowed for the presentation of a conjunctural account of 40 years of urbanising policies. Generic tendencies were teased out in each of the three waves: *anti-migration urbanism*, *anti-settlement urbanism* and *just-in-time urbanism*. This analysis was important when exploring central government policies of the post-2008s. The open tournament inviting the competitive and entrepreneurial localities was propelling a large part of the institutional and political restructuring that entrepreneurial urbanism theory was supposed to explain. In each of the three waves, Lefebvre’s (1991 [1974]) culinary metaphor, Massey’s (1995[1984]) geological analogy, and Offe’s (1994, 1995) insights into the crisis were fused dialogically to interpret how the local effects of (extra-local) urban policies were a layering and crisis-displacing process. This analysis aims to apply and enrich the framework presented in Figure 2.1 by viewing each policy paradigm as an interscalar

articulation of punctured temporality and contingent spatiality. The chapter concluded by foregrounding two undergoing policies in Jiyuan against the wave of ‘just-in-time urbanism’, i.e. the Public-private Partnership and Shareholding Cooperatives of the rural collective asset. They were understood as both the result and the medium of central orchestration and local discretion around two primary storylines: first, the partnership between government, the financial sector and enterprises; and second, the dynamic dual-track handling of the rural and urban sector.

Chapter 5 and 6 contrasted two alternative explanations of urban governance. The first, discussed in Chapter 5, pivoted around the role of public-private partnerships. This explicitly examined each partnership adhering to the approach used in entrepreneurial urbanism theory. Three partnership ideal types: *Extra-local Authority-led*, *Local Authority-led*, and *Cross-scalar partnerships* were conceptualised to unveil how the *de jure* partnership takes different guises, displaying different characteristics of glocal-relationality and territorial embeddedness. Though each type had certain generic characteristics, its form represented a disruptive moment of interventionist (municipal) statecraft and was shaped by the broader picture of evolving state-market relationships in China and beyond. This analysis intended to expose some of the theoretical inadequacies of entrepreneurial urbanism theory. The scale of active partnership is highlighted by comparing the temporality and spatiality of each three ideal-type partnerships across the city. Stated differently, each type of partnership displays a certain way through which ‘scale-in-itself’ became ‘scale-of-itself’ in a due spatial and temporal context, exerting its causal power in the formulation of strategic goals and delivery of investment. In Economic Development Zones, the *Supralocal Authority-centred partnership* has been responsible for articulating the economic growth goals, strengthening regional competitiveness and courting industrial investment. In the construction and promotion of holistic tourist destinations, the *Local Authority-centred partnership* has recently been synergizing all funding sources to promote an updated city image based on resort-led redevelopment. In infrastructure provision during a fiscal austerity period, the *Cross-scalar Partnerships* bear high expectations from many parties while are still struggling to recover from a rollercoaster ride of upsets and downs.

In concluding Chapter 5, I argued that a partnership-centred analysis of how Chinese cities are managed was incomplete. The phase-change of urban governance was usefully explored through the notion of different partnership types. Entrepreneurial urbanism theory focuses attention on the reconfiguration of the interface between state and market. I argue that the phase-change analysis cannot be reduced into taxonomic categories. Rather, a causal analysis of contemporary urban governance must be complemented with specifying the scale of

partnership formulation. In the case of Jiyuan in China, this might mean considering how each type of scale-specific partnership articulates a Schumpeterian combination of the ideas of competition, efficiency, and order under the rubric of sustainable development through a (re)embedding of state and market into the society (cf. Wu, 2010).

Similarly, I argued that Public-Private Partnerships shape inter-urban competitions in indeterminate ways. A fierce inter-urban competition entails a form of partnership very different from that prefigured by a mild one. In the case of Jiyuan, I found that an extra-local authority-led partnership fed into a fiercer inter-city competition through introducing and updating the rating system of enterprise zones. In comparison, despite a local authority-led partnership that was formed under pressure to catch up with the neighbouring forerunners in cultural & tourism development, JCTIG, the pioneering institution of the partnership, draws broader concern regarding its under-qualifiable efficacy of using funds. On top of all these, China's central government proactively introduced the *de jure* cross-scalar partnerships to contain the rising municipal debt, the latter of which was the negative aftermath of the previous wave of inter-city competition for foreign investment.

Chapter 6 goes beyond Chapter 5 to stress the strategic-relational nature of 'urban' in urban governance, as being in an antinomical relationship with the 'rural'. It returns to the theories of urbanising state-market relationship and analysed the shareholding-cooperative reform of each rural collective economy in terms of the economic and institutional urban-rural linkage mediated by urban-rural dichotomic narrative. I argue that an emancipatory theorisation of urban (governance) entails revitalising urban-rural dialectic through an iterative double movement between the theoretical and empirical urban-rural interaction. Theoretically, I argued that *worlding* forms of neo-corporatist and neo-syndicalist analysis of political economy need to be incorporated into the entrepreneurial urbanism theory framework, in combination with a *provincialised* separation of discursive claims made by local actors over the urban-rural coordination with an assessment of the material realities of their institutional and economic positions. Accordingly, this chapter explored Four theoretical positions: *state entrepreneurialism*, *state corporatism*, *urban statism*, and *desakota*, to consider which would best augment the explanatory power of entrepreneurial urbanism theory. Each position attached differing weight to the restructuring of state-market interface; the autonomy and embeddedness of local economic actors; the altering spatialisation of urban-rural interaction; and the shift from 'anti-settlement urbanism' towards 'just-in-time urbanism.'

I argued that a rigorous analysis of urban governance in China needs to highlight the common

ground shared by these stances before highlighting their differences. As the decades of globalisation and ‘planetary urbanisation’ came to a tipping point that the deviation between global and local, between urban and rural, between the one per cent and the rest, seemed more bulging than ever, there is a pressing need to rethink the premises of convergence and unthink the taken-for-granted cosmopolitanism. Furthermore, I argued that of the four alternative positions, *just-in-time Desakota* exhibited the best potential to be a theoretical foil for entrepreneurial urbanism theory and inspire an worlding-cum-provincialising ‘comparative analysis’ (cf. Peck, 2015) of entrepreneurial governance in urbanising China. It enriches the theorisation of ‘urban entrepreneurialism’ by examining the economic and organisational restructuring of rural China. In this approach, the process of accumulation by dispossession (cf. Harvey, 2007) is contextualised alongside the villagers’ aspiration for welfare and freedom. Instead of understanding the rural as a class homogeneous, passive and aspatial division of labour in China’s transition to ‘people-oriented urbanisation’, it conceptualises shareholding cooperative reform as a response to the calling of state, market and (not all) rural elites, i.e. to wrestle away the economic growth function from incumbent rural governance structure. This stance contrasts with the centralism that accompanies the explanation of the competitive allocation of resources in local socio-spatial transformation.

To understand the CPC-led Chinese central government’s attempt to ‘let the market play a decisive role in allocating resources’ and get businesses involved in ‘urban-rural coordinated’ development, one must first explain their economic motives. There was barely anything politically necessary, although it might seem otherwise, about either the adoption of the partnership approach to governance or the policies that assigned local causality to entrepreneurial capacity. National political interpretation rested upon a set of ideological beliefs over the form of the ‘urban’ problem and the type of policies able to solve it. Initiatives such as Urban Investment and Development Corporations charged local elites with delivering a local strand of central interventionism. In contrast to the *urban territorliam* stance, which crosses most paths with entrepreneurial urbanism theory and stresses the social actors’ autonomy to defend a territory for accumulation and distribution in urbanisation, I wish to argue that at a general level, how urban accumulation not necessarily requires the dispossession of rural space. Though, as this thesis has argued, there is scope for a city to converse rural land for urban development, it is also the case that this encroachment is not adequate to solve the deeply entrenched problems the city faces. The urban agency is exercised through certain statist, scalar and rural parameters, the under-theorisation of which does not inspire more ‘politically effective’ actions. In this sense, entrepreneurial urbanism theory has a valid point in opening up questions of genuine innovations of different urbanities.

7.3 Concluding thoughts: the Chinese cities of entrepreneurialism

Urban entrepreneurialism theory seeks to explain the modal changes of urban governance. In conclusion, I wish to argue that it makes a significant but incomplete contribution to analysing the urban governance restructuring in Chinese cities. At the explanatory core of urban entrepreneurialism theory is a series of place-based, innovative partnerships between the public and private sector, compelled by the fundamental alteration of Ford-Keynesianism. The bulk of the initial empirical work focused on the major cities in the US and UK, as the pursuit of similar entrepreneurial policies and practices by these indicated that they contained comparable social and economic problems (Ward, 2010a, 2010b). Partnerships rose to be the *modus operandi* of city governance, despite the type of collaborative synergy that differs in important ways between a regeneration partnership in the UK and an urban regime in the US (Jonathan, 2016).

When urban entrepreneurialism theory (or more precisely, the entrepreneurial city approach) was firstly ‘applied’ in Chinese cities, empirical evidence suggested it had limited explanatory power by making superficial cross-national comparisons. In order to explore deeply the *processes* driving entrepreneurial city emergence in China, additional concepts have been adopted or developed to complement the insights offered by urban entrepreneurialism theory (see Wu, 2003, 2008, 2010, 2018). However, I would argue that this kind of analysis falls short of explanatory and hermeneutic depth (cf. Jessop, 2005) because it elicited while left largely unexplored a series of fundamental theoretical and empirical issues. Notably, existing studies of Chinese cities inspired by entrepreneurial urbanism theory fail to mention the fact, let alone explain the fact why, in many areas, China’s state welfare and market freedom are not as incompatible with each other as those in post-welfare and neoliberal countries. Also, they underestimate the potential return of class politics, if not the ‘restoration of class power’ (Harvey, 2005), in China’s self-claimed transition towards a *new type, urban-rural coordinated, industry-city integrated, and sustainable* urbanisation.

By considering the politico-economic restructuring in the municipality of Jiyuan in China, this thesis has sought to extend the capacity of entrepreneurial urbanism theory to provide a worlding-cum-provincialising understanding of temporality, spatiality, and scale. Existing entrepreneurial urbanism analysis opens up these questions in an enlightening way but is not sufficiently developed to keep providing meaningful answers without a theoretical overhaul of the conventional framework. In my view, this reworking entails a critical return to the methodological soil giving rise to the theory of urban entrepreneurialism, strengthening its

‘causal’ power (cf. Jessop, 2005) while stripping it from the potential ethnocentrism. On top of that, the search for answers can be assisted by fusing the entrepreneurial city analysis with broader crisis theories on the one hand and elite-led urban-rural interaction on the other hand towards a *strategic-relational* investigation of entrepreneurial urban policies.

Appendixes

Appendix A List of Interviewees

Code	Position	Organisation	Category
JY-01-G	Retired senior officer	General Office of Municipal Government	Municipal Government
JY-02-G	Senior officer	Jiyuan Development and Reform Committee	Municipal Government
JY-03-G	Senior officer	Jiyuan Bureau of Land and Resources	Municipal Government
JY-04-G	Senior officer	Jiyuan Bureau of Urban and Rural Planning	Municipal Government
JY-05-S	Senior officer	Jiyuan Urban and Rural Planning Institute	Municipal Government-affiliated Shiye unit
JY-06-G	Senior officer	Jiyuan PPP centre at Bureau of Finance	Municipal Government
JY-07-S	Senior officer	Jiyuan Bureau of Highway Administration	Municipal Government-affiliated Shiye unit
JY-08-E	Chairman	Jiyuan Culture & Tourism Investment and Development Company	Municipal State-owned enterprise
JY-09-E	Executive	Jiyuan Tigeridge Enterprise Zone	Municipal State-owned enterprise
JY-10-E	Senior Officer	Jiyuan Bureau of Commerce	Government-affiliated Shiye unit
JY-11-P	Executive	Jiyuan Branch of Beijing Capital Co.	Business participant in PPP
JY-12-S	Junior officer	Jiyuan Office of Financing	Government-affiliated Shiye unit
JY-13-B	Junior officer	Jiyuan Branch of People's Bank of	Central bank

		China	
JY-14-G	Senior official	Jiyuan Rural Work Office; Former Urban-Rural Integrated Development Office	Municipal Government
JY-15-G	Senior official	Jiyuan Poverty Alleviation Commission; Former Urban-Rural Integrated Development Office	Municipal Government
JY-16-G	Senior official	Jiyuan Rural-collective Asset Trading Centre	Municipal Government
JY-17-G	Junior official	Jiyuan Rural-collective Asset Trading centre	Municipal Government
JY-18-V	Village party secretary	Waterstone Village	Village cadre
JY-19-V	Village committee representative	Northgate Village	Village cadre
JY-20-V	Village collective accountant	Northgate Village	Village cadre
JY-21-V	Senior villager	Northgate Village	Villager
JY-22-V	Village party secretary	Cypress Village	Village cadre
JY-23-V	Junior villager/Journalist	Cypress Village	Villager/Media
JY-24-G	Senior official	Township administering Waterstone Village/ bordering Tigeridge Enterprise Zone	Township Government
JY-25-G	Junior official	Subdistrict Office administering Northgate Village	Subdistrict Government
JY-26-G	Senior official	Subdistrict Office administering Northgate Village	Subdistrict Government
JY-27-G	Junior official	Township administering Cypress Village	Township Government

JY-28-M	Senior journalist	Jiyuan Television & Broadcasting Station	Media
JY-29-M	Senior journalist	Jiyuan Newspaper Station	Media
JY-30-U	Scholar	Wuhan University	University
JY-31-U	Manager	Henan Dapeng Vision Strategic Planning & Research Centre	Private consulting firm
JY-32-S	Senior planner	Henan Urban Planning Institute & Corporation	Provincial Government-affiliated Shiye unit

Source: By author.

Appendix B Key Documents collected for Jiyuan case

Type	Author/ Publisher	Title	Impact Scale	Published Date	Form
Brochure	JY Commence Bureau; JY Investment Promotion Bureau	Invest in JY, building up a win-win future	Municipal	2017	Paper
Government Work Report	JY Municipal Government	Annual Government Work Report (1997-2021)	Municipal	1998 to 2021	Digital
Government Budget Report	JY Municipal Government	Report on Jiyuan Municipality's financial accounts (1997-2021)	Municipal	1998 to 2021	Digital
Five-Year Plan	National Government of China	Outline of the 13th Five-year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China (2016–2020)	National	2016-03- 17	Digital
	Henan Provincial Government	Outline of the 13th Five-year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the Henan Province (2016–2020)	Provincial	2016-03- 28	Digital
	JY Municipal Government	The 13th Five-year Plan for Economic and Social Development of JY (2016–2020)	Municipal	2016-07- 23	Online
Land Use Planning	Ministry of Land and Resources	Outline of National Overall Planning on Land Use (2006-2020)	National	2008-10- 24	Online
	Ministry of Land and Resources	Adjustment Plan for the Outline of National Overall Planning on Land Use (2006-2020)	National	2016-06- 22	Online
	Department of Land and Resources of Henan Province	Henan Provincial Land Use Master Planning (2006-2020)	Provincial	2008-12	Online
	Department of Land and Resources of Henan Province	Adjustment Plan for the Henan Provincial Land Use Master Planning (2006-2020)	Provincial	2018-06- 15	Online
	JY Municipal Government	JY Municipal Land Use Master Planning (2010-2020)	Municipal	2013-04- 17	Online
	JY Municipal Government	Adjustment Plan for JY Municipal Land Use Master Planning (2010- 2020)	Municipal	2017-09	Digital
Tourism Planning	Jiyuan Planning Bureau	Post-Approval Notice of Master Planning of Holistic Tourism Destination in Jiyuan (2016-2030)	Municipal	2017-05- 31	Online
Population Development	Management Committee	Notice on issuing the population development planning (2019-2030)	Municipal	2019-03- 20	Online

Planning	Office of Jiyuan Industry-Urban Integration Demonstration Zone				
Economic, Industrial, and Spatial Development Policies	State council	Instructions on Support of Henan Province to Speed Up Construction of the Central Plains Economic Zone	Inter-provincial	2011-09-28	Online
	CPC Central Committee, State council	National New Urbanisation Plann (2014-2020)	National	2014-03-16	Online
	Henan Provincial Government	Henan Provincial New Urbanisation Planning (2014-2020)	Provincial	2014-07-13	Digital
	State council	Development Planning of Central Plains Urban Agglomeration	Inter-provincial	2016-12	Digital
	Jiyuan Municipal Government	JY Urban and Rural Master Planning	Municipal	2012-07-06	Digital
	Henan Provincial Government	Henan Provincial Urban System Planning (2006-2020); (2011-2020)	Provincial	2007/2012	Online
	Jiyuan Municipal Government	JY Urban-Rural Integration Development Master Planning (2010--2030)	Municipal	2010-05-28	Digital
	Henan Provincial Development and Reform Commission	General Scheme for Jiyuan as the National City-Industry Integration Model Area	Municipal	2017-06-12	Digital
Public-Private Partnership	State Council	Several opinions of the State Council on strengthening the administration of local government debts	National	2014-10-02	Online
	General Office of State Council	Notice of instruction on promoting public-private partnerships in public service	National	2015-05-19	Online
	Ministry of Finance	Operational guidelines for public-private partnerships (pilot)	National	2014-05-31	Online
		The Instruction on Promoting and Using the Model of Public-Private Partnership (PPP)	National	2014-11-29	Online
		Notice of the Ministry of Finance on issuing The interim measures for the administration of the issuance of local government general bonds	National	2015-03-12	Online
		Notice of the Ministry of Finance on issuing The interim measures for the administration of the	National	2015-04-02	Online

		issuance of local government special bonds			
		Notice of the Ministry of Finance on issuing the Measures for the administration of the issuance of local government special bonds	National	2020-12-22	Online
		Notice on issuing the ‘Guidelines for Fiscal Affordability Evaluation in Public-Private Partnerships’	National	2015-05-04	Online
		Notice on regulating the management of the Public-private Partnership Integrated Information Platform	National	2017-11-10	Online
	State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council	Notice on strengthening risk control of PPP business of Central State-owned Enterprises	National	2017-11-17	Online
	China Public Private Partnership Center	National PPP Integrated Information Platform; Database for programs-Henan-Jiyuan	National/Municipal	2020-12-09	Online
	Jiyuan Bureau of Finance	A list of PPP programs in Jiyuan (2016-2019)	Municipal	2016-2019	Online
	Government of United Kingdom	Public Private Partnerships collection	National-UK	2017	Online
	HM Treasury of Government of United Kingdom	Supporting the Development of PPPs in the People’s Republic of China – An International Perspective	International	2015-06-30	Online
Enterprise Zone	General Office of the State Council	Several opinions of the General Office of the State Council on promoting the reform and innovative development of development zones	National	2017-01-26	Online
	People’s Government of Henan Province	Notice of the People's Government of Henan Province issuing several policies on accelerating the scientific development of industrial agglomerations (for trial implementation)	Provincial	2009-08-07	Online
		Guiding opinions of the People’s Government of Henan Province on further promoting the development of enterprise zones	Provincial	2010-03-23	Online
		Opinions of the People’s Government of Henan Province on promoting the sustainable, healthy and rapid development of	Provincial	2012-03-08	Digital

		enterprise zones			
		Notice of the People's Government of Henan Province on the results of the assessment and promotion of enterprise zones in 2014	Provincial	2015-04-02	Online
		Notice of the People's Government of Henan Province on the results of the assessment and promotion of enterprise zones in 2015	Provincial	2016-04-15	Online
	General Office of the People's Government of Henan Province	Notice of the general office of People's Government of Henan Province on improving financial incentive policies to promote the accelerated development of industrial agglomerations	Provincial	2010-03-24	Online
		Notice of the general office of People's Government of Henan Province on the issuance of assessment measures for the development of industrial clusters in Henan province	Provincial	2010-04-02	Online
		Notice of the general office of the People's Government of Henan Province on the implementation measures for the assessment and promotion of professional parks in industrial clusters in new urban areas of Henan province	Provincial	2010-07-19	Online
		Notice of the general office of the <i>People's Government of Henan Province</i> on adjusting and improving the assessment index system for the development of industrial agglomerations in Henan province	Provincial	2011-02-23	Online
		Notice of the General Office of People's Government of Henan Province on the forwarding of the 2014 special work plan for accelerating the construction of enterprise zones of Henan Province	Provincial	2014	Digital
		Notice of the General Office of the People's Government of Henan Province on the issuance of the special work plan for accelerating the construction of enterprise zones of Henan Province	Provincial	2016-04-29	Online
		Implementation opinions of the General Office of the People's Government of Henan province on promoting the reform and innovative development of enterprise zones	Provincial	2017-12-12	Online

