

Coalescence and Conflict:

Hybrid Intervention against the Lord's Resistance Army in Central Africa

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Abstract

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"Coalescence and Conflict: Hybrid Intervention against the Lord's Resistance Army in Central Africa"

There has been a growing acknowledgment that external interventions into the Global South too often fail to account for local agency, which has inspired innovative approaches seeking to better understand the processes of engagement between 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' forces that go beyond liberal peace discourses. Related to these discourses, recent years have seen a resurgence of strategic interest in Africa by the United States, as characterised by the creation of the US military's Africa Command (AFRICOM). Regional institutions such as the African Union may be instrumental in legitimising the work of interveners, as is the increasing role of globally-networked civil society groups. One such undertaking is the multinational effort to eliminate the Ugandan rebels known as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and protect civilians in Central Africa.

This thesis focuses on the regional Counter-LRA initiative, and critically examines both its military and civilian components, as well as the AFRICOM activities which are responsible for training and advising the bulk of the African Union's (mostly Ugandan) military task force. I employ the conceptual framework of hybridity in order to assess asymmetric power relations between and among the various actors involved. This research addresses a lack of scholarship that has failed to account for the lived experiences of locals currently affected by the LRA conflict and its international response. Moreover, it explores the political and historical context from which this effort originates--the considerable US military aid provided to Uganda.

My arguments are threefold: 1) Despite the predominant academic critiques to the contrary, current Counter-LRA efforts are both militarily effective and locally legitimate; 2) In stark contrast, the US-Ugandan security relationship has deleterious consequences inside Uganda in terms of human rights and democratic accountability; 3) The role of civil society is a determining factor both in the emancipatory nature of Counter-LRA activities and why it differs from authoritarian trends in Uganda. This research contributes to broader understandings of the tensions between the liberal peace in Africa and the militarisation of US-Africa policy. Additionally, it provides an opportunity to assess the utility of the conceptual framework of hybridity against robust empirical fieldwork.

Keywords: Hybridity, LRA, Africa, AFRICOM, Uganda, critical security

Declaration

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Biographical Information

Joshua Shurley is a PhD candidate in international politics at the University of Manchester under the supervision of Dr. Piers Robinson and Professor James Pattison. His research focuses on security studies, US foreign policy, and military/defence activities in Africa. He holds a MA in Security and Intelligence Studies (Distinction) from the University of Buckingham, where his dissertation examined intelligence priorities for the US Africa Command (AFRICOM). He also holds a MA in International Relations and a BA in Anthropology from California State University, Fresno. His professional background prior to academia was in the United States military.

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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction, Background, and Literature Review

1.1 Introduction:

This thesis examines a multinational intervention being undertaken in Africa, driven in part by global civil society actors, implemented on the ground via the African Union and five national governments, but largely accomplished via proxies within the language of US military 'capacity-building partnerships.' Since late 2011, special US military advisers are leading and training African troops to pursue and eliminate the elusive Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebel group across three weakly-governed African states,¹ protect civilians in LRA-affected areas, and monitor peace and development efforts at a local level with civil society actors and relief organisations. The main effort of this operation is a large contingent of troops from the Republic of Uganda (which spawned the LRA over two decades previously) who are advised and led by a small number of US special operations forces. Adding to this picture is the global phenomenon of a viral YouTube video by an international advocacy group, whose public relations campaign to raise awareness of the LRA's atrocities has itself become a lightning rod for criticism by lobbying for a military solution to the conflict. Moreover, as a backdrop to the current effort underway to address the LRA threat in Central Africa is the US-Ugandan security partnership upon which the AU mission relies, which itself has garnered significant criticism for militarising the region at the expense of human rights and democratic accountability.

Aside from an expanded insight of Africa's role as an intervention target of the West, this case study provides an improved understanding of current ideas surrounding the liberal peace and its modalities of intervention, the role of US policy in regional affairs, as well as the role of non-traditional actors in formulating foreign policy. The conceptual framework on which this research rests is that of the *hybrid peace*, or hybridity theory. In this context, hybridity can be seen as a useful tool with which to appraise external interventions and their indigenous responses, and the processes whereby this 'hybrid' politics coalesces, conflicts, and re-coalesces to produce a hybridised form of peace.² The notion of hybridity underpins this examination of the US, Uganda, and their collaboration with other actors in what is known as the counter-LRA (C-LRA) intervention and its effects on the lived experiences of locals themselves, and amelioration of structural violence on affected populations—both in the target states—and within Uganda itself. This work explores the relationship between global and local civil society actors and the role

¹ The LRA originated in Uganda, but current LRA-affected areas are in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, and the Republic of South Sudan.

² Roger MacGinty, "Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace." *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 41, Iss. 4, pp. 391-412, 397.

each plays in framing the issues for policymakers, how the responding intervention takes shape, and the reaction to it. In addition, it seeks to contribute to current understandings of the strengths and limitations of using a critical 'hybrid lens' approach through which to describe and explain intervention dynamics in Africa and the developing world. This research sets out to fill in the void left by others working on Uganda's LRA conflict and the US role in it, much of which is ahistorical and two-dimensional. It provides a timely look at the rapid evolution of the international nature of the LRA insurgency, intervening states' response to it, intervening states' use of the C-LRA effort as justification to expand their presence into heretofore unseen ways, and the growing role of international and regional organisations, as well as civil society actors in these emerging socio-political arrangements taking place in central Africa. It also applies and tests the conceptual framework of hybridity against first-hand empirical field research across four African states. The findings of this research are relevant for policymakers, civil society, international relations and security studies scholars, students of African politics, as well as those interested in the increasingly blurred nexus between humanitarianism/advocacy/civil society and military operations.

1.1.2 Thesis Overview

This chapter sets out to introduce the subject, provide some historical context for the LRA conflict, and concludes with a review of the academic literature that this thesis engages with and contributes to. Chapter Two discusses the theoretical framework that this project rests upon (hybridity), followed by a detailed discussion of issues surrounding case study specifics, methodology and research ethics. The following three chapters present my empirical findings. Chapter Three examines the vital role of the Republic of Uganda to the entire C-LRA endeavour, including the role of US military assistance there, and its implications for domestic politics in Uganda. Chapter Four focuses on the C-LRA mission as it is taking place in the three target states, and the resulting issues surrounding external and local perceptions of security, protection, and legitimacy. Chapter Five deals with the important role of non-military/civil society actors in the manifestation of this intervention, and the myriad responses to it. Finally, Chapter Six culminates with a detailed discussion of findings, the hybrid conceptual framework, and provides a broader, concluding discussion of this project's implications and potential areas for future research.

My objectives for this thesis are twofold. First, I seek to develop theoretical understandings of hybridity and apply MacGinty's conceptual framework (which will be discussed in detail in the

following chapter). Secondly, I hope to contribute and improve upon current (mis)understandings of the LRA conflict and the intervention now underway to end it. I principally utilise fieldwork-based primary research to accomplish these goals in order to provide an analysis that is both academically significant in terms of theoretical development, and empirically productive with a high degree of real-world relevance.

1.2 LRA Conflict Background

This section provides a historical background of the LRA conflict in order to set the stage for following discussions and areas with which this research engages. While not meant to be exhaustive, this overview is important to lay out the historical contextual understandings that will be discussed.

1.2.1 *Discontent in Acholiland: The Roots of the LRA*

Known as the “Pearl of Africa” during the colonial era,³ Uganda to some has become associated with violent dictators and child soldiers since its independence—an unfair characterisation in its totality—but not one entirely without merit. Following independence in 1962, elite power struggles and large scale ethno-political violence were a common reality for Ugandans until the 1980s, and for people in its northern regions, this continued well into the 2000s.

The fall of the Milton Obote’s regime in 1985 signified the beginning of the end of Uganda’s widespread violence and the excesses of its post-colonial autocratic leaders, both Obote and Idi Amin. For six months from mid-1985 to January 1986, a military commander from northern Uganda’s Acholi ethnic group named Tito Okello declared himself president of Uganda. The Acholi had historically played a large part in Uganda’s military dating back to colonial times and for that reason had been the target of several purges by both Obote and Amin, who preferred their own ethnic kinsmen to dominate the armed forces. Now they were one of the marginalised groups who had successfully waged a hard fought insurgent campaign to oust Obote. After a power struggle between Okello and a former civil servant named Yoweri Museveni (who himself had been waging a rival insurgency for some years), Museveni and his National Resistance Army⁴ seized the presidency, where he has since remained.

³ Winston Churchill, *My African Journey*. New York: WW Norton and Co., 1991, 118.

⁴ Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) later morphed into the National Resistance Movement (NRM), the country’s sole political party for many years during one-party rule and which still remains the dominant party in its internal politics under the current multiparty system, as will be discussed further in Chapter Three.

One of Museveni's first acts was to unite and pacify the war-torn country. During negotiations between Okello and Museveni, a power-sharing agreement was reportedly reached, although many of the conditions of the 1985 Nairobi Agreement were never met by Museveni, who it seems had by that time seized sufficient power to insulate himself from removal, despite disarming ethnically-based potential rival combatant groups. The NRM allege that their refusal to share power with Okello's faction (supported by Zaire's Mobutu) was due to their widespread human rights abuses during the anti-Obote insurgency.⁵ By 1987 a violent Acholi uprising occurred called the Holy Spirit Movement—led by a spirit medium called Alice Lakawena.⁶ By 1988, Lakawena's rebellion was crushed and she fled to Kenya, but remnants carried on under the leadership of a former Catholic altar boy with similar powers of a spirit medium called Joseph Kony. Kony began to inspire followers with his visions, powers, and prophecies which increasingly took on an apocalyptic and vengeful tone. The widespread belief that Kony had some sort of powerful magic at his disposal no doubt helped add to the mystique and reputation surrounding him. His band of fighters came to be known as the Lord's Resistance Army and sought to oust Museveni, capture Kampala, and impose an Acholi-led theocratic government based on the Biblical Ten Commandments.

1.2.2 *LRA Notoriety Meets Uganda's Counterinsurgency Response*

Although initially supported by some elements of Acholi society, the LRA's methods became increasingly unpopular. By 1991-92, according to many accounts, they began shifting their tactics away from attacks on government soldiers to punitive attacks on Acholi civilians, whom Kony perceived as not being sufficiently supportive of his movement. When local militias began to form against such attacks, Kony's violence escalated, becoming a hallmark signature of the northern Uganda conflict—including not only killing, abductions, and rapes—but extreme practices of cutting off ears, lips, noses, and entire limbs, and forcing their victims to mutilate, rape and murder their own family members at gunpoint.⁷ During the ensuing years, the notoriety of such vicious methods by the LRA and the violent reactions by Ugandan soldiers against civilians in the north began to displace the original conflict narrative of very real grievances between the Acholi and Museveni's NRM.

⁵ See Bethuel Kiplagat, "Reaching the 1985 Nairobi Agreement." *ACCORD website: Protracted Conflict, Elusive Peace: Initiatives to End the Violence in Northern Uganda*, 2010. <<http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/reaching-1985-nairobi-agreement-2002#sthash.7Wdre48C.dpuf>>

⁶ Born Alice Auma, she was a spiritual healer and oracle of sorts until 1986 when, amidst the NRM seizure of power, she became "Lakawena," Acholi for "messenger." She has been known as Alice Lakawena from that time until her death in exile in 2007.

⁷ See Peter Eichstaedt, *First Kill Your Family: Child Soldiers of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army*. Chicago, IL: Lawrence Hill, 2009.

Throughout the 1990s Kony's LRA brutalised northern Uganda with their violent tactics, looting and destroying entire communities, while the nascent state's armed forces seemed powerless (or to some, unwilling) to stop them. The Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) often reacted harshly to LRA attacks on northern villages with their own brutality, fuelled by suspicions that locals were assisting Kony's activities. The civilians were caught in the middle between the LRA on one hand, who imposed strict rules of obedience in providing intelligence, supplies, and people (usually in the form of children abducted at gunpoint) and the retaliating UPDF on the other hand, who consistently failed to prevent such attacks but seemed to blame the victims for them occurring nevertheless.

As the war progressed, the UPDF's approach to the LRA included "a combination of counterinsurgency operations and support to local anti-LRA militia groups," including several major offensives (each designed to decisively defeat the LRA), including Operation North (1998), Operation Iron Fist (2002), and Operation Lightning Thunder (2008-09).⁸ Perhaps the most controversial move by Kampala was the forced removal of over two million northerners into squalid internally-displaced persons (IDP) camps, ostensibly for their "protection" from the LRA. Life in the camps destroyed livelihoods and traditional kinship practices of the Acholi people, and also led to a devastating increase in preventable deaths by disease and hunger. Dolan describes this as a form of "Social Torture," seen as a punishment for the Acholi who spawned the rebellion against Museveni in the early days of his regime. An entire generation of northerners (not just Acholi) were born and raised in the camps, while the outside world (and the rest of Uganda for that matter) hardly took notice.

1.2.3 Regional Conflict Dynamics

Importantly during this period, the LRA began launching their attacks and fleeing across the border to then-Sudan's restive southern region, and their insurgency has been intrinsically linked to regional politics ever since. Uganda and Sudan have long had an adversarial relationship until recently, at times severing diplomatic relations with one another.⁹ In effect, the Ugandan LRA served as a proxy force for Sudan (who provided arms, food, supplies, and safe haven) and would conduct violent cross-border surprise attacks deep into Uganda and then slip

⁸ Alexis Arieff and Lauren Ploch, "The Lord's Resistance Army: The US Response." *CRS Report for Congress (R42094)*. US Congressional Research Service, 11 April 2012, 5.

⁹ Andrew Green, "South Sudan Unexpectedly Drives Uganda and Sudan's Detente." *World Politics Review Online*, 15 October 2015. Accessed 01 January 2016.
<<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/16954/south-sudan-unexpectedly-drives-uganda-and-sudan-s-detente>>

quietly back into Sudan afterwards. Meanwhile, Sudanese rebels who had close ties to Museveni received the same type of safe haven and support in Uganda while serving to destabilise al-Bashir's Sudan.¹⁰ This tit-for-tat proxy war ensued for the better part of two decades.

In 1996, the mass abduction of 139 school girls from St. Mary's College in Aboke by the LRA made a brief appearance onto international headlines.¹¹ After a visit in late 2003, then-UN Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland called the situation in northern Uganda "a moral outrage," and the "worst humanitarian crisis in the world."¹² The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued its first-ever arrest warrants for Kony and his top lieutenants in 2005 (with no mention of how it would be enforced), prompting a vigorous debate over the utility of such vague international justice mechanisms versus the traditional tribal justice rituals known as *mato oput*.¹³

1.2.4 *The LRA Threat Moves West*

By 2006, the LRA had moved out of northern Uganda and remained in safe areas in southern Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) during the Juba peace talks. These negotiations between 2006 and 2008 saw a brief respite from the violence, but after Kony refused to sign the final deal, Museveni launched Operation Lightning Thunder (OLT) in 2008, an offensive against the LRA positions across the its borders into Sudan and the DRC.

Despite some initial successes, the operation was ultimately a failure. Kony retaliated with several high-profile attacks, killing over 900 civilians and abducting thousands more, in remote settlements in the DRC's Garamba National Park, highlighting the LRAs ability to attack with impunity—and the opposing government's inability to stop them.¹⁴ Ugandan forces were pulled

¹⁰ The rebels, known as the Sudanese People's Liberation Front (SPLA) now lead the current post-independence government in the Republic of South Sudan since 2011.

¹¹ See Els de Temmerman, *Aboke Girls: Children Abducted in Northern Uganda*. Kampala: Fountain Press, 2001.

¹² Egeland cited reports of over 20,000 children having been abducted in the preceding five years alone to serve as sex slaves and fighters, as well as the problem of the "night commuters" (thousands of children sleeping on the streets of northern towns to avoid violence in their own villages). See "Uganda Conflict 'Worse Than Iraq': The Humanitarian Situation in Northern Uganda is Worse Than in Iraq, or Anywhere Else in the World, a Senior United Nations Official Has Said." *BBC News Online*, 10 November 2003. Accessed 29 February 2012. <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3256929.stm>>

¹³ See Tim Allen, *Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army*. London: Zed Books, 2006. See Also Dennis Pain, *"The Bending of the Spears": Producing Consensus for Peace and Development in Northern Uganda*. London: International Alert/Kacoke Madit, 1997.

¹⁴ OLT, while a UPDF offensive, included some SPLA forces from southern Sudan, and Congolese troops as well.

out of the DRC in the spring of 2009. The OLT fiasco coincided with the creation of a newly-formed Pentagon command dedicated solely to military operations in Africa, and was characterised by the highest level of covert US military support to the UPDF at that time (including a team of seventeen advisers who assisted in the planning of OLT, as well as providing communications and logistical support).¹⁵ US support (especially military support) for Uganda increased dramatically since the Bush-era War on Terror, owing not only to fighting the LRA, but to Uganda's role in buttressing against Sudanese influence in the region, as well as Uganda's deployment of peacekeeping troops to Somalia.¹⁶

The LRA conflict did not end there—it merely relocated to the remote jungle region where the borders of DRC, South Sudan, and Central African Republic meet. Kony has remained at large and while the LRA may be smaller in numbers than at its height, the attacks against civilians have continued. Since the LRA's leaving Uganda in 2006, many northern Ugandans have left the camps and returned home, where—although the security situation has greatly improved—they continue to deal with the conflict's aftermath, including land disputes and the failings of traditional inter-clan justice systems to remedy them after being separated from their ancestral lands for more than twenty years.¹⁷ Unfortunately for northern Ugandans, the end of the violence there coincided with a sharp increase in international awareness of the LRA. Just as the LRA issue became better known (not just by academics, activists, journalists and policymakers, but by graphic novel authors as well),¹⁸ the threat was no longer directly relevant to northern Ugandans, who now had to contend with the difficult aftermath. This case of 'too little, too late' culminated in the *Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act*, passed by the US Congress in 2010 and supported by President Obama.¹⁹ This effort was largely the result of unprecedented bipartisan lobbying of both the president and

¹⁵ Jeffrey Gettleman and Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Aided a Failed Plan to Rout Ugandan Rebels," *New York Times Online*, 6 February 2009. Accessed 10 December 2011.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/07/world/africa/07congo.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>

¹⁶ See Joshua Shurley, "Seeing the Jungle for the Trees: How Kony 2012 Fits in to the Big Picture of US-Africa Policy," *SIRS Consultancy: Monitor Online Magazine*, Vol. 1, Iss. 2, May 2012, pp. 6-11. Accessed 14 June 2012. <http://issuu.com/sirsconsultancy/docs/monitor_issue_2>

¹⁷ "Uganda: Escalating Land Disputes in the North," *United Nations IRIN website*, 17 February 2011. Accessed 27 March 2012. <<http://www.irinnews.org/report/91957/uganda-escalating-land-disputes-in-the-north>>

¹⁸ See David Axe and Tim Hamilton, *Army of God: Joseph Kony's War in Central Africa*. New York, NY: Public Affairs Press, 2013.

¹⁹ Barack Obama, "Statement by the President on the Signing of the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009." *White House Office of the Press Secretary website*, 24 May 2010. Accessed 19 July 2012. <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-signing-lords-resistance-army-disarmament-and-northern-uganda-r>>

members of congress by advocacy groups such as the Enough Project, Invisible Children, Resolve, and Human Rights Watch finally coming to fruition.

1.2.4 *The New Phase of the LRA Conflict*

In October 2011, Obama announced the deployment of one-hundred US military advisers to help the four affected African states eradicate the LRA.²⁰ In November 2011, the US troops began arriving to oversee C-LRA operations with its dual mandate to pursue the LRA and protect civilians. What was known as Operation: Observant Compass was underway. Interestingly, in that same month was the release of a Hollywood film called *Machine Gun Preacher*, which popularized the true events of an American missionary who fought the LRA alongside SPLA rebels to rescue abducted children and protect the orphanage he started. By March 2012 activities under Observant Compass would merge with the newly created African Union mandate to end the LRA threat. In April 2012, the *Kony 2012* video became a viral internet sensation, raising awareness of the conflict, and also sparking controversy of the role played by such NGOs in calling for increased US military presence in Africa and its support for an authoritarian Ugandan regime. The US advisory role in the C-LRA mission has expanded since its inception, allowing for US advisers to not only assist in planning but to lead operations in the field, as well as increase in its numbers to no more than 300 US military personnel, many of whom support the OV-22 Osprey aircraft (especially suited for carrying out special operations missions in the region's remote terrain). While Kony remains at large, large numbers of defections have dwindled the LRA's ranks, including several subordinate leaders within his inner circle.

1.3 Literature Review

With a better understanding of the historical context of the LRA conflict in hand, we may now turn to the business of improving upon current understandings of the nature of the LRA conflict and the subsequent intervention underway in central Africa within the broader social and geopolitical context. The following sections trace some of these understandings and highlight the gaps in the scholarly literature which my research sets out to fill in.

²⁰ Mareike Schomerus, Tim Allen, and Koen Vlassenroot, "Obama Takes on the LRA: Why Washington Sent Troops to Central Africa." *Foreign Affairs Online*, 15 November 2011. Accessed 21 November 2011. <<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136673/mareike-schomerus-tim-allen-and-koen-vlassenroot/obama-takes-on-the-lra?page=2>>

1.3.1 Africa, the State, and the Liberal Peace

Africa has long been popularly presented as being a miserable place in need of rescue, even “perpetually dangerous,” due to its high occurrence of political violence and instability.²¹ This image sharpened as the 1990s saw an increase in violence “driven by the opportunities of neoliberal globalization.”²² The 2000s have in fact seen a decline in active armed conflicts, although the intensity of those raging on currently remains a worthwhile cause for alarm. But as Francis notes, “Africa’s peace and security challenges have emerged as a global concern and as rekindled international interest in the continent, as manifested by the ‘war on terrorism’ and the new predatory capitalist scramble (China and the West) for energy resources (oil and gas) in Africa.”²³ As a result, Africa continues to be a hotbed of negatively associated activity that warrants attention from the Global North. Since the end of the Cold War, some have argued that rulers of weak states with natural resources have had to reconfigure their political calculus in ways that protects their regimes security first and foremost.²⁴ While some argue for the cutting of aid that enables the corruption and conflict exacerbated by “kleptocratic” African rulers,²⁵ others argue that it is by improving how powerful states intervene in targeted ways that bears the best results and minimizes human insecurity and the root causes of both direct conflict and structural violence.²⁶

The prevailing paradigm which currently justifies and necessitates intervention into Africa is the so-called liberal peace. Dating back to thinkers like Kant, Locke, and Paine, the liberal peace posits that liberal democratic states are peaceful in their conduct, and thus are desirable to emulate (at times justifying war or intervention to achieve the desired ‘peace’). The liberal peace may be thought of as “the dominant form of peacemaking as promoted by leading states, international organisations, and international financial institutions through their peace support

²¹ David Francis, *Peace and Conflict in Africa*. London: Zed Books, 2008, 7.

²² David Francis, 7. See also Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Security and Development*. London: Zed Books, 2002. See also Mary Kaldor, *Human Security*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007.

²³ David Francis, *Peace and Conflict in Africa*, 8. See Also Tom Burgis, *The Looting Machine: Warlords, Oligarchs, Corporations, Smugglers and the Theft of Africa’s Wealth*. New York, NY: Public Affairs Press, 2015.

²⁴ See William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States*. London: Lynn-Reiner Publishers, 1998. See also Ali Mari Tripp, *Museveni’s Uganda: Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime*. London: Lynn-Reiner Publishers, 2010.

²⁵ See Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux: 2009.

²⁶ See Oliver P. Richmond, “Liberal Peace Transitions: A Rethink is Urgent.” *Open Democracy website*. 19 November 2009. Accessed 21 July 2013. <<http://www.opendemocracy.net/oliver-p-richmond/liberal-peace-transitions-rethink-is-urgent>>

interventions."²⁷ This push towards the liberal peace as the dominant form of peacemaking is used synonymously with the interests of the Global North, and "reflects the ideological and practical interests of leading states... and institutions."²⁸ The liberal peace as a set of practices, beliefs and language that perpetuates a Western-dominated paradigm is focused on what may be seen by critics as self-perpetuating, exploitative, and insufficient to achieve lasting, structural peace. Experience suggests it will ultimately be self-defeating if it lacks legitimacy in the eyes of those on whose behalf it sets out to intervene.

Modern thinkers such as Doyle have revived the notion of the pacification of foreign relations vis-à-vis liberal states.²⁹ How powerful states and international and regional bodies respond to the various emergencies occurring in so-called weak states (particularly in Africa) is enormously varied. These types of interventions carried out by self-described liberal states and the liberal international order may be seen as part of the larger liberal peace project, which seeks to impose some form of order and stability on the Global South. To Gelot and Söderbaum "our rapidly changing global landscape, in which 'outsiders' intervene in the affairs of 'insiders,' challenges the ways in which we can frame and respond to questions of intervention."³⁰

MacGinty adds that by enacting policies of intervention and stabilisation, "Western states have fetishized control and order with consequences for peace, liberty and localized autonomy."³¹ In this way, intervention may be seen as "a special kind of response to the diagnosis of an 'extraordinary' and assumedly time-limited set of circumstances (conflict, underdevelopment, lack of governance and so on) in which action is considered necessary for a delimited period of time."³²

As it relates to the liberal peace, Shaw and Mbabazi refer to "two Ugandas."³³ In this vein, the longstanding policy of US military assistance to Uganda as a pre-existing security engagement may be viewed in two distinct yet overlapping ways: one may be seen as the reasonable provision of aid to a democratic African state which is compatible with a version of the liberal

²⁷ Roger Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2011, 22.

²⁸ Roger Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance*, 20.

²⁹ See Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics". *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80, Iss. 4 (December 1986), 1151–1169.

³⁰ Linnea Gelot and Fredrik Söderbaum, 135.

³¹ Roger MacGinty, "Against Stabilisation," *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-6, 1.

³² Linnea Gelot and Fredrik Söderbaum, 137.

³³ See Timothy M. Shaw and Pamela K. Mbabazi, "Two Ugandas and a 'Liberal Peace'? Lessons From Uganda about Conflict and Development at the Start of a New Century." *Global Society*, Vol. 21, No. 4, October 2007, pp. 567-578.

peace, and the second which may be seen as propping up an increasingly undemocratic regime characterised by structural violence and alienation, especially in the north.³⁴ This duality encapsulates both a "challenge to emancipatory versions of the liberal peace" in which "regional instability or human rights abuses demand ameliorative responses", as well as a warning to "users of the liberal peace perspective to adopt a nuanced picture of the liberal peace that is mindful of variations... and is able to accept, or at least absorb, variations in the quality of 'peace' on offer."³⁵ This description aptly highlights the problematic nature of the liberal peace in the context of Uganda and the region and sets out some of the issues to be addressed in this research. In particular, the notion that Western narratives of 'rescuing' vulnerable Africans from Kony the warlord may in fact be shielding gross violations of human rights and democratic accountability through pursuit of Washington's favoured neoliberal reforms and military assistance programmes must be critically examined against the perceptions of local actors and empirical realities on the ground.

Richmond and Mac Ginty argue that by shifting some of the focus away from the liberal peace discourses and reorienting more toward narratives rooted in local agency, improved understandings of subaltern views may be reached that say much about the changing conditions of peace, but which are grounded in real-world events.³⁶ Such a 'local turn', they argue, "reopens the debate on power and peace, social justice, the evolving framework and terms of emancipation, and on who are the subjects in IR."³⁷ Similarly, Kevin Dunn notes that Western scholars have too often given short shrift to the "complexities and contradictions of African international relations", adding that the LRA case in particular "critically challenges some of the assumptions traditional IR makes conflict, security, the state, and regionalism."³⁸ This reorientation toward the local as it relates to both C-LRA activities and the US-Ugandan security relationship provide some important empirical insights into the vagaries and varieties of the liberal peace, as well as prevailing notions involving the role of the state in these processes. The degree to which the so-called liberal peace is liberal, and to which its means and ends are in line with liberal values, is certainly arguable and dependent on any given narrative. What this research seeks to achieve is a refined understanding of the dynamics involved with C-LRA and

³⁴ Timothy M. Shaw and Pamela K. Mbabazi, "Two Ugandas and a 'Liberal Peace'?" 569.

³⁵ Timothy M. Shaw and Pamela K. Mbabazi, "Two Ugandas and a 'Liberal Peace'?" 569.

³⁶ Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver P. Richmond, "The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace." *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 5, 2013, pp. 763-783, 764-765.

³⁷ Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver P. Richmond, "The Local Turn in Peace Building", 780.

³⁸ Kevin C. Dunn, "The Lord's Resistance Army and African International Relations." *African Security*, Vol. 3, Iss. 1, 2010, pp. 46-63, 46.

the forms of politics which enable it, as perceived by the various actors involved across a wide spectrum of power.

The following section discusses what appears to be the favoured instrument of US-Africa policy: that of the US military's geographic command dedicated to operations on the continent.

1.3.2 *US-Africa Policy and the Rise of AFRICOM*

After the end of the Cold War, Africa slipped further off the US foreign policy agenda as concerns there became increasingly marginal, relegated to mid-and lower level bureaucrats to implement various policies.³⁹ With the launch of the Global War on Terror after the 9/11 attacks, however, there was once again to be a unifying strategic framework that took Africa into consideration. US forces were soon present in several African countries working to eradicate Islamist networks it viewed as potential threats to stability. In 2008, the United States created the US Africa Command (AFRICOM), a military command dedicated to Africa, citing the increase in Africa's "military, strategic, and economic importance in global affairs."⁴⁰ This newfound concern with African peace and stability coincided with increasing reliance on African natural resource extraction (not just oil, but natural gas as well as minerals such as diamonds, gold, manganese, cobalt, copper, and chrome)⁴¹ and competition for China for access to these resources.