		Notice of the General Office of People's Government of Henan Province on the issuance of the action plan for promoting the high-quality development of enterprise zones of Henan Province	Provincial	2019-08-02	Online
	General Office of Henan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China	Trial measures for assessment and evaluation of enterprise zones of Henan province	Provincial	2014	Online
	Office of the Joint Conference of Enterprise Zones of Henan Province	Notice of on the results of the assessment and promotion of enterprise zones in 2014	Provincial	2014-05-08	Online
		Assessment and evaluation methods for enterprise zones of Henan Province	Provincial	2015-09-17	Online
		Comprehensive evaluation method for the classification of enterprises in enterprise zones of Henan Province (for trial implementation)	Provincial	2017-12-20	Online
		Special work programme to accelerate the quality and transformation of enterprise zones in 2018	Provincial	2018-06-15	Online
		Notice of on the results of the assessment and promotion of enterprise zones in 2017	Provincial	2018-07-28	Online
		Notice of the Office of the Joint Conference of Enterprise Zones of Henan Province on the results of the assessment and promotion of enterprise zones in 2018	Provincial	2019-10-23	Online
		Notice of the office of the Joint Conference of Enterprise Zones of Henan Province on the issuance of the comprehensive evaluation method for the classification of enterprises in enterprise zones of Henan Province	Provincial	2019-01-17	Online
		Notice of the office of the Joint Conference of Enterprise Zones of Henan Province on the issuance of the comprehensive evaluation method for the classification of enterprises in enterprise zones of Henan Province	Provincial	2019-01-17	Online
		Notice of the Office of the Joint Conference of Enterprise Zones of Henan Province on the	Provincial	2020-03-06	Online

		issuance of guidance on the revision of the planning of enterprise zones			
		Notification of the results of the assessment and promotion of the high-quality development of enterprise zones in 2019	Provincial	2020-08-20	Online
	People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality	A public announcement on the establishment of industrial agglomeration administrative committees	Municipal	2007-04-08	Digital
		Opinions of People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality on Promoting Good and Fast Development of Industrial Economy	Municipal	2007-09-30	Online
		Notice of People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality on improving the financial management system of the enterprise zone management committee	Municipal	2012-12-08	Online
		Notice of People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality on the reconfiguration of financial management system between the municipality, enterprise zones and cooperative townships	Municipal	2018-05-21	Digital
		Notice of People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality on further improving the working mechanism of enterprise zones	Municipal	2018-08-07	Online
	General Office of People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality	Notice on further adjustment and improvement of the fiscal policies of the township (street office) and enterprise zones	Municipal	2013-08-30	Online

Source: By author.

Appendix C Participant Information Sheet

MANCHESTER
1824

The University
of Manchester

Thank you for taking time to read this Participant Information Sheet. Before confirming your participation it is important that you understand the nature of the study. For this reason, please read the following information. Should you have any questions please do not hesitate to ask me for more information.

WHO WILL CONDUCT THE RESEARCH?

Name of researcher: Yong ZHANG

TITLE OF THE RESEARCH

Entrepreneurial urbanism... with chinese characteristics? A case study of governance restructuring in Jiyuan, China

WHAT IS THE AIM OF THE RESEARCH?

This research will use the case study of Jiyuan to examine the contemporary nature of local governance in China.

WHY HAVE I BEEN CHOSEN?

You have been selected for an interview because of your role in local governance and its restructuring. I am interested in your aspirations, thoughts and views on the changes underway in Jiyuan and what they mean for its governance.

WHAT WOULD I BE ASKED TO DO IF I TOOK PART?

By participating in this study, you will be invited to take part in a face-to-face semi-structured interview lasting between an hour and an hour and a half. The researcher will ask a series of questions. The interview will be an interactive process through which you are encouraged to express your views and thoughts on n governance restructuring in Jiyuan. With your consent, the interview will be audio-taped.

WHAT HAPPENS TO THE DATA COLLECTED?

All interviews will be collected and analysed by the researcher and presented in a doctoral thesis. All interview material will be anonymised. The final report or a summary of the findings of the study will be made available to participants.

Any parts of the findings emerging from the study may be published in academic peer-review journals, book chapters, professional magazines or blogs in the future.

HOW IS CONFIDENTIALITY MAINTAINED?

Admittance to all data generated through this research will be limited to the researcher and his supervisory team. All material will be kept under lock and key and all digital data will be stored in a computer under a password, kept by the researcher. Once the research has been completed, all data will be destroyed.

The identities of the interviewees will be kept anonymous, which means the real name will be replaced by a number in the interview transcript. No identity of interviewees will be identifiable in any publications.

WHAT HAPPENS IF I DO NOT WANT TO TAKE PART OR IF I CHANGE MY MIND?

It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part in the interview, you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. You are free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason.

WILL I BE PAID FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE RESEARCH?

No participants will be paid for participating in the research.

What is the duration of the research?

The data will be collected between October 2018 and June 2019. Each participant will be asked to involve in a face-to-face semi-structured interview lasting between 1 and 1.5 hours.

Where will the research be conducted?

The research will be conducted either at your office or in a public space in which you feel

comfortable.

WILL THE OUTCOMES OF THE RESEARCH BE PUBLISHED?

The outcomes of the research will be mainly used in my PhD thesis. In addition, they are also anticipated to be used in the following ways:

- Peer-reviewed journal articles
- Conference presentations

WHO HAS REVIEWED THE RESEARCH PROJECT?

This research has been reviewed by the Research Ethics Committee in the School of Environment, Education and Development.

CONTACT FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

Researcher contact details:

Address:

Quad A, 1/F, Arthur Lewis Building,

The School of Environment and Development, University of Manchester

Manchester, M13 9PL

United Kingdom

Email address: Yong.zhang-2@manchester.ac.uk

Mobile number: +44 7857940738 (UK); +86 13121628234 (Mainland China)

Supervisor contact details:

Email address: Kevin.ward@manchester.ac.uk; Cecilia.wong@manchester.ac.uk

WHAT IF SOMETHING GOES WRONG?

If a participant wants to make a formal complaint about the conduct of the research they should contact the Postgraduate Research Office in the School of Environment, Education and Development by either writing to pgr-seed@manchester.ac.uk or visiting Arthur Lewis Building, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL, United Kingdom.

Appendix D Participant Consent Form

MANCHESTER
1824

The University
of Manchester

If you are happy to participate please complete and sign the consent form below.

Please initial box

1. I confirm that I have read the attached information sheet on the above project and have had the opportunity to consider the information and ask questions and had these answered satisfactorily.
2. I understand that my participation in the study is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason and without detriment to my treatment/service/self.
3. I understand that my data will remain confidential.
4. I understand that the interviews will be audio-recorded.
5. I agree to the use of anonymous quotes.
6. I agree to receive a non-technical summary of the research results after the completion of the research.

I agree to take part in the above project.

_____	_____	_____
Name of participant	Date	Signature
_____	_____	_____
Name of researcher	Date	Signature

References

- 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. (2013). *The decision on major issues concerning comprehensively deepening reforms* [中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定]. Available at: http://www.gov.cn/jrzq/2013-11/15/content_2528179.htm [Accessed on: 17th December 2020].
- Acuto, M. (2013a). City leadership in global governance. *Global governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, 19(3), pp. 481-498.
- Acuto, M. (2013b). Global cities, governance and diplomacy: The Urban Link. London: Routledge.
- Alexander, B. (2013). Design of a socio-technical change management process: a critical realist perspective. INEER ICEER Conference.
- Allen, J. (2012). A more than relational geography? *Dialogues in Human Geography*, 2(2), pp. 190–193.
- Amin, A. (1999). An institutionalist perspective on regional economic development. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 23(2), pp. 365-378.
- Anderlini, J. (2009). CDB turns away from the path of reform. *Financial Times*, November, 1. Available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/cae19852-c70c-11de-bb6f-00144feab49a> [Accessed on 18th December, 2020].
- Andrusz, G.D., Harloe, M., and Szelényi, I. (eds.). (1996). *Cities after Socialism: urban and regional change and conflict in post-socialist societies*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell..
- Ang, Y.Y. (2012). Counting cadres: a comparative view of the size of China's public employment. *The China Quarterly*, 211, pp. 676-696.
- Ang, Y.Y. (2016). *How China escaped the poverty trap*. Cornell University Press.
- Bailey, N. (1994). Towards a research agenda for public-private partnerships in the 1990s. *Local Economy*, 8(4), pp. 292-306.
- Balchin, P., Sykora, L. and Bull, G. (2002). *Regional policy and planning in Europe*. London: Routledge.
- Ball, M. and Maginn, P.J. (2005). Urban change and conflict: Evaluating the role of partnerships in urban regeneration in the UK. *Housing Studies*, 20(1), pp. 9-28.
- Barnekov, T.K., Boyle, R. and Rich, D. (1989). *Privatism and urban policy in Britain and the United States*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bassens, D., Van Heur, B. and Waiengnier, M. (2019). Follow the money: cultural patronage and urban elite geographies. *Urban Geography*, 40(5), pp. 719-746.

- Bayirbağ, M.K. (2010). Local entrepreneurialism and state rescaling in Turkey. *Urban Studies*, 47(2), pp. 363-385.
- BBC 中文. *Henan Jiyuan to move residents near the smelting plant* [河南济源拟迁冶炼厂附近居民], 19th October. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2009/10/091019_china_lead_relocation [Accessed on 5th January 2021].
- Beijing Gauging Consultants Company. (2016). Value-for-Money assessment report for Jiyuan's rural domestic sewage disposal project: Phase I. *China Public-Private Partnership Center*. May. Available at: <https://www.cpppc.org:8082/inforpublic/homepage.html#/preview/001720200118134453260cue0000tlg2lk5> [Accessed on: 3 June 2020].
- Belina, B. and Helms, G. (2003). Zero tolerance for the industrial past and other threats: policing and urban entrepreneurialism in Britain and Germany. *Urban Studies*, 40(9), pp. 1845-1867.
- Blanchard, O. and Shleifer, A. (2001). Federalism with and without political centralization: China versus Russia. *IMF staff papers*, 48(1), pp. 171-179.
- Bouinot, J. with Lovi, C. (1987). *L'action économique des grandes villes en France et à l'étranger*. Paris: Economica.
- Boyle, M. (1997). Civic boosterism in the politics of local economic development—'institutional positions'; and 'strategic orientations' in the consumption of hallmark events. *Environment and Planning A*, 29(11), pp. 1975-1997.
- Boyle, M. (1999). Growth machines and propaganda projects: a review of readings of the role of civic boosterism in the politics of local economic development. In Jonas, A., Wilson, D. (eds.). *The Urban Growth Machine: Critical Perspectives Two Decades Later*. Albany, NY: State University Press of New York, pp. 55-70.
- Boyle, M. and Hughes, G. (1994). The Politics of Urban Entrepreneurialism in Glasgow. *Geoforum*, 25(4), pp. 453-470.
- Brenner, N. (1998a). Between fixity and motion: Accumulation, territorial organisation and the historical geography of spatial scales. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 16(4), pp. 459-481.
- Brenner, N. (1998b). Global Cities, Glocal Scales: Global City Formation and State Territorial Restructuring in Contemporary Europe. *Review of International Political Economy*, 5(1), pp. 1-37.
- Brenner, N. (1999). Globalisation as reterritorialisation: the re-scaling of urban governance in the European Union. *Urban Studies*, 36 (3), pp. 431-451.
- Brenner, N. (2002). Decoding the newest "metropolitan regionalism" in the USA: A critical

- overview. *Cities*, 19(1), pp. 3-21.
- Brenner, N. (2003). 'Glocalization' as a state spatial strategy: urban entrepreneurialism and the new politics of uneven development in western Europe. In Peck, J. and Yeung, H.W.C. (eds.). *Remaking the global economy: economic-geographical perspectives*. London: Sage, pp. 197-215.
- Brenner, N. (2003). Metropolitan Institutional Reform and the Rescaling of State Space in Contemporary Western Europe. *European urban and regional studies*, 10(4), pp. 297-324.
- Brenner, N. (2004). *New state spaces: Urban governance and the rescaling of statehood*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brenner, N. (2004b). Urban governance and the production of new state spaces in Western Europe, 1960–2000. *Review of International Political Economy*, 11(3), pp. 447-488.
- Brenner, N. (2013). Theses on urbanization. *Public Culture*, 25 (1), pp. 85–114.
- Brenner, N. (2019). *New urban spaces: Urban theory and the scale question*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brenner, N. and Theodore, N. (2002). Cities and the geographies of "actually existing neoliberalism". *Antipode*, 34(3), pp. 349-379.
- Brenner, N., Peck, J. and Theodore, N. (2010). Variegated neoliberalization: geographies, modalities, pathways. *Global Networks*, 10(2), pp. 182-222.
- Bryman, A. (1988). *Quantity and quality in social research*. London: Unwin Hyman.
- Burawoy, M. (1982). *Manufacturing consent: Changes in the labor process under monopoly capitalism*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Cai, F. (1995). The logic of reform of the TVE property rights systems and the conditions for success [乡镇企业产权制度改革的逻辑与成功的条件: 兼与国有企业改革比较]. *Economic reform journal*, (10): pp. 35-40.
- Cai, H. and Chen, X. (2021). Study on the introduction of state-owned capital in environmental private enterprises to alleviate their difficulties - the case of Beijing Originwater Technology Co., Ltd [环保民企引入国有资本纾困研究——以碧水源为例]. *Finance and Accounting*, (1), pp. 49-52.
- Cartier, C. (2001). 'Zone fever', the arable land debate, and real estate speculation: China's evolving land use regime and its geographical contradictions. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 10(28), pp. 445-469.
- Cartier, C. (2015). Territorial urbanization and the party-state in China. *Territory, Politics, Governance*, 3(3), pp. 294-320.
- Castree, N. (2002). From spaces of antagonism to spaces of engagement. In Brown, A., Fleetwood, S., Roberts, M. and Roberts, J.M. (eds.). *Critical realism and Marxism*. London:

- Routledge, pp. 187-214.
- Castree, N. (2007). David Harvey: Marxism, Capitalism and the Geographical Imagination. *New Political Economy*, 12(1), pp. 97-115.
- CCP Central documentary research office. (2017). Speech at the symposium on comprehensively deepening reform for major leading cadres at provincial and ministerial levels studying and implementing the spirit of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee (17th February, 2014)[在省部级主要领导干部学习贯彻十八届三中全会精神全面深化改革专题研讨班上的讲话（2014年2月17日）]. *Excerpts from Xi Jinping's discourse on socialist political construction* [习近平关于社会主义政治建设论述摘编]. Beijing: Central literature publishing house, pp. 8.
- CCP committee of JCTIG. (2020). Briefing on the progress of rectification of inspection observations [关于巡察整改进展情况的通报]. *Inspection office of CPC Jiyan Municipal Committee*. 9th November. Available at: http://www.jylzw.gov.cn/sitesources/jylzw/page_pc/gzdt/xcgz/bjxcgz/article7961652b84044afd8ba502c694ecb660.html [Accessed on: 28 February 2021]
- Central urban work conference. (2015). *Central city work conference held in Beijing* [中央城市工作会议在北京举行]. Available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-12/22/c_1117545528.htm [Accessed on: 21 December 2020].
- Chan, A.P., Lam, P.T., Chan, D.W., Cheung, E. and Ke, Y. (2009). Drivers for adopting public private partnerships—Empirical comparison between China and Hong Kong special administrative region. *Journal of Construction Engineering and Management*, 135(11), pp. 1115-1124.
- Chan, K.W. (2007). Misconceptions and complexities in the study of China's cities: Definitions, statistics, and implications. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 48(4), pp. 383-412.
- Chan, K.W. (2018). The emerging transformation of China's economic geography. In Clark, G.L., Feldman, M.P., Gertler, M.S. and Dariusz, W. (eds.). *The New Oxford Handbook of Economic Geography*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 78-96.
- Chen, A. (2016). The politics of the shareholding collective economy in China's rural villages. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 43(4), pp. 828-849.
- Chen, C. (2009). Can the pilot BOT Project provide a template for future projects? A case study of the Chengdu No. 6 Water Plant B Project. *International Journal of Project Management*, 27(6), pp. 573-583.
- Chen, F. (2009). Retrospect and prospect of China's urbanization in the past 30 years of reform and opening-up[改革开放三十年我国城镇化进程和城市发展的历史回顾和展望]. *Planners*, 25(1), pp. 10-12.

- Chen, M., Liu, W. and Lu, D. (2016). Challenges and the way forward in China's new-type urbanization. *Land Use Policy*, 55, pp. 334-339.
- Chen, Y. (2005). *Development financing and China's urbanization*. China Development Bank, www.cdb.com.cn/english/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=1174 [Accessed on, 18th April 2020].
- Chen, Y. (2006). Frequent transfer: Henan scenic spots jump the 'red light' [频频出让：河南景区闯“红灯”]. *Economic Insight*. 27th April, pp. 001.
- Chen, Z. (2010). How Henan Province won the competition for Foxconn [河南是如何抢到富士康的]. *Southern Weekly*. 20th August. Available at: <http://www.infzm.com/content/49066> [Accessed: 27 May 2020].
- Cheng, R. and Fan, X. (2010). New Jiyuan - Report from Jiyuan, a pilot city for urban-rural integration in our province[全域城市新济源——来自我省城乡一体化试点市济源的报道]. *Henan Daily*, 27th April, pp. 1-2. Available at: http://newspaper.dahe.cn/hnrbcnb/html/2010-04/27/content_309844.htm [Accessed on: 24 March 2021].
- Cheng, Y. (2004). *Behind the shipwreck at Xiaolangdi*[小浪底沉船背后]. Sanlian Life Weekly, (27). Available at: <http://www.lifeweek.com.cn/2004/0715/9120.shtml> [Accessed on: 9 February 2021].
- Cheng, Z., Wei X., Lin J. and Cai J. (2018). Spatio-temporal pattern and impact factors of PPP in China during 1984-2013 [1984—2013 年中国 PPP 发展的时空格局与影响因素]. *Economic Geography*, 38(1), pp. 20-27.
- Cheung, S.N. (2010). *Monetary Strategy Theory: The Chinese Experience from Price Theory*[货币战略论：从价格理论看中国经验]. Beijing: China CITIC Press.
- Cheung, S.N. (2014). The economic system of China. *Man and the Economy*, 1(1), pp. 1-49.
- Chiara, N., Garvin, M.J. and Vecer, J. (2007). Valuing simple multiple-exercise real options in infrastructure projects. *Journal of infrastructure systems*, 13(2), pp. 97-104.
- Chien, S.S. (2010). Economic freedom and political control in post-Mao China: A perspective of upward accountability and asymmetric decentralization. *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 18(1), pp. 69-89.
- Chien, S.S. (2013). New local state power through administrative restructuring—A case study of post-Mao China county-level urban entrepreneurialism in Kunshan. *Geoforum*, 46, pp. 103-112.
- Chien, S.S. and Wu, F. (2011). Transformation of China's urban entrepreneurialism: the case study of the city of Kunshan. *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review*, 1(1), pp. 1-28.
- China Public Private Partnership Center. (2020). *National PPP Integrated Information Platform*[全

- 国 PPP 综合信息平台项目管理库]. Available at: <https://www.cpppc.org:8082/inforpublic/homepage.html#/projectPublic>. [Accessed on 9th December 2020].
- China Securities Regulatory Commission (2020 [No. 40]). Notice of the national development and reform commission of China securities regulatory commission on the promotion of the real estate investment trusts (REITs) pilot project in the infrastructure sector [中国证监会国家发展改革委关于推进基础设施领域不动产投资信托基金（REITs）试点相关工作的通知]. 30 April. Available at: http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/zjhxwfb/xwdd/202004/t20200430_374845.html [Accessed on: 7 August 2021].
- Chinese Communist Party. (1981). *Resolution on certain questions in the history of our party since the founding of the People's Republic of China*. Available at: <https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/history/01.htm> [Accessed on 27th April 2019].
- Clarke, J. and Glendinning, C. (2002). Partnerships and the remaking of welfare governance. In Glendinning, C., Powell, M. and Rummery, K. (eds). *Partnerships, New Labour and the governance of welfare*. Bristol: The Policy Press Partnership, pp. 33-50.
- Clegg, J. (1996). China's rural shareholding cooperatives as a form of multi-stakeholder cooperation. *Journal of Rural Cooperation*, 24, pp. 119-142.
- Cochrane, A. (1998). Illusions of power: interviewing local elites. *Environment and Planning A*, 30(12), pp. 2121-2132.
- Cochrane, A., Peck, J. and Tickell, A. (1996). Manchester plays games: exploring the local politics of globalisation. *Urban Studies*, 33(8), pp. 1319-1336.
- Cockburn, C. (1977). *The local state: management of cities and people*. London: Pluto Press.
- Coker, C. (2019). *The rise of the civilizational state*. Cambridge: John Wiley & Sons.
- Conti, J., O'Neil, M. (2007). Studying power: Qualitative methods and the global elite. *Qualitative Research*, 7(1), pp. 63-82.
- Contract Law of the People's Republic of China 1999* [《中华人民共和国合同法 1999》], c. 13. Available at: http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-07/11/content_13695_6.htm [Accessed on: 26 February 2021].
- Cox, K.R. (1993). The local and the global in the new urban politics: a critical view. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 11(4), pp. 433-448.
- Cox, K.R. (1997). Governance, urban regime analysis, and the politics of local economic development. In Lauria, M. (ed.). *Reconstructing urban regime theory: Regulating urban politics in a global economy*. London: Sage, pp. 99-121.
- Cox, K.R. (1998). Spaces of dependence, spaces of engagement and the politics of scale, or:

- looking for local politics. *Political Geography*, 17(1), pp. 1-23.
- Cox, K.R. (2002). *Political geography: territory, state and society*. Cambridge MA:Blackwell.
- Cox, K.R. (2011). Commentary. From the new urban politics to the ‘new’ metropolitan politics. *Urban Studies*, 48(12), pp. 2661-2671.
- Cox, K.R. (2013a). Notes on a brief encounter: Critical realism, historical materialism and human geography. *Dialogues in Human Geography*, 3(1), pp. 3–21.
- Cox, K.R. (2013b). The continuing relevance of old debates. *Dialogues in Human Geography* 3(1), pp. 49–55.
- Cox, K.R. (2020a). Revisiting ‘Urban managerialism.’ *Unfashionable Geographies*, 2 October. Available at: https://kevinrcox.wordpress.com/2020/10/02/urban-managerialism/#_ftnref2 [Accessed on: 1 June 2021].
- Cox, K.R. (2020b). Critical realism/Critical realist geographies. *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, 2nd edn., Vol. 3. Oxford: Elsevier, pp. 65-68.
- Cox, K.R. and Mair, A. (1991). From localised social structures to localities as agents. *Environment and Planning A*, 23(2), pp. 197-213.
- CPPPC. (2018a). National ppp integrated information platform project management database: 2017 report [“中国 PPP 大数据”之全国 PPP 综合信息平台项目管理库 2017 年报]. *China Economic Weekly*, 05, pp. 44-47.
- CPPPC. (2018b). National ppp integrated information platform project management database: quarterly report for the first quarter of 2018 [“中国 PPP 大数据”之全国 PPP 综合信息平台项目管理库 2018 年一季度季报]. *China Economic Weekly*, 05, pp. 44-47.
- CPPPC. (2020a). *Database for programs-Henan-Jiyuan*. Available at: <https://www.cpppc.org:8082/inforpublic/homepage.html#/projectList> [Accessed 6 May 2020].
- CPPPC. (2020b). *National PPP comprehensive information platform project management library: Numbers of projects* [全国 PPP 综合信息平台项目管理: 管理库项目数量]. 30th December. Available at: <https://www.cpppc.org:8082/inforpublic/homepage.html#/projectPublic> [Accessed on 31st December 2020].
- Craven, E., 1969. Private residential expansion in Kent 1956-64: a study of pattern and process in urban growth. *Urban Studies*, 6(1), pp.1-16.
- Creswell, J. W. (2003). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches*, 2nd edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Creswell, J.W. (2009). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods*

- approaches, 3rd edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Creswell, J.W. and Creswell, J.D. (2017). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches*, 5th edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Dahe Fortune Cube. (2019). Representative of Henan Provincial People's Chiu Yingping: Tourism has entered the third phase, and the new representation of traditional culture is the breakthrough [省人大代表邱英平：旅游业已进入第三阶段 传统文化新表达是突破口]. Available at: https://app.dahecube.com/mobile/clfnews/20190121/20190121083510235806?news_id=30961 [Accessed on: 28th July, 2019].
- Danermark, B., Ekstrom, M., Jakobsen, L. and Karlsson, Jan Ch. (2002). *Explaining society: An introduction to critical realism in the social sciences*. London: Routledge.
- Davidson, M. (2013). Governance. In Jayne, M. and Ward, K. (eds.). *Urban theory: New critical perspectives*. Taylor & Francis, pp. 146-157.
- Davidson, M. (2020). Going bust two ways? Epistemic communities and the study of urban policy failure. *Urban Geography*, 41(9), pp. 1119-1138.
- Davidson, M. (2020). Going bust two ways? Epistemic communities and the study of urban policy failure. *Urban Geography*, 41(9), pp. 1119-1138.
- Davidson, M. and Ward, K. (2014). 'Picking up the pieces': austerity urbanism, California and fiscal crisis. *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, 7(1), pp. 81-97.
- Davidson, M. and Ward, K. (eds.). (2018). *Cities under austerity: Restructuring the US metropolis*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Davies, J.S., 2003. Partnerships versus regimes: Why regime theory cannot explain urban coalitions in the UK. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 25(3), pp. 253-270.
- Deng, K. and Todd, W. (2016). Is the US quantitative easing more effective than China's? A second thought. *China Economic Review*, 38, pp.11-23.
- Dicken, P. (1988). The changing geography of Japanese foreign direct investment in manufacturing industry: a global perspective. *Environment and Planning A*, 20(5), pp.633-653.
- Dickson, B. J. (2008). *Wealth into power: The communist party's embrace of China's private sector*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Dong, H. (2019). Rural governance in Waterstone by self-governance, law, and virtue. [花石村念好"三治经" 打造济源版"枫桥经验"]. *Jiyuan Morning Post*, 25th March. Available at: http://www.jyrb.cn/content/201903/25/c_77050.html [Accessed: 7 August 2020].
- Dong, J. (2018). Providing important institutional support for rural revitalisation strategy - an

- overview of the progress of the reform of the rural collective property rights system[为乡村振兴战略提供重要制度支撑——农村集体产权制度改革进展综述]. 30th January. *Xinhua Net*. Available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/2018-01/30/c_1122338569.htm [Accessed on: 26 March 2021].
- Dong, X. and Wen, T. (2008). Macro-economic fluctuations and crisis of rural governance [宏观经济波动与乡村治理危机]. *Management World*, 1(9), pp. 67-75.
- Duan, D. (2018). Ownership reform in Jiyuan advances quality and efficiency [济源产权制度改革提质增效]. *Rural Management*, (10), p. 25.
- Duan, D., Song, X., Xie, Y. and Du, G. (2018). Status quo, problems and advice for the development of new types of agricultural businesses in Jiyuan [济源市新型农业经营主体发展现状, 存在问题及建议]. *Henan Agriculture*, (31), pp. 6-7.
- Duan, L., Ma, Z. and Song, X. (2019). Rural collective ownership reform in Jiyuan: a “3345” model[济源农村集体产权制度改革 “3345” 模式探索]. *Country Agriculture Farmers (B)*, (8), pp. 24, 53.
- Duan, X. (2006). Adhere to the ‘two combination’, take advantage of the opportunity of the east wind : Jiyuan City will lead “three rectification” to full depth [坚持“两个结合”, 巧借机遇东风——济源市将“三项整治”全面引向深入]. *Henan land & resources*, (5), pp. 20-21.
- Duan, X. (2009). The new road of contemporary Yugong-- exploration and practice of urban-rural integration construction in Jiyuan city [当代愚公的新道路——济源市城乡一体化建设的探索与实践]. *Qiusbi*, (1), pp. 49-50.
- Duckett, J. (2001). Bureaucrats in business, Chinese-style: The lessons of market reform and state entrepreneurialism in the People’s Republic of China. *World Development*, 29(1), pp. 23–37.
- Duncan, S. and Goodwin, M. (1988). *The local state and uneven development*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Economist. (2012). Special report: state capitalism. *Economist*, January 28, pp. 3–18.
- Edin, M. (2003). Local state corporatism and private business. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 30(3-4), pp. 278-295.
- Edwards, B., Goodwin, M., Pemberton, S. and Woods, M. (2001). Partnerships, power, and scale in rural governance. *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, 19(2), pp. 289-310.
- Elander, I. (2002). Partnerships and urban governance. *International Social Science Journal*, 54(172), pp. 191-204.

- Elkin, S. J. (1987). *City and regime in the American Republic*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Elkin, S.L. (1987). *City and regime in the American republic*. Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Etzioni, A. (2012). The End of China's Rise: Washington has little to fear from a plateauing Beijing. *The National Interest*, 25 July. Available at: <https://nationalinterest.org/topic/politics/bureaucracy> [Accessed on: 31 July, 2021]
- Ewick, P. and Silbey, S.S. (1995). Subversive stories and hegemonic tales: Toward a sociology of narrative. *Law and Society Review*, 29(2), pp. 197-226.
- Fainstein, N.I. and Fainstein, S.S. (1983). Regime strategies, communal resistance, and economic forces. In Fainstein, S.S., Fainstein, N.I., Hill, R.C., Judd, D., and Smith, P. (eds.). *Restructuring the city: The political economy of urban redevelopment*. New York: Longman, pp. 245-282.
- Fainstein, S.S. and Fainstein, N.I. (1989). The ambivalent state: Economic development policy in the US federal system under the Reagan administration. *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, 25(1), pp. 41-62.
- Fainstein, S.S. and Fainstein, N.I. (1983). Economic change, national policy, and the system of cities. In Fainstein, S.S., Fainstein, N.I., Hill, R.C., Judd, D., and Smith, P. (eds.). *Restructuring the city: The political economy of urban redevelopment*. New York: Longman, pp. 1-26.
- Fields, D. (2015). Contesting the financialization of urban space: Community organizations and the struggle to preserve affordable rental housing in New York City. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 37(2), pp. 144-165.
- Finance Department of Ministry of Finance. (2015). *Notice on issuing the 'Guidelines for Fiscal Affordability Evaluation in Public-Private Partnerships'* [关于印发《政府和社会资本合作项目财政承受能力论证指引》的通知]. 7th April. Available at: http://www.mof.gov.cn/gp/xxgkml/jrs/201504/t20150414_2512403.html [Accessed on: 3 March 2021].
- Finance Department of Ministry of Finance. (2017 [No. 92]). *Notice on regulating the management of the Public-private Partnership Integrated Information Platform* [关于规范政府和社会资本合作（PPP）综合信息平台项目库管理的通知]. 10th November. Available at: http://jrs.mof.gov.cn/ppp/zcfbPPP/201711/t20171116_2751374.html [Accessed on: 3 March 2021].
- Financial Times. (2017). *Xi Jinping delivers robust defence of globalisation at Davos*. Available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/67ec2ec0-dca2-11e6-9d7c-be108f1c1dce> [Accessed 1 March 2020].
- Fletcher, A.J. (2017). Applying critical realism in qualitative research: methodology meets

- method. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 20(2), pp. 181-194.
- Florida, R. (1995). 'Toward the learning region. *Futures*, 27(5), pp. 527-536.
- Flowerdew, R. and Martin, D. (eds.). (2005). *Methods in human geography: a guide for students doing a research project*. London: Routledge.
- Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2020). *27th session: Agricultural transformation and the urban food agenda*. 28th September - 2nd October. Available at: <http://www.fao.org/3/nd408en/nd408en.pdf> [Accessed on: 31 March 2021].
- Foreign & Commonwealth Office of UK. (2014). *China: British Embassy's prosperity fund supports PPP*. 21st October. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/china-british-embassys-prosperity-fund-supports-ppp/china-british-embassys-prosperity-fund-supports-ppp> [Accessed on: 2 March 2021].
- Forrest, R. and Wissink, B. (2017). Whose city now? Urban managerialism reconsidered (again). *The Sociological Review*, 65(2), pp.155-167.
- Friedman, E. (2018). Just-in-time urbanization? Managing migration, citizenship, and schooling in the Chinese city. *Critical Sociology*, 44(3), pp. 503-518.
- Fu, J. H. and Liu, X. (2003). Exploration and practice of ownership reform: An interview of Li Yutian, the chairman of JISC [产权制度改革的探索与实践——访河南济源钢铁(集团)公司董事长李玉田]. *China Steel Focus*, (11), pp. 9-13.
- Fu, Q. (2016). One is "the child of peasants" only when staying true to the original mission. [不忘初心才是“农民的儿子”]. 29th March. Available at: http://opinion.southcn.com/o/2017-03/29/content_167953231.htm [Accessed on: 7th November 2019].
- Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: The Free Press.
- Fukuyama, F. (2018). Identity: Contemporary identity politics and the struggle for recognition. London, UK: Profile books.
- Gaffikin, F. and Warf, B. (1993). Urban policy and the post-Keynesian state in the United Kingdom and the United States. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 17 (1), 67-84.
- Gallagher, M.E. (2011). Contagious capitalism: Globalization and the politics of labor in China. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Gan, J., 2009. Privatization in China: Experiences and lessons. In Barth, J.R., Yago, G. and Tatom, J.A. (eds.). *China's Emerging Financial Markets: Challenges and Opportunities*. Springer, Boston, MA, pp. 581-592.
- Gao, H. and Chen, C. (2007). CDB: waiting for the reform roadmap [国开行: 尴尬前行]. *Banker*, (12), pp. 23-27.

- Gao, J. (2010). Concerning the structural financial problems of local economic development [关于地方经济发展的金融机制问题]. *China Finance*, 12, pp. 11-12.
- Gao, S. (2018). Legal expression of the separation of three rights of contracted land[承包地三权分置的法律表达]. *China Legal Science*, (4), pp. 261-281.
- General Office of Henan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China. (2014 [No.2]). *Trial measures for assessment and evaluation of enterprise zones of Henan province*[河南省产业集聚区考核评价试行办法]. Available at: <https://m.doc.docsou.com/bf4c19d22c639088bd06c0abe-2.html> [Accessed: 23 May 2020].
- General Office of People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality. (2013 [No.90]). Notice on further adjustment and improvement of the fiscal policies of township (street office) and enterprise zoens [关于进一步调整完善镇（街道）、产业集聚（开发）区财税政策的通知 (济政办〔2014〕90 号)]. Available at: http://www.jiyuan.gov.cn/zwgk/xxgkml/zfwj/jyszfbgs/201807/t20180726_387272.html [Accessed on: 2 February 2021].
- General Office of State Council (2015 [No.42]). *Notice of instruction on promoting public-private partnerships in public service* [国务院办公厅转发财政部发展改革委人民银行关于在公共服务领域推广政府和社会资本合作模式指导意见的通知]. 19th May. Available at: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-05/22/content_9797.htm. [Accessed on: 31st May 2020].
- General Office of the People's Government of Henan Province. (2010 [No.30]). Notice of the general office of People's Government of Henan Province on improving financial incentive policies to promote the accelerated development of industrial agglomerations[河南省人民政府办公厅关于完善财政激励政策促进产业集聚区加快发展的通知]. 24th March. Available at: Available at: <http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20100416/08127764733.shtml> [Accessed: 23 May 2020].
- General Office of the People's Government of Henan Province. (2010 [No. 33]). Notice of the general office of People's Government of Henan Province on the issuance of assessment measures for the development of industrial clusters in henan province [河南省人民政府办公厅关于印发河南省产业集聚区发展考核办法的通知]. 2nd April. Available at: https://www.henan.gov.cn/2010/04-02/243199.html?wscckey=3b7173403409e349_1567425051 [Accessed on: 23 May 2020].
- General Office of the People's Government of Henan Province. (2011 [No.9]). Notice of the general office of the *People's Government of Henan Province* on adjusting and improving the assessment index system for the development of industrial agglomerations in Henan

province[河南省人民政府办公厅关于调整完善河南省产业集聚区发展考核指标体系的通知].23 February. Available at: <https://www.henan.gov.cn/2011/02-23/243805.html> [Accessed on: 23 May 2020].

General Office of the People's Government of Henan Province. (2014 [No.49]). Notice of the General Office of People's Government of Henan Province on the forwarding of the 2014 special work plan for accelerating the construction of enterprise zones of Henan Province [河南省人民政府办公厅关于转发 2014 年河南省加快产业集聚区建设专项工作方案的通知(豫政办〔2014〕49 号)]. Gazett of People's Government of Henan Province, (15), pp. 38-44.