Up to that point, Africa was the one discreet region of the world that did not have its own focused US military command coordinating efforts there. Early in its inception, AFRICOM touted its "3D" approach to how AFRICOM would do business—"defense, diplomacy, and development."⁴² By design, AFRICOM espoused an interagency, "whole-of-government" philosophy that had long been called for by some critics within the US defence establishment, characterised by an unprecedented joint focus with organizations such as the State Department and USAID, as well as the many NGOs at work across Africa. Proponents have claimed that there should be "nothing to fear" about AFRICOM, so long as it remains true to its originally

³⁹ See Peter J. Schraeder, *US Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

⁴⁰ "What We Do," AFRICOM website. Accessed 24 May 2010. <<http://www.africom.mil/what-we-do>>

⁴¹ See Pierre Abramovici, "The New Scramble for Africa." *Le Monde Diplomatique*, 7 July 2004.

⁴² Robert Moeller, "The Truth About AFRICOM: No, the US military is not taking over Africa, Here's what we are actually doing." *Foreign Policy* website. 21 July 2010. Accessed 12 Jul 2012. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/07/21/the_truth_about_africom>

publicised interagency nature and strikes a responsible balance between its military and non-military capabilities.⁴³

Despite such statements, the creation of AFRICOM has generated controversy and garnered enormous criticism. The narrative of those opposing AFRICOM is summed up by anthropologist Jeremy Keenan, who decries AFRICOM as yet another neo-imperialist incursion into Africa, pushing its War on Terror on people long accustomed to oppression and human insecurity.⁴⁴ Others fear that US policies via AFRICOM are deligitimising regional organisations such as the African Union, while “promoting a cycle of militarization, radicalizing both its US proxies, and its enemies.”⁴⁵ In a 2008 report by Refugees International, the imbalance between US military and non-military resources and its “perversion of aid” was cited for its prediction that the US counterterrorist agenda would overshadow any attempts at providing the help (uncoupled with military assistance) that states and people in Africa need most.⁴⁶ Echoing the dangers of disproportionate military aid, Besteman adds, “current ratio in US funding for defense versus diplomatic/development operations is 17 to 1,” and adds that this imbalance will only “work against democratic decision-making, civilian controlled governance, and participatory citizenship.”⁴⁷ Although specifics about what AFRICOM is doing on a daily basis in Africa are frustratingly difficult to come by, the command has sponsored activities in forty-nine of Africa’s fifty-four states.⁴⁸

Many of these criticisms appear to have been validated in the years since AFRICOM’s creation, as the original public “3D” rhetoric of AFRICOM has been quietly deemphasized,⁴⁹ and civilian diplomatic and development posts within the command remain chronically short-staffed. Its actions overall seem to indicate that AFRICOM is concerned far less with human development

⁴³ See Robert Gribbin, “Implementing AFRICOM: Tread Carefully.” *Foreign Service Journal*. May 2008, pp. 25-31.

⁴⁴ Jeremy Keenan, “AFRICOM: Its Reality, Rhetoric, and Future.” *US Strategy in Africa: AFRICOM, Terrorism, and Security Challenges* (David J. Francis, ed.). New York: Routledge Press, 2010, pp. 113-129, 113.

⁴⁵ Adam Branch, *Displacing Human Rights: War and Intervention in Northern Uganda*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, 228.

⁴⁶ See Mark Malan, “US Civil-Military Imbalance for Global Engagement: Lessons From the Operational Level in Africa.” *Refugees International*. July 2008.

⁴⁷ Catherine Besteman, “Counter AFRICOM,” in *The Network of Concerned Anthropologists Steering Committee’s Counter-Counterinsurgency Manual*. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2009, pp. 115-132, 123-124.

⁴⁸ See Nick Turse, “The Pivot to Africa: The Startling Size, Scope, and Growth of U.S. Military Operations on the African Continent,” *TomDispatch website*, 5 September 2013. Accessed 1 February 2014. <<http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/>>

⁴⁹ See Thomas PM Barnett, “AFRICOM Gets Seriously... Nasty.” *Time Magazine website*. 21 September 2011. Accessed 28 February 2012. <<http://nation.time.com/2011/09/21/africom-gets-seriously-nasty/>>

and responsible governance than it is with achieving strategic goals associated with the War on Terror, access to resources, and competition with China for those resources. The arguments surrounding AFRICOM provide a contentious backdrop against which to view the subject of this research. This thesis sets out to glean important insights regarding questions surrounding the nature of AFRICOM (as either helpful and humanitarian or harmful and neo-colonial), based on the US role in militarily addressing the LRA since 2011. What is perhaps most interesting here is the fact that despite the LRA being designated a terrorist group, it is not associated with Islam or anti-Islamist narratives usually associated with the US-led War on Terror. The C-LRA mission provides a unique and intriguing case that generally does not fit within the prevailing conceptualisations of conflict and conflict response.

While AFRICOM encompasses the whole of diverse US military activities in the region, ranging from providing humanitarian aid and disaster response, to direct combat (such as the airstrikes which aided rebels militias in ousting Libya's Gadafi), by far the most common type of engagement is that of 'capacity-building' activities through security partnerships with allied African states such as Uganda.

1.3.3 *AFRICOM and Uganda*

While cordial US-Uganda relations date back to the accession of President Museveni in 1986, and were initially focused on neoliberal economic reforms following the disastrous policies of Milton Obote and Idi Amin, forms of US military aid have steadily increase from the 1990s to the present. Generally speaking, the US supports Uganda's security forces in the form of exchange programmes, military education courses, and joint-training exercises, along with the provision of significant amounts of intelligence-gathering technology, as well as logistical support and base construction, often through private contracting firms.⁵⁰ More specifically, the US military has provided ever-increasing mission support for Ugandan deployments in both Somalia and against the LRA in Central Africa. Despite many critics pointing to the military failures of past C-LRA offensives as reasons to withhold such support,⁵¹ the decision by President Obama to deploy special operations advisers in 2011 indicates that some degree of optimism remains in US policymaking circles that current efforts may yield positive results.

⁵⁰ See Nick Turse, "AFRICOM Goes to War on the Sly: U.S. Officials Talk Candidly (Just Not to Reporters) about Bases, Winning Hearts and Minds, and the 'War' in Africa," *TomDispatch website*, 13 April 2014. Accessed 16 April 2014. <<http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/>>

⁵¹ See Robert L. Feldman, "Why Uganda Has Failed to Defeat the Lord's Resistance Army," *Defense and Security Analysis*, Vol. 24, No. 1, March 2008, pp. 45-52. See also Ronald R. Atkinson, Phil Lancaster, Ledio Cakaj, and Guillaume Lacailee, "Do No Harm: Assessing a Military Approach to the Lord's Resistance Army," *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2, May 2012, pp. 371-382.

In addition to the specific issue of countering the LRA, critics assail the longstanding US-Uganda security relationship on the grounds that it exacerbates militaristic and authoritarian tendencies by Uganda's ruling elites as illustrates yet another example of the expansion of US military dominance through regional proxies. According to Bachmann, this "proactive peacetime engagement' on the continent targets crucial communities and their perceptions" by blending security and development in ways that radically "make the distinction between civil and military intervention vanish."⁵² This research sets out to provide an improved understanding of the efficacy and effects of C-LRA efforts currently underway, which to date have been substantially understudied, particularly within the context of the US security assistance to Uganda. This includes the role of local agency in both contexts--that of affected populations in LRA-affected areas, as well as Ugandans who live under a regime politically and militarily supported by US power.

No examination of the LRA conflict would be complete without an understanding of the role of the vast spectrum of civil society actors which have long been actively involved in response to the conflict, which is discussed in the following two sections.

1.3.4 *Advocacy NGOs and Foreign Policymaking*

Ultimately, even the power of state actors and armed forces is not absolute, as the growing agency of civil society groups such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) engaging in security issues certainly attests to. For example, campaigns to work toward eradicating land mines have been moderately successful in getting states to enact policies that these groups push for, culminating in the 1997 Ottawa Treaty.⁵³ Controversially, other groups have become considerably influential in convincing states to undertake military interventions. One such manifestation involves a group of global activist NGOs involved in the Ugandan civil war and the LRA conflict, who seek to accomplish two broad goals. The first is to raise awareness in the Western world of the LRA scourge (and for some, to turn this awareness into fundraising). Secondly, they have lobbied for the US government to directly involve itself diplomatically and militarily to eradicate the LRA.

⁵² Jan Bachmann, "Kick Down the Door, Clean up the Mess, and Rebuild the House'– The Africa Command and Transformation of the US Military." *Geopolitics*, Vol. 15, Iss. 3, 2010, pp. 564-585, 564.

⁵³ See *International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) website*. Accessed July 12, 2013. <<http://www.icbl.org/intro.php>> See Also Kenneth R. Rutherford, *Disarming States: The International Movement to Ban Landmines*. Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 2010.

The most well-known of these is arguably the San Diego, California-based group, Invisible Children, whose *Kony 2012* production was a thirty-minute video designed for a global audience who had no prior knowledge of Joseph Kony or the LRA. Emotions and selected facts highlighted the simplified narrative that Kony's LRA and their methods were bad, and that the deployment of US forces to support Ugandan soldiers in pursuit of Kony was good. The reaction to *Kony 2012* was swift and mostly negative, denouncing such "slacktivism" (slacker activism)⁵⁴ as being high on emotional rhetoric and low on historical context.

In fact, *Kony 2012* is only one well-known facet of longstanding attempts to craft an anti-LRA US foreign policy. Groups such as Invisible Children, the Enough Project, and Resolve have for years lobbied the US government for increased attention to the LRA conflict. This is in addition to the parallel lobbying (if less organised and considerably less effective) done by many in the US Evangelical Christian community to assist Uganda (seen as a Christian ally) against both the Islamist Sudanese government and the LRA. Interestingly, the 2011 film, *Machine Gun Preacher*, illustrates how even Hollywood has involved itself in seeking to affect US foreign policy through an Evangelical Christian lens.⁵⁵ Much of this awareness-raising and engagement, however, has been facilitated by the Internet and the rise of online social media, which has had a significant impact on how the LRA issue has been constructed and framed for consumption by citizens and policymakers alike.

The role played by non-state actors such as these global advocacy NGOs is an important one both to the development of the current responses to LRA violence, as well as to theoretical developments about the role of such actors in foreign policy decision making. During the 1990s, the appearance of the 24 hour news cycle saw the emergence of the so-called 'CNN Effect,' which referred to impact of the news media on policymaking, particularly in terms of foreign interventions.⁵⁶ This even elicited a research response from the US military, seeking potential ways to incorporate such considerations into their own strategies.⁵⁷ Today, in addition to traditional media outlets, a link between the targeted social media activism of advocacy NGOs

⁵⁴ See Evgeny Morozov, "Foreign Policy: Brave New World Of Slacktivism." *NPR Online*, 19 May 2009. Accessed 17 April 2012. <<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104302141>>

⁵⁵ The Hollywood film industry has a long history of individuals associated with Christianity producing Christian-themed films. See Terry Lindvall and Andrew Quicke, *Celluloid Sermons: The Emergence of the Christian Film Industry, 1930-1986*. New York: New York University Press, 2011. See Also Dale Buss, "What Christians Watch," *The Wall Street Journal*, January 21, 2009.

⁵⁶ See Piers Robinson, *The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention*. London: Routledge Press, 2002.

⁵⁷ See Margaret Belknap, "The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk?" *USAWC Strategy Project Paper*, March 30, 2011. Carlisle, PA: The US Army War College.

and potential influence on foreign policy exists that warrants further discussion.⁵⁸ Indeed, as “foreign policy analysis has long involved the exploration of the various influences upon the foreign policy decision-making process,”⁵⁹ the role of advocacy NGOs and social media activism in crafting the C-LRA intervention is important to this research.

The link between civil society actors and the intervention against the LRA goes beyond the question of influencing foreign policy. In addition to awareness-raising and lobbying the US government to intervene militarily against the LRA, these groups are actively involved in the LRA conflict response itself, which has generated a fair amount of controversy among activists and academics.

1.3.5 *Civil Society and Counter-LRA Efforts*

One such critic is Adam Branch, who excoriates the various advocacy groups who purport their work to be necessary to building peace and promoting human rights but instead display a reckless saviour complex which ultimately extends an “open invitation to AFRICOM.”⁶⁰ His description of the “new intensification of US military involvement promoted by American advocacy groups” is at the heart of this thesis.⁶¹ Branch claims that the US Congress’ LRA Act that these groups so successfully lobbied for “represents the culmination of the Uganda conflict’s ascendance in US public consciousness and the consecration of the official discourse on the conflict at the highest levels. It also represents the tragic ascendance of militarism in the US public consciousness.”⁶²

His condemnation is thorough and raises troubling aspects of the ways that efforts by external actors may undermine local agency, deny reality in terms of the drivers of conflict, and erode the very human rights the interventionists are trying to protect. While his strident concern for a responsible civil society accountable to the protection of human rights is no doubt well-intentioned, the animus toward the civil society groups supporting C-LRA efforts appear to be largely unwarranted given the nature of what these groups claim to achieve in LRA-affected areas, which is left out of such critiques. In addressing this gap through empirical fieldwork among civil society actors (to include not only the global advocacy NGOs usually mentioned, but

⁵⁸ See Moisés Naím, “The YouTube Effect: How a Technology for Teenagers Became a Force for Political and Economic Change.” *Foreign Policy Website*, December 27, 2006. Accessed May 15, 2011. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/12/27/the_youtube_effect>

⁵⁹ Piers Robinson, “The CNN Effect Reconsidered: Mapping a Research Agenda for the Future.” *Media, War and Conflict*, Vol. 4, Iss. 1, 2011, pp. 3-11, 4.

⁶⁰ Adam Branch, *Displacing Human Rights*, 237.

⁶¹ Adam Branch, *Displacing Human Rights*, 10.

⁶² Adam Branch, *Displacing Human Rights*, 236.

local NGOs and clergy organisations as well) this research explores these important linkages between military and civil society actors and the forms of politics that emerge. My research engages significantly with the critiques of Branch and others, and examines the work of these groups and their activities in the global, regional, and local contexts, as well as contrasting the function of civil society in current LRA-affected areas versus within Uganda itself. In doing so, this empirical research brings a balanced and more substantive understanding of what civil society's role is and is not, and the implications for such groups affecting future interventions.

1.3.6 *LRA Conflict Narratives*

Another important aspect of this research involves the spatial and temporal differences of how the LRA conflict is conceptualised. Put another way, substantive differences exist between responses to the LRA inside of Uganda in the *past* versus responses to the LRA *now*, outside of Uganda's borders. This is an important point that is missing from much of the prevailing work on recent iterations of the C-LRA operation.

Throughout the 19990s and 2000s, the official LRA conflict narrative supported by the Ugandan government, their US benefactors, and many in the international community was a simple one of a responsible democratic state and Western ally (Uganda) fighting a terrorist insurgency while struggling to protect its civilian population. Finnström's ethnographic research of the northern Ugandan conflict has contributed significantly to exposing how such simplified narratives exacerbated the cycle of violence, and extols the fact that the simple 'good guys versus bad guys' description of the conflict espoused by Museveni's regime and supported by countless global enablers is far from accurate.⁶³ His focus on how local people construct meaning in conflict and post-conflict societies is invaluable in that it highlights reconciliation and restoring of relationships, reminding us that people must be active agents in constructing meaning of their lives, even in the midst of "bad surroundings."⁶⁴ Such localised constructions are vital to gaining a nuanced grasp of how an intervention such as C-LRA is conceptualised by those people directly affected by it. Questions are thus raised involving the type of meaning forged by local communities in response not only to the incursion of LRA rebels in recent years, but in response to the military forces and global civil society actors who have converged upon the region, and whether or not it is significantly different from that of the Acholi in northern Uganda.

⁶³ See Sverker Finnström, *Living with Bad Surroundings: War, History, and Everyday Moments in Northern Uganda*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008.

⁶⁴ Sverker Finnström, *Living with Bad Surroundings*, 11-12.

Similarly, Chris Dolan has conducted extensive research in northern Uganda and argues that although the two decades-old war between the Ugandan government and the LRA had been characterised as the driver for mass social disruption, human rights abuses, and long term suffering of Ugandan civilians, it was actually the reverse. According to Dolan, the war persisted so long because of what he calls 'social torture,' or a form of mass torture as punishment for Acholi resistance to Museveni's rule, and that was only exacerbated by the various international actors (such as donor governments, multi-lateral organisations, academics, churches, and NGOs).⁶⁵ In this view, the catalysts of conflict are located both internally and externally to the obvious armed actors, and extends to the interactions and interdependencies of the fighters, the well-intentioned non-military groups just mentioned, and the civilians caught in the middle.

Dolan draws from the work of David Keen, who advances the notion that contrary to popular belief, 'war' in the contemporary sense is often *not* a matter of two sides facing off, hoping to achieve an outright 'victory' that results in some favourable political outcome. Rather, in these types of wars, it is the goal of its protagonists to increase their personal power, accumulate resources, and suppress political opposition. Thus, their interests lie in the propagation of conflict, rather than its end. Keen calls for investigating the "systems of collusion" obscured by war.⁶⁶ By seeking to understand how war and social torture are cyclically perpetuated by the fluidity of actors, this thesis seeks to answer whether or not the more recent increased US involvement may be a part of the solution, a part of the problem, or yet another system of collusion against which Keen warns us of.

Each of the aforementioned issues involve important findings gleaned from fieldwork in northern Uganda during the LRA conflict there. While this wealth of previous research provides us with a vital grasp of the LRA issue in terms of its meaning to its victims, the agendas pursued by its combatants, and the politics surrounding the entire debacle, it is important to note that it does not deal with more recent evolution of the conflict. Rather than being used to form uncritical assumptions about how the LRA conflict must be occurring now, this thesis treats this past scholarship as an important historical context against which we can compare and contrast current conceptualisations of politics resulting from the US-Uganda security relationship and the current C-LRA activities by the actors involved and those locals most affected.

⁶⁵ Chris Dolan, "Understanding War and its Continuation: The Case of Northern Uganda." PhD Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (2006), 2.

⁶⁶ David Keen, "War and Peace: What's the Difference?" in Adekeye Adebajo and Chandra Lekha Sriram (Eds.) *Managing Armed Conflicts in the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Routledge Press, 2001, pp. 1-22, 2. Also see David Keen, "Complex Emergencies." Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009.

1.3.7 Framing the Post-2011 Response to the LRA

With a better understanding of the role of past phases in hand, a brief discussion of the more contemporary understandings of the LRA conflict is in order. While a great deal of research exists focusing on the LRA conflict and its effects in northern Uganda, "there have been few scholarly appraisals... following the LRA's flight from Uganda in 2006",⁶⁷ and even more scarce research on the most recent phase of conflict since the deployment of US advisors and the initiation of the African Union mandate in 2011-2012. The little attention that has been paid to the LRA in recent years focuses on critical reactions to involvement by the US military and the global civil society groups previously mentioned.

Titeca and Costeur examine the lack of a "unified vision" concerning the LRA problem among the various state and non-state actors involved, and argue that these disparate actors frame the issue in ways that are "weakly connected with the realities" of the conflict, and "in ways that suit their own agendas."⁶⁸ While correctly pointing out that the framing of the conflict has occurred in ways "intrinsically connected with the interests of the various actors involved", their analysis which suggests that multilateral efforts to address the LRA problem were essentially about constructing certain images in pursuit of divergent interests misses a glaring reality. Other than a brief mention in passing acknowledging that some locals perceived an LRA threat,⁶⁹ they ignore the manner in which the LRA problem is framed by currently-affected locals. This omission contributes to the general confusion surrounding the LRA in recent years that tacitly suggests that the LRA is a minimal threat to those who live in these remote areas. My research addresses this gap and focuses explicitly on the perceptions and agency of local actors affected by the LRA, as well as the manner in which this issue is instrumentalised by powerful actors (in particular the Ugandan government as a recipient of US military aid).

Other critiques of recent C-LRA efforts go beyond ignoring the perception of locals, and explicitly claim that the deployment of military forces will only increase the risks of harm to local populations and will likely lead to increased forms of authoritarianism. There is no question that despite military efforts, in the years following their flight from Uganda in 2006, the LRA has deftly exploited the weakness of the three affected states (South Sudan, DRC and CAR) and their inability (or unwillingness) to control their border areas and protect civilians in the region. This relates to another important aspect of the LRA conflict narrative--the rejection of so-called

⁶⁷ Kristof Titeca and Theophile Costeur, "An LRA For Everyone: How Different Actors Frame the Lord's Resistance Army." *African Affairs*, Vol. 114 Iss. 454, January 2015, pp. 92-114, 95.

⁶⁸ Kristof Titeca and Theophile Costeur, "An LRA For Everyone", 92-93.

⁶⁹ Kristof Titeca and Theophile Costeur, "An LRA For Everyone", 113.

'military approaches' to end the LRA, in favour of vague notions of 'peaceful' non-military means. Some have critiqued the military reasons for past failures like OLT,⁷⁰ while others claim that the failure of military solutions are apparent and that current approaches are doomed to be counterproductive and violate the implied humanitarian dictum of "do no harm."⁷¹ However, the type of solutions long called for by some regional experts does not eschew military force entirely, but rather, involves a "new strategy... that prioritises civilian protection; unity of effort among military and civilian actors within and across national boundaries; and national ownership."⁷² My fieldwork-based research assesses the various roles of the involved actors in this intervention and how they are or are not contributing to these goals.

Branch also critiques the entire premise of civilian protection that underpins the current C-LRA efforts. He states that the form of intervention being undertaken is the instrumentalisation of "protection" in order to "experiment with new forms of transnational political authority, specifically unaccountable, militarized administration networks that bring together state, international, and substate actors and institutions."⁷³ In so doing, Branch warns, 'protection' eschews democracy, relegates people to being helpless victims, "removes the ethical from the equation and turns the appropriateness of the policy into a technical affair," and as such "protection itself should be seen as a potential threat."⁷⁴ In this way, he suggests that any and all attempts at addressing LRA violence are really US militarism-in-disguise.

While the risks associated with militarism and the expansion of new forms of political authority in general are a fair point, this critique minimises the firsthand perceptions and desires of locals in these LRA-affected areas that is at odds with the way that his own research so painstakingly attended to the perceptions of the Acholi people in northern Uganda. Obviously, northern Ugandans have their own lived experience as a result of the LRA insurgency rooted in policies of 'social torture' and carried out by the UPDF, and their fears and misgivings of broadening and possibly escalating the LRA conflict are worthy of the large amount of critical attention received by scholars such as Branch. What must be included in understanding the totality of this situation, however, is the lived experiences of locals that are affected by the LRA where they

⁷⁰ See Robert L. Feldman, "Why Uganda Has Failed to Defeat the Lord's Resistance Army."

⁷¹ Ronald R. Atkinson, Phil Lancaster, Ledio Cakaj, and Guillaume Lacailee, "Do No Harm: Assessing a Military Approach to the Lord's Resistance Army", 379.

⁷² "LRA: A Regional Strategy Beyond Killing Kony," *Africa Report No. 157*, International Crisis Group (ICG) Working Group, 28 April 2010.

⁷³ Adam Branch, "The Paradoxes of Protection: Aligning Against the Lord's Resistance Army." *African Security*, Vol. 5, 2012, pp. 160-178, 160.

⁷⁴ Adam Branch, "The Paradoxes of Protection", 175.

currently exist--that is, far outside of Uganda's borders. How *they* frame the LRA and its response through their own perceptions of themselves, the state, and the civil society actors upon whom they rely on heavily for garnering outside help is an entirely different matter. The implication that decades-old Acholi-driven conflict narratives should direct and influence current anti-LRA campaigns outside of Uganda robs currently-affected locals of their own voice, which is a crucial point in understanding how the evolving nature of C-LRA activities since the group left Uganda. My research sets out to investigate such claims rigorously, especially as they relate to the recent shifting of the conflict out of Uganda and into a population historically uninvolved with Ugandan politics and the LRA insurgency.

It should be acknowledged that previous work by the aforementioned scholars has been an enormous contribution to our understanding of the roots and context of Uganda's insurgency and the rise of the LRA. But where they fall short is explaining *current* iterations of militarized counter-LRA interventions *outside* of Uganda, and in particular the role of local populations, which this research addresses.

1.3.8 *Assessing Asymmetric Power Relations*

Inherent in this discussion of external intervention and local reaction is the perpetual twin problems of power and legitimacy, and how to exercise the former appropriately enough not to sacrifice the latter. Richmond describes this tension well, whereby interactions between international interests and local forms of agency can produce positive or negative forms of peace, defined largely by the degree to which locals exercise "active, rather than passive everyday agency."⁷⁵ As such, "there is a pressing need for more research on how to understand, conceptualise as well as theorise the encounter between intervener and intervened upon."⁷⁶ As previously noted, the presence of power in Uganda's two-decades old LRA insurgency lay disproportionately with the ruling regime, and was brutally projected by its security forces onto the disaffected Acholi population in ways far worse than any suffering enjoyed by the more resilient LRA itself. My work in the following chapters addresses the aforementioned pressing need for further research by unpacking this distribution of power as it exists today in Uganda, as well as how power is exercised in current LRA-affected areas.

⁷⁵ Oliver P. Richmond, "The Dilemmas of a Hybrid Peace: Negative or Positive?" *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2015, pp. 50-68, 50.

⁷⁶ Linnea Gelot and Fredrik Söderbaum, 141.

Mac Ginty and Richmond argue that the "renaissance of interest"⁷⁷ in the local dimensions of intervened-upon societies, while not without its share of problematic contradictions, has contributed to the acknowledgment that states from the Global North face limitations in imposing policies on the Global South, and in turn "everyday emancipation, political awakenings, resistance, questions about the role of the state and authority international actors and donors... are changing the landscape of IR and peace and conflict theory."⁷⁸ One objective of this thesis is to investigate this case of North-South interaction in order to identify and describe local forms of resistance, adaptation, and alternatives to imposed policies, and how these fit into the dynamics of power at work surrounding this issue.

As 'critical security' approaches emphasizing the agency of the local have become more widespread, some suggest that 'emancipatory horizons' have consequently been lowered. Chandler and Hynek claim that these "post-emancipatory" approaches associated with the "Manchester School" which reject liberal discourses in favour of 'post-liberal' or 'hybrid' frameworks represent substantially decreased emancipatory aspirations.⁷⁹ They dismiss the notion of a 'turn toward the local' espoused by Richmond and Mac Ginty as lacking in any clear programme as to how such claims would be carried out in reality. This reductionist critique by Chandler and Hynek, however, seems to miss the point of these 'post-liberal' and 'hybrid' approaches that in fact do acknowledge the potential for emancipatory alternatives under the appropriate conditions. Furthermore, this critique of the so-called 'Manchester School' ignores the utility of these approaches not as 'magic bullet' solutions to render Western intervention palatable to its subjects in the Global South, but as approaches that seek to understand the actual everyday practices of politics and peace that occur within the engagements between external forces and local actors. This research will delve into the emancipatory potential of power, as well as its pitfalls, as laid out by these critical approaches rooted in understandings of post-liberal hybridity (which will be discussed further in the following chapter), and provides an empirical case with which to apply and validate these conceptualisations.

Others who are critical of hegemonic power and cautious of the invocation of liberal peace rhetoric also acknowledge the necessity of the 'local turn' if emancipatory alternatives to the status quo are to become an achievable goal. Despite his critique of US support to Uganda and current C-LRA efforts, Adam Branch nevertheless calls (somewhat vaguely) for an "Africanised

⁷⁷ Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver P. Richmond, "The Local Turn in Peace Building", 763.

⁷⁸ Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver P. Richmond, "The Local Turn in Peace Building", 773.

⁷⁹ David Chandler and Nik Hynek. "No Emancipatory Alternatives, No Critical Security Studies." *Critical Studies on Security*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2013, pp. 46-63, 55.

practice" of intervention "focused on the cessation of hostilities... within specific limits" and "based on the possibility of organising and acting politically, but always self-critically, when faced with common struggles that bridge the Africa-West divide."⁸⁰ The question then is raised as to what such a practice would look like in contrast to the current C-LRA operation underway, as it appears to be about ending LRA violence first and foremost, and secondarily addresses community needs according to local inclinations. This research provides a critical understanding of both the negative and positive forms of politics that result which are associated with these issues. It specifically looks for such forms of self-critical political organisation that ameliorates structural violence, as well as for those forms which advance the hegemonic agendas of unaccountable power-holders.

Indeed, the need to assess asymmetric power relations goes beyond military interventions and applies equally to the tensions between the powerful and powerless occurring within states. This is true in particular in what Tripp describes as a semi-authoritarian militarised state such as Uganda, where its own military, police and intelligence services, "which are said to be security forces, have become one of the biggest sources of insecurity for Ugandan citizens."⁸¹ One aspect of this thesis to bear in mind is the apparent contradiction between what appears on one hand to be a C-LRA effort that is locally legitimate and based on 'bottom-up' notions of power and agency carried out by Ugandan security forces. On the other hand, however, these same Ugandan security forces are an instrument of semi-authoritarian 'top-down' power projection inside of Uganda's borders. The accuracy of these seemingly contradictory narratives and paradoxical politics will be explored in these pages, and seek to add substance which will serve to further the debates surrounding power, legitimacy, security, and peace.

This ongoing debate regarding the potential of emancipatory approaches to understanding peace and peace support interventions appear to essentially be problems in assessing power relations. This problem certainly extends to the C-LRA endeavour in Africa, as well as the politics of US security aid to Uganda which surrounds it. Thus, what is needed are theoretical approaches which adhere to Cox's warning to "not base theory on theory but rather on changing practice and empirical-historical study, which are a proving ground for concepts and hypotheses."⁸² This thesis sets out to utilise a conceptual framework which clearly and

⁸⁰ Adam Branch, *Displacing Human Rights*, 241.

⁸¹ Aili Mari Tripp, *Museveni's Uganda: Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime*. Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner Press, 2010, 135.