General Office of the People's Government of Henan Province. (2016 [No. 63]). Notice of the General Office of the People's Government of Henan Province on the issuance of the special work plan for accelerating the construction of enterprise zones of Henan Province [河南省人民政府办公厅关于印发 2016 年河南省加快产业集聚区建设专项工作方案的通知 (豫政办〔2016〕63 号)]. 29th April. Available at: https://sfwv74hl3_rw2_ql4w3_vayr-9rw.3pco.ourwebpicvip.com/jrobot/plugin/link/show.do?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.henan.gov.cn%2F2016%2F05-31%2F247816.html&q=&webid=450001&id=247816 [Accessed on: 26 January 2021].

General Office of the People's Government of Henan Province. (2017 [No. 159]). Implementation opinions of the General Office of the People's Government of Henan province on promoting the reform and innovative development of enterprise zones [河南省人民政府办公厅关于促进产业集聚区和开发区改革创新发展的实施意见(豫政办〔2017〕159 号)]. 12th December. Available at: <https://wxeda13m96jzaw-z-9rw.3pco.ourwebpicvip.com/2018/01-08/249401.html> (Accessed on: 26th January 2021).

General Office of the People's Government of Henan Province. (2019 [No. 43]). Notice of the General Office of People's Government of Henan Province on the issuance of the action plan for promoting the high-quality development of enterprise zones of Henan Province[河南省人民政府办公厅关于印发河南省推进产业集聚区高质量发展行动方案的通知(豫政办〔2019〕43 号)]. 26th July. Available at: <http://fgw.henan.gov.cn/2019/08-02/938416.html> (Accessed on: 26th January 2021).

General office of the People's Government of Henan Province. (2010 [No. 33]). Notice of the general office of the People's Government of Henan Province on the implementation measures for the assessment and promotion of professional parks in industrial clusters in new urban areas of henan province[河南省人民政府办公厅关于印发河南省城市新区产业集聚区专业园区考核晋级实施办法的通知]. 19th July.

General Office of the State Council. (2017 [No. 7]). Several opinions of the General Office of the State Council on promoting the reform and innovative development of

- development zones[国务院办公厅关于促进开发区改革和创新发展的若干意见(国办发〔2017〕7号)]. 19th January. Available at: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-02/06/content_5165788.htm [Accessed on: 26 January 2021].
- Gibbs D, Krueger, R. and MacLeod, G. (2013). Grappling with smart city politics in an era of market triumphalism. *Urban Studies*, 50(11), pp. 2151–2157.
- Ginsburg, N.S., Koppel, B. and McGee, T.G. eds. (1991). *The extended metropolis: Settlement transition in Asia*. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press.
- Goldman, M. (2011). Speculative urbanism and the making of the next world city. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 35(3), pp. 555–581.
- Government of United Kingdom. (2017). *Public Private Partnerships collection*. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/public-private-partnerships> [Accessed 14th June, 2019].
- Grabher, G. (2006). Trading routes, bypasses, and risky intersections: mapping the travels of networks' between economic sociology and economic geography. *Progress in Human Geography*, 30(2), pp.163-189.
- Grant, T. (1996). Keys to successful public-private partnerships. *Canadian Business Review*, 23, pp. 27-28.
- Greer, J. (2019). Partnership governance in Northern Ireland: improving performance. London: Routledge.
- Gu, C., Wei D.Y. and Cook I. G. (2015) Planning Beijing: socialist city, transitional city, and global city. *Urban Geography*, 36(6), pp. 905-926.
- Gu, J., Yue, J. and Chen, X. (2015). The stages and policies of Chinese urbanization since 1949 [新中国城镇化的发展阶段及政策分析]. *Planner*, 31(10), pp. 74-81.
- Guo, C. (2008). Jiyuan: decentralize and strengthen the township to speed up the integration of urban and rural areas[济源：放权强镇加快城乡一体化]. *Sina Net*, September 24. Available at: <http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2008-09-24/072614492006s.shtml> [Accessed on: 6 January 2021].
- Guo, G. (2009). A survey report on speeding up the transformation of economic development mode and promote the sound and fast growth of Henan province. [关于加快转变经济发展方式, 促进河南经济社会又好又快发展的调研报告]. Available at: http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2009-01/09/content_1200476.htm [Accessed: 23rd, May, 2020].
- Guo, J. (2020). Promotion-driven local states and governing cities in action—re-reading China's urban entrepreneurialism from a local perspective. *Urban Geography*, 41(2), pp. 225-246.

- Guo, L. (2013). Innovate financing mechanism for urbanization [创新城镇化融资机制]. *China state finance*, (9), pp. 32-33.
- Guo, T. and Zhao, X. (2008). China Development Bank reform: 4 major questions to be answered [国开行改革: 4大疑问待明]. *Shanghai State Capital*, (3), pp.22-23.
- Habermas, J. (1976). *Legitimation Crisis*. London: Heinemann.
- Haila, A. (1999). City building in the East and West. *Cities*, 16(4), pp. 259-267.
- Hall, S. and Massey, D. (2010). Interpreting the crisis. *Soundings*, 44, pp. 57-71.
- Hall, T. and Hubbard, P. (1996). The entrepreneurial city: new urban politics, new urban geographies?. *Progress in Human Geography*, 20(2), pp. 153-174.
- Hall, T. and Hubbard, P. (1998). The entrepreneurial city and the 'new urban politics.' In Hall, T. and Hubbard, P. (eds.). *The entrepreneurial city: geographies of politics, regime and representations*. Chichester: Wiley, pp. 1-26.
- Hambleton, R. (1989). Urban government under Thatcher and Reagan. *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, 24(3), pp. 359-388.
- Hamnett, C. (2020). Is Chinese urbanisation unique?. *Urban Studies*, 57(3), pp. 690-700.
- Harvey, D. (1973). *Social justice and the city*. Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 2009.
- Harvey, D. (1974). Class-monopoly rent, finance capital and the urban revolution. *Regional Studies*, 8(3-4), pp. 239-255.
- Harvey, D. (1976). Labor, capital, and class struggle around the built environment in advanced capitalist societies. *Politics & Society*, 6(3), pp. 265-295.
- Harvey, D. (1982). *The limits to capital, new edition*. London: Verso, 2006.
- Harvey, D. (1985a). *The urbanisation of capital*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Harvey, D. (1985b). *Consciousness and the urban experience*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Harvey, D. (1989a). From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: the transformation in urban governance in late capitalism. *Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography*, 71(1), pp. 3-17.
- Harvey, D. (1989b). *The condition of postmodernity*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Harvey, D. (1990). Between space and time: reflections on the geographical imagination. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 80(3), pp. 418-434.
- Harvey, D. (2005). *A brief history of neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harvey, D. (2006). Comment on Commentaries. *Historical Materialism*, 14 (4), pp. 157-66.
- Harvey, D. (2007). Neoliberalism as creative destruction. *The Annals of the American Academy*

- of *Political and Social Science*, 610(1), pp. 21–44.
- Harvey, D. (2012). *Rebel cities: From the right to the city to the urban revolution*. London: Verso books.
- Harvey, D. (2016). *The ways of the world*. London: Profile Books.
- Harvey, W.S. (2011). Strategies for conducting elite interviews. *Qualitative Research*, 11(4), pp. 431–441.
- Hastings, A. (1996). Unravelling the process of “Partnership” in urban regeneration policy. *Urban Studies*, 33(2), pp. 253–268.
- Haughton, G. and While, A. (1999). From corporate city to citizens city? Urban leadership after local entrepreneurialism in the United Kingdom. *Urban Affairs Review*, 35(1), pp. 3–23.
- Hausner, J., Jessop, B. and Nielsen, K. (eds.) (1995). *Strategic choice and path-dependency in post-socialism*. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
- Hay, C. (1995a). Structure and Agency. In Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. (eds). *Theory and Methods in Political Science*. London: Macmillan.
- Hay, C. (1995b). Restating the problem of regulation and re-regulating the local state. *Economy and Society*, 24, pp. 387–407.
- Hay, C. (1998). The tangled webs we weave: the discourse, strategy and practice of networking. In Marsh, D. (ed.). *Comparing policy networks*. Buckingham: Open University Press, pp. 33–51.
- Hay, C. (2002). *Political analysis: a critical introduction*. Hampshire: Palgrave.
- Hay, C. and Jessop, B. (1995). The governance of local economic development and the development of local economic governance: a strategic-relational approach. *Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association*, Chicago, 31st August–2nd September.
- He, C., Huang, Z. and Wang, R. (2014). Land use change and economic growth in urban China: A structural equation analysis. *Urban Studies*, 51(13), pp. 2880–2898.
- He, D. and Li, H.. (2018). Urban-rural integration to expand the world view [城乡融合, 绘就互促共荣新画卷]. *Jiuyan Daily*. 16th November. Available at: http://m.jiuyan.gov.cn/zwyw_19762/tpxw/201811/t20181116_516801.html [Accessed on: 27th July 2020].
- He, S. (2020). Urban entrepreneurialism 2.0? Financialization, cross-scale dynamics, and post-political governance. *Dialogues in Human Geography*, 10(3), pp. 322–325.
- He, S. and Wu, F. (2009). China's emerging neoliberal urbanism: perspectives from urban redevelopment. *Antipode*, 41(2), pp. 282–304.

- He, S., Li, L., Zhang, Y. and Wang, J. (2018). A small entrepreneurial city in action: policy mobility, urban entrepreneurialism, and politics of scale in Jiyuan, China. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 42(4), pp. 684-702.
- He, X. (2013). Research on the path of realizing equal exchange of production factors between urban and rural area [实现城乡生产要素平等交换的路径研究]. *Academic Journal of Zhongzhou*, (9), pp. 43-47.
- He, X. (2016). Work hard to compose a new Jiyuan legend [用实干谱写新的济源传奇]. In Party History Research Office of Jiyuan. (ed.) *Interviews with successive party secretaries and mayors of Jiyuan*. Zhenzhou: Henan People's Press, pp. 181- 197.
- Heilmann, S. and Perry, E. (2011). Mao's invisible hand: The political foundations of adaptive governance in China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Herrschel, T. (1998). From socialism to post-Fordism: the local state and economic policies in Eastern Germany. In Hall, T. and Hubbard, P. (eds.). *The entrepreneurial city: geographies of politics, regime and representations*. Chichester: Wiley, pp. 173-196.
- Hess, M. (2004). 'Spatial' relationships? Towards a reconceptualization of embeddedness. *Progress in Human Geography*, 28(2), pp. 165-186.
- Hirst, P. and Thompson, G. (1996). *Globalisation in question: the international economy and the possibilities of governance*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- HM Treasury. (2015). Supporting the Development of PPPs in the People's Republic of China – An International Perspective. *UK Government*, 30, June. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/supporting-the-development-of-ppps-in-the-peoples-republic-of-china-an-international-perspective> [Accessed on: 4 March 2021].
- Ho, P. (2001). Who owns China's land? Policies, property rights and deliberate institutional ambiguity. *The China Quarterly*, 166, pp. 394-421.
- Hoffmann-Lange, U. (2007). Methods of elite research. In Dalton, R.J. and Klingemann, H.D. (eds.). *The Oxford handbook of political behavior*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 911-928.
- Hoffmann-Lange, U. (2018). Methods of elite identification. In H. Best, J. Higley (eds.). *The Palgrave handbook of political elites*. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 79-92.
- Howe, K.R. (1988). Against the quantitative-qualitative incompatibility thesis or dogmas die hard. *Educational researcher*, 17(8), pp.10-16.
- Hu, J. (2012). Report to the eighteenth national congress of the communist party of China. 8th November. Available at: http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/18th_CPC_National_Congress_Eng/t992917.htm [Accessed on: 4 June 2020].

- Huang, J. and Guo, Z. (2019). Typical issues on “separation of the three rights” of rural collective land and relevant legislative strategy [农村集体土地“三权分置”普遍性问题及其立法应对]. *Social Sciences in Ningxia*, (04), pp. 76-83.
- Huang, P. (2015). Rural ownership reform in Jiyuan [济源市农村产权制度改革探索]. *New West*, (35), pp. 56, 42.
- Huang, Y. (1999). Inflation and investment controls in China: The political economy of central-local relations during the reform era. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hunter, A. (1995). Local knowledge and local power: Notes on the ethnography of local community elites. In Hertz, R., Imber, J. B. (eds.), *Studying elites using qualitative methods*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp. 151-170.
- Jessop, B. (1990). State theory: Putting capitalist states in their place. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Jessop, B. (1993). Corporatism and syndicalism. In Goodin, R.E., Pettit, P. and Pogge, T.W. (eds.), *A companion to contemporary political philosophy*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., pp. 503-510.
- Jessop, B. (1996). Interpretive sociology and the dialectic of structure and agency. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 13(1), pp. 119-128.
- Jessop, B. (1997a). The entrepreneurial city: re-imagining localities, re-designing economic governance, or restructuring capital? In Jewson, N. and MacGregor, S. (eds.). *Transforming cities: contested governance and new spatial divisions*, London: Routledge, pp. 28-41.
- Jessop, B. (1997b). A neo-Gramscian approach to the regulation of urban regimes: Accumulation strategies, hegemonic projects, and governance. In Lauria, M. (ed). *Reconstructing Urban Regime Theory: Regulating urban Politics in a Global Economy*, London: Sage, pp 51–73.
- Jessop, B. (1998a). The narrative of enterprise and the enterprise of narrative: place marketing and the entrepreneurial city. In Hall, T. and Hubbard, P. (eds.). *The entrepreneurial city: Geographies of politics, regime and representation*. Wiley, Chichester: pp. 77-99.
- Jessop, B. (1998b). The rise of governance and the risks of failure: the case of economic development. *International Social Science Journal*, 50 (155), pp. 29–45.
- Jessop, B. (2000). The crisis of the national spatiotemporal fix and the tendential ecological dominance of global capitalism. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 24 (2), pp. 323–60.
- Jessop, B. (2001a), Institutional re(turns) and the strategic-relational approach. *Environment and Planning A*, 33(7), pp. 1213-235.
- Jessop, B. (2001b). What follows Fordism? On the periodization of capitalism and its regulation. In Albritton, R. and Itoh, M. (Eds.) *Phases of capitalist development:*

- Booms, crises, and globalization. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp. 282–299.
- Jessop, B. (2002a). *The future of the capitalist state*. Cambridge: Policy.
- Jessop, B. (2002b). Liberalism, neoliberalism, and urban governance: A state–theoretical perspective. *Antipode*, 34(3), pp. 452–472.
- Jessop, B. (2004). The gender selectivities of the state: A critical realist analysis. *Journal of Critical Realism*, 3(2), pp. 207–237.
- Jessop, B. (2005). Critical Realism and the Strategic-Relational Approach. *New Formations: A journal of culture, theory and politics*, (56), pp. 40–53.
- Jessop, B. and Sum, N.L. (2000). An entrepreneurial city in action: Hong Kong’s emerging strategies in and for (inter) urban competition. *Urban Studies*, 37(12), pp. 2287–2313.
- Jessop, B. and Sum, N.L. (2006). *Beyond the regulation approach: putting capitalist economies in their place*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Jessop, B. and Sum, N.L. (2016). What is critical?. *Critical Policy Studies*, 10(1), pp. 105–109.
- Jessop, B., Brenner, N. and Jones, M. (2008). Theorizing sociospatial relations. *Environment and planning D: Society and Space*, 26(3), pp. 389–401.
- Jiang, Y. (2001). Century review and prospect of China’s urbanization [中国城市化的世纪回顾与展望]. *Seeker*, (1), pp. 27–30.
- Jiang, Y. and Waley, P. (2018). Shenhong: The anatomy of an urban investment and development company in the context of China’s state corporatist urbanism. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 27(112), pp. 596–610.
- Jiang, Z. (1992). Report on the 14th National Congress of the Party: Accelerating the Reform, the Opening to the Outside World and the Drive for Modernization, so as to Achieve Greater Successes in Building Socialism With Chinese Characteristics[加快改革开放和现代化建设步伐, 夺取有中国特色社会主义事业的更大胜利]. Available at: http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2011-03/29/content_363504.htm [Accessed on 29th April, 2020].
- Jiang, Z. (2006). *On Socialist Market Economy*[论社会主义市场经济]. Beijing: Central Literature Publishing House.
- Jin, H. and Rial, I. (2017). Regulating local government financing vehicles and public-private partnerships in China. *Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development*, 1(2), pp. 190–215. DOI: 10.24294/jipd.v1i2.67.
- Jin, W. (2013). “Big demolition and construction” in Jiyuan: A thousand of households demolished in a year with unsynchronized resettlement housing support [济源“大拆大建”: 一年拆了上千户, 安置房配套难同步]. *National Business Daily*, 28th January. Available at: <http://www.nbd.com.cn/articles/2013-01-28/710411.html> [Accessed on: 6

January 2021].

Jiyuan Bureau of Finance. (2017). Report on Jiyuan Municipality's financial accounts for 2017 and the financial budget execution for the first half of 2018 [关于济源市 2017 年财政决算和 2018 年上半年财政预算执行情况的报告]. 10th September. Available at: http://www.jysczj.gov.cn/yjxgkpt/zfyjx/zfjx/201809/t20180910_507514.html [Accessed on: 24 February 2021].

Jiyuan Bureau of Finance. (2018). Report on the financial accounts of Jiyuan Municipality for 2017 and financial budget execution for the first half of 2018 [关于济源市 2017 年财政决算和 2018 年上半年财政预算执行情况的报告]. 10th September. Available at: http://www.jysczj.gov.cn/yjxgkpt/zfyjx/zfjx/201809/t20180910_507514.html [Accessed on: 24 February 2021].

Jiyuan Bureau of Finance. (2019). *A list of PPP programs in Jiyuan in 2019* [济源市 2019 年 PPP 项目情况表(财政部管理库)]. Available at: http://jysczj.gov.cn/rdppp/xmtj/201901/t20190123_535009.html [Accessed 14th June 2019].

Jiyuan Bureau of Statistics. (2010). *Research and reflection on the development of tourism industry in Jiyuan* [关于济源市旅游产业发展的调研与思考]. 16th December. Available at: <http://tjj.jiyuan.gov.cn/readinfo.asp?id=17185> [Accessed on: 9 February 2021].

Jiyuan Bureau of Statistics. (2016). *Report on the population and urbanisation development of Jiyuan in the 12nd Five Year* [“十二五”济源市人口与城镇化发展情况报告]. 28th March. Available at: <http://tjj.jiyuan.gov.cn/readinfo.asp?id=23573> [Accessed on 11th November 2019].

Jiyuan Municipal Committee of Communist Party of China and People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality. (2013 [No.44]). Notice of Jiyuan Municipal Committee of Communist Party of China and People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality on the issue of 'implementation program of management system of enterprise zones in Jiyuan' [中共济源市委济源市人民政府关于印发《济源市产业集聚（开发）区管理体制实施方案的通知》（济文（2013）44 号）].

Jiyuan Municipal Committee of Communist Party of China and People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality. (2009 [No.21]). Opinions of Jiyuan Municipal Committee of Communist Party of China and People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality on several policies to accelerate the scientific development of enterprise zones [中共济源市委济源市人民政府关于加快产业集聚区科学发展若干政策的意见]. Available at: http://jyztzsw.com/Article/ShowArticle_ArticleID_197.html [Accessed on: 2 February 2021].

Jiyuan News. (2013). *32 rural and urban communities are allocated to be governed by the enterprise zones* [32 个村（居）划入产业集聚区大家庭]. 16th September. Available at :

- http://www.jiyuan.gov.cn/govzwgk/zwyw/zwyw/zwyw2013/201808/t20180801_465982.html [Accessed on: 23 May, 2020].
- Jiyuan Planning Bureau (2017). *Post-Approval Notice of Master Planning of Holistic Tourism Destination in Jiyuan* [济源市全域旅游总体规划 (2016-2030) 批后公告]. 31st May. Available at: http://ghj.jiyuan.gov.cn/zwgk/ghgs/ghbz/201706/t20170602_330470.html [Accessed on: 25 February 2021].
- Jiyuan. Bureau of Statistics. (2019). Handbook of per capita disposable income of rural residents in Jiyuan [济源市 2018 年农村居民人均可支配收入基本情况手册].
- Jiyuan's Rural Domestic Sewage Disposal Project: Phase I (2017). *China Public-Private Partnership Center*. Available at: <https://www.cpppc.org:8082/inforpublic/homepage.html#/preview/001720200118131217775cue0000rjijfq2> [Accessed on: 3 June 2020].
- Jones, M. (1997). Spatial selectivity of the state? The regulationist enigma and local struggles over economic governance. *Environment and Planning A*, 29(5), pp. 831-864.
- Jones, M. (2001). The rise of the regional state in economic governance: 'partnerships for prosperity' or new scales of state power?. *Environment and planning A*, 33(7), pp. 1185-1211.
- Jones, M. and Ward, K. (2002). Excavating the logic of British urban policy: Neoliberalism as the "crisis of crisis-management". *Antipode*, 34(3), pp. 473-494.
- Jones, M. and Ward, K. (2004). Capitalist development and crisis theory: Towards a "fourth cut". *Antipode*, 36(3), pp. 497-511.
- Ke, Y., Zhao, X., Wang, Y. and Wang, S. (2009). SWOT analysis of domestic private enterprises in developing infrastructure projects in China. *Journal of Financial Management of Property and Construction*, 14 (2), pp. 152-170.
- Ke, Y.J., Wang, S.Q. and Chan, A.P.C. (2009a). Public-Private Partnerships in China's infrastructure development: lessons learnt. *Proceedings of Changing roles: new roles, new challenges (CIB W096, W104)*, Noordwijk aan Zee, Netherlands, 5-9 October, pp. 177-188.
- Kefford, A. (2020). Actually existing managerialism: Planning, politics and property development in post-1945 Britain. *Urban Studies*, p.0042098020949034.
- Kim, T.Y. (2006). Interview method development for qualitative study of ESL motivation. *외국어교육*, 13(2), pp. 231-256.
- Kirkby, R.J. (2018). Urbanization in China: town and country in a developing economy 1949-2000 AD. London: Routledge.

- Koppel, B. (1991). The rural-urban dichotomy reexamined: beyond the ersatz debate. In N.S. Ginsburg, B. Koppeland T.G. McGee. (eds.). *The Extended Metropolis: Settlement Transition in Asia*. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, pp.47-70.
- Kurtz, M. (2009). Time and Historical. *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, 1st edn. Oxford: Elsevier, pp. 259-265.
- Kurtz, M. (2020). Time and Historical. *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, 2nd edn., Vol. 13. Oxford: Elsevier, pp. 265-269.
- Lang, X. (2004). Greencool revels in the feast of “retreat of the state and advancement of the people” [在“国退民进”盛筵中狂欢的格林柯尔]. *Sina Finance*, 16th August. Available at: <http://finance.sina.com.cn/t/20040816/1202951523.shtml> [Accessed on 1st January 2021].
- Lanteigne, M. (2019). *Chinese foreign policy: an introduction*. London: Routledge.
- Larner, W. and Craig, D. (2005). After neoliberalism? Community activism and local partnerships in Aotearoa New Zealand. *Antipode*, 37(3), pp. 402-424.
- Lauermann, J. (2018). Municipal statecraft: Revisiting the geographies of the entrepreneurial city. *Progress in Human Geography*, 42(2), pp. 205-224.
- Lawless, P. (1988). Urban Development Corporations and their alternatives. *Cities*, 5(3), pp. 277-289.
- Lawson, T. (1997). *Economics and Reality*. London: Routledge.
- Lee, J. and Zhu, Y.P. (2006). Urban governance, neoliberalism and housing reform in China. *The Pacific Review*, 19(1), pp. 39-61.
- Lefebvre, H., translated by Kofman, E. and Lebas, E. (1996). *Writings on cities*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Leitner, H. (1992). Urban geography: responding to new challenges. *Progress in Human Geography*, 16(1), pp. 105-118.
- Levi, Y. (1998). Beyond traditional models: multi-stakeholder cooperatives and their differential roles. *Journal of Rural Cooperation*, 26(1-2), pp. 49-64.
- Li, B. and Akintoye, A. (2003). An overview of public-private partnership. In Akintola, A., Beck, M., and Hardcastle, C. (eds.). *Public private partnerships: managing risks and opportunities*. Oxford: Blackwell Science, pp. 3-30.
- Li, C. (2016). The endeavoring song of the central plains: Exploration and practice of revitalizing Henan in the 1990s, Vol 1 [中原大地奋进曲：20 世纪 90 年代振兴河南的探索与实践(上册)]. Beijing: People's Press.
- Li, D. (1995). The theory of ambiguous property rights in a transitional economy [转型经济

- 中的模糊产权理论]. *Economic Research Journal*, (4), pp. 42-50.
- Li, H. (2012). Retrospect and rethinking: At the 50th Anniversary on the issue of “not undertake urban planning for three years” [历史回眸与反思——写在“三年不搞城市规划”提出 50 周年之际]. *City Planning Review*, (01), pp. 73-79.
- Li, H. and Wang, T. (2012). Historical stages of China's urbanization since 1949 [新中国城镇化发展的历史分期问题研究]. *Urban planning forum*, (06), pp. 4-13.
- Li, H. and Zhou, L.A. (2005). Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China. *Journal of Public Economics*, 89(9-10), pp. 1743-1762.
- Li, H.Y.(2009). *Village China under socialism and reform: A micro-history, 1948–2009*. Stanford, CT: Stanford University Press.
- Li, J. (2003). *Financing China's rural enterprises*. London: Routledge.
- Li, J. (2009). *Jiyuan signed to transfer operation rights of Jiuligou scenic area*[济源市九里沟景区经营权转让签约]. 27th July. Available at: <https://www.henan.gov.cn/2009/07-24/364434.html> [Accessed on: 27th July 2009].
- Li, J. and Chiu, L.R. (2018). Urban investment and development corporations, new town development and China's local state restructuring—the case of Songjiang new town, Shanghai. *Urban Geography*, 39(5), pp. 687-705.
- Li, J. and Chiu, L.R. (2020). State rescaling and large-scale urban development projects in China: The case of Lingang New Town, Shanghai. *Urban Studies*, 57(12), pp. 2564-2581.
- Li, K. (2014). *Report on the work of the government*. Available at: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/publications/2014/08/23/content_281474982987826.htm [Accessed on 21st December 2020].
- Li, L. (2020). *History tourism development in Jiyuan*[济源旅游发展历程]. 9th September. Available at: <https://new.qq.com/rain/a/20200909A0KZY900> [Accessed on: 9 February 2021].
- Li, Q. (2017). Jiyuan Cultural Tourism & Investment Group: To forge a new engine for the transformation of industry and city. [济源市文旅集团:打造产城转型新引擎]. *Henan Daily*, 24 January, pp. 12. Available at: http://newpaper.dahe.cn/hnrb/html/2017-01/24/content_115528.htm [Accessed on: 25 February 2021].
- Li, T. and Xue, M. (2013). One vehicle and three systems: The practise meaning and theoretical value of the regional development in Henan province [一个载体、三个体系——河南区域发展的实践意义和理论价值]. *Learning Times* [学习时报], 16th September, pp. 008. Available at: <http://www.bjgx.org.cn/qxweb/n80951c769.aspx> [Accessed on 26th August, 2019].
- Li, Y. and Wu, F. (2012). The transformation of regional governance in China: The rescaling

- of statehood. *Progress in Planning*, 78(2), pp. 55-99.
- Li, Z., Liu, D., and Lin, S. (2020). A literature review of the study on return floating population in China [中国城乡流动人口“回流”研究进展与述评]. *Human Geography*, 35 (1), pp. 1-10.
- Lim, K. F. (2017a). State rescaling, policy experimentation and path dependency in post-Mao China: a dynamic analytical framework. *Regional Studies*, 51(10), pp. 1580-1593.
- Lim, K.F. (2017b). On the shifting spatial logics of socioeconomic regulation in post-1949 China. *Territory, Politics, Governance*, 5(1), pp. 65-91.
- Lim, K.F. (2018). Researching state rescaling in China: methodological reflections. *Area Development and Policy*, 3(2), pp. 170-184.
- Lin Y. (2014). *Deng Xiaoping had made a conservative prediction* [邓小平的经济预测保守了]. Available at: <http://finance.sina.com.cn/zl/china/20140820/115320066940.shtml> [Accessed on 8th November 2019].
- Lin, G.C. and Ho, S.P. (2005). The state, land system, and land development processes in contemporary China. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 95(2), pp. 411-436.
- Lin, W. (2013). Digitizing the Dragon Head, geo-coding the urban Landscape: GIS and the transformation of China's Urban Governance. *Urban Geography*, 34(7), pp. 901-922.
- Lin, Y., Zhang, Y., and Zhao, Q. (2017). Peasants become shareholders and villages get yearly dividend: An exploration of Jiyuan's rural shareholding reform of collective asset [农民成了股东,农村年年分红——探秘农村集体资产股份权能改革的“济源经验”]. *China Reform Daily*, 18th December, pp. 4. Available at: http://www.crd.net.cn/2017-12/18/content_24712121_0.htm [Accessed: 7 August 2020].
- Linder, S.H. (1999). Coming to terms with the public-private partnership: A grammar of multiple meanings. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 43(1), pp. 35-51.
- Lipietz, A. (1992). The Regulation Approach and Capitalist Crisis: An Alternative Compromise for the 1990s. In Dunford, M. and Kafkalas, G. (eds.). *Cities and Regions in the New Europe*. London: Belhaven Press, pp. 309-334.
- Lipietz, A. (1994). The national and the regional: their autonomy vis-à-vis the capitalist world crisis. In Palan, R.P. and Gills, B. (eds.). *Transcending the state-global divide: a neostructuralist agenda in international relations*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 23-43
- Lipietz, A. (2008 [1994]). The national and the regional: their autonomy vis-à-vis the capitalist world crisis. In Brenner, N., Jessop, B., Jones, M. and Macleod, G. (eds.). *State/space: a reader*. John Wiley & Sons, pp. 239-255.
- Liu, A. (1992). The “Wenzhou model” of development and China's modernization. *Asian Survey*, 32, pp. 696-711.

- Liu, C. (2010). *Jiyuan takes a new leap in reforming management system of scenic spots* [济源市景区体制改革实现新跨越]. 21st January. Available at: <https://www.henan.gov.cn/2010/01-21/395116.html> [Accessed on: 8 February 2021].
- Liu, C. (2017). Innovating public policy supply and drawing a blueprint for the holistic development: One of a series of reports on the building of a national demonstration zone for holistic tourism destination in Jiyuan. [创新公共政策供给, 擘画全域发展蓝图——济源市创建国家全域旅游示范区系列报道之一]. *Henan Daily*, 21st September, pp. 1. Available at: http://newpaper.dahe.cn/hnrb/html/2017-09/21/content_186336.htm [Accessed on: 25 February 2021].
- Liu, H. (2018). *Pursue high-quality development, work together for global economic prosperity and stability*. Available at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1528861.shtml [Accessed on 2nd May, 2020].
- Liu, S. (1999). The embeddedness and relational contract [嵌入性与关系合同]. *Sociology Studies*, (4), pp. 75-88.
- Liu, X. (2009). Developing development ideas and serving economic construction: Jiyuan implements the ‘industry out of the city and project move to the mountains’ industrial development model [开拓发展思路, 服务经济建设——济源实施“工业出城, 项目上山”工业发展模式]. *China land*, (3), pp. 62.
- Liu, Y. and Yau, Y. (2020). Urban entrepreneurialism vs market society: the geography of China's neoliberal urbanism. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 44(2), pp. 266-288.
- Liu, Y., Fang, F. and Li, Y. (2014). Key issues of land use in China and implications for policy making. *Land use policy*, 40, pp. 6-12.
- Logan, J.R. and Molotch, H.L. (1987). *Urban fortunes: the political economy of place*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Long, Y. and Wu, K. (2016). Shrinking cities in a rapidly urbanizing China. *Environment and Planning A*, 48(2), pp. 220-222.
- Lou J. (2019). *Root in the soil of Chinese society and promote the long-term, stable development of PPP* [根植中国土壤, 推动 PPP 行稳致远]. CPPPC, 15th November. Available at: <https://www.cpppc.org/bjdx/451.jhtml> [Accessed on 3rd May, 2020].
- Lu, X. and Wang, H. (2014). Crisis and breakthrough of reform: Evidence from China [危机与改革突破: 来自中国的证据]. *Collected Essays on Finance and Economics*, 182(6), pp. 3-10.
- Luo, Y. and Luo, J. (2020). Transformation of Yugong Village [愚公村里看变]. *Xinhua Net*, 21st July. Available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/2020-07/21/c_1126266287.htm [Accessed on: 1 March 2021].

- Lynch, D.C. (2016). The end of China's rise: still powerful but less potent. *Foreign Affairs*, 11 January. Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-01-11/end-chinas-rise> [Accessed on: 31 July, 2021]
- Lynch, D.C. (2020). The End of China's Rise: Consequences for PRC debates on soft power. In Edney, K., Rosen, S., and Zhu, Y. (eds.). *Soft power with Chinese characteristics: China's campaign for hearts and minds*. London: Routledge, pp. 45-62.
- Ma, H. (2019). Hou Jiapeng: Strengthening tourism services for development [侯加鹏：做强旅游服务促发展]. *Jiyuan Daily*, 23rd March, pp. 2. Available at: http://epaper.jyrb.cn/pc/con/201903/23/c_20806.html [Accessed on: 25 February 2021].
- Ma, L. and Fan, M. (1994). Urbanisation from below: The growth of towns in Jiangsu, China. *Urban Studies*, 31(10), pp. 1625-1645.
- Ma, L. J. C. (2002). Urban transformation in China, 1949–2000: A review and research agenda. *Environment and Planning A*, 34(9), pp. 1545–1569.
- Mackintosh, M. (1992). Partnership: issues of policy and negotiation. *Local Economy*, 7(3), pp. 210–224.
- MacLeod, G. (1997). Globalizing Parisian thought-waves: recent advances in the study of social regulation, politics, discourse and space. *Progress in Human Geography*, 21(4), pp. 530-553.
- MacLeod, G. (2001). New regionalism reconsidered: globalisation and the remaking of political economic space. *International journal of urban and regional research*, 25(4), pp. 804-829.
- MacLeod, G. (2002). From urban entrepreneurialism to a “revanchist city”? On the spatial injustices of Glasgow's renaissance. *Antipode*, 34(3), pp. 602-624.
- Mair, A., Florida, R. and Kenney, M. (1988). The new geography of automobile production: Japanese transplants in North America. *Economic geography*, 64(4), pp.352-373.
- Management Committee Office of Jiyuan Industry-Urban Integration Demonstration Zone. (2020). *Notice on issuing the population development planning (2019-2030)* [济源产城融合示范区管理委员会办公室关于印发济源产城融合示范区人口发展规划（2019—2030年）的通知]. 20th March. Available at: http://www.jiyuan.gov.cn/govzwgk/zwgk/xxgkml/zfwj/jyszfbs/202003/t20200313_657678.html (Accessed: 13th July 2020).
- Mao Z. (1965 [1945]). The foolish old man who removed the mountains. *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung: Volume III*, pp. 271-74. Peking : Foreign Languages Press. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-3/mswv3_26.htm [Accessed on: 21 May 2020].

- Mao, Z (1957). *On the correct handling of contradictions among the people*. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_58.htm [Accessed on: 15 January 2021].
- Mao, Z. (1948). *Telegram to the headquarters of the Loyang front after the recapture of the city*. [再克洛阳后给洛阳前线指挥部的电报]. April, 8th. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-4/mswv4_37.htm [Accessed: 26 February 2020].
- March, H. and Ribera-Fumaz, R. (2016). Smart contradictions: The politics of making Barcelona a Self-sufficient city. *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 23(4), pp. 816-830.
- Martin, S. (1989). New jobs in the inner city: the employment impacts of projects assisted under the Urban Development Grant programme. *Urban Studies*, 26(6), pp. 627-638.
- Marx, K. (2008). *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. New York: Wildside Press.
- Matthews, P. (2010). Mind the gap? The persistence of pathological discourses in urban regeneration policy. *Housing, Theory and Society*, 27(3), pp. 221-240.
- McCann, E. (2011). Urban policy mobilities and global circuits of knowledge: Toward a research agenda. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 101(1), pp. 107-130.
- McCann, E. (2017). Governing urbanism: urban governance studies 1.0, 2.0 and beyond. *Urban Studies*, 54(2), pp. 312–326.
- McCann, E. and Ward, K (2011). Urban assemblages: territories, relations, practices, and power. In McCann, E, Ward, K. (eds.). *Mobile urbanism: Cities and policy making in the global age*. Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota University Press, pp. xiii-xxxv.
- McCann, E. and Ward, K. (2010). Relationality/territoriality: Toward a conceptualisation of cities in the world. *Geoforum*, 41(2), pp. 175-184.
- McCann, E., Roy, A. and Ward, K. (2013). Assembling/Worlding Cities. *Urban Geography*, 34(5), pp. 581-589.
- McDowell, L. (1992). Valid Games? A Response to Erica Schoenberger. *Professional Geographer*, 44 (2), 212-215.
- McDowell, L. (1998). Elites in the city of London: some methodological considerations. *Environment and Planning A*, 30 (12) , pp. 2133-2146.
- McGee, T.G. (1991a). Presidential address: eurocentrism in geography-the case of asian urbanization. *Canadian Geographer/Le Géographe canadien*, 35(4), pp. 332-344.
- McGee, T.G. (1991b). The emergence of desakota regions in Asia: expanding a hypothesis. In Ginsburg, N.S., Koppel, B., and McGee, T.G. (eds.). *The Extended Metropolis: Settlement Transition in Asia*. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 3–26.
- McGee, T.G. (2014). The Emergence of Desakota Regions in Asia: Expanding a Hypothesis.