⁸² Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders" (1981), in Robert W. Cox and Timothy Sinclair (eds.), *Approaches to World Order*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 85-123, 87.

definitively assesses the power relations inherent in this phenomenon and provides much-needed "research on how to understand, conceptualise as well as theorise the encounter between intervener and intervened upon."⁸³ In so doing, the following pages set out to provide an empirical response to the question posed by Mac Ginty and Richmond, "what is the relationship between power and peace, and how might an emancipatory peace relate to, or emerge from, power?"⁸⁴ This conceptual framework which will address this pressing need and serves as a guide to this research is discussed in detail in the following chapter.

1.4 Conclusion

This chapter has introduced the topic and provided some historical background necessary for contextual understanding of the LRA conflict. With a grasp on previous academics' understandings of this long-running insurgency and its effects in Uganda, the reader is better able to contend with the questions raised since the new phase of counter-LRA activities has begun. Moreover, this chapter has situated this research within the academic literature I seek to engage with and improve upon. C-LRA activities have elicited diverse reactions from the academic and policymaking communities as well as by various locals affected by responses to the LRA in different locales. This must of course be understood within the bigger picture of not only US security aid to Uganda and US power projection in the region, but within the much broader context of the West's engagement with Africa, the myriad of actors involved, and the role of the so-called liberal peace and its outcomes. Having established that C-LRA is an understudied and evolving regional phenomenon, conceptual tools which afford us a useful view towards reckoning the powers of interveners to coerce and incentivize with the abilities of local actors to resist and provide alternatives in a manner that facilitates emancipatory possibilities are obviously desirable. This issue will be discussed in great detail in the theory section in the following chapter, as will the methodology and case study specifics of this research.

⁸³ Linnea Gelot and Fredrik Söderbaum, 141.

⁸⁴ Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver P. Richmond, "The Local Turn in Peace Building", 780-781.

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CHAPTER TWO: Hybridity Theory and Research Design

2.1 Introduction

This chapter sets out to accomplish two broad goals. The first is to examine the central role of hybridity theory in this thesis. In doing so, it explicates the conceptual framework upon which this inquiry is undertaken. The second goal comprises the latter half of the chapter and discusses the important issues of research design, including research objectives and research questions, operationalisation of concepts, methodology, case study specifics, and research ethics. Along with the previous chapter, which outlines the broad parameters of this thesis and what it sets out to address in terms of making a contribution to the field, this chapter expands on how this will be achieved prior to moving on to the empirical chapters.

2.2 Hybridity Theory

The notion of hybridity or things being hybrid, while not new, is certainly en vogue in recent years. The idea of things being 'hybridised' can be witnessed in "hybrid-operations" such as the joint United Nations-African Union mission in Somalia known as AMISOM.¹ We see evidence of this in AFRICOM promoting itself as hybrid institution,² and responding to a complex operational theatre full of "hybrid threats."³ There is much discussion and debate within military circles about the notion of hybrid war as an emergent paradigm.⁴ Where does all of this talk of hybrid things lead us? In its most basic definition, hybridity is both an "analytical tool" and in some cases, a "desired political project."⁵ Hybridity is the conceptual framework upon which this inquiry rests. According to Mac Ginty, the "hybrid peace" is arrived at through a process "whereby different actors coalesce and conflict to different extents on different issues to produce

¹ James Pattison, *Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 209-211.

² See John David W. Willis, "Hybrid Orgs for Hybrid Wars: The Story of AFRICOM's New Hybrid and Why Every CCDR Should Want One, Too." Research Paper, Newport, RI: Naval War College. Department of Joint Military Operations, 23 Oct 2009.

³ George W. Casey, "America's Army in an Era of Persistent Conflict," *Army Magazine* 58, No. 10 (October 2008): 19-28. Accessed 22 Oct 2011. <<http://ausa.org/>>

⁴ See Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, *History and Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Also See Frank Hoffman, "Further Thoughts on Hybrid Threats." *Small Wars Journal*. Mar 2, 2009. Accessed 12 Jan 2013. <smallwars.org/jrnl/art/further-thoughts-on-hybrid-threats>.

⁵ Jenny Peterson, "A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity: Accounting for Notions of Power, Politics, and Progress in Analyses of Aid Driven Interfaces." *Peacebuilding and Development*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2012, pp. 9-22, 10.

a fusion peace... The result is a hybridized peace that is in constant flux, as different actors and processes cooperate and compete on different issue agendas.”⁶

Before considering hybridity and its role here as an analytical framework, it is important to mention a few words on the role of theory in general and how hybridity fits in to social science inquiry of this kind.

2.2.1 *The Role of Theory*

The work of Robert Cox offers us a good review in terms both of what theory is and of what—and whom—theory is for. One key aspect of Cox’s contribution is his assertion that all theory is for someone and some purpose. Theories that claim some form of removed objectivity, upon deeper scrutiny reveal a concealed perspective, from some particular political time and place. Another is the distinction between what he describes as the two purposes that theory may serve: a “simple, direct response” which he calls *problem-solving theory*, and another purpose, more reflective upon the process of theorizing itself, known as *critical theory*.⁷ The former accepts current world order and the power relations that comprise it, as is. Problem solving theories (represented in this case by the liberal-realist approaches) are advantageous in that they can “fix parameters to a problem area... and reduce the statement of a particular problem to a limited number of variables,” ending up with a theory that finds more precise explanations to given problems within the generally accepted framework of the status quo. Critical theory on the other hand, “unlike problem-solving theory, does not take institutions and social power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing.”⁸

Problem solving can be thought of as facilitating tactical activities that may address short term issues but sustains the existing order. Critical theory, meanwhile, is strategic in its nature in that it addresses alternative orders that may transcend the status quo while seeking alternative systemic and structural orders. Hybridity offers a way to see how human action and interaction—social forces—are informed by, and inform, forms of the state, and of the larger world order (like interventions), while always in a state of fluidity and change. All of this is important and relevant here because hybridity, as discussed in this project has been understood

⁶ Roger Mac Ginty. “Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace.” *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 41, Iss. 4, 2010, PP. 391-412, 397.

⁷ Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States, and World Orders” (1981), in Robert W. Cox and Timothy Sinclair (eds.), *Approaches to World Order*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 85-123, 88.

⁸ Cox, 88-89.

both ways—problem solving and critical. On the one hand, hybridity may be thought of as a prescriptive means to implement a softer approach to interventions, and one that solves the problem of local or indigenous resistance (thereby increasing the legitimacy of the intervener as this power is seen as responsive and sensitive, etc). On the other hand, hybridity may be seen as being explicitly critical in that it offers a way of seeing a given phenomenon (in this case, liberal peace interventions) in a way that takes into account all actors and interested parties, and recognises unequal power structures and patterns of structural violence. We will go into more detail on this dichotomy below, but for now let us examine the historical development of hybridity to how it is used today.

2.2.2 *The Roots of Hybridity*

With biological and taxonomic origins, a hybrid refers simply to a mixing of two prior forms or species. The term later gained popularity during the colonial era. Hybridity has a long history of problematic usage, particularly as it was conceptualized in Victorian era racial theories to lend credence to pseudoscientific notions of racial purity and fear of racial mixing during the colonial age. The very idea of a “hybrid” opened the doors to critical examination of psychological boundaries between power and social relationships that underpinned the existing social order. In this way, purity and the avoidance of hybridity was seen as desirable to colonial powers intent on maintaining status-quo relations.

Mac Ginty, however, cautions against the caricature of European society during this period as rigidly essentialist in their thinking.⁹ One such critique was from Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of “polyphony”, may be described as representation of many voices, with no single truth standing out among the multitude of voices which carry it.¹⁰ This challenge to the imperialistic narrative of assumed superiority influenced the development of hybridity theory in later discourses. In this way, Bakhtin’s “polyphony” was an early form of seeing through a “hybrid lens”. In other words, hybridity, a historically problematic term that began as an essentially “problem-solving” idea rooted in imperialism with racist undertones, later morphed into a “critical” way of viewing phenomena in a more relativistic manner. Bakhtin also identified two types of hybridised activity, organic, and intentional. The former refers to hybrid forms emerging out of “the practices of the everyday,” while the latter refers to hybrid forms “focused on resistance,” which

⁹ Roger Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2011, 71.

¹⁰ See Mikhail Bakhtin, “Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics” in *Theory and History of Literature, Volume 8* (Caryl Emerson, ed.). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984.

tend to lend itself toward a more “calculated or purposeful strategy.”¹¹ These ideas provide a historical basis for modern hybridity theory, which will be discussed further below.

It was with the emergence of hybridity theory in post-colonial discourses that brings us closest to the way in which hybridity “is most clearly articulated and exposed in relation to understanding the modern, cultural, social, and political relationships.”¹² Postcolonial theorist Homi K. Bhabha describes hybridity as “the sign of the productivity of colonial power, its shifting forces and fixities; it is the name of the process for the strategic reversal of the process of domination through disavowal“, adding that it “unsettles the mimetic or narcissistic demands of colonial power but reimplicates its identifications in strategies of subversion that turn the gaze of the discriminated back upon the eye of the power.”¹³ Put another way, Bhabha recognises the:

subversive potential of the concept of hybridity and how it undercuts the confidence and coherence of colonial discourses that depended on authority, hierarchy, and separation. Hybridity may suggest a breakdown of the barriers constructed by the colonial power: indigenous groups may adopt and adapt some of the ways of the colonial power. Similarly, agents of colonialism may be forced to adopt indigenous practices. In doing so, all actors change.¹⁴

The resulting mimicry becomes transformational for both the colonizer and colonized. There is an inescapable process within unequal power relationships that sees the colonial subject as a “partial presence”, while at the same time sees the emergence of “themes of resistance to domination and the creative power of the ‘other’—underlying currents which arguably give the term undeniable appeal to those interested in economic, political, and social justice.”¹⁵ When a post-colonial power took on certain elements of the indigenous people they sought dominion over, they may have appeared benevolent and yielding to the varying norms and values espoused by the population in question. However this can also be viewed in Machiavellian terms as the perfect way to wield power—without resorting to the threat of force.

By appearing willing to compromise and negotiate in smaller matters of detail in any intervention scenario characterised by an unequal power relationship, there is a tendency to fail to question the legitimacy of the endeavour as a whole as actors are busying themselves with details. Shifting the focus of popular perception from whether a given intervention is morally right and

¹¹ Jenny H. Peterson, "A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity", 19.

¹² Jenny H. Peterson, "A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity", 10.

¹³ Homi K. Bhabha, “Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority Under a Tree Outside Delhi, May 1817” in B. Ashcroft, G. Griffiths, and H. Tiffin, eds. *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader*. London: Routledge Press, 1985, 29-35,34-35

¹⁴ Roger Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding*, 2011, 71.

¹⁵ Jenny H. Peterson, "A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity", 10.

appropriate to ways that some local wants and needs are being met from the intervention project illustrates hybridity being utilised to the stronger powers advantage. Both actors have appropriated some elements of their counterpart's values, worldview, and narratives. The degree to which one has gained significant advantage remains dependent on the specifics of each situational context. In this sense, hybridity is the taking on of some of each other's characteristics, resulting in the "creation of new transcultural forms within the contact zone produced by colonialism."¹⁶ Hybridity is thus a "complex process of variable geometry with multiple and constantly moving parts."¹⁷ These processes are fluid and dynamic, and reflect a way of conceptualizing contact between actors of unequal power in a way that better reflects the complexities occurring in these 'contact zones' that go beyond simplified notions of the external and internal, the strong and the weak, the imperial and the local.

Thus, hybridity offers not just a critical point of view, but a way of seeing power relations as they occur. When a colonial or neo-colonial power involves itself with local actors and societies, it is incorrect to assume that either party has their way completely. Both are changed in the process, although to what degree depends on a myriad of factors specific to each case. Today, what is seen as the projection of neo-colonial power onto less powerful states is analogous to what is called the liberal peace, or liberal peace interventions, which we turn to now.

2.2.3 *Intervention and the Liberal Peace*

Born out of its usage in post-colonial studies, hybridity today has perhaps become *de rigueur* in its usage regarding the 'liberal peace.' An overview of some of the problems associated with invoking the liberal peace were discussed in the previous chapter, and these have led to a great deal of research that counters and critiques the notion of the liberal peace, Mac Ginty states that "the types of activity found in the majority of interventions tend to coalesce around security and statebuilding agendas. The interests served by many peace interventions tend to reflect those of powerholders, either within the state emerging from violent conflict or internationally."¹⁸ Consequently, since the turn of the millennium, the critiques of the liberal peace have grown from a "trickle" into "a veritable flood."¹⁹

¹⁶ Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin. *Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts*. Abingdon, UK: Routledge Press, 2000, 118.

¹⁷ Roger Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding*, 72.

¹⁸ Roger Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding*, 20.

¹⁹ Shahar Hameiri, "A Reality Check for the Critique of the Liberal Peace" in *A Liberal Peace?: The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding* (Susanna Campbell, David Chandler, and Meera Sabaratnam, eds.). London: Zed Books, 2011, pp. 191-208, 191.

Liberalism, according to Mac Ginty, is “capable of constructing a beguiling and attractive rationale for its own promotion,” but is often seen as “the negative peace, or forms of peace that address conflict manifestations but avoid structural change.”²⁰ Thus, despite the liberal peace being the dominant prism through which much of the international community (powerful nation-states, IFIs, IGOs, and many NGOs) views and conditions the process of peacebuilding and statebuilding intervention, it fails to account for what actually occurs, which is the hybrid peace. To reach some modicum of success, liberal peace powers must exercise some degree of coercion and compliance, while local actors will often struggle by whatever means available to retain some degree of autonomy and agency they fear losing under the mantle of imposed liberal peace. This slew of challenges to the essentialism of the liberal peace has proven useful in building a consensus that many of the core assumptions of the liberal peace are fundamentally flawed.

Some have even argued that many of the existing critiques are in themselves problematic, adding, “it makes little sense to think of these interventions in terms of a clash between external and domestic actors, institutions, and values, seen mainly through the ‘liberal’ versus ‘non-liberal’ prism... This complexity creates a problem of description and analysis.”²¹ Mac Ginty also blames the types of thinking that underpin peace support operations as problematic, identifying a reflexive hubris that imbues liberalism with a “sense of epistemic closure or belief that the ‘problem’ and ‘solution’ are well-matched.”²² Acknowledging such problems, contemporary hybridity theorists envision a way to conceptualize a reform of the liberal peace and the overly dichotomous critiques offered to it.²³

2.2.4 *Intervention and the Illiberal Peace*

While academic research involving hybridity to date tends to be centred around the insufficiency of critiques of the liberal peace, relatively little has been said about hybridity’s potential relationship with other forms of peace—notably those which have less to do with liberalism and more to do with political expediency, geostrategic interests, and Realpolitik. The rapidly

²⁰ Roger Mac Ginty, “Hybrid Peace”, 393-394.

²¹ Shahar Hameiri, “A Reality Check for the Critique of the Liberal Peace”, 193.

²² Roger Mac Ginty, “Why Do We Think in the Ways That We Do” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 21, Iss. 1, 2014, pp. 107-112, 108.

²³ See Oliver P. Richmond, “Beyond Liberal Peace?: Responses to ‘Backsliding’” in *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding* (Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver Richmond, eds.). New York: United Nations University Press, 2009, 54-77. See Also Oliver P. Richmond, “Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace.” In *A Liberal Peace?: The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding* (Susanna Campbell, David Chandler, and Meera Sabaratnam, eds.). London: Zed Books, 2011, pp. 226-224. See Also Mac Ginty *International Peacebuilding*, 2011.

changing nature of transnational and supranational political forms is highlighting “the emergence of new subjectivities,”²⁴ and rendering past characterizations and categorizations as incomplete. After the post-Cold War turn towards humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect doctrine, the US-led War on Terror pushed the parameters of modern intervention further. Many would reject outright the notion that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have any link to liberalism or should be included in discussions of the liberal peace. The fact that some liberal motivations were ascribed to these invasions as part of *jus ad bellum* can be seen as being betrayed by later shifts in strategy that underlie other, more selfish motivations. While the sources of justification that policymakers use for entering into conflicts remains a subject of debate, what is relevant to this discussion is the fact that during and after these wars began, the resulting situation looked far different than what the original objectives sought to achieve. The US-led forces failed to create the conditions they set out to manifest in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and instead a slew of unintended consequences unfolded, seeing the ensuing years full of strife and instability for all actors involved.

These conflicts are nevertheless relevant to the discussion of hybridity and should be included. Identifying and explaining hybridity may apply to any and all situations where a powerful force (be it a state, a coalition of states, or some international or regional institution) imposes its will on some group or groups, ostensibly to facilitate peace, stability, security, transition to liberal democracy, or any other technocratic forms of liberalisation imposed by force, threat of sanction, or incentivized politically or financially. What is important here is not how these interventions are defined by the espoused liberal (or realist) intentions of powerful actors, but how the actual processes are occurring between externally led powers (who almost always claim liberal—and thus “helpful” motives) and those (un)lucky enough to be on the other end—the *local*. In most cases, from Northern Ireland and Bosnia to Iraq and Afghanistan, the stated motives versus actual motives of interveners—to the extent they can be “proven” at all—are largely unimportant to those on the recipients of external intervention. In these cases we find some elites in target countries with a vested interest in the success of the intervention, and others who have a stake in its failure. More importantly, we find a much larger number of locals who seem to have little, if any, voice to protest or shape the manner in which the intervention takes shape in their name.

²⁴ Roger Mac Ginty, “Why We Think in the Ways That We Do”, 109.

The ways in which the non-liberal peace is important to hybridity involves regionally powerful states intervening in the affairs of their weak-state neighbours, as Uganda has historically done with its weaker neighbours. Furthermore, hybridity can result from the interaction of non-state actors as well. Ranging from IGOs like the UN or AU to rebel or militia groups, or even NGOs that exert significant influence, a myriad of actors interact, creating moments of coalescence and conflict and creating newer forms of hybridity as the dynamic social and political context continuously evolves. While there are reasons that these activities may not be properly associated with the liberal peace, they are nevertheless types of foreign interventions onto existing local networks which also result in a hybrid peace at every turn. As such, my research involves hybridity where it occurs, be it liberal, quasi-liberal, or at times explicitly illiberal.

2.2.5 Conceptualising Hybridity

Recent years have been characterised by both the “increased assertiveness of local actors as well as the loss of confidence by major actors” linked to the liberal peace.²⁵ This turn to the local has facilitated what is known as a *hybrid peace*. According to Richmond, “Hybrid forms of peace partly arise from liberal peacebuilding and its attempt to manage or end others' conflict. They represent a juxtaposition between international norms and interests and local forms of agency and identity.”²⁶ Mac Ginty uses the hybridity concept as a useful way to understand peace support interventions that go beyond some of the past and current “critiques of the liberal peace that tend toward caricatures of an all-powerful liberal internationalism.”²⁷ In this vein, hybridity is a response to the overly dichotomous nature of how post-conflict situations are viewed under the rubric of the liberal peace. Understanding what occurs as hybridity thus helps to remedy what heretofore has been “unuseful and distractive binary conceptualizing.”²⁸ Consider the following passage from an anthropologist with extensive fieldwork experience in Uganda:

When dichotomised conceptions of who the actors are (e.g. Government versus Rebels, insiders versus outsiders, perpetrators versus victims, military versus civilian) give way to more comprehensive and fluid range of actors, then the causal and locational internal-external oppositions... fall away... Importantly, they are located in both—and, as the analysis of discourse exemplifies—in the interactions, influences and mutual dependency between the (geographically) internal and external. The cast of actors involved in creating and perpetuating the dynamics... extends well beyond the evident military groupings, to also include international governments and donors, multi-lateral organisations, religious groupings,

²⁵ Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver P. Richmond, “The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace.” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 5, 2013, pp. 763-783, 763.

²⁶ Oliver P. Richmond, “Dilemmas of a Hybrid Peace.” *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2015, pp. 50-68, 50.

²⁷ Roger Mac Ginty, “Hybrid Peace”, 391.

²⁸ Roger Mac Ginty, “Hybrid Peace”, 397.

international and national NGOs and media, 'victims' and diasporas, and academics and policy makers.²⁹

Dolan's sentiment echoes the calls by some who wish to move past the current emphasis on technocracy and liberalism, looking toward "alternative forms of thinking," by the cautioning against "static thinking" in a "dynamic world."³⁰ Hybridity should be thought of as a "process of social negotiation, conflict and coalescence and can be found in all societies and social interactions. It is accelerated in contexts of international peacebuilding, post-war reconstruction, and humanitarian intervention... it is a more complex and fluid process of interchange."³¹ Mac Ginty adds that, "rather than monolithic and hegemonic peacemaking and peacebuilding processes from the international community, it is more accurate to envisage peace and development processes that are a composite of exogenous and indigenous forces," and that any number of peacemaking or peacebuilding forms represent "a real-world condition and the process whereby that condition is constructed, maintained, and replicated".³² Gelot and Soderbaum acknowledge the "multidimensional nature" of external intervention as "intrusive, though not always coercive," and "with necessarily varying degrees of consent/dissent/acquiescence."³³ This variable response to external intervention can be referred to as a form of *hybrid politics*, which may be used synonymously with the hybrid peace, but refers to the processes of social negotiation that may produce a contentious and dynamic result.

Often, the specific technocratic policies of "stabilisation" linked with the "essentially conservative doctrine" of the liberal peace do not equate with stability, and in fact serve to undercut locally-recognised forms of peace.³⁴ There is a call for a rethink in conceptualising interventions that move "beyond conventional or orthodox analyses,"³⁵ and an answer to this call is precisely what hybridity sets out to offer. Mac Ginty has encouraged using the concept of hybridity to "move away from thinking about vertical silos of interaction" where there is a "straightforward top-down chain of power and resources from the international actors, to national governments and thence downwards to municipalities, local communities and individuals in societies attempting to

²⁹ Chris Dolan, *Social Torture: The Case of Northern Uganda, 1986-2006*. New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2009, 253.

³⁰ Roger Mac Ginty, "Why We Think in the Ways That We Do", 3.

³¹ Roger Mac Ginty, "Recommending Hybridity," *Hybridity and Hybridisation: Beyond Top-Down and Bottom-Up*. Paper Prepared for HCRI Manchester/Bradford Seminar. 22-23 June 2011.

³² Roger Mac Ginty, "Hybrid Peace", 392.

³³ Linnea Gelot and Fredrik Söderbaum, "Rethinking Intervention and Interventionism", 136.

³⁴ Roger Mac Ginty, "Against Stabilization," *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, Vol.1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-6, 1.

³⁵ Linnea Gelot and Fredrik Söderbaum, "Rethinking Intervention", 136-137.

emerge from violent conflict.”³⁶ Such an examination seeks to account for local agency and context, and takes us away from more conventional analyses which see those being intervened upon as passive subjects, rather than active agents.

Applying the hybrid lens to correct a skewed pre-existing way of looking at intervention is more than just an academic problem; it is one with serious policy relevance as “the bias to conceptualise and theorise intervention more or less in isolation from those intervened upon is part and parcel of the failure of many contemporary interventions.”³⁷ When guided by narrow ideological or strategic goals, empirical evidence suggests that many interventions are not just unsatisfactory, but indeed counterproductive.³⁸ If interveners define an intervention’s success by some external value-based technocratic metric, while the intervened define the intervention’s legitimacy as dependent on local perceptions of impacts, the resulting disconnect fails to serve either the ambitious policy goals of the external power, and the target society as well. One may see here the necessity to reintroduce some mutual accommodation into the process of understanding the result of these clashes of belief systems.

One common characteristic of the expansive set of interventions since the end of the Cold War are unintended consequences. Some of those being intervened upon seem to display a degree of resistance to the top-down transmission of power, even as other locals (particularly local elites) may signal consent. These unintended consequences are evidence of hybridity, and are in themselves dynamic forms of hybrid peace. Sources of power that exert influence on events do not always coincide with the technocratic plans of interveners or with the expressed consent of local elites. It brings political rewards for the intervener and the intervened upon at times, with different meanings of rewards for each. By seeking to incorporate emancipatory approaches into analyses of external interventions, space opens up for potentially transformative frameworks to be conceptualised. At the heart of such possibilities is the necessity to reassess the nature of power in the relationships among actors involved in such interventions. Consider Richmond:

Liberal peacebuilding has caused a range of unintended consequences. These emerge from the liberal peace’s internal contradictions, from its claim to offer a universal and epistemological basis for peace, and to offer a technology and process which can be applied to achieve it. When viewed from a range of contextual and local perspectives,

³⁶ Roger Mac Ginty, “Recommending Hybridity.”

³⁷ Linnea Gelot and Fredrik Söderbaum, “Rethinking Intervention”, 138.

³⁸ Linnea Gelot and Fredrik Söderbaum, “Rethinking Intervention”, 146.

these top-down and distant processes often appear to represent power rather than humanitarianism or emancipation.³⁹

Determining the locus of power is crucial to understanding contextual realities as they are, to conceptualise locally just alternative orders, and to implementing potentially emancipatory corrections to interventionist policies. Hybridity's emphasis on process and fluidity attempts to do just that, by acknowledging that consent is not absolute, and that there will always be a spectrum of reaction ranging from acquiescence to outright challenges to power-holders. Hybridity offers us a tool that focuses on this interchange of power, and how it can affect (or fail to affect) perceptions of actors involved. With the utility of the general concept outlined, we will turn now to the conceptual framework of hybridity as by one of its leading proponents.

2.2.6 *Mac Ginty's Four-Part Model*

As Mac Ginty characterises it, hybridisation can be thought of as a “constantly moving piece of variable geometry,” which “operates on multiple levels, through multiple mediums, and impacts multiple (if not all) aspects of life.”⁴⁰ His proposed model seeks to better “visualize the main axes along which hybridisation may be projected or resisted in certain contexts.”⁴¹ Recognising that “like all models, this [one] is an abstraction and is unable to capture the full complexity of actors and actions in societies emerging from armed conflict and experiencing international peace support interventions,” Mac Ginty nevertheless encourages its use in order to “examine the full range of actors involved... and thus move beyond the state-centric lens favoured by political science and international relations.”⁴² The model has four parts that identify categories of actors and agency. It is the interaction between the four parts of this model that comprise the hybrid peace. These four constituent parts are:

- The compliance power of the liberal peace, or the ability of liberal peace agents, networks, and structures to compel others to follow its instructions;
- The incentivizing power of the liberal peace, or the ability of liberal peace agents, networks, and structures to incentivize others to follow its wishes;
- The resistance of local actors, or the ability of local actors, networks, and structures to resist, ignore, subvert, and adapt liberal peace interventions; and
- The alternatives provided by local actors, or the ability of local agents, networks, and structures to provide alternatives and modifications to the liberal peace.⁴³

³⁹ Oliver P. Richmond, *A Post-Liberal Peace*. London: Routledge Press, 2011, 1.

⁴⁰ Roger Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding*, 77.

⁴¹ Roger Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding*, 77.

⁴² Roger Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding*, 77.

⁴³ Roger Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding*, 77-78.

Mac Ginty adds that the four variables in the model above are of course, a simplification of reality and depend on many sub-variables. In addition, this model may have “little to say on the wider geo-political structures and systems that provide the context” in which these interventions occur.⁴⁴ I would add that while Mac Ginty and others consistently apply this framework to what he calls liberal peace interventions, it fits appropriately into unorthodox interventions where the degree of liberalism may be called into question (as discussed above). As we will discover in the following chapters, the distinction between liberal and non-liberal forms of peace interventions is largely a semantic one in that they may be taken together in terms of failing to acknowledge “the importance of local agency, power relations, and perceptions”⁴⁵ involving what interveners say versus what they do.⁴⁶ The irony being highlighted of course being that the so-called liberal peace “often uses illiberal means in its promotion of liberal values.”⁴⁷ It must be noted that across different contexts, weight given to each of the four variables will change over time.⁴⁸ Each of these four parts must be understood as part of a wider structural context, and each requires further discussion.⁴⁹

The first is the ability of intervening powers to gain compliance to its wishes. The most obvious example of compliance power is that of coercive military force, or the threat of its use. Whether we are referring to humanitarian interventions like Kosovo, or more controversial and problematic types of “democratisation at gunpoint adventurism”⁵⁰ as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, they have been characterised by coercive means by a hegemonic power. The presence of armed military forces is not the only way that liberal powers gain compliance. Aid conditionality, be it unilateral or through international financial institutions like the World Bank or International Monetary Fund, is also an oft-used tool to enforce the intervener’s will onto its subjects. This illustrates Mac Ginty’s point that “powers of coercion are often implicit and take the form of complex and near hegemonic systems of economic, diplomatic, and security rules and mechanisms that compel states to act in certain ways.”⁵¹ Such implicit mechanisms may include the issuance of arrest warrants by the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a way of providing a *cassus belli* for liberal powers to remove recalcitrant leaders from power and impose

⁴⁴ Roger Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding*, 78.

⁴⁵ Linnea Gelot and Fredrik Söderbaum, "Rethinking Intervention", 144.

⁴⁶ See Beatrice Pouligny, *Peace Operations Seen From Below: UN Missions and Local People*. London: Hurst, 2006.

⁴⁷ Roger Mac Ginty, "Hybrid Peace", 394.

⁴⁸ Roger Mac Ginty, "Recommending Hybridity."

⁴⁹ Roger Mac Ginty, "Recommending Hybridity."

⁵⁰ Roger Mac Ginty, "Recommending Hybridity."

⁵¹ Roger Mac Ginty, "Recommending Hybridity."

order—as defined through liberal peace tenets. In these instances, the liberal peace is framed as the only option available to a failed or failing state experiencing some human tragedy where the rhetoric of emancipation is often employed in order to gain support (even via illiberal means) be it through the international community, coalitions of the willing, or from domestic voting blocs in the intervening state.

The second part of the model deals with the incentivising powers of intervening actors. On the face of it, the idea of providing incentives seems much more amenable to the narrative of the liberal peace or intervening power as benevolent. The largest and most obvious incentive is financial remuneration. Substantial injections of financial aid or “cargo planes full of cash” are not necessarily the only means of incentivising power. It can take on a moral form as well, including diplomatic recognition for marginalised groups, or some other form of legitimisation.⁵² Still, more often than not incentivising tends toward the payment of bribes. Afghanistan, for example, has seen billions of dollars poured into a statebuilding project that has enriched countless Afghan elites who claim to act on behalf of their populations. When certain warlords have become an obstacle to intervener’s objectives, the tendency has been to incorporate the troublesome warlord into the state, thus securing more access to tribute and setting an example that for others to do similarly well, it would be wise to join on to the statebuilding project. While there are critics who charge that such incentives are unevenly distributed and thus harm the most vulnerable and poor,⁵³ there is no doubting that during any intervention, there are bound to be actors who stand to gain significantly.

The third aspect of Mac Ginty’s model, “the ability of local actors, networks, and structures to resist, ignore, subvert, and adapt” interventions seeks to recognise the agency of local actors in these societies. While the intervening power can and does often co-opt local actors and exercises significant influence, the potential for resistance from locals should not be minimised. The local in this case may be weaker state governments, local districts or municipalities, non-state militia groups, NGOs or humanitarian agencies, political parties, religious organisations, elements of the media, business associations, or everyday communities and individuals. Any actor that has the capability to thwart any or all aspects of the imposed order may be the local for the purposes of this model. Resistance, Mac Ginty notes, may or may not be subversive in

⁵² Roger Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding*, 81.

⁵³ Michael Pugh, “Post-War Economies and the New York Dissensus.” *Conflict, Security, and Development*, Vol. 6, Iss. 3, 2006, pp. 269-289, 285.

form, adding that “actors can cooperate with some aspects of the liberal peace, remain agnostic on other parts, and oppose other parts.”⁵⁴

The difficult time the US and its allies had in fighting the Iraqi insurgency demonstrates this phenomenon. While the situation was a complex one, with multiple insurgent actors seeking disparate objectives, Sunni tribes in Iraq were highly successful for over three years in combating both the US-led forces and the newly formed Shia-dominated central government (after Sunnis largely boycotted the elections which many viewed as illegitimate). Eventually, these groups sought a stake in the new government and were brought into the fold (or co-opted by the US-led coalition and its Iraqi client state, depending on one’s viewpoint) by allowing their militias to become state-sanctioned security forces known as the Sons of Iraq. The Sunni militias-turned-Sons of Iraq are a classic example of a local effort to resist, ignore, and adapt to top-down policies with an effective bottom-up approach that facilitated not an imposed peace, but a *hybrid peace*. Mac Ginty mentions the variables that this aspect of the hybrid peace depends on. One relates to the social and political capital of local actors, and extent to which traditional or indigenous structures are intact (which, after prolonged conflict may or may not be the case), and can be rallied to push back and hybridise the imposed forms of peace.⁵⁵ Another such variable deals with the degree to which local actors are willing to either accept international tutelage and replicate their systems versus resisting such assistance in favour of locally-understood systems based on patronage, clientelism, or kinship to produce a hybrid.⁵⁶

The fourth aspect of Mac Ginty’s hybridity model is “the ability of local actors, structures, and networks to present and maintain alternative forms of peace and peacemaking.”⁵⁷ As previously discussed, some forms of resistance may be reactionary and violent in nature toward the goals of the interveners, but they become particularly problematic for the hegemonic powers when they present alternative orders to the imposed peace—challenging the precept that the liberal peace is “the only deal in town.”⁵⁸ The case of Hezbollah in Lebanon provides an illustrative example of a local network not just resisting to, but providing and maintaining alternatives to the Lebanese state (or the international presence exemplified by the United Nations). Despite being labelled a terrorist organisation by the US government, in fact Hezbollah has been quite attentive in many aspects of governance, in particular with combating corruption (one arena of

⁵⁴ Roger Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding*, 84.

⁵⁵ Roger Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding*, 86.

⁵⁶ Roger Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding*, 86.

⁵⁷ Roger Mac Ginty, “Hybrid Peace”, 403.

⁵⁸ Roger Mac Ginty, “Hybrid Peace”, 399.

governance that the liberal peace has been unsuccessful in achieving in Lebanon). Hezbollah has essentially created a type of “parallel state” deft in its exploitation of the issue of government corruption to their advantage, as well as gaining a reputation for providing basic goods and services to the people that the central government is unable to provide. Their efforts have been so effective that recent years have seen Hezbollah vying for parliamentary representation, controlling municipalities, participating in power-sharing plans, and even holding ministry positions. These alternative forms of peace may be extensions of pre-existing, indigenous forms of governance and order, or may be created ad hoc in reaction to the disruptive circumstances of a foreign intervention.

The last point regarding Hezbollah having linkages to the Lebanese state to which they are (at least partially) opposed to illustrates a key point regarding the fluidity of hybridity. Hezbollah’s ability to maintain alternative forms of peace sees it blur into being a part of the state and by extension, the liberal peace (which supports governance agenda via support of the state). Additionally, the Sons of Iraq are an example of resistance and adaptation of the liberal order, which runs into providing alternative forms of peace. Likewise, there can be difficulty in finding the line between coercion and incentives by intervening powers. These four constituent parts should not be thought of as discreet elements, and there is considerable overlap between the categories. What are important are the processes by which these forces conflict and amalgamate to constantly provide an ever-shifting equilibrium we may think of as a hybrid peace.

Again, what is important to understand about applying this framework is that its constituent parts are not fixed, but are fluid and dynamic, representing the shifting of power between and among various actors, both external and local. Thus, a high degree of resistance and alternative ordering by locals, coupled with a relatively lower degree of compliance and incentivising by the intervener would suggest that in this case the locals have considerable strength and political capital to shape events in their favour. To the intervener, this may be construed negatively, as a policy failure or a weakness in leadership or planning, or positively as though it demonstrates the truly benevolent intentions of the liberal peace. Indeed, for the liberal peace power to achieve a just peace in the eyes of locals (and other voices sceptical or critical of hegemonic interventions), the four-part conceptual framework would consequently lean heavily in favour of the bottom-up actors, while the top-down parts would be near-empty save for its limited (and its assumed, humanitarian) objectives.

2.2.7 *The Dual Forms of Hybridity*

Having explored the constituent parts of the four-part model, one more important aspect of the hybridity model that must be discussed involves the manner in which it is utilised. In short, the concept of hybridity can be seen (and applied) in two broad forms. The first is *descriptive and analytical*, and has been referred to as “hybridity as critical lens,” and the second “hybridity as desired political objective,” is *prescriptive* in nature.⁵⁹ The aim of this research seeks to employ the concept in the former manner—hybridity as critical lens. The critical hybrid lens is descriptive, as it captures the processes of coalescence and conflict between actors and describes where the locus of power rests at any given time under any given context. This approach that gives equal analytical weight to local forms of agency necessarily leads us to question the critical issues, “questioning and problematising for whom and for what purposes interventions are carried out.”⁶⁰ In this vein, hybridity as critical lens is what Cox would identify as a critical theory approach.

The second form of utilising hybridity is as a potentially normative framework where the hybrid peace is “portrayed as a desirable political project.”⁶¹ If hybridity offers us a context-specific and locally nuanced manner in which to view peace support operations by identifying structural violence, perhaps it offers a clear way forward in constructing a less problematic way for powers to intervene that eliminates or at least ameliorates structural violence. While this idea serves to stimulate the potential for alternatives to the liberal peace,⁶² this iteration of the concept is *prescriptive*. By acknowledging the inadequacies of liberal peace engagements thus far and condemning a 'one size fits all' approach, Richmond calls for a normative shift in peacebuilding strategies, rooted firmly in hybrid peace as a normative prescription.⁶³ Consider the following:

Talk of ‘human security’, ‘responsibility to protect’, ‘do no harm doctrines’ and ‘local ownership’ seems very empty from the perspective of most of the peoples these concepts have been visited upon. This in turn has often elicited from subject communities a ‘post-colonial response’, criticising peace interventions as self-interested, imperialist, orientalist, and focusing on the interveners’ interests rather than local interests. A local (transnational and transversal) attempt is under way to reclaim political agency and autonomy from the new post-Cold War ‘civilising

⁵⁹ See Jenny H. Peterson, "A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity."

⁶⁰ Linnea Gelot and Fredrik Söderbaum, "Rethinking Intervention", 138. See Also Adam Branch, "The Paradoxes of Protection: Aligning Against the Lord's Resistance Army." *African Security*, Vol. 5, Iss. 3-4 (2012), pp. 160-178.

⁶¹ Jenny H. Peterson, "A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity", 9.

⁶² Jenny H. Peterson, "A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity", 9.

⁶³ Oliver P. Richmond, "Liberal Peace Transitions: A Rethink is Urgent." *Open Democracy website*, 19 November 2009. Accessed 14 January 2013. < <https://www.opendemocracy.net/oliver-p-richmond/liberal-peace-transitions-rethink-is-urgent>>

mission', which has over the last twenty years, shown itself unable to provide for basic needs, rights, security (state or human) at levels local actors expect, or to respect or understand local differences and non-liberal, and even non-state patterns of politics. Non-liberal and non-western forms of politics, economics, society, and custom, are clamouring for discursive and material space in many post-conflict zones, with mixed implications for sustainability and for the purpose of achieving a normatively (to liberals at least) and contextually acceptable, locally sustainable peace.⁶⁴

Richmond goes on to say “a recognition that this emergent local-liberal form of hybridity which is leading to a post-liberal form of politics, may lead to states and to forms of peace that are more locally relevant, stable, autonomous, while also reflecting widely agreed international norms, which themselves may be altered by these developments,” adding “it will be more profoundly democratic and stable as a result.”⁶⁵ Some critics of the liberal peace may be weary to embrace the notion that a normative hybridity that informs intervention policy may lead to a sufficiently emancipatory post-liberal peace. Peterson points out the seductive nature of hybridity by warning of what she calls the “hybridity as progress” narrative.⁶⁶ It may be true that the “hybridity as progress’ rhetoric underlying some research imbues analysis with an aura of hope, suggesting that the phenomenon under consideration may represent a challenge to the hegemonic discourse of liberalism.”⁶⁷ At what point does hybridity become local resistance and subversion? And at what point does it devolve into postcolonial mimicry, where systems of exploitation are subtly reified and indigenous values are co-opted for the purposes of the external intervener?

Imagining that all current modes of interventions require is a hybrid model to guide their actions and policies risks missing the emancipatory potential of the concept. The liberal peace itself is highly problematic in that “liberalising the world implies indirect rule,” whereby liberal understandings and frames of reference—showcased as universal values, set “the direction and frame of interpretation of the actual... processes, thus conflating the normative course chosen with an objective or universal idea.”⁶⁸ “Peace in these terms,” Richmond reminds us, “is not seen as an international gift, or as a local production, but as a contract. Emancipatory thinking about peace has collapsed into conditionality and governmentality.”⁶⁹ One could argue that the continuation of indirect rule via liberal peace projects over the past two decades have already been successful at co-opting emancipatory narratives through norms like humanitarian

⁶⁴ Oliver P. Richmond, “Liberal Peace Transitions.”

⁶⁵ Oliver P. Richmond, “Liberal Peace Transitions.”

⁶⁶ Jenny H. Peterson, “A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity”, 15-16.

⁶⁷ Jenny H. Peterson, “A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity”, 16.

⁶⁸ Linnea Gelot and Fredrik Söderbaum, “rethinking Intervention”, 133.

⁶⁹ Oliver P. Richmond, *A Post-Liberal Peace*, 1.

intervention and the responsibility to protect doctrine, which some see as little more than postcolonial dominance masquerading as responsible protection.⁷⁰ By falling for what Peterson sees as the “hybridity as progress narrative,” interveners may assume that all hybridity is emancipatory, and represents a positive step forward.⁷¹ This kind of assumption is potentially dangerous because a hybrid peace does not *necessarily* equal an emancipatory peace. Millar notes how prescriptive hybridity is “inherently resistant to planned administration,” and cautions against such approaches that “do not produce predictable experiences of peace.”⁷² Mac Ginty has warned of skewed appraisals of local agency and indigenous norms that romanticise the local.⁷³ There are aspects of any outsider-insider interaction that may be problematic. For example, if the intervener is involved in reifying pre-existing authoritarian power structures or is imposing its will through one local actor to the exclusion of other local voices.

This is not to say that there is not room for hybridity as desired political objective to be realised at all, merely that prescriptive hybridity is not a “magic bullet” fix for societies in conflict or post-conflict turmoil. Liberal peace powers seeking to internalise local narratives and indigenous sources of legitimacy will be more likely to be justifiable than those who do not, and the notion reaffirms some of the liberal motivations espoused by such powerful actors. This intentional hybridity still fixes parameters to a problem area, albeit with improvements, and seeks to work within the existing order. Thus, this form of utilising hybridity should be thought of as oriented toward a problem-solving paradigm. This can be seen in many cases where, after a prolonged period of failing to achieve its original objectives by its original means, an intervener seeks out a hybrid solution, be it a political dialogue with Afghanistan’s Taliban, or the inclusion of Iraqi militias into state security forces. Hybridity in practice might in fact pave the way for some alternative forms of peace in certain cases—though not all. However it is important to recognise that its utility as a conceptual lens depends on the researcher’s ability to avoid the pitfall of the ‘progress’ narrative, and see asymmetric power relations as they are occurring. In other words, a critical lens of hybridity lens does not and should not equal ‘rose-tinted glasses’ with which to see these interventions.

⁷⁰ See Adam Branch, “The Irresponsibility of R2P in Africa,” in *Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect: Interrogating Theory and Practice* (Philip Cunliffe, ed.). New York: Routledge Press, 2011, pp. 269-303.

⁷¹ Jenny H. Peterson, “A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity”, 7-8.

⁷² Gearoid Millar, “Disaggregating Hybridity: Why Hybrid Institutions Do Not Produce Predictable Experiences of Peace,” *Journal of Peace Research Online*, 19 March 2014, pp.1-15, 1. Accessed 2 April 2014. <jpr.sagepub.com/early/2014.full.pdf>

⁷³ Roger Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding*, 68.

For the purposes of this research, I use hybridity and the four-part framework as a critical lens. By applying hybridity across the different sets of actors involved in C-LRA, the empirical chapters are intended to present a more nuanced understanding of the complexities of this emerging form of intervention. Although this work primarily involves the critical lens form of hybridity, some space does exist that can contribute to the latter notion—that of hybridity as desired political objective. By utilising Mac Ginty's conceptual model in the field, in the mode of critical lens, I hope to present a potential for an alternative order as this form of intervention continues to take shape, and in so doing to provide both a Coxian critical perspective, as well as contribute to problem solving modalities within existing paradigms.

2.2.8 *Hybridity's Potential Objections*

Having discussed the problem of employing the dual forms of hybridity, a few other points regarding the concept are worth mentioning. Some cite problems with its usage, not the least of which is the “methodological constraints and considerations when employing a hybridity lens.”⁷⁴ One such objection is that hybridity is too vague a notion that can too easily be applied to all things—in a sense making everything the result of hybridity, illustrating a lack of certainty, and bogging down all discussion in caveats.⁷⁵ Indeed, no phenomena are strictly 'pure'—that is, without some degree of prior hybridisation. In a sense, all things may be a result of hybridity, and everything is hybrid, which makes categorisation difficult and necessary without numerous caveats.⁷⁶ While hybridity is particularly useful in moving past overly simplistic dichotomous thinking, it is also possible to take hybridity's language too far, so that it loses its value and relevance. Taken to extremes, the concept risks posing a “vexing ambiguity,”⁷⁷ which sees “everything and everyone” as a hybrid, where “concepts such as endogenous and exogenous, indigenous and international risk losing their currency.”⁷⁸

Acknowledging that some external forces are more powerful than others and may be more effective at imposing its will on local populations, and that certain societies and local actors and networks are better equipped to resist and subvert domination or transformation, it is the processes and interplay in each circumstance that is the focus of identifying and exploring

⁷⁴ Jenny H. Peterson, "A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity", 7.

⁷⁵ Cheryl McEwan, *Postcolonialism and Development*. Abingdon: Routledge Press, 2008, 77. See Also Roger Mac Ginty, "The Hybrid Peace", 396.

⁷⁶ Cheryl McEwan, *Postcolonialism and Development*. Abingdon: Routledge Press, 2008, 77.

⁷⁷ Marwan M. Kraidy, *Hybridity, or the Cultural Logic of Globalization*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2005, 70.

⁷⁸ Marwan M. Kraidy, *Hybridity, or the Cultural Logic of Globalization*, 73.

hybridisation. Accepting the limitations and shortcomings of the language and terminology of hybridity, it is nevertheless important to move toward recognising that degrees of hybridisation exist and seek to understand its linkages to the power relations in the interplay between actors.⁷⁹ What is important here is to focus on the hybrid process, and recognise that there will be varying degrees of relation to hybridity's four parts, or discreet characteristics. In other words, "some actors and processes are more hybridised than others."⁸⁰ Similarly, "some actors and processes are more resilient in resisting external pressures and incentives than others."⁸¹ Nevertheless, to some degree the hybridity scholar is required to essentialise subjects in order to clear this "analytical hurdle."⁸² This type of reluctant but necessary categorisation—what Spivak calls "strategic essentialisms"—may be needed in order to bring a certain area to light in order to understand it adequately.⁸³ Keeping focused on the overall process, the necessary strategic essentialisms, and on these distinctions between categories, when they occur, how they occur, and why they occur will help keep hybridity useful in terms of employing it as a lens to understand external interventions.

There is one final objection worth addressing that deals with hybridity in a liberal peace context that is related to the intentional, or prescriptive application of hybridity already mentioned above. It echoes the same critiques of hybridity in post-colonial studies, that being that in the "creation of narratives surrounding colonial subjects, the subaltern and those dominated over by... neo-colonial structures of power, there is concern that these stories continue to be told and interpreted through the eyes and mouths of elite intellectuals."⁸⁴ Kraidy refers to Bhabha's post-colonial interpretation of hybridity as "a symptom of resistance by the colonized, as a contamination of imperial ideology."⁸⁵ This exposes one potential weakness in the utilisation of the hybrid lens. In a sense, the voice of the subaltern may never be (re)produced or isolated in such a way as to give it legitimacy and agency delinked with the biases and perceptions of the intellectual, who, like it or not, tends to be a product of the Global North.⁸⁶

⁷⁹ Roger Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding*, 73.

⁸⁰ Roger Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding*, 73.

⁸¹ Roger Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding*, 73.

⁸² Jenny H. Peterson, "A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity", 14.

⁸³ See Gayatri C. Spivak, "Can the Sub-Altern Speak?" In *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader* (B. Ashcroft, G. Griffiths, and H. Tiffin, eds.). London: Routledge Press, 1995, 24-28.

⁸⁴ Jenny H. Peterson, "A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity", 15.

⁸⁵ Marwan M. Kraidy, *Hybridity, or the Cultural Logic of Globalization*, 58.

⁸⁶ To which I as a white Westerner, am certainly no exception.

A problem of employing hybridity is when researchers take the progress narrative as a given, and it ends up justifying the actions and policies of the hegemon.⁸⁷ This tendency to believe that by virtue of a process of interaction being 'hybrid', it becomes less paternalistic and thus more favourable is a problematic one.⁸⁸ There is no simple solution to this dilemma other than rigorous fieldwork imbued with a critical self-awareness that acknowledges this problem and seeks to maximise participation by affected actors. By remaining cautiously aware of the potential for inherent biases, this research ambitiously hopes to capture the instances of the hybrid peace involved in C-LRA so that future researchers (particularly those from the Global South) can carry this inquiry further.

2.2.9 *Hybridity and the C-LRA Intervention*

Mac Ginty argues that the application of hybridity has been “underutilised in relation to the study of contemporary security, peace, and conflict.”⁸⁹ This project seeks to address Mac Ginty’s call to use the conceptual tool of hybridity to inform empirical research on contemporary ‘liberal peace’ contexts,⁹⁰ as well as in contexts that are arguably removed from the tenets of the liberal peace. I apply it in order to evaluate and understand US security assistance to Uganda and its effort to end LRA violence in central Africa.

The concept of hybridity represents a challenge to current and past discourses overly-reliant on the one-way transmission of power characterised by the liberal peace, and this challenge could not have come at a more opportune moment. Here we see the US, working through Uganda, alongside the African Union and the fragile governments of three weak central African states, seeks to capture a warlord and his rebel army, protect vulnerable civilians, and assist in building a lasting peace—and doing so at the urging of humanitarian advocacy groups and civil society organisations. This situation underscores the weaknesses and limitations of a conventional liberal peace paradigm to understand this intervention, and offers up a host of challenges to the problematic assumptions made about conflict, the state and the exercise of power in international politics.. Hybridity thus identifies the problem, and gives us a potential recipe for solving it—writing the “local” into accounts of peacebuilding and intervention where such voices been traditionally written out in favour of the hegemonic technocracy *de jour*. By examining hybrid relationships and the resulting peace (or lack thereof), it is possible to ask “where does the power lie?” It is determining where power lies, where it may potentially be transformed,

⁸⁷ Jenny H. Peterson, "A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity", 15-16.

⁸⁸ See Gearoid Millar, "Disaggregating Hybridity."

⁸⁹ Roger Mac Ginty, "Hybrid Peace", 392.

⁹⁰ Roger Mac Ginty, "Hybrid Peace", 398.

transmitted and redistributed that offers the subaltern a possibility to have an emancipatory voice while offering the intervener (be it a state, or coalition of state and non-governmental institutions) a source of limited legitimacy. “It is this interface—between the most effective elements of the liberal peace and the local approaches—where the liberal-local hybrid is likely to be most evident,” claims Mac Ginty, adding that “there is limited evidence from the field that peacebuilders have been able to calibrate peacebuilding interventions so that they play to the strengths of local and external actors.”⁹¹

This research offers an empirical case study of hybridity’s utility and a framework for inquiry based on a nuanced understanding of the processes at work, power relations inherent in these processes, and reveals useful insights related to policy choices. The potential successes and benefits of hybridity are apparent in its ability to come to grips with a unique, dynamic situation fraught with power inequities, policy uncertainties, cultural clashes and unconventional alliances and schisms. Applying this concept to the empirical data here presents an opportunity to better understand the “new logic of interventionism”⁹² using the hybrid lens, as well as refining and improving hybridity theory itself. To sum up the objectives of this research, my aims here are: First, to use Mac Ginty’s hybridity framework as a critical lens with which to better understand the power dynamics of external intervention carried out by a coalition of the US and Ugandan militaries along with a network of global advocacy groups and determine what kind of ‘hybrid peace’, or ‘hybrid politics’ has emerged at this point in time; Secondly, to use the framework of hybridity to better understand the wider political and security context of the US-Ugandan security partnership, from which the C-LRA intervention emerges; Thirdly, to provide a perspective on these issues that addresses both the problem-solving policy matters inherent in the status quo and also provides a clear path for critical, emancipatory action; Finally, to assess the utility of employing the hybrid lens which will allow a re-evaluation of Mac Ginty’s conceptual framework.

2.3 Research Questions

With hybridity’s utility as a critical lens laid out as the primary working definition here, I seek to apply this lens to critically interrogate the US-led counter-LRA intervention in Central Africa via Ugandan proxy forces, as well as the US-Ugandan security relationship which enables it. The following set of five research questions are our starting point from which to make an original

⁹¹ Roger Mac Ginty. “Hybrid Peace”, 408.

⁹² Henning Melber, *The End of the Development-Security Nexus?*, 3.

contribution to the field by utilising an under-tested analytical framework (hybridity) and applying it to current intervention in central Africa. In doing so it will provide a clear contribution to the field regarding the conceptual notion of hybridity, as well as providing important insights into this unorthodox intervention taking place in Central Africa and the politics that surround it. These questions will be listed below, and will follow with a brief discussion of each in turn. The central question this project addresses is:

- RQ 1: Using Mac Ginty's hybridity model in order to better understand the dynamics of power and agency in this case, what kind of 'hybrid peace' or 'hybrid politics' has emerged at this point in time?

In order to fully address this question, I have identified six subsidiary research questions that clearly link this thesis to the empirical data, seeking to keep this project tightly defined. These subsidiary research questions begin with four sub-research questions which are directly taken from the four constituent parts of Mac Ginty's framework. By answering them, we arrive at the answer to the primary research question above. They are as follows:

- RQ 2: To what extent and to what effect are compliance powers employed?
- RQ 3: To what extent and to what effect are incentivising powers employed?
- RQ 4: To what extent and to what effect are local actors resisting and adapting?
- RQ 5: To what extent and to what effect are local actors providing alternatives?

The following two are subsidiary research questions which seek to assess the utility of the hybrid framework itself, and provide some broader implications of interest to the field which can be gleaned from these findings. They are as follows:

- RQ 6: In what ways does this research contribute to a more refined understanding of hybridity's utility, both as a critical lens, and its potential as a desired normative framework for future interventions?
- RQ 7: What are the implications of these findings on broader issues involving the militarisation of US-Africa policy, the emerging security-development nexus, forms of online issue-advocacy, as well challenges involving traditional IR assumptions about the liberal peace and the state?

2.3.1 *Expanded Discussion of Research Questions*

- RQ 1: Using Mac Ginty's hybridity model in order to better understand the dynamics of power and agency in this case, what kind of 'hybrid peace' or 'hybrid politics' has emerged at this point in time?

This is the overarching research question for this project. In more detail, what does hybridity tell us about the C-LRA effort, given increased US security aid to Uganda, particularized local security needs, and increased civil-military engagement by its various actors? Recognizing that C-LRA is an intervention that is limited in scope and involving international and powerful state actors, regionally powerful states, regionally weak states, the widespread use of proxy forces, and a myriad of non-military actors, what are the relevant hybrid relationships among these actors that are driving the intervention and the responses to it? By applying hybridity as a critical lens, this work sets out to determine where the locus of power is situated in this intervention (i.e. who is making the decisions about the objectives of the intervention, policy implementation, resource allocation and prioritization, makeup of security forces, inclusion of non-military actors, interaction of local and regional actors, etc). Furthermore, how does this relate to the nature of US security assistance to Uganda, and what are its effects within that country in terms of domestic politics and the legacy of discontent which long ago spawned the LRA in the first place?

- RQ 2: To what extent and to what effect are compliance powers employed?

How are the compliance powers of powerful actors being applied, and how successful are these at achieving compliance with their stated objectives? A large degree of observable compliance powers being applied indicates a predominantly top-down and coercive model of intervention or political strategy, while a scarcity of compliance powers applied would indicate that a more balanced, legitimate and localized strategy (or “bottom-up”) approach may be at work. Additionally, identifying the compliance strategies of interveners and ruling elites, and comparing these against stated objectives may reveal unstated (or concealed) policy objectives.

- RQ 3: To what extent and to what effect are incentivising powers employed?

In what ways are the incentivizing strategies successful at influencing local actors the way that the powerful actor intends, and are incentivizing strategies in line with stated objectives of the intervention or political strategy writ large? This assumes that if external interveners or powerful state elites require a large degree of incentivizing then it is most likely at odds with more localized norms and practices (otherwise, such incentivizing would presumably be unnecessary). The degree to which incentivizing powers are minimal indicates an intervention and political strategies that account for local participation and legitimacy.

- RQ 4: To what extent and to what effect are local actors resisting and adapting?

Are the abilities of local actors to adapt to or resist to hegemonic forces identifiable and how successful are these abilities? A large degree of adaptation and resistance to the powerful actor's strategies indicates a significant gap between external and local priorities, suggesting that the intervention or political strategy lacks legitimacy and support as perceived by locals and by extension that the agendas of powerful actors may have less to do with local needs than officially stated. However, if there is little for local actors to resist or adapt to, then this suggests that the intervention and political strategy is more in line with local narratives, and is inclusive in terms of prioritizing local perceptions and inputs.

- RQ 5: To what extent and to what effect are local actors providing alternatives?

How are local actors providing alternatives to 'top-down' policies and how successful are they in achieving these alternatives? Are these alternatives being 'written in' to the powerful actor's plans and policies, or are they being undertaken *despite* the efforts of the powerful to thwart such alternatives from being realized? If there is little or no pursuit of alternatives by local actors then this indicates that 'bottom-up' forces have been taken into account and are apparent in the powerful actor's strategies, while a significant pursuit of alternatives indicates a gap in the 'top-down' objectives that local voices are seeking to 'fill in.' In addition, the extent to which interveners are receptive to adopting these alternatives into their policies correlates with the intervener's priorities.

- RQ 6: In what ways does this research contribute to a more refined understanding of hybridity's utility, both as a critical lens, and its potential as a desired normative framework for future interventions?

By employing the four-part conceptual framework of hybridity as a critical lens we are able to identify aspects of the interventions that are overly "top-down" (or insufficiently "bottom-up) and thus may lack local legitimacy. Conversely, the four-part model may allow us to identify aspects of interventions that are moderately successful at being supported *both* by powerful actors *and* are locally supported and legitimized. It is this last point that opens the possibility of conceptualizing hybridity as a normative framework, and could potentially serve as a template with which to plan and undertake future external interventions.

- RQ 7: What are the implications of these findings on broader issues involving the militarisation of US-Africa policy, the role of civil society in external interventions, the degree to which non-state actors may affect policy decisions, as well challenges involving traditional IR assumptions about the liberal peace, conflict, and the state?

With a better understanding of these hybrid relationships being examined here, a wide range of broader implications are exposed which say a great deal about the role of AFRICOM and US Africa policy and how these relate to notions of the liberal peace. How are non-state actors such as civil society groups able to not only influence policy but shape and in some cases determine the nature of external interventions? What lessons learned from this analysis add to current assumptions and understandings within IR theory, particularly in Africa, what are some areas for potential future research along similar lines?