- In. N. Brenner (ed.). *Implosions/Explosions: Towards a study of planetary urbanization*. Berlin: Jovis Verlag GmbH, pp. 121-137.
- McGurik, P.M., Winchester, H.P. and Dunn, K.M. (1996). Entrepreneurial approaches to urban decline: The honeysuckle redevelopment in inner newcastle, New South Wales. *Environment and Planning A*, 28(10), pp. 1815-1841.
- McQuaid, R.W. (2000). The theory of partnership: why have partnerships?. In Osborne, S.P. (ed.). *Managing public-private partnerships for public services: an international perspective*. London: Routledge, pp. 9-35.
- Mendez, A. (2020) Enlisting the gatekeeper: chain-referral and elite access in foreign policy analysis. *SAGE Research Methods Cases*. DOI: <https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781529711318>
- Meng, J. (2017). *Principal contradiction facing Chinese society has evolved in new era*: Xi. Xinhua Net, 18th October. Available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/18/c_136688132.htm [Accessed 19th February 2020].
- Mikecz, R. (2012). Interviewing elites: Addressing methodological issues. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 18(6), pp. 482-493.
- Ministry of Finance (2014 [No. 76]). *The Instruction on Promoting and Using the Model of Public-Private Partnership (PPP)* [财政部关于推广运用政府和社会资本合作模式有关问题的通知]. 29th November. Available at: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2016-05/25/content_5076557.htm [Accessed on: 2 March 2021].
- Ministry of Finance (2014 [No.113]). *Operational guidelines for public-private partnerships (pilot)* [政府和社会资本合作模式操作指南（试行）]. 29th November. Available at: http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2015/content_2835273.htm [Accessed on: 31 May 2020].
- Ministry of Finance. (2015 [No. 64]). Notice of the Ministry of Finance on issuing The interim measures for the administration of the issuance of local government general bonds [财政部关于印发《地方政府一般债券发行管理暂行办法》的通知]. Available at: http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2015/content_2883244.htm [Accessed on: 22 December 2020].
- Ministry of Finance. (2015 [No. 83]). Notice of the Ministry of Finance on issuing The interim measures for the administration of the issuance of local government special bonds [财政部关于印发《地方政府专项债券发行管理暂行办法》的通知]. Available at: http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2015/content_2883246.htm [Accessed on: 22 December 2020].
- Ministry of Finance. (2020 [No. 43]). Notice of the Ministry of Finance on Issuing the Measures for the Administration of the Issuance of Local Government Special Bonds [关于印发《地方政府债券发行管理办法》的通知]. Available at:

- http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2020-12/18/content_5570967.htm [Accessed on: 22 December 2020].
- Mollenkopf, J.H. (1983). *The contested city*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Moran, K. (1997). The learning region: institutions, innovation and regional renewal. *Regional Studies*, 31(5), pp. 491-503.
- Morrow, R.A. and Brown, D.D. (1994). *Critical theory and methodology* (Vol. 3). London: Sage.
- Mossberger, K. (2009). Urban regime analysis. In Davies, J.S. and Imbroscio, D.L. (eds.). *Theories of urban politics*. London: Sage, pp. 40-54.
- National credit information publicity system [全国信用信息公示系统] (2019). Available at: <http://www.gsxt.gov.cn/index.html> [Accessed on: 5th July 2019].
- Newton, K. (1978). Conflict avoidance and conflict suppression: the case of urban politics in the United States. In Cox, K.R. (ed.). *Urbanization and conflict in market societies*, Chicago, IL: Maaroufa Press, pp. 76-93.
- Newton, K. and T. J. Karran. (1985). *The politics of local expenditure*. London: Macmillan.
- Nie, X. (2006). *Henan: Difficulties to be solved in transferring operation rights of scenic spots* [河南: 景区经营权转让难题待解]. 11th November. Available at: <https://www.henan.gov.cn/2006/11-10/255233.html> [Accessed on: 8 February 2021].
- Ning, Z. (2018). The formation and improvement of the central-local double-tier financial regulation system [中央与地方双层金融监管体制的形成及完善]. *Economic Review Journal*, (5), pp. 123-128.
- O'Neill, P. (2019). The financialisation of urban infrastructure: A framework of analysis. *Urban Studies*, 56(7), pp. 1304-1325.
- OECD (2007): *Competitive Cities: A new entrepreneurial paradigm in spatial development*. OECD, Paris. Available at: https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/urban-rural-and-regional-development/competitive-cities_9789264022591-en#page6 [Accessed on: 23 June 2021].
- OED Online (2020). Partnership, noun. *Oxford English Dictionary Online*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at <https://www-oed-com.manchester.idm.oclc.org/view/Entry/138320> [accessed on 19th January 2021].
- Offe, C. (1984). *Contradictions of the Welfare State*. London: Hutchinson
- Offe, C. (1985). *Disorganized capitalism: Contemporary transformations of work and politics*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Office of Jiyuan Urban-Rural Integration and Beijing Capital Co., Ltd. (2017). PPP project contract of Jiyuan's rural domestic sewage disposal project: Phase 1 [济源市农村生活

污水治理一期 PPP 项目]. *China Public-Private Partnership Center*. Available at: <https://www.cpppc.org:8082/inforpublic/homepage.html#/preview/001720200118133647213cue0000mj3h3cr> [Accessed: 3 June 2020].

Office of the Joint Conference of Enterprise Zones of Henan Province. (2014 [No.2]). *Notice of on the results of the assessment and promotion of enterprise zones in 2014*[关于发布 2013 年度产业集聚区考核晋级结果的通知 (豫集聚办 (2014) 2 号)]. 8th May. Available at: <http://fgw.henan.gov.cn/2014/05-08/697310.html> [Accessed on: 27 January 2021].

Office of the Joint Conference of Enterprise Zones of Henan Province. (2018 [No.6]). *Notice of on the results of the assessment and promotion of enterprise zones in 2017*[关于 2017 年度产业集聚区考核晋级结果的通报 (豫集聚办 (2018) 6 号)]. Available at: http://www.jiyuan.gov.cn/zbwgk/yccyjjq/zcxx/wjzl/201807/t20180728_436298.html [Accessed on: 27 January 2021].

Office of the Joint Conference of Enterprise Zones of Henan Province. (2019 [No.5]). *Notice of the Office of the Joint Conference of Enterprise Zones of Henan Province on the results of the assessment and promotion of enterprise zones in 2018*[河南省产业集聚区联席会议办公室关于 2018 年度产业集聚区考核晋级结果的通报 (豫集聚办 (2019) 5 号)]. 23rd October. Available at: <http://fgw.henan.gov.cn/2019/11-05/992391.html> [Accessed on: 27 January 2021].

Office of the Joint Conference of Enterprise Zones of Henan Province. (2020 [No.5]). *Notification of the results of the assessment and promotion of the high-quality development of enterprise zones in 2019*[关于 2019 年度产业集聚区高质量发展考核晋级结果的通报 (豫集聚办 (2020) 5 号)]. 20th August. Available at: <http://fgw.henan.gov.cn/2020/08-20/1757716.html> [Accessed on: 27 January 2021].

Office of the Joint Conference of Enterprise Zones of Henan Province. (2015). *Assessment and evaluation methods for enterprise zones of Henan Province*[河南省产业集聚区考核评价办法]. 17th September. Available at: <http://fgw.henan.gov.cn/2015/09-17/701799.html> [Accessed on: 23 May 2020].

Office of the Joint Conference of Enterprise Zones of Henan Province. (2017 [No. 11]). *Comprehensive evaluation method for the classification of enterprises in enterprise zones of Henan Province (for trial implementation)* [河南省产业集聚区企业分类综合评价办法 (试行) (豫集聚办 (2017) 11 号)]. Available at: <http://fgw.henan.gov.cn/2017/12-20/707777.html> [Accessed on: 23 May 2020].

Office of the Joint Conference of Enterprise Zones of Henan Province. (2019 [No. 1]). *Notice of the office of the Joint Conference of Enterprise Zones of Henan Province on the issuance of the comprehensive evaluation method for the classification of enterprises in enterprise zones of Henan Province*[河南省产业集聚区联席会议办公

- 室关于印发《河南省产业集聚区企业分类综合评价办法》的通知 (豫集聚办〔2019〕1号)]. 17th January. Available at: <http://fgw.henan.gov.cn/2019/04-15/742859.html> [Accessed on: 23 May 2020].
- Office of the Joint Conference of Enterprise Zones of Henan Province. (2018). *Special work programme to accelerate the quality and transformation of enterprise zones in 2018* [2018 年加快产业集聚区提质转型专项工作方案]. Available at: <http://fgw.henan.gov.cn/2018/06-15/711433.html> [Accessed on: 26 January 2021].
- Office of the Joint Conference of Enterprise Zones of Henan Province. (2020). Notice of the Office of the Joint Conference of Enterprise Zones of Henan Province on the issuance of guidance on the revision of the planning of enterprise zones [河南省产业集聚区联席会议办公室关于印发产业集聚区规划修编指导意见的通知]. 6th March. Available at: <http://fgw.henan.gov.cn/2020/03-06/1301091.html> [Accessed on: 26 January 2021].
- Oi, J.C. (1999). *Rural China takes off: Institutional foundations of economic reform*. California: University of California Press.
- Olds, K. (1995). Globalization and the production of new urban spaces: Pacific rim megaprojects in the late 20th century. *Environment and planning A*, 27(11), pp. 1713-1743.
- Ong, A. (2007). Neoliberalism as a mobile technology. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 32(1), pp. 3-8.
- Ostrander, S.A. (1993). “Surely you’re not in this just to be helpful”: Access, rapport, and interviews in three studies of elites. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 22(1), pp. 7-27.
- Pahl, R.E. (1969). Urban social theory and research. *Environment and Planning A*, 1(2), pp. 143-153.
- Pahl, R.E. (1970). *Whose city? And other essays on sociology and planning*. London: Longman.
- Pahl, R.E. (1974). Urban managerialism. *Papers: revista de sociologia*, (3), pp. 325-43.
- Pan, F., Zhang, F. and Wu, F. (2020). State-led Financialization in China: The Case of the Government-guided Investment Fund. *The China Quarterly*, pp.1-24.
- Pan, F., Zhang, F., Zhu, S. and Wojcik, D. (2017). Developing by borrowing? Inter-jurisdictional competition, land finance and local debt accumulation in China. *Urban Studies*, 54(4), pp. 897–916.
- Party history research office of Jiyuan. (ed). (2016). *Interviews with successive party secretaries and mayors of Jiyuan* [情满玉川—济源历任市委书记市长访谈录]. Zhengzhou: Henan People’s Press.
- Pearson, M. M. (1997). *China’s business elite: The political consequences of economic reform*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Peck, J. (1995). Moving and shaking: business elites, state localism and urban privatism. *Progress in Human Geography*, 19(1), pp. 16-46.
- Peck, J. (2001). *Workfare states*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Peck, J. (2002). Political economies of scale: Fast policy, interscalar relations, and neoliberal workfare. *Economic Geography*, 78(3), pp.331-360.
- Peck, J. (2014a). Entrepreneurial urbanism: Between uncommon sense and dull compulsion. *Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography*, 96(4), pp. 396-401.
- Peck, J. (2014b). Pushing austerity: State failure, municipal bankruptcy and the crises of fiscal federalism in the USA. *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, 7(1), pp. 17-44.
- Peck, J. (2015). Cities beyond compare?. *Regional Studies*, 49(1), pp. 160-182.
- Peck, J. (2017). Uneven regional development. In Richardson, D., Castree, N., Goodchild, M.F., Kobayashi, A., Liu, W. and Marston, R.A. (eds.). *The International Encyclopedia of Geography*. Oxford: John Wiley and Sons, pp. 1-13.
- Peck, J. (2018). Pluralizing labor geography. In Clark, G.L., Feldman, M.P., Gertler, M.S. and Wójcik, D. (eds.). *The new Oxford handbook of economic geography*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 465-484.
- Peck, J. and Theodore, N (2010). Mobilizing policy: models, methods, and mutations. *Geoforum* 41(2), pp. 169-174.
- Peck, J. and Theodore, N. (2019). Still neoliberalism?. *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 118(2), pp. 245-265.
- Peck, J. and Zhang, J. (2013). A variety of capitalism... with Chinese characteristics?. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 13(3), pp. 357-396.
- Pei, M. (2016). *China's crony capitalism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Peng, H. (2004). Indirect MBO of Henan Yuguang Gold & Lead Company [豫光金铅曲线 MBO 悬疑]. *Sina News*, 19th September. Available at: <http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2004-09-19/00433705798s.shtml> [Accessed on 7 May 2020].
- People's Bank of China and Banking Regulatory Commission. (2009). *Guide on How to Adjust Credit Structure and to Boost Economic Growth and Development*[关于进一步加强信贷结构调整促进国民经济平稳较快发展的指导意见. Available at: http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2009/content_1336375.htm [accessed 22 April 2020].
- People's Government of Henan Province. (2009 [No.62]). Notice of the People's Government of Henan Province issuing several policies on accelerating the scientific development of industrial agglomerations (for trial implementation) [河南省人民政府印发关于加快产业集聚区科学发展若干政策（试行）的通知]. 7th August.

Available at:

http://pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=lar&Gid=f1ce92fe38f723b8a2ce4d95677a0d80bdfb. [Accessed on: 23rd May 2020].

People's Government of Henan Province. (2010 [No.34]). Guiding opinions of the People's Government of Henan Province on further promoting the development of enterprise zones [河南省人民政府关于进一步促进产业集聚区发展的指导意见（豫政（2010）34号）]. 23rd March. Available at: https://sfwv74hl3_rw2_ql4w3_vayr-9rw.3pco.ourwebpicvip.com/jrobot/plugin/link/show.do?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.henan.gov.cn%2F2010%2F03-23%2F237564.html&q=&webid=450001&id=237564 [Accessed on: 25 January 2021].

People's Government of Henan Province. (2012 [No. 34]). Opinions of the People's Government of Henan Province on promoting the sustainable, healthy and rapid development of enterprise zones [河南省人民政府关于促进全省产业集聚区持续健康快速发展的若干意见（豫政（2012）34号）]. 8th March. *Gazette of People's Government of Henan Province*, (18), pp. 9-15.

People's Government of Henan Province. (2015 [No.20]). Notice of the People's Government of Henan Province on the results of the assessment and promotion of enterprise zones in 2014 [河南省人民政府关于 2014 年度产业集聚区考核晋级结果的通报（豫政（2015）20号）]. 2nd April. Available at: <http://fgw.henan.gov.cn/2015/04-07/699381.html> [Accessed on: 27 January 2021].

People's Government of Henan Province. (2016 [No.25]). Notice of the People's Government of Henan Province on the results of the assessment and promotion of enterprise zones in 2015 [河南省人民政府关于 2015 年度产业集聚区考核晋级结果的通报（豫政（2016）25号）]. 15th April. Available at: <http://fgw.henan.gov.cn/2016/04-29/704101.html> [Accessed on: 27 January 2021].

People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality. (2007 [No. 14]). *A public announcement on the establishment of industrial agglomeration administrative committees*. [济源市人民政府关于成立工业集聚区管委会的通知（济政（2007）14号）]. 8th April.

People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality. (2007 [No.52]). Opinions of People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality on Promoting Good and Fast Development of Industrial Econom [济源市人民政府关于促进工业经济又好又快发展的意见（济政（2007）52号）]. 30th September. Available at: http://www.jiyuan.gov.cn/depzwgk/sgyhxxhwyh/zcxx/gfxwj/201807/t20180727_397328.html [Accessed on: 28 January 2021].

People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality. (2010). *Government Work Report 2010*. 23 February. Available at: http://www.jiyuan.gov.cn/zwgk/xxgkml/zfgzbg/201807/t20180726_387798.html

[Accessed on: 23 March 2021].

People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality. (2012 [No.96]). Notice of People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality on the improving the financial management system of the enterprise zone management committee [济源市人民政府关于完善产业集聚区管理委员会财政管理体制的通知（济政〔2012〕96号）]. 8 December.

Available at:

http://www.jiyuan.gov.cn/zbwgk/yccyjq/zhglxx/gkzd/201810/t20181016_512419.html [Accessed on: 2 February 2021].

People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality. (2018 [No.15]). Notice of People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality on reconfiguration of financial management system between the municipality, enterprise zones and cooperative townships. [济源市人民政府关于调整市与产业集聚（开发）区、联动镇财政管理体制的通知]. 21 May 2018.

People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality. (2018 [No.22]). Notice of People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality on further improving the work mechanism of enterprise zones [济源市人民政府关于印发进一步完善产业集聚（开发）区推进工作机制的通知]. 7 August 2018. Available at:

http://www.jiyuan.gov.cn/zwgk/xxgkml/zfwj/jyszf/201809/t20180907_507305.html [Accessed on: 2 February 2021].

People's Government of Jiyuan Municipality. *Yugong spirit, the soul of Jiyuan City* [济源：愚公移山精神，济源城市之魂]. Available at: <https://www.henan.gov.cn/2018/06-11/660182.html> [Accessed on: June 11 2018].

Peterson, P. E. (1981). *City limits*. Chicago, US: University of Chicago Press.

Phelps, N.A. and Miao, J.T. (2020). Varieties of urban entrepreneurialism. *Dialogues in Human Geography*, 10(3), pp. 304-321.

Pickles, J. and Smith, A. (eds.). (1998). *Theorizing transition: the political economy of post-communist transformations*. London, UK: Routledge.

Pike, A., O'Brien, P., Strickland, T. and Tomaney, J. (2019). *Financialising city statecraft and infrastructure*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Pinchain Tourism. (2019). *Jiyuan cultural and tourism investment group: struggle and hope* [济源文旅：一个市级文旅集团的挣扎与希望]. 29 October. Available at: <https://www.pinchain.com/article/205821> [Accessed on: 29 May 2020].

Platt, J. (1986). Functionalism and the survey: the relation of theory and method. *The Sociological Review*, 34(3), pp. 501-536.

Po, L. (2008). Redefining rural collectives in China: Land conversion and the emergence of rural shareholding co-operatives. *Urban Studies*, 45(8), pp. 1603-1623.

- Polanyi, K. (1944). *The great transformation*. New York, NY: Rinehart.
- Pow, C.P. (2011). China exceptionalism? Unbounding narratives on urban China. In Edensor, T. and Jayne, M. (eds.). *Urban theory beyond the West: a world of cities*. London: Routledge, pp. 62-79.
- Pratt, A.C. (2013). ‘... the point is to change it’: Critical realism and human geography. *Dialogues in Human Geography* 3(1), pp. 26–29.
- Pun, N. (2005). *Made in China: Women factory workers in a global workplace*. Duke: Duke University Press.
- Pun, N. and Lu, H. (2010). Unfinished proletarianization: Self, anger, and class action among the second generation of peasant-workers in present-day China. *Modern China*, 36(5), pp. 493-519.
- Qian, H. and Wong, C. (2012). Master planning under urban–rural integration: the case of Nanjing, China. *Urban Policy and Research*, 30(4), pp. 403-421.
- Qian, Y. and Roland, G. (1998). Federalism and the soft budget constraint. *American economic review*, 88(5), pp. 1143-1162.
- Qian, Z. (2011). Building Hangzhou's new city center: mega project development and entrepreneurial urban governance in China. *Asian Geographer*, 28(1), pp. 3-19.
- Qin, H. (1998). The "Ye Qiming Phenomenon": An analysis of the "self-buyout" problem in the reform of property rights of state-owned assets. [叶启明现象”辨析——国有资产产权改革中的“自购自”问题]. In Qin, H. (ed). *天平集*. Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House, pp. 81-85.
- Qin, H. (2005). The Chinese peasant problem in history and reality [历史与现实中的中国农民问题]. *Village, agriculture and peasants*, (10B), pp. 12-14.
- Qin, H. (2013 [2004]). Can China break out of the loop of the “inchworm Effect”? --The dilemma of SOE reform and the dilemma of economics in the light of the “Lang whirlwind” [中国能否走出“尺蠖效应”的怪圈？——从“郎旋风”看国企改革的困境与经济学的窘境]. In Qin, H. (ed). *The common bottom line[共同的底线]*. Nanjing: Jiangsu Literature and Art Publishing House, pp. 217-250.
- Qin, H. (2017). Reassessment of the Lang-Ku dispute [“重估郎顾之争”答客难]. *The Economic Observer*. Available at: <http://www.chinareform.net/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=181&id=17904> [Accessed on 1 March 2021].
- Qu, J. (2015). Possession, operation, and governance as three conceptual dimensions of town and township enterprises: An analysis going back to the classical social sciences (Part I). *Chinese Journal of Sociology*, 1(4), pp. 540-579.

- Qu, J. (2016). Possession, operation, and governance as three conceptual dimensions of town and township enterprises: An analysis going back to the classical social sciences (Part II). *Chinese Journal of Sociology*, 2(1), pp. 95-128.
- Quilley, S. (1999). Entrepreneurial Manchester: The Genesis of Elite Consensus. *Antipode*, 31(2), pp. 185-211.
- Raco, M. (1998). Assessing 'institutional thickness' in the local context: a comparison of cardiff and sheffield. *Environment and Planning A*, 30(6), pp. 975-996.
- Raco, M. and Street, E. (2012). Resilience planning, economic change and the politics of post-recession development in London and Hong Kong. *Urban studies*, 49(5), pp. 1065-1087.
- Ren, W., Wang, J. and Liu, J. (2005). The "Chongqing Experience" of SOE debt restructuring [国企债务重组的“重庆经验”]. *Capital Shanghai*, (6), pp.17-19.
- Research Team of Social Science Development Research Center of Higher Education Institutions of the State Education Commission to Jiyuan [国家教委高等学校社会发展研究中心赴济源调查组]. (1996). The way of Jiyuan -- an example of developing a good county (or county-level city) affiliated state-owned economy from the whole [济源之路——从整体上搞好县（市）属国有经济的榜样]. *Theoretical front of higher education*, (7), pp. 27-34.
- Robinson, J. (2011). The travels of urban neoliberalism: Taking stock of the internationalization of urban theory. *Urban Geography*, 32 (8), pp. 1087–1109.
- Robinson, J. (2016). Thinking cities through elsewhere: Comparative tactics for a more global urban studies. *Progress in human geography*, 40(1), pp. 3-29.
- Robinson, J. and Roy, A. (2016). Global urbanisms and the nature of urban theory. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 40(1), pp. 181–186.
- Robson, B. (1989). Social and economic futures for larger cities. In Herbert, D.T. and Smith, D.M. (eds.). *Social problems and the city*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Roy, A. and Ong, A. (2011). *Worlding cities: Asian experiments and the art of being global*. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Rudra, N. (2008). *Globalization and the race to the bottom in developing countries: Who really gets hurt?*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Saich, T. (2002). The blind man and the elephant: analysing the local state in China. In L. Tomba (ed). *On the Roots of Growth and Crisis: Capitalism, State and Society in East Asia*. Milan: Annale Feltrinelli, pp. 75–99.
- Sanderson, H. and Forsythe, M. (2012). China's superbank: debt, oil and influence-how China Development Bank is rewriting the rules of finance. Singapore: John Wiley &

Sons.

- Sang, Y. and Chen, Y. (2006). Jiyuan is buiding up new economic pillar industries by developing tourism [倾力旅游，济源构建经济新支柱]. *Economic Insights*, 12 October, p. 36.
- Saunders, P. (1979). *Urban politics: A sociological interpretation*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- Sayer, A. (1992). *Realism and scoial science: a realist appaorch*, 2nd edn. London: Routledge.
- Sayer, A. (2000). *Realism and scoial science*. London: Sage.
- Sayer, A. (2010). *Method in social science: a realist appaorch*, revised 2nd edn. London: Routledge.
- Sbragia, A.M. (1996). Debt wish: Entrepreneurial cities, US federalism, and economic development. Pittsburgh, US: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Schoenberger, E. (1991). The corporate interview as an evidentiary strategy in human geography. *The Professional Geographer* 43 (2), pp. 180-189.
- Schoenberger, E. (1992). Self-criticism and self awareness in research: a reply to Linda McDowell. *The Professional Geographer* 44 (2), pp. 215-218.
- Scott, A.J. (1998). *Regions and the world economy: the coming shape of global production, competition, and political order*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shang, F. (2012). The path exploration of developing rural collective economy in Jiyuan under the new situation [新形势下济源发展村级集体经济的路径探索]. *Modern Economic Information*, (08X), pp. 242, 252.
- Shen, J. (2006). Understanding dual-track urbanisation in post-reform China: conceptual framework and empirical analysis. *Population, Space and place*, 12(6), pp. 497-516.
- Shen, J. (2013). *Rethinking the “four billlion” phobia [反思“四万亿”恐惧症]*. 9 August. Available at: <http://m.ftchinese.com/story/001052046?archive> [Accessed on 21 December 2020].
- Shen, J.Y., Wang, S.Q. and Qiang, M.S. (2005). Political risks and sovereign risks in chinese bot/ppp projects: a case study [中国 BOT/PPP 项目的政治风险和主权风险：案例分析] *Chinese Businessman: Investment and Finance*, (1), pp. 50–55.
- Shenton, A.K. and Hayter, S. (2004). Strategies for gaining access to organisations and informants in qualitative studies. *Education for Information*, 22(3-4), pp. 223-231.
- Sheppard, E. and Barnes, T. J. (1990). *The capitalist space economy: geographical analysis after ricardo, marx and sraffa*. London: Unwin Hyman.
- Shi, F. (2017). Municipal leaders investigate the work of holistic tourism destination [市领导调研全域旅游工作]. *Jiyuan Daily*, 26 August. Available at: http://epaper.jyrb.cn/pc/con/201708/26/c_14029.html [Accessed on: 28 Feburary 2021].

- Shi, Y. (2018). The speech on the mobilization congress for forging the best business-friendly environment [在全市打造最佳营商环境动员大会上的讲话]. *Jiyuan Government Gazette*. 24 April. Available at: http://www.jiyuan.gov.cn/zwgk/xxgkml/zfgb/201802/ldjh/201808/t20180817_501686.html [Accessed on: 31 July 2019].
- Sit, V.F. and Yang, C. (1997). Foreign-investment-induced exo-urbanisation in the Pearl River Delta, China. *Urban Studies*, 34(4), pp. 647-677.
- Smart, A. (2018). Ethnographic perspectives on the mediation of informality between people and plans in urbanising China. *Urban Studies*, 55(7), pp. 1477-1483.
- Smith, A. and Swain, A. (1998). Regulating and institutionalising capitalisms: the microfoundations of transformation in eastern and central Europe. In J. Pickles and A. Smith. (eds.). *Theorising transition: The political economy of post-communist transformations*. London: Routledge, pp. 25-53.
- Smith, N. (1993). Homeless/Global: Scaling Places. In Bird, J., Curtis, B., Putnam, T., Robertson, G. and Tickner, L. (eds.). *Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change*. London: Routledge, pp. 87-120.
- Smitha, K.C. (2017). Entrepreneurial urbanism in India: A framework. In Smitha, K.C. (ed). *Entrepreneurial Urbanism in India*. Singapore: Springer India, pp. 1-31.
- Somers, M.R. (1994). The narrative constitution of identity: A relational and network approach. *Theory and Society*, 23(5), pp. 605-649.
- State Council. (1980 [No. 299]). *Endorsing the Summaries on national city planning work meeting* [国务院批转《全国城市规划工作会议纪要》]. 9 December. Available at: <http://www.reformdata.org/1980/1209/12718.shtml> [Accessed on 8 April 2020].
- State Council. (1980 [No.33]). Provisional Regulations of the State Council Concerning the Implementation of “Division of Revenue and Expenditure between the Central and Local Governments and with Contracts at Different Levels” [国务院关于实行“划分收支、分级包干”财政管理体制的暂行规定]. Available at: <http://www.reformdata.org/1980/0201/6138.shtml> [Accessed on 8 November, 2019].
- State Council. (2014 [No. 43]). *Several Opinions of the State Council on strengthening the administration of local government debts* [国务院关于加强地方政府性债务管理的意见]. October 2nd. Available at: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-10/02/content_9111.htm [Accessed on 2 May 2020].
- State Council. (2014). National New-type Urbanization Plan (2014-2020) [国家新型城镇化规划（2014—2020年）]. *Xinhua Net*, 16 March. Available at: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2014-03/16/content_2640075.htm [Accessed on December 17, 2020].

- State Council. (2017 [No. 79]). Guiding opinions of the General Office of the State Council on further stimulating the vitality of effective private investment for sustainable and healthy economic development[国务院办公厅关于进一步激发民间有效投资活力促进经济持续健康发展的指导意见].1 September. Available at: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-09/15/content_5225395.htm [Accessed on: 9 March 2021].
- State Council. (2019 [No. 21]). Notice of the State Council on the issuance of the Promotion plan for the adjustment of the reform of the division of central and local revenues after the implementation of larger tax cuts and fee reductions [国务院关于印发实施更大规模减税降费后调整中央与地方收入划分改革推进方案的通知]. 26 September. Available at: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2019-10/09/content_5437544.htm [Accessed on: 7 August 2021].
- State Ministry of Environmental Protection.(2018). Environmental impact report form for construction project: Wangwu Old Street by Henan Xiaoyoudongtian Cultural Development Ltd [河南小有洞天文化发展有限公司王屋老街项目环境影响报告表]. *Ecological Environment Bureau of Jiyuan Production City Integration Demonstration Zone*. Available at: http://hbj.jiyuan.gov.cn/hjpi/hppf/201802/t20180223_362381.html. [Accessed on: 28 February 2021].
- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC). (2017 [No. 192]). *Notice on Strengthening Risk Control of PPP Business of Central State-owned Enterprises* [关于加强中央企业PPP业务风险管控的通知]. 17 November. Available at: http://www.jysczj.gov.cn/rdppp/pppzc/201711/t20171128_353564.html [Accessed on: 9 March 2021] .
- Stephens, N. (2007). Collecting data from elites and ultra elites: Telephone and face-to-face interviews with macroeconomists. *Qualitative Research*, 7(2), pp. 203-216.
- Stiglitz, J.E. (2002). *Globalization and its discontents*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Stiglitz, J.E. (2018). *Globalization and its discontents revisited: Anti-Globalization in the era of Trump*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Stone, C.N. (1989). *Regime politics: governing Atlanta, 1946-1988*. University press of Kansas.
- Stone, C.N. (1993). Urban regimes and the capacity to govern: A political economy approach. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 15(1), pp. 1-28.
- Storper, M. and Scott, A.J. (2016). Current debates in urban theory: A critical assessment. *Urban Studies*, 53(6), pp. 1114–1136.
- Su, X. (2015). Urban entrepreneurialism and the commodification of heritage in China. *Urban Studies*, 52(15), pp.2874-2889.
- Sun, W. (2015). Mao Zedong: Utopian Visions and Practical Realities. In *Nation building, state*

- building, and economic development: Case studies and comparisons*. London: Routledge, pp. 128-145.
- Sun, X.L. and Zhou, F.J. (2013). Land finance and tax-sharing system: An empirical explanation [土地财政与分税制: 一个实证解释]. *Social Science in China*, (4), pp. 40-59.
- Swyngedouw, E. (1989). The heart of the place: the resurrection of locality in an age of hyperspace. *Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography*, 71(1), pp. 31-42.
- Swyngedouw, E. (1997). Neither global nor local: 'glocalization' and the politics of scale. In K.R. Cox (ed.). *Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local*. New York: Guilford Press, pp. 137-77.
- Swyngedouw, E. (2007). The post-political city. In BAVO. (ed.). *Urban politics now: Re-imagining democracy in the Neoliberal city*. Rotterdam : Netherland Architecture Institute Publishers, pp. 58-76.
- Tan, X. and Altrock, U. (2016). Struggling for an adaptive strategy? Discourse analysis of urban regeneration processes—A case study of Enning Road in Guangzhou City. *Habitat International*, 56, pp. 245-257.
- Tang, K.L. and Ngan, R. (2001). China: developmentalism and social security. *International Journal of Social Welfare*, 10(4), pp. 253-259.
- Tao, R. and Su, F. (2021). The “Chinese model” of economic growth: Two alternative hypotheses and a systematic analytical framework [中国模式”: 两个备择理论假说和一个系统性分析框架]. *Comparative Studies*, (114).
- Tashakkori, A., Teddlie, C. and Teddlie, C.B. (1998). *Mixed methodology: Combining qualitative and quantitative approaches* (Vol. 46). Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Taylor, P.J. (1996). Embedded statism and the social sciences: opening up to new spaces. *Environment & planning A*, 28(11), pp. 1917-1928.
- Tian, K. (2018). Annual net income per capita of 11,300 yuan! What are the "magic tricks" to get rid of poverty in Cypress Village? [年人均纯收入 11300 元！柏木洼村脱贫有啥“妙招”]. Dahe, 12 September. Available at: <https://news.dahe.cn/2018/09-12/374225.html> [Accessed on: 26 March 2021]
- Tian, M. (2012). The significance of accelerating the construction of new rural communities in Jiyuan [济源市加快新型农村社区建设的意义]. *Time Report (academic version)*, (09X), pp. 388.
- Tiebout, C. (1956). A pure theory of local expenditures. *Journal of Political Economy*, 64 (5), pp. 416-424.
- Tilt, B. (2016). Dams, displacement, and the morel economy in southwest China. In Rojas, C. and Litzinger, R.A. (eds.). *Ghost protocol: Development and displacement in global China*. Duke:

- Duke University Press, pp. 87-108.
- Uitermark, J. (2002). Re-scaling, 'scale fragmentation' and the regulation of antagonistic relationships. *Progress in human geography*, 26(6), pp. 743-765.
- Van Heur, B. and Bassens, D. (2019). An urban studies approach to elites: Nurturing conceptual rigor and methodological pluralism. *Urban Geography*, 40(5), pp. 591-603.
- Vogel, E.F. (1990). *One step ahead in China: Guangdong under reform*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- Vogel, S.K. (2018). *Marketcraft: How governments make markets work*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wakely, P. (2020). Partnership: a strategic paradigm for the production & management of affordable housing & sustainable urban development. *International Journal of Urban Sustainable Development*, 12(1), pp. 119-125.
- Walder, A. (1995). Local governments as industrial firms: An organizational analysis of China's transitional economy. *American Journal of Sociology*, 101(2), pp. 263-301
- Walsh, A. H. (1978). *The public's business: the politics and practices of government corporations*. Cambridge, US: MIT Press.
- Wang, G. (2004). MBO of listed companies: Suppression or rescue [上市公司 MBO: 围剿抑或拯救]. *21st Century Business Herald*, 24 November. Available at: <http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/FI-c/711497.htm> [Accessed on 15 August 2019].
- Wang, H., Zhang, X., Wang, H. and Skitmore, M. (2017). The right-of-use transfer mechanism of collective construction land in new urban districts in China: The case of Zhoushan City. *Habitat International*, 61, pp. 55-63.
- Wang, K. J. (2009). Governor Guo: Speed up the construction of enterprise zones in Henan Province [郭庚茂: 加快河南产业集聚区建设]. *Science & Technology and Economy*, (3), pp. 6-7.
- Wang, Q. and Zhang, X. (2017). Three rights separation: China's proposed rural land rights reform and four types of local trials. *Land Use Policy*, 63, pp.111-121.
- Wang, S. (1997). The bottom line of decentralization [分权的底线]. *Strategy and Management*, (2), pp. 37-56.
- Wang, S., Ke, Y.J. and Xie, J. (2012). Public private partnership implementation in China. In Winch GM, Onishi M and Schmidt S (eds.). *Taking stock of PPP and PFI around the world*. London, UK: Certified Accountants Educational Trust, pp. 29-36.
- Wang, X. (2008). Making rural life as good as urban life: Jiyuan Municipality delegates power to townships, promotes urban-rural integration and bridges the gap between urban and rural areas [让农村人过得和城市人一样: 济源市放权乡镇, 促进城乡一体化,

- 力图消除城乡差别]. 24 September. Available at:
<http://newpaper.dahe.cn/hnsb/page/270/2008-09-24/A07/68871222200408687.pdf>
 [Accessed on: 7 February 2021].
- Wang, X. and Cheng, L. (2014). Henan's first rural property rights trading centre unveiled in Jiyuan[我省首家农村产权交易中心在济源揭牌]. *Henan Daily*, 17 May, pp. 3.
 Available at: https://newpaper.dahe.cn/hnrb/html/2014-05/17/content_1077461.htm?div=-1
- Wang, X. and Wang, F. (2017). China steps up scrutiny of public-private partnerships. *Caixin Net*, 13 November. Available at: <https://www.caixinglobal.com/2017-11-13/china-steps-up-scrutiny-of-public-private-partnerships-101169970.html> [Accessed 6 June 2020].
- Wang, Y. (2016). Jiyuan's dream for prosperity [宏图伟业济源梦]. In Party History Research Office of Jiyuan. (ed.). *Interviews with successive party secretaries and mayors of Jiyuan*. Zhengzhou: Henan People's Press, pp. 198-211.
- Wang, Y. (2016). The sustainable infrastructure finance of China development bank: composition, experience and policy implications. *Global Economic Governance Initiative Working Paper* No. 05. Boston, MA: Boston University.
- Wang, Y., Gao, H.O. and Liu, J. (2019). Incentive game of investor speculation in PPP highway projects based on the government minimum revenue guarantee. *Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice*, 125, pp. 20-34.
- Wank, D. L. (1999). *Commodifying communism: Business, trust and politics in a chinese city*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ward, K (1996). Rereading urban regime theory: a sympathetic critique. *Geoforum*, 27(4), pp. 427-38.
- Ward, K. (1997). Coalitions in urban regeneration: a regime approach. *Environment and Planning A*, 29(8), pp. 1493-1506.
- Ward, K. (2000). A critique in search of a corpus: re-visiting governance and re-interpreting urban politics. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 25(2), pp. 169-185.
- Ward, K. (2003). Entrepreneurial urbanism, state restructuring and civilizing 'New'East Manchester. *Area*, 35(2), pp. 116-127.
- Ward, K. (2010a). Entrepreneurial urbanism and business improvement districts in the state of Wisconsin: a cosmopolitan critique. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 100(5), pp. 1177-1196.
- Ward, K. (2010b). Towards a relational comparative approach to the study of cities. *Progress in Human Geography*, 34(4), pp. 471-487.
- Ward, K. and Jones, M. (1999). Researching local elites: reflexivity, 'situatedness' and political-temporal contingency. *Geoforum*, 30(4), pp. 301-312.