2.3.2 Operationalisation of Concepts

Empirical research that employs hybridity requires a two-part approach. The first part is to identify the actors, networks, and structures involved in this study. From becoming familiar with the issues of the LRA conflict and the US-Ugandan security relationship through the copious literature, sorting and prioritising which actors are to be considered as discreet units and which are part of a larger descriptive unit. Secondly, once these actors, networks, and structures are identified, we must determine the type of agency (or absence of agency) at work. Is agency a mutual, two-way process? Or is it instead a one-way transmission of objectives pushed onto a subordinate actor? This can be difficult to measure, as there may be varying degrees of power asymmetries at play. This type of information is gleaned both through first-hand interviews with individuals within these organisations, as well as by conducting participant-observation among some these groups, providing a wealth of empirical data regarding the perceptions and attitudes of actors against the four-part hybridity framework, which serves as a guideline.

Some expanding on how the four part model relates to the answering the research questions is in order. Respondents may be asked about the nature of their relationship with other institutions, or individuals within other institutions, and the degree to which they perceive certain strategies or pressures to be taking place. For example, a Ugandan parliamentarian belonging to the ruling NRM party and who is involved in legislation surrounding security issues may be asked to discuss what they feel are the most important issues and aspects of their work, from which the themes drawn from Mac Ginty's four-part model can be explored: *How successful have you been in implementing that policy, and did it unfold as you willed it to? Or was there pushback? What had to be done in order to get your way?* (Depending on their willingness to be forthcoming, this may lead to them providing examples of coercive or incentivising strategies). *Furthermore, what was the response by your political opponents, or constituent citizens? Have they been able to gain compromises, and if so, how? Would you describe their*

opposition as resistance that is amenable to adaptation or negotiation, or as unwilling to engage and seeking alternatives?

Similarly, a South Sudanese subsistence farmer and member of a local self-defence militia who has been affected by LRA violence in recent years may be asked to talk with me about his views on the LRA problem and the external response to it that has been talking place: *How do you feel now that the AU forces and the US advisers are in your area? Has this had a positive or a negative impact? Do you feel you and your community have a stake in this operation? What kinds of issues do you feel you have little or no control over? When there is a problem, how is this typically resolved? Do the security forces ever use force or apply pressure to get what they want? Or do they offer incentives to convince people to go along with their plans? Are there ways that you or your community resists the work they are doing? What steps do you take to adapt to it? Are there ways that you seek a different set of solutions to these problems than the ones they are bringing? Furthermore, would you say that these views match that of most of your community? Who do you know that may have a different point of view?*

By employing enough open-ended questions such as these, the responses from the subject that are being elicited are actually providing copious data that informs the researcher within the hybridity framework. Additionally, the employment of additional field methods such as participant-observation (which will be discussed further below) are important here, as this affords the ability to check what people say against what people actually do. For example, a Congolese soldier assigned to the AU task force may talk as if he espouses the humanitarian ideals of the AU task force similarly to how his Ugandan counterparts describe. But in actual practice, unlike the better-trained and better-led Ugandan troops, he and his unit may engage in small-scale theft or extortion among the population they are there to protect. Acknowledging that no research is perfect, by seeking triangulation of methods, whereby information is obtained via interview, observed through participant-observation, and checked against multiple sources so that accuracy of reported data can be optimised.

Often it is the case that a group of people will have much to say about one or two aspects of the four part model, which tells a lot. For example, Ugandans who complain that there was a lack of basic service provision in their district because they were not represented by the NRM party may provide a long list of grievances and ways in which the ruling elites withheld these basic services and do not govern, except to enforce arbitrary laws. They then may say that when they began to support an NRM candidate, suddenly they received these basic services and there

was assistance in finding jobs for some of their people, and some tools and food aid were provided in exchange for their support. This is a clear example of coercion and incentivisation by elites. Moreover, their inability to do anything substantial in response to these manipulations or to provide service access, or to organise politically in ways that affect them in positive ways indicates a marked lack of an ability to resist, adapt or subvert the wishes of the powerful, as well as an inability to provide alternatives to the hegemonic order imposed on them from the top-down.

The four part model is manageable enough to easily categorise responses as being in one of the four parts of the model. When taken along with a large enough sample to ensure something near consensus, a picture emerges of power relations that has been afforded us by the critical lens of hybridity. The result is a spectrum where one end may be an overly top-down autocratic ruling elite that stifles opposition and is disconnected from the lived experiences of the less-powerful. While on the other end of the spectrum the politics at hand may be of a locally legitimate bottom-up nature, where external powerful actors actively listen to locals and include them as stakeholders in the processes occurring, and appear cognisant of and responsive to, the needs of locals.

2.3.3 Case Study Selection and Justification

In exploring unorthodox interventions in the Global South and the politics that surrounds it, a balance must be struck between a micro-level view that adequately and accurately describes and explains local and regional phenomena in a way that doesn't overlook the importance of details, and a macro-level analysis that draws wider conclusions that are useful to the field and offers other scholars a reference point from which to conduct future research and seek to replicate these inquiries. Aside from the obvious financial, logistical, and temporal limitations, an exhaustive comparative study of the US role in a wide range of activities in Africa would have been too cumbersome to glean useful, coherent findings, whereas the limited focus I have taken here has been manageable, yet more than adequate to provide a wealth of empirical data which reveals much about the real-world dynamics involved, as well as a much-needed theoretical contribution to the field at large. Research on the direct role of US-Ugandan military partnership within Uganda has provided a contextual 'big picture' analysis from which more recent regional realities such as C-LRA have emerged. By examining these newly created political forms of security presence, I seek to make an original theoretical contribution with significant policy relevance to the phenomenon that is the C-LRA intervention. Employing the hybrid approach allows this inquiry to "dissect the various strands and influences that conflict and coalesce to

construct the hybridized peace. This dissection aids us in locating the sources and direction of power and agency.”⁹³

By applying the lens of hybridity to the entire spectrum of C-LRA activities, we see this analysis providing such multiple observations in a manner that “captures the complexity and fluidity”⁹⁴ of such interventions and meets the criteria that a research project be “important’ in the real world,” and that it make a “specific contribution to an identifiable scholarly literature by increasing our collective ability to construct verified scientific explanations of some aspect of the world.”⁹⁵ As King, Keohane, and Verba state, “what may appear to be a single-case study... may indeed contain many potential observations, at different levels of analysis, which are relevant to the theory being evaluated.”⁹⁶ I have chosen to apply the hybrid lens to the C-LRA intervention, as it encompasses the role of the US AFRICOM providing military assistance to Uganda, as well as the effects of the military and non-military interventions in the three distinct target states. While the geographical area affected by LRA violence is characterised by weak or non-existent governance, both the official responses by each state and the response by civilian communities vary among them, providing us with a comparative look at each case. Furthermore, sustained US military support to the Ugandan regime is a key piece of this endeavour and its implications are also a significant aspect of my project. As a result, the strands of inquiry branching out provide a conceptual focus that is, on balance, relatively manageable.

The data examined here and applied to the four-part model is drawn from primary research, as well as secondary sources that supplemented the empirical data gathered in the field. Broadly speaking, it is temporally focused on the time period from late 2011 (when the US announced its support for the C-LRA intervention and its increased military support to Uganda in order to achieve it) to the present (the mission is still active, and continues to evolve at the time of this writing). The bulk of primary data collected, however, deals with my fieldwork period over approximately one year, beginning with a one month period in the summer of 2012, and culminating with a longer stay of six months in the first half of 2013.

Equally important were the perceptions of the many locals I interviewed interacted with (and who were often my hosts) both inside Uganda, and in LRA-affected regions. Perceptions at all levels are examined with equal importance. I engaged with as wide a variety of people as

⁹³ Roger Mac Ginty, “Hybrid Peace”, 407.

⁹⁴ Roger Mac Ginty, “Recommending Hybridity.”

⁹⁵ Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, 15.

⁹⁶ Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry* 208.

possible so that my sample reflected the larger society as much as possible, within the parameters of this study. With hybridity there is an almost limitless potential to explore between and within categories of actors and the networks and structures in which they sit. While my work does not claim to fully account for diversity within and between actor categories, I have attempted to define actors here as they are largely perceived by their co-actors.

For example, the US government is largely treated as a single actor (with AFRICOM and the relevant Embassy teams as extensions of that actor), when it can easily be pointed out that there are many splits, division, and complexities within the US government which makes it more of a network than an actor. Diplomats, military officers, intelligence analysts, and humanitarian aid providers all have agendas that may vary as often as they overlap. Add to the mix a wide range of NGOs, church organisations, advocacy groups that lobby the US government (the complex relationship of which is the subject of Chapter Five), and presenting a “US policy” on any issue or set of issues is problematic at best. Nevertheless, given the inability of my research to get to the heart of these differences (due to the highly-secretive nature of US-Africa policy and AFRICOM), I have tended towards defaulting to the US as a single actor. I have done my utmost to describe and categorise actors and networks according to their perceptions by other stake-holding actors and their importance in answering the research questions this study asks.

2.4 Research Methodology

The following methods were utilised in order to understand this conflict and intervention, the resulting political dynamics, and to describe the nature of agency among and between its various agents, networks, and structures.

2.4.1 Interviews

I relied significantly on the use of unstructured interviews for this research. As effective interviewing relies on fostering cooperation and a sense of mutual trust,⁹⁷ I attempted to prioritise these when engaging with respondents. Often a large portion of the interview was not about my topic per se, but an attempt to loosen up the conversation so that information I *am* interested in would flow freely when that time came. By meeting and developing rapport with subjects, asking detailed, open-ended questions regarding their roles, the interaction of other actors, asymmetries that exist, the role of influence or coercion, and by conducting follow-up

⁹⁷ See Robert Weiss, *Learning From Strangers: The Art and Method of Qualitative Interview Studies*. New York: Free Press, 1996.

discussions, I was able to glean important firsthand perceptions from people directly involved in this intervention. There is no 'one size fits all' approach to effective interviewing, and during this fieldwork this was especially so. Factors such as an individual's nationality, spoken language, level of education, and role within their respective institution or community, all are meaningful in how to interact positively.

During fieldwork, I conducted formal or semi-formal interviews with over one hundred and twenty subjects, about half of which I visited for one or many follow-up meetings.⁹⁸ These subjects included Ugandan and US government officials, Ugandan and US military officers and soldiers, local and international NGO staff, African journalists, African and Western scholars, local religious, tribal and community leaders, as well as everyday people affected by the issues at hand. All were done with informed consent, most anonymously, and all within ethical guidelines of privacy protection. The idea of having a uniform set of questions to 'locate' hybridity was deemed unworkable and jettisoned early on. Depending on the individual's role and temperament to engage in conversation, it often seemed more natural to get at the target information through open-ended conversation. Attempting to explain the nature of the academic research was not something the majority of subjects were amenable to. Rather, when asked to talk about their role, and give their perspective about the nature of their relationships with other actors (both individuals and institutions), and cooperation and conflict, more often than not, information was forthcoming. The four part hybridity model provides a useful and rather simple thematic guide to asking questions and directing conversation. I found it especially useful to ask subjects to tell stories or give examples of coalescence or conflict among actors (using the four parts of the model as broad themes), and how it was or wasn't resolved, or of cooperation, how it came to be and what—if anything—was learned (individually or institutionally) as a result.

The purpose was not necessarily to discover any particularly objective set of facts (although this sometimes became discernible), but to understand the various narratives and the perspectives that inform, and are informed by these narratives. Remembering that hybridity is about process, these interviews were invaluable in understanding the individual points of view involved in the myriad ways hybridity occurs. How each side came to some understanding that allowed for a regulation of interaction, and the sustainment of some mutually agreed upon order—a hybrid peace—is gleaned from focusing on the processes, both socially and psychologically, occurring

⁹⁸ Roughly half of my interviewees were individuals whom I also spent a significant amount of time with away from a semi-structured research environment (during participant-observation periods, which are discussed below). The rest were individuals I was able to gain access to who granted my requests for interviews, and included several persons from the various actor subsets already mentioned.

between and within these individuals. Developing personal rapport was ultimately extremely vital in gaining access to information via interviews. When rapport-building did become very successful in a handful of cases, friendly acquaintances were made that allowed for more in-depth opportunities to explore the hybrid relationships and what they said about the implications of US-Ugandan security cooperation and C-LRA intervention.

2.4.2 *Archival/Media Research*

A very important backdrop to my empirical field research was reviewing policy documents, media articles, scholarly journals, and other written sources to gain context, history, and to essentially back up the data from firsthand sources. Advocacy groups also produce a significant output of written materials online and in print. From the LRA Crisis Tracker (a publication jointly-published by Invisible Children, Resolve Uganda, and the Enough Project) to civil society newsletters, to the Acholi- and English language pamphlets by local NGOs, these publications embody and capture the many fluid narratives that exist and surround this issue.

In terms of Ugandan and African media outlets, several were crucial to the data and findings presented here. I fastidiously read the daily and weekly sources available in order to glean a rich, contextual understanding of what drives local debate and understanding of their own political situation and the issue of outside interventionism. This includes the Ugandan government-sanctioned newspaper and website, *The New Vision*, as well as widely-read and circulated opposition outlets like *The Daily Monitor*, *The Independent*, and *The Red Pepper*. Radio stations like Kampala's KFM (closely tied to *The Daily Monitor*) are a vital outlet for Uganda's less literate citizens and are very popular in rural areas for their talk-radio format, often in local languages.

Along with reading Ugandan media, it is important to note that some of my research subjects are the very journalists who write in these pages, and as a result, what is often the most striking bits of information are those which may *not* be printed (or printed in their entirety due to government censorship), but are spoken about behind closed doors, due to the regime's cautious nature in dealing with media and freedom of information. There is a large body of scholarship that deals with most of the themes explored in this thesis, and the literature review has given a perusal of such work. In addition this work would not have been possible without a look at hundreds of articles in academic journals and dozens of academic books. The US government and especially its military have provided reams of relevant published data that are

crucial to this research (even when access to the people who compile this data was less than forthcoming).

2.4.3 *Ethnographic Participant-Observation*

Although a fair amount of empirical data came from interviews, many of these interviews and the access they assume was only possible due to my explicit usage of ethnographic fieldwork methods—namely, what anthropologists call *participant-observation*.⁹⁹ Strictly speaking, anthropologists distinguish between *fieldwork* and *ethnography*, with the former being a qualitative method of research, and the latter the writing up of that research. A word about participant-observation, and the extent of *participation* it denotes, is in order. It should be said that participant-observation is a complex method with many potential types of researcher interaction with their subjects (ranging from *non-participatory*, *passive*, *moderate*, *active*, and *complete*). As the researcher is unavoidably a part of the research process, total removal from the objects(s) of study is impossible. Here, I characterise my approach as sometimes *passive* (researcher in the bystander role) and sometimes *moderate* (researcher maintains a balance between “insider” and “outsider” roles).¹⁰⁰ Much has been said about the processes involved in producing this type of data,¹⁰¹ the degree to which it provides insights into the minds of others,¹⁰² as well as the ethics of doing so.¹⁰³ Participant-observation offers a broader approach whose “open-ended flexibility” was able to “incorporate other research methods like in/formal interviews, text analyses... and so on.”¹⁰⁴ This was certainly the case here, as it provided a rigorous way of triangulating data derived from other, more formalistic methods.

Initially, the majority of my fieldwork was based in Kampala. Once I had developed sufficient contacts I made numerous smaller research trips of one to three weeks to towns in northern Uganda and in the relevant LRA-affected regions in neighbouring states. Both in Kampala and

⁹⁹ See Brian Moeran, “From Participant-Observation to Observant Participation: Anthropology, Fieldwork, and Organizational Ethnography.” *Creative Encounters Working Paper #2*. University of Copenhagen Business School, July 2007, 1.

¹⁰⁰ See Kathleen DeWalt, Billie DeWalt, and Coral Wayland, “Participant Observation,” in *Handbook of Methods in Cultural Anthropology* (H. Russell Bernard, ed.). Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 1998, pp. 259-299.

¹⁰¹ See Paul Rabinow, *Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977.

¹⁰² See Rosaldo Renato, “From the Door of His Tent: The Fieldworker and the Inquisitor,” in *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography* (James Clifford and George Marcus, eds.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986.

¹⁰³ See Michael Allen Rynkiewich and James P. Spradley, *Ethics and Anthropology: Dilemmas in Fieldwork*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, Inc., 1976.

¹⁰⁴ Sharon MacDonald, “Ethnography in the Sciences Museum, London” in *Inside Organizations: Anthropologists at Work* (David Gellner and Eric Hirsch, eds.). Oxford: Berg Press, 2001, 77.

away on smaller field trips, I maximised my time seeking to “collect as many concrete data as possible over a wide range of facts.”¹⁰⁵ I had unlimited access to most places, save for a few areas in the LRA-affected regions where my movements were limited by the military. In Kampala, my regular interaction with government officials and civil society actors provided useful insights into the implications of US-African security cooperation and the multitude of ways civil society actors colluded with or opposed it that was often different from what occurred in remote parts of DRC, CAR, and South Sudan.

The role of context is important in a conflict or post-conflict scenario. In settings affected by violence, context is “much more than a landscape or backdrop. It is a factor that... affects all aspects of an intervention... It is the very existence of violence and the particular conditions that it spawns... which raise acute challenges for... researchers.”¹⁰⁶ This insight is as true among soldiers and militia fighters as it is true among local communities who have been victimized and traumatized by both the brutality of Kony’s LRA, and the sometimes vicious responses to it by military and militia forces. It is within this context that the development and maintenance of relationships became vital to successfully drawing out respondent’s experiences, feelings, and perceptions while maintaining awareness of certain potential sensitivities. Surprising to me was the sense of contextual violence, not only in the DRC, CAR, and South Sudan (the most recent sites of LRA violence), but within Uganda as well, despite the war there being over for almost seven years at that time.

One problem with ethnographic fieldwork has been seen as an inherent tension between it being a “mirror” versus a “filter.”¹⁰⁷ As a mirror, this can be seen as a transparent process—that of simply the objective writing up of what one sees and hears. The predominant view leans toward the idea of ethnographic fieldwork as filter—that is, a “constructed process” relying on a “variety of stylistic conventions.”¹⁰⁸ This problem of researchers creating “highly selective and partial descriptions of observed and revoked details... enhanced or blurred by their descriptive writing skills” has long been a vexing issue.¹⁰⁹ Yet, strategies exist that seek to mitigate this problem that deal with depiction, organisation, and analysis of research among subjects in fluid

¹⁰⁵ Brian Morean, “From Participant-Observation to Observant Participation”, 10.

¹⁰⁶ Kenneth Bush, Colleen Duggan, Erin McCandless, and Mohammed Abu-Nimer, “Evaluation in Violently Divided Societies: Politics, Ethics, and Methods.” *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2013, pp. 1-4, 2.

¹⁰⁷ Robert M. Emerson, Rachel I. Fretz, and Linda L. Shaw, *Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011, 66.

¹⁰⁸ Robert M. Emerson, Rachel I. Fretz, and Linda L. Shaw, *Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes* 66.

¹⁰⁹ Robert M. Emerson, Rachel I. Fretz, and Linda L. Shaw, *Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes* 67.

settings. Chief among these is maintaining the explicit awareness of the researcher's role in fieldwork, not as an objective and unseen observer (mirror), but as a character playing a role in these interactions (filter). It is naive to assume that my presence does not in some way alter the 'reality' of my observations or the types of responses to queries I may pose to subjects. It is here that the explicit "awareness of writing conventions... invites the ethnographer to make more conscious choices when creating fieldnote records that portray social worlds as experienced by others."¹¹⁰ As much as possible, I attempted to remember that a "self-reflexive ethnographer should make his judgments explicit," but keep in mind that the task at hand is "description that leads to an empathetic understanding of the social worlds of others."¹¹¹

The disadvantages of utilising this method included the fact that I was studying multiple subjects in the sense that I spent time with various sets of actors, and this at times contributed to a lack of the sort of depth usually expected from and associated with anthropological research, which often just focuses on one specific group.¹¹² Ethnographic participant-observation has been described as "an underutilised methodological approach" to studying politics,¹¹³ and others have attempted to promote its effective usage in such a setting.¹¹⁴ Participant-observation allows us to see problems of agency and power, especially the micro-level processes embodied in the makeup of the international system.¹¹⁵ I found that for my purposes, it proved a well-suited and appropriate method, and that the scope of inquiry was sufficient enough to answer the questions posed here. The advantages of this type of fieldwork (even in its limited ethnographic depth), rooted firmly in hybridity, is that it allowed a form of grounded theory that allowed discussions of the hybrid peace in a more formal sense (interviews), while being situated within a more informal observational setting (ethnographic participant-observation). It provided a discernible advantage in overcoming a real difficulty inherent in fieldwork, "trying to distinguish between what people say they do and what people actually do."¹¹⁶ That is, information may be collected during an interview about a subject's experience or perception of any given issue. However,

¹¹⁰ Robert M. Emerson, Rachel I. Fretz, and Linda L. Shaw, *Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes* 106.

¹¹¹ Robert M. Emerson, Rachel I. Fretz, and Linda L. Shaw, *Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes* 72.

¹¹² Typically this involves long-term immersion in the cultural setting under study, usually several months or even years.

¹¹³ Andra Gillespie and Melissa R. Michelson, "Participant Observation and the Political Scientist: Possibilities, Priorities, and Practicalities." *Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 44, Iss. 2, April 2011, pp. 261-265, 261.

¹¹⁴ See Helmar Schone, "Participant Observation in Political Science: Methodological Reflection and Field Report." *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung (Forum: Qualitative Social Research)*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2003. *FQS Website*. Accessed online 17 April 2014. <www.qualitative-research.net>

¹¹⁵ Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch, *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations*. New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2007, 37-38.

¹¹⁶ Brian Moeran, "From Participant-Observation to Observant Participation", 13.

when you spend time around this subject and observe and interact with them on a consistent basis, one is able to compare what was said in an interview against the observable actions, thus determining the difference between what a subject will say and what the subject actually does.

The importance of building and developing rapport during fieldwork cannot be overstated. Among the US military C-LRA advisers I was particularly well-received, where my own background and nationality afforded me limited 'insider' status, and unlike many researchers and journalists I felt better able to understand how their operational jargon coincided with civil society and academic understandings of C-LRA activities, which I hope will lead to better empirical data than otherwise may be collected. Similarly, I came to rely on building rapport simply through common cultural ground when possible when I encountered other Westerners involved in this issue, such as anti-LRA advocates, missionaries, relief workers, and academics). It was a mutual personal connection and some common background that opened those doors of access.

With a firm grasp of research methods used to glean these research findings, the following section discusses the matter of ethical concerns as they relate to this thesis.

2.5 Research Ethics

To address potential ethical concerns, the following section discusses ethical considerations on several fronts. As my project will include contact with three primary groups of actors (US and African political actors and security forces,¹¹⁷ NGO/civil society actors, and African civilians across four states), maintaining appropriate standards of practice in each case is necessary. As NGO/civil society actors work in areas of society that are generally transparent, being part of academic research rarely presents any issues of concern. Research with government personnel, and armed military personnel in particular (as well as the civilian population they interact with), is another matter. In addition, working among civilian populations in low-intensity - conflict situations, in authoritarian states, or in un- or under-governed territories likewise presents obvious challenges. These present potential physical as well as psychological concerns that will be addressed below. The first section deals with aspects of gaining access to reliable primary data versus issues of the researcher's personal safety. The second deals with the ethics of working with potentially illiberal actors, while the third deals with potential harms to civilian populations in conflict zones, post-conflict areas, and authoritarian political spaces.

¹¹⁷ These were primarily Ugandans, but also Congolese, South Sudanese, and Central African personnel as well.

2.5.1 *Personal Safety Concerns*

Regarding personal safety, I emphasize that my project is *not* intentionally conflict research, *per se*, but rather focuses on the affected relations between and among actors in conflict and post-conflict situations. The civil war in northern Uganda between the LRA and Uganda has been effectively over since 2006. Northern towns like Gulu, Kitgum, and Arua were plundered and pillaged by the LRA (and their Ugandan military pursuers—often just as brutal) for over thirty years, but have seen burgeoning growth and investment compared to just a few years ago. Although, these towns are still chronically underdeveloped compared to Uganda's capital and southern districts, often with basic needs of its northern citizens not being sufficiently met by government, physical safety has not been an issue during fieldwork in Uganda.

In the three neighbouring target states, however, armed conflict is still a persistent reality for many people. While I will discuss in later chapters how danger in some of these remote areas has evolved and shifted as a result of this intervention, armed attacks, abductions, and thefts continue. Whether these are attributed to the LRA, other armed actors related to the variable spectrum of regional conflict, or simple banditry, these incidents typically were away from populated areas and by the time of my arrival, reasonable countermeasures existed that mitigated against grave personal concerns (the details of which will be discussed in further chapters). My research trips out to LRA-affected areas were for the most part in secure areas, and precluded any conflict zone operations. On smaller excursions in more remote areas to conduct interviews, I never felt in imminent danger and remained aware of recent trends in violence by following both the LRA Crisis Tracker¹¹⁸ reports and the early-warning radio networks in place, just as local residents must vigilantly do. Among the multiple states, communities, and ethnic groups I visited, on all occasions my hosts were very attentive and concerned for not only my safety, but my comfort and research success as well.

2.5.2 *Fieldwork Among Armed Actors*

My fieldwork occurred in two distinct areas. One was in Uganda, a fairly militarised state who provides the bulk of troops for C-LRA activities, while the other was in the vast LRA-affected area where the borders of CAR, DRC, and South Sudan meet, where official governance is rarely present and tends to be much more ad hoc and informal in nature when it is present. Data collection among armed actors was focused on the narratives, perceptions, attitudes and

¹¹⁸ "LRA Crisis Tracker," *LRA Crisis Tracker website: Invisible Children and Resolve*. Accessed 31 October 2013. <<http://www.lracrisistracker.com/>>

opinions about the effects of past and current operations. The intelligence services and military forces of states (and even diplomats and elected officials in authoritarian-leaning states) are not often associated with openness and ethical inquiry. As such, my status as a foreign researcher afforded me some deference and the ability to follow lines of questioning which locals would surely have been unable to safely pursue.

During fieldwork, I strived at all times to be as transparent and forthcoming about my research and my motives as possible, while keeping the subject matter understandable to research subjects. Rather than employing academic jargon, I let all actors who were potential subjects know that I was conducting research on understanding their perceptions of the issue at hand, be it the C-LRA activities in Central Africa, or the state of politics in Uganda and the role of US support. First and foremost I always made clear that speaking with me was optional and I ensured their consent was freely given. Additionally, in some cases where I was essentially embedded with either security forces, NGO or clergy official, I made it clear that I was an independent scholar and not formally associated with these groups. Informed consent proved to never be an issue, especially in Uganda, where Western fieldworkers are not uncommon. In LRA-affected areas, I was somewhat of a novelty presence, and more often than not people provided an abundance of unsolicited information. Moreover, I maintained the anonymity of my subjects at all times (by assigning aliases in my notes), except in the few cases where their choice to self-identity in print was freely given, although this was rare.

Perhaps surprisingly, my work among armed security forces and informal militias in LRA-affected areas never encountered any significant obstacles or resistance. Nor were there any reports of recent abuses by any of these forces, allaying fears of being perceived as colluding with any such abuses in my research. The most troubling behaviour by security forces during fieldwork were not in the so-called war-torn areas, but in Uganda's capital, where police and soldiers periodically harassed crowds suspected of dissident political activities. While disconcerting, this did not raise any immediate ethical concerns in terms of gathering research data. While northern Uganda has enjoyed relative freedom from insurgent conflict for a number of years the problems of structural violence against Uganda's civilians remain.

2.5.3 Civilian Safety Concerns

I now turn to the potentially more problematic issue of conducting ethical research with civilian respondents and any concerns raised over their safety. Perhaps this dilemma was put best by

social anthropologist Chris Dolan, who himself conducted fieldwork in northern Uganda while it was still an active conflict zone during the final days of the civil war in the early 2000s.¹¹⁹ Dolan describes two types of respondent safety concerns: that of the “political and physical safety of respondents,” and that of subject’s “psychological risk”. I shall borrow Dolan’s terminology for these purposes and address each one in turn. In this case, a political and physical risk to respondents refers to things like repercussions from government authorities against what may be perceived as political dissent. In terms of safeguarding the well-being of potential research subjects, I took great care to ensure that conversations were in private and data was kept confidential. Nearly all respondents were forthcoming and only a few expressed concerns over political reprisals. The second, non-physical category of concern regarding civilian respondents—that of “psychological risk”—Dolan discusses below with regards to his fieldwork in Uganda:

Although it was an area with very high levels of violence and violation and these were obviously issues of concern to the study, it seems to me that setting certain types of questions about deeply personal or sensitive experiences (e.g. “how many people did you kill?” or “how many times were you raped?”) is ethically wrong if it puts the respondent under pressure to open wounds which the researcher has no way of dressing, let alone healing. Such questioning, to my mind, implies that the questioner believes him or herself to occupy the moral high ground from which they can ask whatever they choose, because they have objectified the respondent to the point where his or her experience of being questioned ceases to matter. If, however, the respondent chooses to divulge deeply personal information, that is a different matter.¹²⁰

These sentiments seem appropriate in considering the ethics in interviewing and interacting with human subjects, and I would echo Dolan’s considerations in my data collection methods. Despite the potential for deeply personal or sensitive matters to surface, nearly all interviewees were voluntarily forthcoming, some even recounting horrific experiences of rape, mutilation, and killing. Sometimes respondents were the victims, other times they were witnesses, and other times the perpetrators— and sometimes all three. At all time they were active agents in the telling of their own stories and chose to share them with me, and certainly did not need the well-intentioned platitudes of ‘research ethics’ from a white Westerner.

One brief example of “psychological risk” at work is a programme that sees former LRA fighters granted amnesty from prosecution in return for a term of service with the UPDF, usually as scouts or guides in leading soldiers to recent LRA-occupied areas. In order

¹¹⁹ Chris Dolan, *Social Torture: The Case of Northern Uganda, 1986-2006*. Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2011, 25-26.

¹²⁰ Chris Dolan, *Social Torture*, 26.

for the returnee to be “valuable” as a scout or guide, this requires entering the UPDF as soon as possible after returning from the bush. Some civilians described the horrors of being victimized by the LRA, only to have an official army unit return to the area months or weeks later, among whose ranks may be the very individual who committed murder, rape, or abduction against this victim or their family—but this time in a soldier's uniform and under the auspices of the state. In reality, the individual who has committed these acts was likely abducted himself and forced to do these things, making him both a victim *and* a perpetrator. To the victim who sees this individual return to the scene of the crime to ‘protect’ the villagers, the event is obviously traumatic, but often seen as necessary to heal and reconcile.

What was tangible to me in considering the ethical dimensions of my research was an eagerness for Africans to show the outside world their stories in ways that facilitated me “getting it right.” At times I was initially eyed with suspicion, only later to be grabbed and told lengthy stories and experiences by conflict victims and participants so that the outside world would know the *truth* (*but whose truth is a harder matter to pin down*). I hope to accomplish giving a voice to those who wish to be heard, and to shed light on the most positive and least damaging ways the respective governments (both US and African) and civil society actors can coalesce their efforts in as fruitful and emancipatory a manner possible for those involved.

2.6 Conclusion

Having introduced the conceptual framework of the hybridity, the research objectives and research questions, as well as issues of methodology, case study specifics, and ethics in this chapter, I now turn to the bulk of the thesis--my empirical findings. Chapter Three will examine the role of the US military aid to Uganda and its effects on the domestic politics of Uganda, since this should rightfully be seen as the proper context out of which the C-LRA endeavour emerges. Chapters Four and Five discuss the C-LRA activities that are the primary focus of this research, with the former focusing on the intervention's objectives and relevant security issues, and how these are perceived by the various actors involved. The latter, Chapter Five, deals with the matter of civil society actors and the vital role they play in C-LRA efforts. Finally, Chapter Six concludes with a final analysis and discussion of the broader objectives of this thesis as set forth in this chapter.

Chapter Three: Ugandan Politics and US Military Aid

3.1 Introduction

For the purposes of this thesis, the conceptual framework of hybridity is employed as a methodological guide to fieldwork and an analytical aid with which to examine unequal power relations. The bulk of this thesis will apply this concept toward external interventions--in this case, the C-LRA mission. Remember, however, that hybridity as a critical lens is not necessarily limited to external interventions, and is potentially as useful in determining power and agency among actors within any political context that involves the asymmetric exercise of power. Much of Uganda's political landscape is centred on its ability to project power through its security forces--which are trained and supported by the US military. In this chapter, I apply the conceptual framework of hybridity to domestic Ugandan politics as it relates to the issue of US security assistance to Uganda through AFRICOM.

Only a few thousand of these US-trained forces are deployed abroad, while the bulk of Uganda's security forces are at home, where they are routinely used for domestic security purposes. Before moving on to discussing the operation against the LRA in which Ugandan forces are the main effort (which is the subject of Chapter Four), the findings contained in this chapter are intended to provide a clearer understanding of where that military capacity is derived. This chapter sets out the 'bigger picture' risks associated with such forms of military capacity-building support.

3.2 Uganda's External Security Relations

After an overview of the background of the Ugandan military and the support it enjoys from its US benefactor, these dynamics are examined within the framework of Mac Ginty's hybridity concept. Following that is an expanded discussion of these findings intended to provide an appropriate contextual backdrop for later empirical chapters that focus entirely on the C-LRA endeavour.

3.2.1 Historical Background

Uganda's military has a history of external support dating back to the colonial era. This legacy continued with a close relationship between the British and Uganda's post-independence regime up until Idi Amin seized power, who was himself a former sergeant major in the King's

African Rifles.¹ After Yoweri Museveni claimed the presidency in 1986, that external support came increasingly from the United States, who regarded him as "a new style of African leader to be emulated for introducing key institutional reforms."² Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM) party effectively turned Uganda into a one-party state until 2005, when multiparty elections were allowed. The country's government structure rests on the formation and maintenance of Local Councils, which are modelled after the 'resistance councils' that funnelled supplies to Museveni's then-rebel fighters during the Bush War of the early 1980s.³ Although a professed revolutionary leftist in his earlier struggles, he soon proved equally amenable to the neoliberal prescriptions of the Washington Consensus.⁴

The ensuing years of NRM rule finally saw positive growth trends in Uganda's economy after years of civil war. Successful efforts to tackle the soaring HIV rates in his country, as well as improve the human rights record of the government under his leadership did much to stabilise Ugandan society after decades of post-independence turmoil. With the flight of the LRA, the late 2000s saw relative peace and security extended throughout northern Uganda, along with the hope that multiparty democracy could finally flourish. Today, however, thirty years since Museveni's coup d'état, this progress has become for many a "frustrating mirage,"⁵ as the president stubbornly remains in power, his rule increasingly authoritarian and militarised, and the Ugandan economy in steep decline, all while Uganda has yet to witness a peaceful transition of power in its entire post-independence history.

¹ After taking power with Western complicity, Amin rejected Western involvement in Uganda, a fact that may explain why his legacy enjoys a surprising amount of enthusiastic support among Ugandan people, most of whom were not alive during Amin's presidency.

² Aili Mari Tripp, *Museveni's Uganda: Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Press, 2010, 2.

³ There are five levels of LCs, from LC1 to LC5, LC1 being the smallest unit—normally a village or a neighbourhood—and LC5 being an entire electoral district. See Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, *Ten Point Programme of NRM*. Kampala: NRM Publications, 1986.

⁴ As a young man, Museveni studied political science at the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, writing his university thesis on the applicability of Frantz Fanon's ideas on revolutionary violence to post-colonial Africa. See Yoga Adhola, "Museveni's Revolution Strategy Misguided." *The Daily Monitor Online*, 9 February 2014. Accessed 12 October 2015.

<<http://www.monitor.co.ug/Magazines/PeoplePower/Museveni-s-revolution-strategy-misguided/-/689844/2198120/-/njve3p/-/index.html>>

⁵ John Ssenkumba, "The Dilemmas of Directed Democracy: Neutralizing Ugandan Opposition Politics under the NRM." In *The Politics of Opposition in Contemporary Africa* (AO Olukoshi, ed.). Upsalla: Nordic Africa Institute, 1998, 172.

3.2.2 The US-Uganda Security Partnership

Uganda has long been a staunch US ally in East Africa, and today is regarded as a "key U.S. strategic partner."⁶ Since 2001, Uganda has increasingly framed its relationship with the US as a stakeholder in the War on Terror, and through successful bandwagoning practices has become what some describe a US regional proxy.⁷ Uganda provides the bulk of troops for the AMISOM mission in Somalia, which is a major regional concern for the US, but is not a politically feasible option for the US to undertake directly. In addition to facing al Shabaab, Uganda provides a regional bulwark against the Khartoum government of the Sudan (whom the US considers to be a state sponsor of terrorism), as well as chronic instability perpetuated by various rebel groups and militias in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. In return the US gains a militarily strong regional ally in a pivotal location that is soon to become an oil-producing state (Uganda sits on vast, under-explored oil reserves in the Lake Albert region, while production has yet to commence).⁸

US security assistance to Uganda includes numerous programmes through both the US Defense and State Departments providing military training, joint exercises, and other capacity-building activities. Uganda has been one of the most eager African states to receive capacity-building assistance as it increasingly defines its role with the US as not only an ally in regional stability, but a strong counterterrorism partner.⁹ Some scholars acknowledge that capacity-building efforts often can make "an important contribution to crisis management," but warn that it "must be context-specific and geared towards long-term needs."¹⁰ Although some early hopes that security sector reform in Africa would meet such long-term needs have failed to live up to its

⁶ US Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, "US Relations with Uganda." *US Department of State website, Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet: Uganda*, 8 October 2013. <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2963.htm>>

⁷ Kevin C. Dunn, "Sub-Saharan Africa." In *From Superpower to Besieged Global Power: Restoring World Order After the Failure of the Bush Doctrine* (Edward A. Kolodziej and Roger E. Kanet, eds.). Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2008, pp. 238-256, 247.

⁸ See Ashley Neese Bybee and Eliza Mary Johannes, "Neglected But Affected: Voices From the Oil-Producing Regions of Ghana and Uganda." *African Security Review*, Vol. 23, No. 2, June 2014, pp. 132-144.

⁹ US Department of State, "Country Reports on Terrorism," *Bureau of Counterterrorism: US Department of State website*, 2013. <<http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224820.htm>>

¹⁰ Claudia Major, Christian Mölling and Judith Vorrath, "Train + Equip = Peace? Stabilization Requires More Than Capacity Building." *SWP Comments 4: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs)*, February 2015, 1.

innovative potential,¹¹ long-term engagement with Uganda has seen some substantial improvements. Pointing to Uganda's foreign deployments, the US military's engagement with Uganda has been widely regarded as successful in recent years in, both against the LRA in Central Africa,¹² and against al Shabaab in Somalia.¹³ In each case, Ugandan forces have generally been lauded for their abilities, due in part to external capacity-building efforts and despite chronic corruption and political intrigue among senior army officers and government officials.

3.3 The Four-Part Hybridity Framework

This section analyses my empirical findings through the critical lens of hybridity. Again, rather than focus on an external intervention, it focuses on the power dynamics of Uganda's politics, and in particular the role of US security assistance in facilitating and maintaining these dynamics.

3.3.1 Coercive Powers

The power to gain compliance is a glaring feature of the NRM regime, and in particular the president himself. Without a doubt, the power in this context lies with the state. Ordinary Ugandans have little agency as a citizenry, and opposition politicians and their supporters are not only politically and economically marginalized, but suffer from arbitrary arrests, interrogations, and detentions. President Museveni has skilfully reconstituted colonial power structures through his own use of 'divide and rule' tactics in order to stir up conflicts based on ethnicity, so-called 'traditional values,' fears of terrorism/rebellion, and the urban-rural divide in order to clamp down on the very threats that are exacerbated by his security forces. In this way 'security' is instrumentalised and often becomes both a means and an ends.

Uganda's ruling elites project coercive power in the same way post-independence rulers often have—through the use or threat of violence. More recently, in the run-up to the 2016 national elections, the president ordered his top police commander to mobilise the so-called Crime

¹¹ Daniel Bendix and Ruth Stanley, "Security Sector Reform in Africa: The Promise and the Practice of a New Donor Approach." *African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) Occasional Paper Series*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2008, pp. 1-51, 9.

¹² See James J.F. Forest, "U.S. Military Deployments to Africa: Lessons from the Hunt for Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army." *Joint Special Operations University: Report 14-4*. MacDill AFB, FL: JSOU Press, 2014.

¹³ See Bronwyn E. Bruton and Paul D. Williams, "Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Lessons Learned from the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2007-2013." *Joint Special Operations University: Report 14-5*. MacDill AFB, FL: JSOU Press, 2014.

Preventer programme. According to the regime, these 'crime preventers' are a "volunteer force of civilians recruited... to report on and prevent crime in cooperation with the police and communities" but in practice are "strongly affiliated with the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party. About 200,000 in number, its members have acted in partisan ways and carried out brutal assaults and extortion with no accountability."¹⁴ Aside from the so-called crime preventers appearing to showcase an implied threat of coercion by the regime, they simultaneously function to politically 'groom' Uganda's disaffected youth population toward NRM loyalty and the state-sanctioned violence and patronage networks that sustain it. While gatherings of these regime desirables are welcome, similar gatherings of anyone else are swiftly dealt with.

Legal measures such as the Public Order Management Act (POMA) are examples of using state authority to maintain regime security, regardless of their actual effect on human rights and democratic accountability. POMA requires that any public gathering for any purposes receive prior written permission from NRM-loyal police commanders.¹⁵ With the stated intention of "regulation of public meetings," and "to prescribe measures for safeguarding public order without compromising the principles of democracy, freedom of association and freedom of speech," the law was deemed by supporters to be an "absolute necessity in preventing chaos and rebellion by thugs and troublemakers."¹⁶ It is difficult to overstate the absurdity of the law's arbitrary nature, as POMA gives police "discretionary powers to prevent a gathering of as few as three people in a public place to discuss political issues."¹⁷ With such instruments, the NRM system keeps a watchful eye on local politics while security forces enforce draconian laws designed to stifle dissent by routinely harassing and intimidating media outlets, civil society groups, and opposition groups either through arbitrary 'regulation' or outright physical violence and detentions. Of course, the most obvious form of coercion is the well-funded and US-trained UPDF, which Museveni wields direct control over along with Ugandan police and intelligence services, serves to prevent the emergence of any potential alternative political outcome.

¹⁴ "Uganda: Suspend 'Crime Preventers': Massive Unregulated Force Threatens Election Security." *Human Rights Watch website*, 12 January 2016. Accessed 14 January 2016. <<https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/12/uganda-suspend-crime-preventers>>

¹⁵ During fieldwork, after developing relationships with a group of Ugandan parliamentarians, I was present during many of the floor debates over the then-Public Order Management Bill, as well as some committee meetings surrounding the bill, which was enacted into law later in 2013 (Periods of ethnographic observation, Kampala, Uganda. June 2012-June 2013).

¹⁶ Ugandan MP from the NRM Party, during floor debate, March 2013.

¹⁷ "Explanatory Memorandum, Public Order Management Bill." *Ugandan Parliament Bills Supplement, No. 29, Vol CIV*, 29 April 2011.

3.3.2 *Incentivising Powers*

One manner in which the regime incentivises is by allowing and perpetuating the prevalence of corruption, so that those employed by the state have an incentive to maintain the status quo by using the state as a means for personal enrichment. In relation, the practice of offering development assistance to pro-NRM regions and ignoring others (particularly in the north) sends a clear message that one cannot disturb the foundations of structural violence without negative consequences.¹⁸ A more recent example of incentivising powers involves the 'crime preventer' programme previously mentioned. While certainly an instrument of force, these 200,000 Ugandan youths are paid a small salary by the regime, thus incentivising its members to join the programme, and essentially join the regime in brutalising opposition to regime dominance (real or imagined).

Another way the NRM maintains dominance is by blurring the lines between public and private election campaign funding. Historically, the NRM has not publicly acknowledged a campaign budget, but they have spent vast amounts of *state* funds for elections purposes. Journalists estimated that between \$200 and \$350 million was spent on NRM election activities and Museveni's 2011 re-election campaign, which the NRM denies as exaggerated, yet still is unable to disprove due to the secrecy of their expenditures.¹⁹ In contrast, opposition groups are able to raise and spend only a tiny fraction of that on their candidates, putting them at an obvious disadvantage. This is particularly so in poverty-stricken rural areas where NRM officials come through just prior to elections to distribute commodities and bags of cash among poor communities. One community leader in Pakwach decried the practice as a form of corruption, preying on the lack of political understanding by people in such communities, charging that these displays are in effect "vote-buying" and "should have no place in our modern nation".²⁰ Tangiri notes how the NRM has also expanded its campaign war chest through for-profit entities such as the NRM-owned Danze Enterprises, and "a number of business groups linked to politicians or politically-connected local Ugandans."²¹

¹⁸ See Anna Reuss, "Uganda's 2016 Elections: Same Same But Different?" *African Arguments website*, 6 January 2016. Accessed 2 February 2016. <<http://africanarguments.org/2016/01/06/uganda-2016-elections-same-same-but-different/>>

¹⁹ See Roger Tangiri, *The Politics of Elite Corruption in Uganda: Uganda in Comparative African Perspective*. New York, NY: Routledge Press, 2013.

²⁰ Interview with George, in Pakwach, Uganda. June 2012.

²¹ Roger Tangiri, *The Politics of Elite Corruption in Uganda...*

In Uganda, strong incentives exist around the work of NGOs, both global and local to self-censor and refrain from politics and any criticism of the regime.²² Nobody appeared to like this fact, but accepted it as a reality in order to achieve their specific types of work.²³ They all did so not due to coercion, but because there was an obvious incentive—continuation of their work. Another form of incentivising power flexed by Uganda is its ability to be perceived as a useful asset to US security interests. In this way, the UPDF's ongoing troop commitments to Somalia, the C-LRA effort, and other initiatives are a strong incentive that meets a US regional security need while insulating Uganda from the repercussions it would certainly occur if it were not a useful US proxy. To its citizens, however, even Uganda's incentivising powers seem to come with an implied threat, such as the matter of public goods provision that a local district may expect, assuming it votes in loyal NRM members (of course, no loyalty means no such provision of public goods). This was certainly how everyday politics was characterised during my fieldwork, and according to observers of the recent 2016 elections, the situation has only worsened. As Reuss relates:

State control has been used as a little veiled threat by Museveni who in drastic statements – such as 'I own all the money in Uganda' – has warned voters that electing an opposition candidate would deny their constituency access to government funds. One friend who is relatively critical of the regime is running as a parliamentary candidate on an NRM ticket simply because it's the only way one is able to deliver services to the people. And as a young voter in Northern Uganda told African Arguments: 'This time I am not going waste my vote. This time I am voting NRM so that my village will also get some new roads.'²⁴

This form of incentive may be described as a "throtter",²⁵ and reminds one of the common Latin American refrain associated with the power of narco-trafficking, '*plato o plomo?*'

3.3.3 *Resistance and Adaptation to Regime Power*

In Uganda, there is plenty of resistance on several fronts, but how it is expressed in the political domain requires cautious adaptation on the part of resisters and only insofar as the confines of

²² Conversations with NGO staff and journalists during periods of ethnographic fieldwork, Kampala, Uganda. June 2012 to May 2013.

²³ As a visiting researcher, I felt this myself on several occasions. I felt that while I *could* voice critique of (or even politely question) political matters rather safely (as a Westerner), doing so during elite interviews would have immediately closed certain doors of access to some officials. Discussions in private, among non-elites once trust was established, were another matter. Some of the most anti-regime voices I encountered in Uganda were in government—parliamentarians, civil servants, and UPDF members.

²⁴ Anna Reuss, "Uganda's 2016 Elections".

²⁵ See Robert Stevens, "Coercive Offers." *Australian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 66, Iss. 1, 1988, pp. 83-95.

restricted political space will allow.²⁶ It is not uncommon for news media outlets to be shut down on charges of sedition, opposition leaders jailed and beaten, or foreigners expelled for violating these acceptable confines of political space. When there is some manifestation of visible resistance, it tends to come from other regime elites, and has the appearance of co-opting narratives of democratic expression as to maintain the appearance of liberal values.

Still, popular resistance to Uganda's increasingly authoritarian tendencies is growing, as several 'bottom-up' protest movements attest to. During my fieldwork, these included the 'Walk to Work' demonstrations (which protested crippling inflation and soaring food and fuel costs), the 'Black Monday' protests (highlighting rampant corruption in Ugandan society), and the '4GC'²⁷ movement (a peaceful protest movement calling for democratic accountability and regime change).²⁸ The massive crowds associated with each of these popular demonstrations underscores the very real appeal they have to a large portion of Ugandans. Shortly after this wave of social protest, Museveni signed the Public Order Management Act into law, which effectively criminalised political opposition and popular protests, and further cemented the 'legality' of political repression.

While hybridity lends itself to unequal power dynamics and resistance by less powerful people, expressions of resistance to the regime *by* elites is steadily becoming more visible. During fieldwork, in May 2013, one of the UPDF's top generals and long-time NRM insider, David Sejusa, then the Chief of Military Intelligence, abruptly defected to the UK. During his military career, Sejusa had previously led the UPDF during some of the worst abuses carried out against the LRA (and Acholi civilians) during the northern insurgency in the 1990s and 2000s. In exile, he formed a new political party which called on Ugandans to "build alternative capacity" and remove Museveni from power.²⁹ In the recent elections, one of Museveni's rival challengers was the former Prime Minister, national intelligence director, and NRM leader, Amama Mbabazi, who declared himself fed up with Museveni's grasp on power.³⁰ Although each of these men has

²⁶ See Aili Mari Tripp, *Museveni's Uganda: Paradoxes of Power: A Hybrid Regime*. Boulder, CO: Lynne-Reinner Press, 2011.

²⁷ '4GC' refers to Uganda's national motto, "For My God and Country". See Innocent Anguyo and John Tatyamisa, "Uganda: 4GC Rallies Banned in Kampala." *New Vision Online*, 16 June 2013. Accessed 1 May 2014. <http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1323158/4gc-rallies-banned-kampala>

²⁸ Observation of public rallies during ethnographic field research. Kampala, Uganda. June 2012-June 2013.

²⁹ "Renegade Ugandan General Declares War on Museveni." *Sudan Tribune Online*, 22 November 2013. Accessed 23 November 2013. <<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article48897>>

³⁰ Godfrey Ojore, "Museveni Ignored My Advice to Retire-Mbabazi." *New Vision Online*, 9 January 2016. Accessed 14 February 2016. <http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1414491/museveni-ignored-advice-retire-2016-mbabazi>

built notable careers and personal fortunes from their role as regime elites, their recent ambitions represent the growing dissatisfaction over Museveni's unwillingness to allow any senior officials or NRM 'originals'³¹ a chance at national leadership. In addition to the mass demonstrations during my fieldwork, along with the recent 2016 national elections showcase the extent of Ugandans' ability to resist, adapt, subvert, or ignore the regime's behaviour. Millions took to the streets, the airwaves and the Internet to express their political voice. Between security forces enforcing 'public order' under POMA, closing certain media outlets, and the regime shutting down social media access, this ability was shown to be weak.³²

One popular Ugandan musician released a song whose lyrics encapsulate popular feelings surrounding the recent 2016 elections, "When leaders become misleaders and mentors become tormentors, when freedom of expression becomes a target for suppression, opposition becomes our position."³³

3.3.4 *Providing Alternatives to Hegemonic Power*

Power is wielded to such an extent that alternatives to the status quo are essentially prevented from coalescing. When there has been resistance, it does not translate into change. The Ugandan people appear to have almost no effect on swaying the direction of the regime's governance or providing any alternatives to the status quo. As mentioned above, the closest thing to alternatives to this have been from other ruling elites, who are unhappy with Museveni's increasingly direct personal control of the state. The recent 2016 elections were widely deemed to be not free, not fair, not credible, and marred by violence by security forces and mobs of pro-regime 'crime preventers'.³⁴ Museveni had not only handpicked the Electoral Commission chairman, but in the days prior to the vote placed his election rivals and critical journalists under

³¹ In the context of Uganda's post-independence history, the so-called 'originals' refers to the early days of Museveni's armed rebellion, which had begun with a failed attempt by a few dozen ill-equipped militants at overthrowing Obote that was launched from Tanzania in 1981. Although initially defeated, they later regrouped and began growing in numbers until they seized Kampala in 1986, ending the brutal five year Bush War. That original small band of fighters enjoy a national status as something akin to being the 'founding fathers' of the NRM regime, and most would go on to become high-ranking officials and NRM elites. Their numbers include Paul Kagame (the current president of Rwanda), Crispus Kyonga (current defence minister), Gen. David Sejusa (the imprisoned former head of UPDF intelligence), Dr. Kizza Besigye (Museveni's former physician, who became his first electoral rival in 1996), and several other highly-placed generals and government ministers.

³² Bwesigye Bwa Mwesigire, "All You Need to Know About Uganda's 2016 Elections." *Africa Is A Country website*, 8 March 2016. Accessed 10 March 2016. <<http://africasacountry.com/2016/03/how-to-make-sense-of-ugandas-2016-elections-and-president-musevenis-power-grab/>>

³³ Bobi Wine, "Situka (Rise)" as quoted in Bwesigye Bwa Mwesigire, "All You Need to Know About Uganda's 2016 Elections."

³⁴ Bwesigye Bwa Mwesigire, "All You Need to Know About Uganda's 2016 Elections."

arrest, closed certain media outlets and blocked online social media access.³⁵ Despite being a loyal and trusted insider for over three decades, Mbabazi was arrested and mistreated in the days running up to the election. General Sejusa (who had defected to the UK and denounced the regime he once fought to put in power), had returned to Uganda eighteen months after defecting, with assurances he would not be harmed. After a public statement by Museveni that he wished to make peace with his "renegade general", he was arrested just weeks prior to the 2016 elections and now languishes in the maximum-security Luzira prison.³⁶ Tripp argues that "the most powerful forces influencing the Movement [NRM party] away from authoritarianism are splits within the elite and the military, which one finds in Uganda."³⁷ Thus far, the regime has so successfully maintained a vacuum of power that the only possible alternatives to Museveni's rule have been those who break ranks within the existing power structure—and their chances at electoral success (if they realistically ever had any) have been dashed until at least 2021.

This inability to provide bottom-up alternatives to the status quo reveals the regime's success in the top-down exercise of power, either through coercion or incentivisation. What is important to note here is that this power which prevents the formation of alternatives is linked to Uganda's donor states, and the US in particular. While the US has released some statements of disappointment through State Department officials, nothing of substance has been done in response to Museveni's litany of recurring abuses. Tweets and press releases from a handful of mid-level diplomats hardly affect the hundreds of millions of dollars that support Uganda's defence budget annually or the substantial military training and equipment that allows the UPDF to remain an effective tool of compliance. The lack of serious consequences for the regime's crackdowns on dissent means that viable alternatives are for the time being, not an option. Nothing has taken place that would discourage the impression that this is anything but 'business as usual.'

3.4 Expanded Discussion of Findings

Below is an expanded discussion stemming from the empirical findings that highlight some of the issues that contribute to the current situation in Uganda, beginning with an explication of the

³⁵ Milton Allimadi, "Dear President Obama - No "Business As Usual" After Gen. Museveni's Uganda Coup." *Huffington Post website*, 4 March 2016. Accessed 4 March 2016. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/milton-allimadi/dear-president-obama-no-b_b_9380864.html>

³⁶ Ivan Okuda, "Uganda: Gen Sejusa Arrest - Story Behind the Story." *AllAfrica website*, 2 February 2016. Accessed 5 February 2016. <<http://allafrica.com/stories/201602020787.html>> See also "Gen. Sejusa Remanded to Luzira Prison." *New Vision Online*, 2 February 2016. Accessed 4 February 2016. <http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1416115/gen-sejusa-appears-court-martial>

³⁷ Aili Mari Tripp, *Paradoxes of Power*, 195.

regime's instrumentalisation of ethnic-based discourses and civil society functions. This is followed by a more detailed discussion of regime strategies to remain in power and the hazards of US military aid. The purpose of this is to help explain some of the contributing factors to the findings discussed above in light of the four-part conceptual framework.

3.4.1 *Ethnicity and the North-South Divide*

Ethnic-based policies of favour and marginalization between Uganda's northern and southern people can be traced back to the colonial era, when "misrepresentations and manipulations of ethnicity were part of the very creation of Uganda by the British."³⁸ This divide persists to this day. While there are numerous northern ethnic groups such as the Lugbara, Kakwa, Alur, Langi, and the Karamojong in the northeast, the 'tribe' most often discussed in the context of civil war and political power struggle is arguably the Acholi. Throughout the twentieth century, 'Acholiland' was further incorporated into the Uganda protectorate, as:

The lines drawn on colonial maps and images in peoples' heads demarcating Acholi from neighbouring tribes were increasingly operationalised, reinforced, and reified, in a pattern common to much of colonial Africa. On the basis of perceived (or presumed) common origins, political organisation, language, and culture, Acholi was a designated tribe, and as such was administered as a discrete tribal unit. Politics was to be strictly limited and exclusively tribal. Individuals and social and political groups among the Acholi competed for power and influence within the context of their tribe, and the Acholi as a collective identity competed with other tribes for scarce social and economic investments and opportunities. All of this served the interests of those in power, who emphasized sharply differences among them. In this context, the Acholi and their neighbours increasingly saw themselves as different and distinct from each other, and acted as if this were so.³⁹

Acholi identity, like that of other northern groups, was in fact constructed by colonial administrators and consistently reconstituted in order to serve as discreet and manageable political entities. Deeper research into language and familial ties, along with discussions with northern elders reveals that many northerners under the Luo-language family in fact share archeo-historical roots going back to their migration south from what is now central South Sudan.⁴⁰ I single out the example of Acholi history here as they have a unique place in Uganda's tumultuous military history, and are most closely aligned with the rebellion which spawned Joseph Kony's LRA and the ensuing conflict that this research centres on. Narratives

³⁸ Ronald R. Atkinson, *Roots of Ethnicity: Origins of the Acholi of Uganda*. Kampala: Fountain Press, 2010, 2.

³⁹ Ronald R. Atkinson, *Roots of Ethnicity*, 7.

⁴⁰ Numerous conversations with locals during participant-observation in Gulu, Kitgum, Paidha, Nebbi, and Pakwach in northern Uganda. June 2012-June 2013. See also David W. Cohen, "The River-Lake Nilotes from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century", in *Zamani: A Survey of East African History* (Bethwell Allan Ogot, ed.). Nairobi: Longmans and East African Publishing House, 1974, pp. 135-149.

common to Acholi marginalization are not unique, however, and the contextual histories of other non-favoured 'tribes' in the region run in a similar vein.