- Ward, K., Imbroscio, D., Davidson, M., Hankins, K., Leitner, H. (2020). David Harvey (1989) From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: the transformation in urban governance in late capitalism, *Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography*, 71 (1) 3-17 and Clarence Stone (1989) Regime Politics. Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press. *Urban Geography*, 41 (2), pp. 329-340. DOI: 10.1080/02723638.2019.1697074.
- Ward, K., Newman, J., John, P., Theodore, N., Macleavy, J. and Cochrane, A. (2015). Whatever happened to local government? A review symposium. *Regional Studies, Regional Science*, 2(1), pp. 435-457.
- Weber, I. (2020). Origins of China's contested relation with neoliberalism: Economics, the World Bank, and Milton Friedman at the dawn of reform. *Global Perspectives*, 1(1). <https://doi.org/10.1525/gp.2020.12271>.
- Weber, R. (2010). Selling city futures: The financialization of urban redevelopment policy. *Economic geography*, 86(3), pp. 251-274.
- Wei Y.H. (2013). Regional development in China: states, globalisation, and inequality. London: Routledge.
- Welch, C., Marschan-Piekkari, R., Penttinen, H. and Tahvanainen, M. (2002). Corporate elites as informants in qualitative international business research. *International Business Review*, 11(5), pp. 611-628.
- Wen, X. (2020). Eco-countryside tour: adding a cultural flavour to Waterstone village[生态乡村游:给花石村添点文化味]. Henan Daily, 5 May, pp. 5. Available at: http://hnrpaper.dahe.cn/html/2020-05/05/content_416001.htm [Accessed on: 29 March 2021].
- Whyte, M. K. (2009). Paradoxes of China's economic boom. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 35, pp. 371-392.
- Williams, P. (1978). Urban managerialism: a concept of relevance?. *Area*, 10(3), pp. 236-240.
- Wilson, D. (2017). Entrepreneurialism. In Jayne, M. and Ward, K. (eds.). *Urban theory: new critical perspectives*. London: Routledge, pp. 122-133.
- Wimmer, A. and Glick Schiller, N. (2002). Methodological nationalism and beyond: nation-state building, migration and the social sciences. *Global networks*, 2(4), pp. 301-334.
- Wong, S.W. (2016). Reconsolidation of state power into urbanising villages: shareholding reforms as a strategy for governance in the Pearl River Delta region. *Urban Studies*, 53(4), pp. 689-704.
- Wong, S.W.(2015). Urbanisation as a process of state building: local governance reforms in China. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 39(5), pp. 912-926.
- Wood, A. (1998). Making sense of urban entrepreneurialism. *Scottish Geographical Magazine*,

- 114(2), pp. 120-123.
- Woods, M. (1998). Rethinking elites: networks, space, and local politics. *Environment and planning A*, 30(12), pp. 2101-2119.
- World Bank. (2009). The Urban Development Investment Corporations (UDICs) in Chongqing, China. *Technical Assistance Report*, Washington D.C. Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCHINA/Resources/318862-1121421293578/1429963-1235543628658/Chongqing_UDIC_en.pdf [Accessed on 19 April 2020].
- Wu, D. (2019). Welcoming Village: Revitalising the land to enrich the people of the mountain [迎门村：盘活土地富山民]. *Jiyuan Daily*, 8 August, pp. 1. Available at: http://epaper.jyrb.cn/pc/con/201908/09/c_34385.html [Accessed on: 27 February 2021].
- Wu, F. (1997). Urban restructuring in China's emerging market economy: towards a framework for analysis. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 21(4), pp. 640-663.
- Wu, F. (1998a). Polycentric urban development and land-use change in a transitional economy: the case of Guangzhou. *Environment and Planning A*, 30(6), pp. 1077-1100.
- Wu, F. (1998b). The new structure of building provision and the transformation of the urban landscape in metropolitan Guangzhou, China. *Urban Studies*, 35(2), pp. 259-283.
- Wu, F. (2000). Place promotion in Shanghai, PRC. *Cities*, 17(5), pp. 349-361.
- Wu, F. (2003). The (post-) socialist entrepreneurial city as a state project: Shanghai's reglobalisation in question. *Urban Studies*, 40(9), pp. 1673-1698.
- Wu, F. (2008). China's great transformation: Neoliberalization as establishing a market society. *Geoforum*, 39(3), pp. 1093-1096.
- Wu, F. (2010). How neoliberal is China's reform? The origins of change during transition. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 51(5), pp. 619-631.
- Wu, F. (2016a). China's emergent city-region governance: a new form of state spatial selectivity through state-orchestrated rescaling. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 40(6), pp. 1134-1151.
- Wu, F. (2016b). Emerging Chinese cities: Implications for global urban studies. *The Professional Geographer*, 68(2), pp. 338-348.
- Wu, F. (2018). Planning centrality, market instruments: Governing Chinese urban transformation under state entrepreneurialism. *Urban Studies*, 55(7), pp. 1383-1399.
- Wu, F. (2019). Land financialization and the financing of urban development in China. *Land Use Policy*. doi: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2019.104412.

- Wu, F. (2020). The state acts through the market: 'state entrepreneurialism' beyond varieties of urban entrepreneurialism. *Dialogues in Human Geography*, 10(3), pp. 326-329.
- Wu, F., Chen, J., Pan, F., Gallent, N. and Zhang, F. (2020). Assetization: The Chinese path to housing financialization. *Annals of the American Association of Geographers*, pp. 1-17.
- Wu, J. (2007). A market economy calling for the rule of law [呼唤法治的市场经济]. Beijing: Sanlian Bookstore.
- Wu, L. (2002). A Study of China's Urbanization Process 1978-2000 [1978—2000 年中国城市化进程研究]. *Researches in chinese economic history*, (3), pp.73-82.
- Wu, W. (1999a). City profile: Shanghai. *Cities*, 16(3), pp. 207-216.
- Wu, W. (1999b). Reforming China's institutional environment for urban infrastructure provision. *Urban Studies*, 36(13), pp. 2263-2282.
- Wu, Y. (1983). National seminar on the path of Chinese urbanization held in Nanjing [中国城镇化道路问题学术讨论会在宁召开]. *Economic Geography* (1), pp. 77-79.
- Xi, J. (2014). *Connectivity spearheads development and partnership enables cooperation*. 8 November. Available at:
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/ytjhzzdrscldrfzshyixghd/t1210466.shtml [Accessed on: 27 July 2019].
- Xi, J. (2016). Speech at the joint meeting of the National Democratic Construction Association and the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (full text) [习近平在民建、工商联界联组会讲话（全文）]. Xinhua Net, 4 March. Available at:
http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2016lh/2016-03/09/c_1118271629.htm [Accessed on: 11 January 2021].
- Xi, J. (2017). *Full text of Xi Jinping keynote at the World Economic Forum: Jointly shoulder responsibility of our times, promote global growth*. January 17th. Available at:
<https://america.cgtn.com/2017/01/17/full-text-of-xi-jinping-keynote-at-the-world-economic-forum> [Accessed: 29 February 2020].
- Xiao, J. and Liu, B. (2018). Retrospect and prospect of China's urbanization in the past 40 years of reform and opening-up [改革开放 40 年中国城镇化回顾与展望]. *Macroeconomics*, (12), pp. 18-29.
- Xinhua Interview. (2020). Li Qingjun: Promoting cultural and tourism integration for the flower of wealth to blossom. [李庆军：依托“一山一水一精神”推进文旅融合绽放致富之花]. Xinhua Net. 31 December. Available at:
<http://www.ha.xinhuanet.com/special/special2020/jylyfpinterview2020/index.htm> [Accessed on: 28 February 2021].
- Xiong, L. (2019). *Research on developable public-private partnership mode of CFLD's Gu'an industrial*

- new town*[华夏幸福固安产业新城开发性 PPP 融资模式案例探究]. Master's Dissertation. Hebei Finance University. Available at: <http://gb.oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?filename=1019161223.nh&dbcode=CMFD&dbname=CMFD2020> (Accessed on: 29 December 2020).
- Xu H., Zhou H. and Yu. X. (2009). Jiyuan in Henan province to promote the development of urban-rural integration[河南济源市推进城乡一体化发展纪实]. Insitute of China Rural Comprehensive Reform. 9 May. Available at: <http://nyzx.xynu.edu.cn/a/2017/07/14443.html> [Accessed: 27 July 2020].
- Xu, Q. (2017). China Development Bank: reinventing itself and driving the reshaping of the financial system[国家开发银行: 自我重塑和推动金融体系的重塑]. *Development Finance Research*, (4), pp.15-27.
- Xue, D. and Wu, F. (2015). Failing entrepreneurial governance: From economic crisis to fiscal crisis in the city of Dongguan, China. *Cities*, 43, pp.10-17.
- Xue, F. (2013). The experience and features of China's Urbanisation from 1949 to 1979 [1949~ 1979 年中国城镇化的经验与特色]. *Contemporary China History Studies*, (4), pp. 25-27.
- Yang, C. and Wu, H. (1995). The backbone of regional economic take-off - Exploration of cultivating backbone enterprises in Jiyuan City [区域经济腾飞的脊梁——济源市培植骨干企业的探索]. *Enterprise Vitality*, (1), pp. 10-14.
- Yang, S. and Wen, T. (2010). The economic fluctuations, the change in taxation institution, and the capitalization of land resources: A case study on the problems with “the three times of enclosing land” since China's reform [经济波动、财税体制变迁与土地资源资本化]. *Management World*, (4), pp. 32-41.
- Ye, J. and Zhao, N. (2010). Interview with Mayor of Jiyuan Zhao Suping: “Moving preasants upstairs is like to revolutionise their lifes” [专访河南省济源市市长赵素萍:“让农民上楼就像革他们的命”]. *China Economic Weekly*, (14), pp. 52-53.
- Yeager, P.C. and Kram, K.E. (1990). Fielding hot topics in cool settings: The study of corporate ethics. *Qualitative Sociology*, 13(2), pp. 127-148.
- Yeh, A.G.O, Xu, J. and Yi, H. (2006). The fourth wave of urbanization in China [中国城市化的第四波]. *City planning review*, 30(B11), pp. 13-18.
- Yeh, A.G.O. and Chen, Z. (2020). From cities to super mega city regions in China in a new wave of urbanisation and economic transition: Issues and challenges. *Urban Studies*, 57(3), pp. 636-654.
- Yeung, H. W. C. (1995). Qualitative personal interviews in international business research: some lessons from a study of Hong Kong transnational corporations. *International*

- Business Review*, 4(3), pp. 313-339.
- Yeung, H.W.C. (2019a). Rethinking mechanism and process in the geographical analysis of uneven development. *Dialogues in Human Geography*, 9(3), pp. 226-255.
- Yeung, H.W.C. (2019b). What kind of theory for what kind of human geography?. *Dialogues in Human Geography*, 9(3), pp. 283-292.
- Yin, R.K. (2018). Case study research and applications: design and methods, 6th edn. Los Angeles: Sage.
- Young, C. and Kaczmarek, S. (1999). Changing the perception of the post-socialist city: place promotion and imagery in Lodz, Poland. *Geographical Journal*, 165, pp. 183-191.
- Young, C. and Lever, J. (1997). Place Promotion, Economic Location and the Consumption of City Image. *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie*, 88(4), pp. 332-341.
- Yuan, K. and Liu, X. (2007). A survey of 'industry out of town and projects moved to the mountains' policy in Jiyuan, Henan Province [喜看唱“山”歌——来自河南省济源市实行“工业出城, 项目上山”的调查]. *Henan land & resources*, (8), pp. 4-5.
- Yuan, P. and Liu, T. (2016). On the approaches to and policy suggestions of developing new collective economy in rural china: investigations into certain Chinese rural areas [发展农村新型集体经济的路径和政策建议]. *Studies on Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Theories*, (10), pp. 23-28, 91.
- Zhan, X. (2014). From 'Wuhu model' to new-type urbanisation comprehensive pilot: the innovative practices of developmen finance in new-type urbanisation [从“芜湖模式”到新型城镇化综合试点——开发性金融在新型城镇化进程中的创新实践]. *China Development Bank*, Marth 20th.
http://www.cdb.com.cn/xwzx/gdpl/201603/t20160318_2894.html [Accessed on 18 April 2020].
- Zhang, G. and Xiao, G. (2017). Analysis and policy suggestions for private enterprises participation in PPP projects [民营企业参与 PPP“双降”原因探析及政策建议]. *BRI Data*, September. Available at: <http://www.bridata.com/report/detail?pid=1187> [Accessed on: 9 March 2021].
- Zhang, H. (2007). A 'thrilling leap' of China Development Bank [国开行的“惊险一跃”]. *China Entrepreneur*, (15), pp. 23-23.
- Zhang, H. (2019). Transformation of "dormant assets" in a mountain village [山村“沉睡资产”变形记]. *Henan Daily*, 17 July. Available at: <https://www.henandaily.cn/content/2019/0717/176594.html> [Accessed on: 29 March 2021].
- Zhang, H.T. and Cheng, L.J. (2018). Jiyuan becomes the biggest base of Silver production in

- China, making up 12% of total domestic production. [济源成全国最大白银生产基地, 占全国总产量的 12%]. *Xinhua Net*, May 25. Available at: http://m.xinhuanet.com/ha/2018-05/25/c_1122884837.htm (Accessed on 10 November 2019).
- Zhang, J. and Peck, J. (2016). Variegated capitalism, Chinese style: regional models, multi-scalar constructions. *Regional Studies*, 50(1), pp. 52-78.
- Zhang, J., Chen, H. and Wang, Y. (2019). The Evolution of Thoughts on Urban and Rural Planning in China Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China [新中国 70 年城乡规划思潮的总体演进]. *Urban Planning International*, 34(4), pp. 8-15.
- Zhang, L. (2020). China: Revised Land Administration Law takes effect. *Library of congress*, 20 February. Available at: <https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/china-revised-land-administration-law-takes-effect/> [Accessed on: 26 February 2021].
- Zhang, L. and Zhao, S. (2003). Reinterpretation of China's under-urbanization: a systemic perspective. *Habitat International*, 27(3), pp. 459-483.
- Zhang, L.N. and Yang, K. (2006). Jiyuan to transfer three tourism spots for free [济源: 三景区携手无偿转让]. *Henan Daily*, 16 May. Available at: <http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2006-05-16/04548933788s.shtml> [Accessed on: 28 May 2020].
- Zhang, R. (2016). Status quo, problems and countermeasures of rural labour transfer in Henan Province [河南省农村劳动力转移的现状问题及对策]. *Journal of Nanyang Normal University*, (11), pp. 39-43.
- Zhang, S. (2011). The study on problems and measures of the current financing platform of local government [当前地方政府融资平台存在的问题及对策探讨]. *Modern Urban Research*, (12), pp. 56-60.
- Zhang, S., Gao, Y., Feng, Z. and Sun, W. (2015). PPP application in infrastructure development in China: Institutional analysis and implications. *International journal of project management*, 33(3), pp. 497-509.
- Zhang, W. and Li, S. (1998). Cross-regional competition and privatisation of State-owned Enterprise in China [地区间竞争与中国国有企业的民营化]. *Economic Research Journal*, 12, pp. 13-22.
- Zhang, X. (2006). Fiscal decentralization and political centralization in China: Implications for growth and inequality. *Journal of comparative economics*, 34(4), pp. 713-726.
- Zhang, Y. (2015). Great clearances: The Chinese version of enclosure movement, 1991—2013 [大清场: 中国的圈地运动及其与英国的比较]. *China Agricultural University Journal of Social Sciences Edition*, 32(1), pp. 19-45.

- Zhao, L. and Yuan, P. (2014). Rural cooperative in China: diversity and dynamics. *Chinese Economy*, 47(4), pp. 32-62.
- Zhao, S. (2009). 2009 Government Work Report. *Jiyuan Government*, March, 13. Available at: http://jiyuan.gov.cn/zwgk/xxgkml/zfgzbg/201807/t20180726_387790.html (Accessed on: 6 January 2021).
- Zhao, S. (2016). Pass the torch of Yugong spirit to the endless generations [让愚公移山精神薪火传承生生不息]. In Party history research office of Jiyuan. (eds.) *Interviews with successive party secretaries and mayors of Jiyuan*. Henan People's Press, pp. 167-180.
- Zhao, X. and Zhou, Y. (2002). A review of China's urbanization road and urbanization theory since the reform [改革以来中国城市化道路及城市化理论研究述评]. *Social Sciences in China*, (2), pp. 132-138.
- Zhao, X., Zhou, Y. and Cao, G. (2002). On the difficulty and practical mistakes in the small town priority strategy [小城镇重点战略的困境与实践误区]. *City Planning Review*, 26(10), pp. 36-40.
- Zhengxin research institute at Central University of Finance and Economics (2018). *China's PPP Industry Development Report (2017-2018)* [中国PPP蓝皮书: 中国PPP行业发展报告 (2017~2018)]. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press.
- Zhong, L.J. and Mol, A.P. (2008). Participatory environmental governance in China: Public hearings on urban water tariff setting. *Journal of Environmental Management*, 88(4), pp. 899-913.
- Zhou, F., Wu, L., Zuo, W. and Li, S. (2018). From industrial urbanization, land urbanization to people-centered urbanization: a sociological investigation on the Chinese pathway to urbanization[从工业城镇化, 土地城镇化到人口城镇化: 中国特色城镇化道路的社会学考察]. *Journal of social development*, (1), pp. 42-64.
- Zhou, L. (2007). Governing China's Local Officials: An Analysis of Promotion Tournament Model [中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究]. *Economic Research Journal*, (7), pp. 36-50.
- Zhou, L. and Wang, T. (2014). Social media: A new vehicle for city marketing in China. *Cities*, 37, pp. 27-32.
- Zhou, X. (2005). Property Rights as a Relational Concept: A sociological approach [关系产权: 产权制度的一个社会学解释]. *Sociological Research*, 2(3), pp. 1-31.
- Zhou, Y. and Ma, L. J. C. (2000). Economic restructuring and suburbanization in China. *Urban Geography*, 21(3), pp. 205-236.
- Zhu, J. (2005). A transitional institution for the emerging land market in urban China. *Urban Studies*, 42(8), pp.1369-1390.

- Zhu, R. (2011). Transcripts of Zhu Rongji's speeches, Vol.1 [朱镕基讲话实录·第一卷]. Beijing: People's Publishing House.
- Žižek, S. (1989). *The sublime object of ideology*. London: Verso.
- Žižek, S. (2019). Speech at the Oxford Union, video recording, *Youtube*, viewed 12 June, 2019, Available at: <https://youtu.be/545x4EldHlg>.
- Zou, D. (2004). Viewpoints concerned with the urbanization of China's countryside towns [对中国城镇化问题的几点认识]. *Urban planning forum*, (3), pp.3-5.
- Zou, Y., Zhao, W. and Mason, R. (2014). Marketization of collective-owned rural land: A breakthrough in Shenzhen, China. *Sustainability*, 6(12), pp. 9114-9123.