To Ugandan scholar Mamood Mamdani, the legacy of colonialism instilled a system of bifurcated power via 'indirect rule' through 'customary' or 'Native' authorities.⁴¹ Today, Uganda has reconstituted this bifurcated power system (what he calls 'decentralized despotism') largely around themes of ethnic identity where we see Ugandan institutions able to fragment resistance by perpetuating tensions between the rural and urban, and between ethnicities.⁴² While the NRM system has been portrayed as transcending ethnicity in politics, some allege that elites within ethnic factions today have been "co-opted" by patronage and "official corruption."⁴³ According to some, ethnicity in Uganda "has been instrumentalised to offer the necessary justifications and rationalizations" for certain regime policies, "by a government that has little or no credibility in dealing with ethnic tension."⁴⁴

The Ugandan regime has thus carried on the colonial practice of instrumentalising ethnicity as "a consciousness to be further imbedded" into political society.⁴⁵ The fact that Museveni's neo-colonial rule is guiding Uganda on its current semi-authoritarian trajectory is not lost on the vast majority of Ugandans.⁴⁶ Pilger reminds us that as "Frantz Fanon explained in 'Black Skin, White Masks', what matters is not so much the colour of your skin but the power you serve and the millions you betray."⁴⁷

3.4.2 Ugandan Civil Society

As ethnicity is instrumentalised in order to maintain regime power, so too are civil society functions. Not unlike the trouble with providing military aid to the regime, longstanding external donor support to fund Ugandan civil society has had similar deleterious effects. MacGinty and Williams note that it can be problematic when Westerners (either interveners or critics of

⁴¹ See Mamood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996.

⁴² See Mamood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*.

⁴³ Andrew Mwenda, "Uganda's Anti-Corruption Rituals: To Understand How Theft of Public Resources Works, One Has to Observe How it is Fought." *The Independent*. 12 August 2012.

⁴⁴ Jimmy Spire Ssentongo, "Uganda: Playing the Ethnicity Card." *Open Democracy Website*. 16 February 2011. Accessed 25 April 2013. <<http://www.opendemocracy.net/jimmy-spire-ssentongo/uganda-playing-ethnicity-card>>

⁴⁵ Jimmy Spire Ssentongo, "Uganda: Playing the Ethnicity Card."

⁴⁶ A widespread and common attitude among Ugandans across regional, ethnic, demographic and class lines (Numerous conversations and observations during fieldwork across Uganda. June 2012-June 2013).

⁴⁷ John Pilger, "A Son of Africa Claims A Continent's Crown Jewels." *JohnPilger.com website*, 20 October 2011. Accessed 31 March 2014. <<http://johnpilger.com/articles/the-son-of-africa-claims-a-continents-crown-jewels>>

intervention) impose their own particular concepts of civil society when they are oblivious to norms of the host society.⁴⁸ Unfortunately for Uganda's most vulnerable, such norms largely preclude vibrant, grassroots forms of civil society expression. Ugandan civil society tends to be driven by donors, rather than draw popular support from the people. This foreign-funded "grand act" offers little chance for genuine political reform.⁴⁹ Branch describes civil society in Uganda as plagued by corruption every bit as much as other aspects of society, and its work is often instrumentalised as a form of patronage that is "not voluntary but professional, does not have the active participation of citizens, and is not egalitarian but is restricted to those who have the requisite connections".⁵⁰

The NGO sector in Uganda essentially serves a function that allows Uganda's government to remain unaccountable in the provision of public goods such as infrastructure, education and healthcare, most notably in regions historically and politically at odds with NRM rule. One Member of Parliament noted that "As long as foreign donors subsidise these core matters, then the *M'zee* [President Museveni] does not have to. He does not have to *pay*, obviously, since countries like yours are doing that," adding "But more importantly, he does not have to really improve in these areas either, or address them. And the cycle continues. Nothing changes."⁵¹ Indeed, for civil society actors, journalists, opposition politicians, and even disaffected NRM elites, as POMA indicates, opposing the NRM can be both "dangerous to one's freedom and hazardous to one's health."⁵²

Having discussed some of the ways in which the regime manipulates perceptions in order to maintain power (externally, through the appearance of a functioning civil society, and internally, by reinforcing ethnic division), the following section discusses concrete strategies to maintain that power.

3.4.3 *Coup-Proofing and Regime Security*

Despite his student days of professed Marxism, Museveni's current path appears one of straightforward militarism, seemingly devoid of discernible politics or ideology aside from

⁴⁸ Roger MacGinty and Andrew Williams, *Conflict and Development*, 83.

⁴⁹ Adam Branch, *Displacing Human Rights*, 146.

⁵⁰ Adam Branch, *Displacing Human Rights*, 145.

⁵¹ Interview with Ugandan Member of Parliament, Kampala, Uganda. June 2012.

⁵² Remark by Ugandan LC (local council) Chairman from the Teso region, who wished to remain anonymous.

remaining in power.⁵³ What the US considers to be Uganda's increased political will to collaborate on US-led regional security initiatives should be seen as personal opportunities for regime elites--not the least of which are strategies to insure against potential coups and curry favour with the US to provide military aid that will bolster Museveni's power. Jonah Victor explores the role of regional security cooperation by African states in enhancing regime security. He argues that regimes are incentivised by financial and material support, the increase in their perceived legitimacy (by powerful donor states), and that such contributions can be employed as a "diversionary strategy to divert the attention of both an African state's military and major powers from a regime's misrule."⁵⁴

Luttwak's definition of a successful coup as the "rapid seizure of power by a small group followed by the speedy acceptance of the new authorities by the remaining portions of the government and the population"⁵⁵ is perfectly embodied in the capture of Kampala by Museveni and his guerrilla fighters in 1986. However, the subsequent three decades have kept Museveni firmly in power without succumbing to the type of coup that put him in power. James Quinlivan found that some regimes employ so-called "coup-proofing" policies, which include "reliance on groups with special loyalties to the regime and the creation of parallel military organizations and multiple internal security agencies."⁵⁶ Rwengabo confirms that Uganda's current leadership since 1986 has effectively "applied and undertook coup-prevention strategies consistent with... Quinlivan's coup-proofing theory."⁵⁷ These findings confirm what many who follow Uganda and the region have long understood: that the benefits of Uganda being a strong US ally may be seen as particularly helpful to Museveni's firm grip on power, rather than any notion of Uganda's national interest.

⁵³ Yoga Adhola, "Museveni's Revolution Strategy Misguided." *The Daily Monitor Online*, 9 February 2014. Accessed 12 October 2015. <<http://www.monitor.co.ug/Magazines/PeoplePower/Museveni-s-revolution-strategy-misguided/-/689844/2198120/-/njve3p/-/index.html>>

⁵⁴ Jonah Victor, "African Peacekeeping in Africa: Warlord Politics, Defense Economics and State Legitimacy." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 217-229, 217.

⁵⁵ Edward Luttwak, *Coup Detat: A Practical Handbook*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969' In James T. Quinlivan, "Coup Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East." *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 2, Fall 1999, pp. 131-165, 131.

⁵⁶ James T. Quinlivan, "Coup Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East." *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 2, Fall 1999, pp. 131-165, 131. <<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/016228899560202?journalCode=isec#.VMQdECvF9S0>>

⁵⁷ Sabastiano Rwengabo, "Regime Stability in Post-1986 Uganda: Counting the Benefits of Coup-Proofing." *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 39, No. 3, July 2013, pp. 531-559 <http://afs.sagepub.com/content/39/3/531.short>

3.4.4 *The Muhoozi Project*

One example of such 'coup-proofing' activities directly related to Uganda's US-boosted military capacity involves President Museveni's son, an army brigadier called Muhoozi Kaineraguba. The forty-year old General Muhoozi has been educated and trained abroad by the US, UK and Chinese militaries, and his career progression has surpassed far more experienced officers in the army. His meteoric rise signals Museveni's apparently-obvious grooming of a likely successor beyond the 2021 elections.⁵⁸ Muhoozi leads the UPDF's Special Forces Command, which does not operate in the manner usually associated with special operations forces, but rather, acts as a parallel security force *within* the army. Since he was given command, the Special Forces have been restructured so as to be under the complete control of Muhoozi himself, who reports directly to his father (the president), and not through the normal UPDF chain of command. Muhoozi's command is comprised of handpicked soldiers with close ties to the Museveni family, and are officially responsible for securing key government facilities, critical transportation infrastructure, heavy weaponry such as artillery, armour assets, and air defence systems (which could be vital in any imagined coup scenario).

In his current position he is uniquely placed to collect information on other army leaders who may pose a potential threat to his father's rule, as well as being personally responsible for securing certain types of weaponry *from* the rest of the army.⁵⁹ The Special Forces also occupy the Kyangali army base at the site of Uganda's oil production facilities, where, along with strict control of information regarding the secretive negotiation of lucrative oil contracts, popular feelings of mistrust and suspicion towards Museveni, his cronies, and his family are particularly exacerbated.⁶⁰ By keeping the bulk of UPDF forces either deployed abroad or in barracks, they are effectively sidelined from potentially challenging the president's personal power base within the security forces. Meanwhile, the institutions of state, critical infrastructure, and the oil fields, effectively remain under the direct military control of Museveni's family.

⁵⁸ Haggai Matsiko, "Muhoozi: How the First Son Controls the UPDF", *The Independent*, No. 252, February 15-21, 2013, pp. 10-12.

⁵⁹ See African Intelligence, "Museveni's Son is Already Number Two." *African Intelligence website*, 4 April 2014. <<http://www.africaintelligence.com/ION/politics-power/2014/04/04/museveni-s-son-is-already-number-two,108016719-EVE>> See also "The Muhoozi Project." *The Independent*, 17 May 2013.

⁶⁰ Ashley Neese Bybee and Eliza Mary Johannes, "Neglected But Affected: Voices From the Oil-Producing Regions of Ghana and Uganda", 142.

3.4.5 Building Capacity - For What Purpose?

As President Obama stated in his 2010 National Security Strategy, the US military "will continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments."⁶¹ As we examine the effects of US-Ugandan capacity-building efforts through the analytical lens of hybridity, it becomes clear that this represents a mutually beneficial partnership in terms of the strategic interests of US policymakers intersecting with the ambitions of the Ugandan regime. The issue this highlights of course, is how this affects the Ugandan people. As the question that was redirected at me by respondents on more than one occasion: to what ends is the US is 'building capacity' for?

Tripp states that, "the political matrix in Uganda is fluid... resulting in a variety of alliances based on region, ethnicity, clan, caste, and religious denomination that intersect in complicated ways with party allegiances as well as military and other types of power."⁶² Thus, she adds, "the rationale for political appointments seems to be not ethnic hatred, animosity, or sectarianism, but rather political expediency and survival."⁶³ We have seen how the NRM enforces and maintains its power in Ugandan politics through the inseparability of NRM politics and the organs of the state. Thus, to speak of the boosted 'security capacity' of the state is to speak of the security of the NRM and the Museveni regime, and their prolonged political survival.

All of this points to the dubious nature of US security priorities in Africa, despite the ethical and moral framing of foreign policy and War on Terror in language couched in the values espoused by the so-called liberal peace. Chandler sees the notion of an ethical foreign policy as "ideally suited to buttressing the moral authority of governments, often under question in the domestic context, because policymakers are less accountable for matching ambitious policy aims with final policy outcomes in the international sphere." Thus, when the US boosts Ugandan security capacity to achieve shared goals, it appears to be part of a larger ethical and moral commitment, which in turn boosts its legitimacy domestically. Yet, when the moral ends (peace, security, and a vibrant democracy) are never realized, but the means continue (sustained

⁶¹ Alan Shumate, "Building Partner Capacity in the 21st Century: How the U.S. Can Succeed." *Small Wars Journal Online*, 07 August 2013. Accessed 15 September 2013.

<<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/building-partner-capacity-in-the-21st-century-how-the-us-can-succeed>>

⁶² Ali Mari Tripp, *Museveni's Uganda: Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime*. Boulder, CO: Lynn-Reiner, 2010, 56.

⁶³ Ali Mari Tripp, *Museveni's Uganda*, 56.

military and security aid), it appears to unmask the clearly identified self-interested motives of enhancing political authority. When the lofty rhetorical goals fail to materialize, US leaders are not held accountable by Ugandans. Nor are Ugandan leaders held to account by Ugandans, due to the regime's ability to project power, not only externally, but domestically as well.

Aside from any ethical or moral concerns, the effectiveness of the UPDF is increasingly acknowledged by their US benefactors. One US officer stated that the UPDF is the most professional non-Western army he has worked with yet, adding "They are far from perfect and still have a ways to go, but compared to Afghanis, Iraqis, Yemenis—plus soldiers from other African states in the region I've worked with—they are heads and shoulders above the rest—both as individuals and as an institution".⁶⁴ Perhaps counter-intuitively, the UPDF recruits heavily from northern ethnic groups, in reverse of the practices of Museveni's dictatorial predecessors. This suggests that Museveni may be avoiding the "coup traps" which have been characteristic of many post-independence African states by ensuring broad-based recruitment within the UPDF, but some argue that this still poses some risk in "highly ethnically politicized contexts."⁶⁵ In terms of politics, the UPDF is officially non-partisan, with this principle having been written into the constitution.⁶⁶ The reality, however, is that elite army leadership and the NRM go hand in hand. For that matter, the UPDF effectively acts as Museveni's personal security force. Since it can also be called on to perform as a US proxy to achieve Washington's regional interests, the UPDF is a prime target for US security assistance, and this relationship has evolved for some time—dating back to the early 1990s. The Ugandan army is thus the proverbial prize in its usefulness to enhance both regime survival and US regional security interests.

It may be surprising to some that in spite of the enormous military and economic power of the US, its ability (or willingness) to condition Ugandan behaviour appears minimal at best. While Sullivan raises doubts over the effectiveness of military aid as a tool of foreign policy,⁶⁷ Fisher effectively makes that case using Uganda's relationship with donor states as a case in point. He effectively argues that Uganda's foreign policy actions vis-à-vis the War on Terror has "as much

⁶⁴ Interview with US Army Special Forces officer, Captain 'Olaf', at Yambio, South Sudan. April 2013.

⁶⁵ See Kristen Angela Harkness, *The Origins of African Civil-Military Relations: Ethnic Armies and the Development of Coup Traps*. PhD Dissertation, Princeton University. June 2012. Accessed 14 June 2013. <http://dspace.princeton.edu/jspui/bitstream/88435/dsp01b2773v72b/1/Harkness_princeton_0181D10216.pdf>

⁶⁶ *Constitution of the Republic of Uganda*. 8 October 1995. Chapter 12, Article 208(2), 101.

⁶⁷ See Patricia Sullivan, "Is Military Aid an Effective Tool for US Foreign Policy?" *Scholars Strategy Network (SSN) website*, May 2012. <http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/sullivan_on_military_aid_and_foreign_policy.pdf>

to do with Ugandan-donor relations as it does with maintaining regional stability (Kampala's putative reason for intervention).⁶⁸ Citing various "image management strategies" employed by the Museveni regime, Uganda has been able to avoid real scrutiny in areas of "traditional donor concern such as democratisation, corruption and military activity, thereby achieving a considerable degree of agency in a theoretically highly unequal relationship."⁶⁹ Furthermore, such security cooperation incentivizes recipient states "to run their governments as secretive, militarized kleptocracies."⁷⁰ The significant gain in military resources and political advantage by the president and his ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party, with much of its defence budget subsidised, means that Uganda's ability to maintain and project power is significantly boosted at very little cost.

Compared to many neighbouring states, the US has been comparatively lenient on holding Uganda to account for systemic corruption, and employing authoritarian methods to intimidate and suppress political opposition.⁷¹ Critics of US security assistance cite good governance as a prerequisite to effective regional security initiatives, without which such efforts and initiatives are doomed to fail.⁷² Although there is growing recognition by some of the need to de-emphasize security assistance and link security sector engagement with the "on-the-ground realities and insecurities of African people and states in order to build a sense of genuine ownership and participation by citizens and civil society,"⁷³ this has not yet translated into action. Put another way, it is widely perceived that the US finances the Ugandan regime's stranglehold on power at the expense of Ugandan people's chances for political freedom and human rights.

3.4.2 *Victims, Perpetrators and Bystanders*

This apparent lack of US conditionality may be viewed in other terms. As mentioned above, the current political trajectory does not incur US attempts to regulate Ugandan behaviour or discipline the regime for its misdeeds in any substantive manner. The hybrid lens has revealed

⁶⁸ See Jonathan Fisher, "Managing Donor Perceptions and Securing Agency: Contextualising Uganda's 2007 Intervention in Somalia." *African Affairs* (Advanced Online Publication), 9 May 2012.

<<http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/05/09/afraf.ads023.full.pdf+html> >

⁶⁹ Jonathan Fisher, "Managing Donor Perceptions and Securing Agency," 1.

⁷⁰ Alex de Waal, "Why Obama's \$5 Billion Counterterrorism Fund Will Actually Support Terrorism."

⁷¹ Jonathan Fisher, "Managing Donor Perceptions and Securing Agency," 5.

⁷² Hussein Solomon, "Failed Counter-Terrorism Initiatives Linked to Myth of Security Sector Reform in Africa." *RIMA Occasional Papers*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2014.

⁷³ Paul Nantulya, "Security Sector Reform Should Link to Broader Society, Experts Say at Central Africa Workshop." *Africa Center for Strategic Studies (on US Africa Command website)*, 19 December 2013. <<http://www.africom.mil/newsroom/article/11594/security-sector-reform-should-link-to-broader-society-experts-say-at-central-africa-workshop>>

that despite the significant role played by US donor support to maintain regime security, the most visible and substantial display of power is not by the US, but by the Ugandan government. Dolan used the terms 'perpetrators' and 'bystanders' to describe types of actors involved during Uganda's civil war, and I will borrow his terminology here. Dolan concluded that Uganda represents a counterintuitive example where rather than the perpetrator holding the most power (and turning bystanders and victims into such), it is the "the most visible 'perpetrators' (Government of Uganda)" which are subordinate to "key 'bystanders' (external states)."⁷⁴ Simultaneously, "perpetrators are able to exercise leverage over the bystanders because, by virtue of their own inaction, the bystanders become complicit."⁷⁵ Due to their complicity, perpetrators and bystanders find themselves in a "shared position vis-à-vis external constituencies such that they jointly generate and perpetuate the discourses which serve to mask the true nature of what is going on."⁷⁶ This is an accurate description of the ramifications of the US-Uganda security partnership, where the true winner of this grand bargain appears to be Museveni and his direct beneficiaries.

The 'perpetrator-bystander' dynamic goes a long way in explaining the reticence displayed by AFRICOM and US diplomatic officials in Uganda to discuss anything in the political realm that deviated from their predetermined talking points. This role of the US as 'bystander' is hardly new. Going back to US complicity over widespread UPDF abuses during Ugandan military forays into the eastern Congo in the late 1990s, the US has "lavished arms and money" on the UPDF, and "protected them from sanction by international forums and courts."⁷⁷ One thing is certain: the losers are the Ugandan people.

3.5 Conclusion

Dobson notes that, "even as the world's modern authoritarians hang on, their vulnerabilities become better known, and their margin for error shrinks. These regimes may be durable... But if recent events have revealed anything, it is that people who challenge them are moving up their own learning curve, too."⁷⁸ I have argued that the condition of Uganda vis-à-vis democratic

⁷⁴ Chris Dolan, *Social Torture*, 254.

⁷⁵ Chris Dolan, *Social Torture*, 254.

⁷⁶ Chris Dolan, *Social Torture*, 254.

⁷⁷ John Ford, "Rwandan War Criminals Defeated in Congo, But AFRICOM Riding High." *Centre for Research on Globalization Website*. 5 November 2013. Accessed 7 November 2013. <<http://www.globalresearch.ca/rwandan-war-criminals-defeated-in-congo-but-africom-riding-high/5357189>>

⁷⁸ William Dobson, *The Dictator's Learning Curve: Inside the Global Battle for Democracy*. New York, NY: Anchor Books, 2012, 294.

accountability, human rights, the rule of law, and the expectation of responsible governance is worsening in direct correlation with increased military, financial, and rhetorical support from the US. If the world's superpower will not confront the inequalities and abuses inherent in the status quo, Ugandans may eventually one day find a way to confront it themselves. Hopefully they will do so without the tragic bloodshed that has marred so much of its post-independence history. While the brutal northern insurgency is long over, the roots of the LRA conflict in northern Uganda have yet to be satisfactorily addressed, and the structural violence characterised by economic marginalisation, ethnic division, unequal access to services, and a lack of political voice, remains. Whether in one year or ten years, the eventual post-Museveni Uganda will surely see the eruption of these tensions which have been boiling under the surface now for three decades.

Considering its role as the preferred instrument of compliance, the above findings create understandable difficulties in considering the UPDF separately from the power dynamics of Ugandan politics that (along with US support) empowers it. Yet in spite of this, associating the US-supported military capacity of the UPDF with the repression and brutality of Museveni's Uganda may not be entirely accurate in all contexts. The following chapter employs the conceptual lens of hybridity to specifically examine Counter-LRA security activities currently underway in Central Africa (of which the UPDF is the main effort). The potential for security assistance from external powers to bring about emancipatory forms of peace will be explored in hopes that not every UPDF military endeavour is characterised by the troubling politics discussed here, and the diminishing lustre of the so-called 'Pearl of Africa.'⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Winston Churchill, *My African Journey*, 118.

CHAPTER FOUR: Counter-LRA and Security

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter linked the general US-Ugandan military partnership with the current domestic political situation in Uganda, arguing that the security assistance provided by AFRICOM directly correlates with a worsening turn to authoritarianism and marked lack of human rights. In contrast, the next two chapters will discuss a more specific aspect of US military support to Uganda—the current Counter-LRA (C-LRA) intervention in central Africa. This chapter deals with the *security* aspects of C-LRA, and the portion of the mission that involves both civilian protection, as well as efforts to kill or capture Joseph Kony and his top LRA commanders. It is intended to build on findings in the previous chapter, and asks what hybridity reveals about power, legitimacy, and effectiveness within C-LRA activities. Specifically, what has been the result of the initiation of the African Union Regional Task Force (AU-RTF) and the arrival of the US advisory element? Does this effort represent, as critics suggest, a new militarised danger to local civilians characterised by a tense, illiberal form of hybridity such as that taking place within Uganda? Or is something else occurring altogether?

After an overview of the C-LRA mission and its main actors, this chapter will outline the main thrust of the arguments by critics of this effort before examining these questions through Mac Ginty's four-part conceptual framework of hybridity. Following that is an expanded discussion of these findings in order to provide an improved understanding of C-LRA's security component prior to the next chapter.

4.2 Overview of the C-LRA Mission

Having already discussed the background of the LRA conflict and its evolution over the past three decades, we now turn to the current phase of the conflict which focuses on the time period after the disastrous Uganda offensives of 2008-09 and since the renewed effort by interveners since the arrival of US advisers in November 2011. So began 'Operation: Observant Compass', which by March 2012 was to morph into a regional initiative under an African Union (AU) mandate. This effort takes place across large swaths of South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Central African Republic (CAR) where their three borders converge. This followed passage of the 2010 Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act by the US Congress, and the decision a year later deemed "consistent with the

War Powers Resolution” (which gives the president the authority to deploy US forces abroad).¹

The strategic objectives laid out emphasise four key objectives:

- (1) Increased civilian protection;
- (2) Apprehension or removal of top LRA commanders;
- (3) The promotion of LRA defections and the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of remaining LRA abductees and combatants; and
- (4) The provision of humanitarian relief to LRA affected communities.²

One important aspect to understand about any efforts to counter the LRA problem in this part of the world is the extremely remote terrain. Perhaps not unsurprisingly, the epicentre of LRA activity equates near perfectly with what is known as Africa’s “pole of inaccessibility.”³ This inaccessibility reinforces the marked lack of political authority and basic provision of services to the millions of people who populate the region. This region roughly coincides with the area of land predominantly populated by the Zande (or Azande) ethnic group, a marginalised group spread across the under-governed tri-border area.

Another important fact regarding this effort is that each of these three regional governments can be described as weak or failing states, and this is especially the case in the area where the three states share a border. While Uganda can be described as a militarized, semi-authoritarian state with political control of its sovereign territory, the same cannot be said of the DRC, CAR, and South Sudan, where many civilians in LRA-affected regions are effectively left to their own devices in terms of security. Officially, these three respective governments do not view the LRA as a serious threat, and all are dealing with issues of regime insecurity and instability near their own capitals, with C-LRA regarded as an ancillary issue. Despite three years of C-LRA operations, the inability and/or unwillingness of South Sudanese, Congolese, and Central African national governments to govern their converging border areas remains a “core factor underlying the LRA’s capacity to endure.”⁴ These chronic institutional weaknesses on the part of host nations mean that:

¹ “A Communication from the President of the United States, Transmitting Notification That Approximately 100 US Military Personnel Have Been Deployed to Central Africa to Act as Advisors to Partner Forces Against the Lord’s Resistance Army and Its Leader” (H. Doc. No. 112-64); See *Congressional Record*, p. H6975, 14 October 2011.

² Alexis Arieff and Lauren Ploch, “The Lord’s Resistance Army: The US Response.” *Congressional Research Service* (CRS Report 7-5700, R42094), 11 April 2012, 9.

³ Daniel Garcia-Castellanos and Umberto Lombardo, “Poles of Inaccessibility: A Calculation Algorithm for the Remotest Places on Earth.” *Scottish Geographical Journal*, Vol. 123, No. 3, September 2007, pp. 227-233, 231.

⁴ International Crisis Group, “LRA: A Regional Strategy Beyond Killing Kony,” *Africa Report No. 157*, 28 April 2010, 25.

States are not the primary security providers as in the conventional international system. Instead a mosaic of actors—foreign militaries, international peacekeepers, civilian self-defence groups—play roles alongside national authorities... Because the need for security is urgent, flexible and innovative forms of cooperation are needed to counter the threat that operates in and exploits this semi-stateless zone.⁵

Security governance in this part of Africa has long been problematic, and can be understood as “an emerging regime complex that is characterized by partially converging actors... and single lead nations,”⁶ with the LRA conflict specifically being called a “self-perpetuating cycle of loss, resentment, and hopelessness.”⁷ Despite this, the operation has managed to achieve significant degrees of success in three of the four strategic objectives mentioned above.⁸

The unfulfilled objective of dismantling LRA leadership has not a total failure, since a small number of subordinate field commanders have been killed or captured, although the inability to eliminate Kony has been a source of frustration. During early 2013 it was discovered that Kony and a sizable group of LRA had been living for at least a year in a disputed border enclave called Kafia Kingi.⁹ Since that time, it has been reported that Kony and his inner circle (to include dozens of LRA 'wives' and children) routinely move between safe havens both within Kafia Kingi and across the Sudanese border into southern Darfur. Interestingly, Kony's safe havens never appear to be far from Sudanese military camps in these areas, strongly indicating cordial relations between the LRA and local Sudanese army (although the question of whether this relationship extends to the Khartoum government remains open).¹⁰ While Kony remains near these safe haven areas, the activities on which the LRA depend—forced abductions, looting, banditry and poaching—are taking place in the tri-border region further south. This situation helps to explain why Kony himself has been so elusive, despite AU-RTF successes in achieving incremental dismantling of the LRA as a whole through increasing defections and

⁵ International Crisis Group, “LRA: A Regional Strategy Beyond Killing Kony,” 25.

⁶ Malte Brosig, “Introduction: The African Security Regime Complex—Exploring Converging Actors and Policies.” *African Security*, Vol. 6, Iss. 3-4 (2013), pp. 171-190, 171.

⁷ Kennedy Tumutegyeize, “What Will it Take to End the LRA Conflict?” *Conciliation Resources website*, March 2012. Accessed 14 March 2013. <<http://www.c-r.org/>>

⁸ These being increased civilian protection, promoting LRA defections, and provision of humanitarian aid.

⁹ Kafia Kingi borders northeast CAR, and is claimed by both Sudan and South Sudan, but is occupied by the Sudanese military and other than sporadic UN observers over the years, other regional state actors officially cannot enter. This of course does not preclude the use of technical means to observe and gather intelligence through aerial and satellite-based platforms, or intelligence-gathering debriefings of civilians crossing back and forth into Kafia Kingi. AU-RTF incursions into the enclave, which certainly take place, are not officially acknowledged by the task force.

¹⁰ See Paul Ronan, Michael Poffenberger, and Chelsea Geyer, “Hidden In Plain Sight: Sudan's Harboring of the LRA in the Kafia Kingi Enclave, 2009-2013.” 26 April 2013. Accessed 27 November 2014. <http://www.enoughproject.org/files/HiddeninPlainSight_Sudans_SupporttotheLRA_April2013.pdf>

occasional combat attrition. Despite initial optimism by locals that this effort would not take long, the fact that it continues into its fifth year indicates otherwise, and a significant task of AU-RTF actors has been to manage expectations among locals who had hoped the foreign forces would bring about a swift conclusion.

4.3 Overview of C-LRA Security Actors

It is important to note that the list of actors discussed section is not exhaustive, and deals solely with C-LRA security actors. Another integral element of C-LRA is that of civil society actors, who represent an enormously vital contribution to the effort--one so important that it is the topic of the next chapter, a detailed discussion of the role of civil society in C-LRA. The following overview considers the forces that officially contribute to the AU-RTF, as well as indigenous attempts to organise in order to provide local security in LRA-affected areas.

4.3.1 *Uganda and the UPDF*

While the emerging regime complex carrying out this effort is diverse, it is unquestionable that the main effort is Uganda's UPDF, which provides thousands of soldiers that perform the bulk of both offensive and defensive military and security activities across this tri-border region (with the notable exception of the DRC, where Uganda is not officially allowed to deploy its forces). Troop strength details are classified, but the UPDF provides at least 2500 (and some estimate upwards of 3,500) soldiers deployed in the C-LRA effort.¹¹ Having received the vast majority of military training and logistical support in C-LRA, the UPDF is the only one of these actors "who can remotely be considered an actual army, able to conduct sustained operations in the field."¹² Aside from their military capabilities is the UPDF's symbolic importance to this effort, both to locals and to the Ugandans. To the locals, their role is important since Uganda spawned the LRA in the first place, and they are seen as actively working to address these dangerous rebels who fled their borders. To the Ugandans their role is significant in that these UPDF forces enjoy a diverse ethnic representation drawn from across Uganda's regions, with a large portion of the soldiers being ethnic Acholi. This lends a good deal of legitimacy to their mission by demonstrating that things have changed since the LRA insurgency within Uganda, which for two decades saw the UPDF carry out brutal policies of 'social torture' against the ethnic Acholi. The Acholi are important in terms of language and the ability to communicate with LRA defectors,

¹¹ Conversations with UPDF and US military personnel during periods of participant-observation, Uganda, South Sudan, and Central African Republic, February to May 2013.

¹² Interview with Captain Olaf, US Special Forces, Yambio, South Sudan. April 2013.

but perhaps most striking is that several of these UPDF soldiers are former LRA fighters, who since defecting have joined the ranks of the UPDF.¹³

4.3.2 *Host-Nation Forces and the AU-RTF*

Despite its resource wealth and pronounced commitment to national unity and security sector reform,¹⁴ South Sudan has been beset by internal divisions, unequal development, and rampant insecurity.¹⁵ Their army, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) keeps several hundred troops stationed in Nzara, South Sudan which are dedicated to the AU-RTF's C-LRA mission. They are primarily comprised of soldiers from the Dinka ethnic group (the dominant group in the country linked to South Sudan's president). While their presence indicates Juba's lacklustre stake in C-LRA, it is important to note that many local Zande regard these soldiers as foreign, in that they are not indigenous to western South Sudan. The SPLA forces are viewed by their US and Ugandan counterparts as lacking professionalism and militarily effectiveness, being "not capable of independent operations"¹⁶ and with "sometimes questionable leadership."¹⁷ While they tend to remain in and around populated areas of WES, while the UPDF handles the deep jungle patrols and more militarily complex activities in the area, there have been exceptions. On occasion, US advisers lead patrols of handpicked SPLA on tracking missions, such as within the DRC, where it is problematic for the UPDF to venture.¹⁸

In the Central African Republic (CAR), the LRA situation is arguably the most dynamic. Its remote jungles in the Mbomou, Haut-Mbomou, Haut-Kotto, and Vakaga prefectures have long

¹³ Precise numbers are difficult to obtain, due in part to argument over who qualifies as 'former LRA' since some were abducted and held for years while fighting for Kony, and others may have only been abducted for shorter periods of time. My best estimate is that roughly between twenty and several dozen such UPDF members existed in the ranks during my fieldwork.

¹⁴ Annette Weber, "Transformation Backlog in South Sudan: Security Sector Reforms Stall in the Face of Growing Autocracy." *German Institute for International and Security Affairs*, SWP Comments No. 20, July 2013, 1.

¹⁵ While Uganda has deployed thousands of UPDF soldiers into South Sudan to bolster President Kiir's forces since the outbreak of violence in December 2014, this effort is bilateral in nature, not officially US-sanctioned, and is distinctly separate from the AU's C-LRA mission. With a few exceptions, western South Sudan has avoided the brunt of the violent clashes that have characterised the country's civil war since December 2013.

¹⁶ Conversations with US Special Forces personnel during periods of participant-observation. Yambio, South Sudan. April 2013.

¹⁷ Interview with Captain Moses, UPDF infantry officer. Nzara, South Sudan. April 2013.

¹⁸ Namely, when FARDC troops either are not available or are not deemed fit for such patrols by the US advisers. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "Kony 2013: US Quietly Intensifies Effort to Help African Troops Capture Infamous Warlord." *Washington Post Online*, 28 October 2013. Accessed 30 October 2013. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kony-2013-us-quietly-intensifies-effort-to-help-african-troops-capture-infamous-warlord/2013/10/28/74db9720-3cb3-11e3-b6a9-da62c264f40e_story.html >

held significant numbers of LRA and contain vital routes between LRA safe havens in other states. Central African towns such as Obo, Zemio, Djema, and Rafai, along the Mbomou and Ouara river basins, have UPDF contingents there, joined by SF personnel who perform community security duties in the surrounding areas. CAR's military, the *Forces armées centrafricaines* (FACA), to the extent it can be called an 'army' at all, exists near the capital city of Bangui, nearly a thousand miles away from LRA-affected regions. There are reportedly only around one hundred FACA stationed across the entire eastern CAR. Local civilians in CAR have mixed feelings toward these troops, with some appreciating that they are at least there to support the international mission, and many others feeling that they are "almost useless."¹⁹ The scattered handfuls of FACA soldiers are usually seen guarding inside the villages and towns, too often with rusty rifles that often have little or no ammunition to go with them. A local priest in Haut-Mbomou prefecture sees the FACA as symbolic, but agrees that any real security has been achieved by the UPDF and later, the US advisers, whom have "made it safe for us—and for the FACA—to live safely in Obo again."²⁰

In the DRC, aside from the UN's MONUSCO forces and a small number of US advisers, the poorly trained and often undisciplined *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC) troops comprise the AU-RTF's presence, since (due to political animus between Kinshasa and Kampala)²¹ the UPDF are not officially allowed to enter DRC territory. Prior to the US deployment, one UN report described how the Congolese army kept their troops inside the villages "for their own safety," prompting locals to reply that "We are the ones protecting the army... Not the other way around!"²² Security sector reform (along with most every other type of reform) has been elusive and progress monumentally slow, despite an outpouring of global support.²³ Capacity-building attempts to professionalise Congolese units have been consistently disappointing. The ineffectiveness of FARDC to contribute to solving eastern DRC's security problem (and according to some, contributing to it) may be seen as a symptom of a larger condition—the chaos and incompetence of Congolese government and hopes for reform.

¹⁹ Interview with Catherine, a shopkeeper in Obo, CAR, March 2013.

²⁰ Interview with Father Marciel, Catholic priest in Obo, CAR. March 2013.

²¹ This goes back to widespread abuses by UPDF units and commanders committed in DRC in the 1990s and early 2000s.

²² United Nations IRIN, "Central Africa: Agencies Call for International Action Against LRA," *United Nations IRIN Website*, 15 December 2010. Accessed 17 February 2012.

<<http://www.irinnews.org/report/91376/central-africa-agencies-call-for-international-action-against-lra>>.

²³ See Theodore Trefon, *Congo Masquerade: The Political Culture of Aid Inefficiency and Reform Failure*. London: Zed Books, 2011.

4.3.3 US Special Forces Advisers and the AU-RTF

Throughout late 2011, US special operations advisers began operating from small remote outposts in LRA-affected areas in DRC, CAR, and South Sudan. This use of America's elite forces to carry out US-Africa policy objectives in the region places great emphasis on their relationship with AFRICOM, and tacitly "helps entrench the command's relevance."²⁴ Drawn from the US Army's Special Forces (SF) community, these advisers, popularly known as the 'Green Berets' are characterised by their unconventional nature in planning and conducting missions alongside foreign forces--often possessing extensive language and cultural skills that enable them to be highly effective in working with indigenous host-nation partners.

Although small in number (the mission initially was capped at one-hundred advisers spread across the entire effort during my fieldwork, but since 2014 have almost doubled), the US advisers staff high-tech command posts in these forward bases, and lead long-range patrols deep into the bush, constantly seeking to improve the effectiveness and legitimacy of how the AU task force operates. It was often said that while the military patrols and training are vital, it was their ability to develop and maintain relationships that was the "primary tool" most effective in typical SF missions like C-LRA.²⁵ One retired SF officer states that:

Green Berets get to know the people of other countries where we train (and fight) and do so intimately. Our goal: to ensure legitimacy and win rapport among people that our military is unaccustomed to worrying about. Our success in pursuing our interests anywhere in the world can be measured along these lines... Legitimacy brings intimacy, and intimacy brings understanding—and victory.²⁶

By combining the classified technology-based intelligence gathering means with their typical local rapport, community security meetings, debriefings from defectors, and their analytical means, SF intelligence capabilities appear to transcend the traditional Western intelligence cycle in favour of a more networked process where "crucial intelligence comes from the 'communitarian' sector."²⁷ This, along with their role as elite Western military advisers brings

²⁴ Spencer Ackerman, "East Africa is the New Epicenter of America's Shadow War." *Wired Magazine Online: The Danger Room Blog*, 26 January 2012. Accessed 27 September 2013. <<http://www.wired.com/2012/01/battleground-africa/>>

²⁵ Conversations with US Special Forces advisers during periods of participant-observation, Nzara and Yambio, South Sudan, April 2013.

²⁶ Tony Schwalm, *The Guerrilla Factory: The Making of Special Forces Officers, the Green Berets*. New York: Free Press, 2012, 7.

²⁷ Julian Richards, *The Art and Science of Intelligence Analysis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 24-25.

them considerable credibility in dealing with locals and host-nation forces, and helps to bind stakeholders into a unified effort.

4.3.4 *Intergovernmental and International Organisations*

All of these security forces are unified as a task force under an AU mandate that works closely with other AU and United Nations missions in these three host states.²⁸ The AU-RTF, which is staffed by personnel from each of the involved states, provides the administrative coordination of the various elements involved, and at times reflects the quarrelsome nature of relations between adversarial states—most often, between Uganda and DRC. In practice, much of the key intelligence analysis and dissemination that is classified is undertaken first by the US advisers, and to a lesser degree, their UPDF counterparts, followed by the other stakeholders. With its Joint Operations Centre based in Yambio, South Sudan, the most important function the AU-RTF headquarters serves, according to some actors, is its ability to pressure constituent national governments to make decisions that sufficiently prioritise C-LRA activities, and reach accommodation with matters such as troop deployments and resource allocation, when the tactical and operational-level actors fail to reach agreement.²⁹

The UN has active missions in each of the three target states, with the most recent known as MINUSCA, which seeks to stabilise the CAR since the outbreak of violence there following the so-called Seleka rebellion in early 2013. One of the tasks under their mandate is to coordinate with the AU-RTF regarding the LRA and C-LRA activities, although in reality, there has been little accomplished thus far in terms of prioritizing civilian protection or in assisting with offensive C-LRA operations in eastern CAR due to “a very poor understanding of LRA activity in eastern CAR, thought the group is more active there than anywhere else.”³⁰ The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has been active in conflict prevention and monitoring activities in that country, although its focus at present lies closer to its capital Juba, and the conflict occurring in that country. The largest UN mission in the world however, which *has* become moderately effective against the LRA is known as MONUSCO. With over 20,000 troops spread throughout the vast

²⁸ United Nations, “Fact Sheet: United Nations Actions to Address the Threat and Impact of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA),” *United Nations Information Centres Website*. Accessed 12 November 2014. <http://unic.un.org/downloads/socialmedia/lra_factsheet.pdf>

²⁹ Conversations with AU-RTF personnel during periods of participant-observation, Kampala, Uganda and Yambio, South Sudan, March to May 2013.

³⁰ Paul Ronan, “3 Ways MINUSCA Can Tackle the LRA Threat in CAR,” *Inside the LRA*, The Resolve website, 11 April 2014. Accessed 16 June 2014. <<http://www.theresolve.org/2014/04/3-ways-minusca-can-tackle-the-lra-threat-in-car/>>

eastern DRC, their mandate now includes coordinating with the AU-RTF and relevant NGOs.³¹ While they have yet to conduct offensive operations against the LRA, they have helped to offset the disadvantage of the UPDF absence in the eastern DRC. More importantly, MONUSCO has been considerably integrated into the AU-RTF strategy of providing humanitarian aid, protecting vulnerable civilians, and encouraging defections. It is important to note however, that MONUSCO's mandate covers a much broader region, and addresses a wider variety of threats to peace and security from various rebel groups and armed actors—of which the LRA is just one.

4.3.5 *Local Self-Defence Forces: The 'Arrow Boys'*

Growing out of the LRA violence from 2008-2010, some Zande leaders came together and formed self defence groups, called “Arrow Boys,” which parallel culturally traditional means of Zande self-organization and ethnic-tribal identity.³² Such groups have been sporadically formed and disbanded in recent years, although never to the extent of the South Sudanese Arrow Boys, which some attribute to a degree of historical affinity to their past as a favoured proxy of British colonialism, as compared to Zande in DRC and CAR.³³ In contrast to DRC and CAR, where they have been sporadically defunded and disbanded (presumably out of fear by state officials of creating ethnic-based militias that will only proliferate the conflict), Arrow Boys in western South Sudan have grown in number to estimates of 17,000 to as many as 20,000.³⁴

They are seen as the legitimate force in the area, and are “the eyes and the ears of [the] Zande people... especially away from the villages and the towns.”³⁵ Similarly to the three affected states' host-nation forces, the Arrow Boys are generally perceived to be of little military use to the UPDF or the US advisers. This has been ascribed to what some in the UPDF call their “primitive tribal way of organizing,” and the fact that “they are poor farmers and hunters mostly,” and “not professional soldiers.”³⁶ The US advisers were less derogatory of these groups, but

³¹ See “United Nations Resolution 2147,” *UN Security Council, 7150th Meeting*, 28 March 2014, p. 2.

³² The name “Arrow Boys” appears to be borrowed by anti-LRA militias formed in northern Uganda of the same name during the civil war there, and refers to the lack of modern weaponry by many desperate local groups tired of LRA attacks—resorting to stones, sticks, pangas (machetes), and arrows when firearms were not available.

³³ Douglass H. Johnson. *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*. Kampala: Fountain Press, 2003, 18.

³⁴ Conversations with WES officials, Yambio County officials, South Sudanese civil society representatives, and Arrow Boys members during periods of participant-observation. Nzara and Yambio, South Sudan, April 2013.

³⁵ Interview with Gori Faustino Basukangbi Badabu, Paramount Chief of the Zande. Nzara, South Sudan. April 2013.

³⁶ These phrases were common refrains voiced by UPDF officers and soldiers in their descriptions of Arrow Boys during participant-observation.

generally supported the notion that their lack of military sophistication was indicative of a lack of real capabilities to fight the LRA. Both US and Ugandan leaders were quick to acknowledge that they are important symbolically in that they make the local Zande people “feel like a part of the solution to their problems of insecurity.”³⁷

From the Zande point of view however, it has been the effectiveness of the Arrow Boys (particularly those from South Sudan) that has spurred action from outside interveners to finally address the LRA in a serious manner. The reticence to sustain such groups in CAR and DRC may be partially responsible for a dramatically different security situation in both CAR and DRC compared to South Sudan, and also underlie the lack of prioritization by Kinshasa and Bangui regarding the LRA threat. The self defence groups that do exist in DRC and CAR tend to be unofficial and not as organized—nor as effective either militarily or symbolically—as their counterparts in South Sudan.

Having outlined the C-LRA mission and its security actors, the following section provides a brief overview of the criticisms directed toward these efforts.

4.4 Summary of C-LRA Critiques

While not exhaustive, they represent two strands of the various arguments against this current phase of C-LRA, and both partially informed certain assumptions and expectations in preparation for my fieldwork.

4.4.1 Military vs. Non-Military Approaches

The first strand of critique toward this intervention to end the LRA threat is the notion that the current operation overemphasizes militarism, and undermines attempts for peaceful solutions to work. This follows from a large body of research and reporting which details the ways in which Uganda’s heavy-handed military approach to the LRA during their civil war in the 1990s and 2000s was problematic and counterproductive, both in terms of morality and military utility.³⁸ Reported abuses by Ugandan troops were rampant, even while these tactics failed to produce any significant military victories. Some activist academics and human rights advocates condemn

³⁷ Interview with Lieutenant Tom, UPDF intelligence officer. Nzara, South Sudan. April 2013.

³⁸ See Christopher Dolan, *Social Torture*. See Also Robert L. Feldman, “Why Uganda Has Failed to Defeat the Lord’s Resistance Army.” *Defense and Security Analysis*, Vol. 24, No. 1, March 2008, pp. 45-52.

the military approach, even while also acknowledging that some military involvement is called for by local and regional humanitarian groups.³⁹

'Militarisation' critics offer a critique that focuses on the military actors and their high-risk methods that—by virtue of being associated with military forces—present too many moral hazards and are unlikely to succeed. Invoking the spirit of the Hippocratic Oath (along with others who did so in the development literature in the 1990s), they caution that above all else, advocates of a military approach to the LRA problem should “do no harm.”⁴⁰ Their analysis includes questioning the military feasibility of continuing to use military forces to maintain pressure on the LRA, due to past Ugandan military offensives leading to LRA reprisal attacks that killed hundreds and displaced thousands more.⁴¹ These critics dismiss the idea of US military support as an operation that, according to them:

...does not seem to be based on any diagnosis at all. Rather, those who support the present military course of action seem to believe that the proposed or promised AU military involvement, along with the now deployed American forces to assist the UPDF, will succeed against the LRA by *doing more of what has not yet worked*. One is reminded of Allied strategies in World War I—only this time the casualties will more than likely be civilian [emphasis added].⁴²

This analysis raises doubts on the mission's chances of success over the political enmity between Uganda and the DRC, as well as weak capabilities of Central African, Congolese, and South Sudanese security forces—resulting in the question being posed, “How much can 100 US troops contribute to those daunting requirements?”⁴³ The 'militarisation' critics reject the proposed “military solution” and instead seek to “ask what it would take to do the job, look at the resources available, and then figure out how—or even if—the requirements for probable success can be met.”⁴⁴ Their argument is that due to the inevitable harm resulting from military activities to end the LRA threat, any such intervention with a military component should be abandoned.

³⁹ Ronald R. Atkinson, Phil Lancaster, Ledio Cakaj, and Guillaume Lacaille, “Do No Harm: Assessing a Military Approach to the Lord's Resistance Army.” *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2, May 2012, pp. 371-382, 373.

⁴⁰ Ronald R. Atkinson, et al., “Do No Harm”, 375.

⁴¹ The most noted of these was during the Ugandan army's “Operation: Lighting Thunder” during 2008-2009, which resulted in mass reprisals and escalation of atrocities by Kony's fighters.

⁴² Ronald R. Atkinson, et al., “Do No Harm”, 379.

⁴³ Ronald R. Atkinson, et al., “Do No Harm”, 379.

⁴⁴ Ronald R. Atkinson, et al., “Do No Harm”, 379.

4.4.2 *The Critical 'Protection' Narrative*

While the above critique seeks to lay out why the current intervention should be abandoned, a second form of critique focuses on how the intervention takes shape, and the forms of peace that may result from military operations to end the LRA. Peace, it has been said, “is a moment of possibility and danger.”⁴⁵ Acknowledging that the intervention by US troops to support African (mainly Ugandan) military forces may well provide some form of observable peace, some critics question the manner in which this peace may be realised. Following the deployment of US advisers to support the C-LRA mission in 2011, Adam Branch condemns the plan and what he calls the “protection narrative” that underpins it, arguing that such a narrative is antithetical to real peace and security, and sets up an uncertain and dangerous future for the subjects of intervention.⁴⁶

This 'protection' critique suggests that the notion of civilian protection at the core of C-LRA strategy is deceptively misleading, in effect being little more than a means to an end, with the end being unaccountable forms of political control by Western powers through their African proxies, justified by the typical liberal peace platitudes. Branch laments “the idea that the LRA threat to civilians can be dealt with only through a stronger coercive effort, to be realised by building the capacity and coordination of regional militaries through increased foreign involvement, particularly by US forces.”⁴⁷ According to this view, military power is not a tool for accomplishing some idealized task, but rather the ideal task (human security, human rights, civilian protection) masks the real objective—which is military control of a region, its people, and its resources.

When President Obama announced that the initial one hundred US advisers were deploying to central Africa, “a particular confluence of circumstances” was identified that “has made the LRA protection agenda attractive enough to bring together this wide array of adherents and draw such significant investment” by state, regional, and international actors, as well as many civil society groups.⁴⁸ To summarise:

⁴⁵ David Keen, *Complex Emergencies*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008, 171.

⁴⁶ See Adam Branch, “The Paradoxes of Protection: Aligning Against the Lord’s Resistance Army.” *African Security*, Vol. 5 (2012), pp. 160-178.

⁴⁷ Adam Branch, “The Paradoxes of Protection”, 161.

⁴⁸ Adam Branch, “The Paradoxes of Protection”, 161.

In short, the disproportionately large response to the LRA cannot be explained through reference to the particular brutality of LRA violence, although that brutality has helped to establish the legitimacy of the response. Rather, it can be better explained by seeing the initiatives mounted to protect civilians from the LRA as being not so much about the LRA or about civilians at all. Instead, it is more helpful to see these policies as efforts to constitute and experiment with new forms of political authority, transnational forms that are anchored locally, nationally, regionally, and globally and that stretch far beyond what happens in the forests and savannahs of central Africa. Thus, the emergence of these new political formations confirms... that the politics of protection fundamentally comprise the expansion of executive international authority.⁴⁹

Branch goes further in linking what he sees as the dangerous consequences of C-LRA with his more general critique of the dangerous consequences of the 'Responsibility to Protect' doctrine, stating that with this doctrine's "precipitous ascent" based on its "increasingly expansive formulations... there ends up being no realm of life... that is excluded from reform for the sake of protection and no tool that may not be used toward its end, from psychosocial support to invasion and occupation."⁵⁰ Thus, according to this view, military interventions justified in whole or in part by the intention to provide *protection* to some group of people may be seen as a 'Trojan Horse' of sorts, whereby interveners can shape target societies according to the desires of the interveners and do so with little or no accountability to, or input from those for whom protection is being provided.

The next section addresses these critiques I have just laid out in line with the objectives of this chapter by examining my research findings through the critical lens of the four-part conceptual framework of hybridity.

4.5 C-LRA Security and the Four-Part Hybridity Framework

The following is a brief discussion of the four inputs according to MacGinty's conceptual model and my own analyses undertaken during C-LRA fieldwork, and which challenges many of the critical characterisations of these efforts found throughout the scarce literature on the subject. These US-advised AU-RTF forces appear to have in large part crafted their strategy as a response to local conceptualisations of insecurity. As a result, this particular hybrid relationship looks significantly different than most major military interventions in recent memory. In Afghanistan and Iraq for example, an obstinate US-led coalition attempted to push forward their favoured policies onto populations that were at odds with such policies at best, and openly hostile to them at worst. What ensued in both places showed that both 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' forces had to make concessions and adjust their expectations and definitions of success. In

⁴⁹ Adam Branch, "The Paradoxes of Protection", 162.

⁵⁰ Adam Branch, "The Paradoxes of Protection", 164.

contrast, C-LRA has from the outset has been characterised by bolstering pre-existing efforts (mainly the pre-existing UPDF mission to hunt Kony), and expanding the strategy in such a manner that invites local communities and NGOs to define some of the key parameters of this operation.

4.5.1 *Coercive Powers*

Reports of coercion were extraordinarily rare, as C-LRA seems to be a largely voluntary arrangement among actors, with each state or actor contributing what it is able. Other than the direct pursuit and engagement of combat with LRA fighters, force or coercive powers do not play much of a role. As a consensus-building body, the AU and the AU-RTF presence occurs with the permission of host-nation governments, albeit as a low priority.⁵¹ Some tough diplomacy and combative communications between actors may occur at times—either through official diplomatic channels, or within the AU-RTF between high-level host-nation state defence officials and militaries. This type of interaction takes place when the more powerful actors (US or Ugandan) need the central governments of host-nations to act in some way, usually with the US or Ugandans making their case at the AU-RTF headquarters, who use their AU liaisons to pass along such requests, or by pursuing direct communication in other cases. When direct talks at the this level fail to produce satisfactory results, “working through the AU is the preferred method for such things.”⁵²

One example of this during fieldwork was the official prohibition of deploying UPDF soldiers into the DRC by Kinshasa officials, owing largely to past abuses by UPDF forces there, and mutual mistrust between the leaders of the two states. There is however, space for ad hoc arrangements whereby UPDF soldiers may be inserted for small periods of time for specific military tasks related to pursuing or disrupting LRA fighters. This is usually accomplished through the AU-RTF headquarters in Yambio, South Sudan. The US advisors may present their intelligence and plans, and make formal requests to Congolese officials via the AU, which “brings about a *usually* more positive response.”⁵³ Another example of this which occurred during my fieldwork involved the 2013 coup in CAR, which for a brief time ushered in the Seleka rebels to hold power in CAR’s capital of Bangui. When the Seleka seized power and ordered all

⁵¹ See Kristof Titeca and Theophile Costeur, “An LRA For Everyone: How Different Actors Frame the Lord’s Resistance Army.” *African Affairs*, Vol. 114 Iss. 454, January 2015, pp. 92-114.

⁵² Interview with Gary, US Special Forces sergeant, Nzara, South Sudan. April 2013.

⁵³ Interview with Ryan, US Special Forces sergeant, Nzara, South Sudan. April 2013.

C-LRA activities in CAR to cease, it was strong pressure exerted through the AU-RTF and AU Special Envoy that ensured that C-LRA operations were resumed within a matter of days.

As one US adviser put it, “whatever gains we concede by not imposing our will forcefully here in the short term, we more than make up for in the long run by achieving some legitimacy when we do work through our partners,” adding that “By treating them as partners, we may sometimes pull our hair out in frustration working through some of these spats that go on, but in the end the overall mission is more successful.”⁵⁴ In this sense, coercion seems to be employed on actors outside the realm of C-LRA who threaten their activities and efforts, but not on the people, communities, or local leaders, since they have a voice in the shape that their protection takes, and maintaining popular legitimacy is a broadly-stated goal of C-LRA security actors.

4.5.2 Incentivising Powers

Generally speaking, there is a low need for incentivizing strategies by C-LRA interveners. But incentives do exist, chief among these is the safety network that interveners provide which allow for local feelings of improved security where C-LRA forces are present. Another significant incentive is the frequent medical outreach clinics in the community. The US advisers (and to a lesser extent, the Ugandans) bring with them a significant capability to provide a wide spectrum of medical assistance in the form of medications, equipment, facilities, and education. This includes assisting directly with sick and injured patients from the community as well as supporting and advising local health clinics and hospitals in the area. Other types of humanitarian aid include assistance with building projects, vehicle repairs and transport. Since the C-LRA mission is separate from other assistance programmes to South Sudan, DRC, and CAR, local US advisors have some discretion over how their aid to communities is distributed.

In addition, there is a discernible local economic benefit of C-LRA troops and in an influx of money for various goods and services, which is greatly welcomed by many locals in Zande communities. This may be seen as ameliorating pre-existing human insecurity. One area that is lacking (which will be discussed further in Chapter Five) is the disproportionately low funding provided to humanitarian aid and defection efforts compared to military expenses—and although locals may wish for more of the 'soft' aid, they certainly do not wish the security aid to be withdrawn or decreased. To host-nation forces, interveners provide some non-monetary military benefits in the form of training, fuel, food, supplies, and medical care. The C-LRA effort

⁵⁴ Conversation with US Special Forces personnel during period of participant-observation, Obo, Central African Republic, April 2013.

sees little in the way of direct financial remuneration to host-nation forces or Arrow Boys, at least compared to the financial resources of US commanders for their allies in other theatres of operation. One US adviser explained that while direct payment from US forces has been common in other theatres like Afghanistan and Iraq, it is not the case here:

We don't pay these guys. They are barely paid by their own governments, and in our experience, it just creates more problems and hassle down the road when it's time for us to leave. Why should they do their jobs after we leave, when their pay stops? They need to do their job because they are expected to by their countrymen. We want to foster some independence on their part. Some pride in what they are doing, so that they carry that on.⁵⁵

Instead they do provide logistical help, such as fuel for trucks and aircraft, ammunition, communications technology, uniforms and other gear and supplies. Even with this limited assistance, the Americans often bemoaned the problems that arose with host-nation forces becoming accustomed to and expectant of US leadership and support at every step—rather than stepping out and innovating, which is what the SF try so hard to instil.

Again, when asked, the largest incentive to locals accepting the presence of foreign security forces is security itself. The umbrella of AU-RTF governance and security provided by the intervention serves as an incentive for those people living outside of it, to get under it. And with that, the development and economic benefits—in addition to the C-LRA humanitarian services—are an added impetus. People in the protected communities do feel safer than they did prior to 2011, and regardless of whether they attribute that to US and Ugandan forces, to their own national soldiers and local militias, NGOs, or to prayer—one common thread among the many responses to this question of incentives is the fact they are safer and more secure. Opinions may have varied as to exactly who or what is responsible for making it safe, but there seems to be near-unanimity about the fact that economically, physically, and psychologically, no one believes that they would like to go back to the way it was when the uncertainty regarding LRA violence was foremost on the minds of people who already are often barely surviving.

4.5.3 *Local Resistance and Adaptation*

While significant resistance is not an ongoing element within C-LRA, local resistance has played a role in how this effort has taken shape. This resistance involves the way in which some local perceptions of the C-LRA mission are understood differently than external actors, and are viewed in terms of their own ethnic or tribal identity. An example of this can be seen in the

⁵⁵ Interview with Ryan, a US Army Special Forces sergeant. Nzara, South Sudan.

community of Ezo, a town which officially lies in South Sudan, but in reality is sprawled out around the point on the map where the borders of South Sudan, DRC, and CAR converge. Trade and human activity are constantly moving between borders here, and Ezo is in some ways an ideal place to see daily life among the Zande juxtaposed against the “imagined communities” of the modern state-centric Westphalian system,⁵⁶ whose problematic security systems⁵⁷ had failed to keep Ezo safe from a plethora of LRA attacks between 2008 and 2011.⁵⁸ The LRA usually attacked from the DRC side (the least guarded) and were able to commit killings, abductions, and looting before fleeing back into the DRC. According to many locals, the primary reason these attacks have dwindled is a combination of two factors. First, the C-LRA intervention has prioritised civilian protection for the tri-state community around Ezo, including a small UPDF base camp there (with frequent visits and support by the American SF advisers). Second (and most importantly according to local Zande), is the mobilisation of local ‘Arrow Boys’ self defence forces that have repelled the LRA and discouraged them from their raids in this vicinity.

Bishop John Zawa from Ezo Diocese explained that prior to 2011, and after months and years of frustration borne from these vicious attacks that the Zande were neither accustomed to, nor were their political leaders able to withstand against, they “formed civilian militias through traditional tribal and clan [means of] organisation” that “once and for all made the people feel safe.”⁵⁹ According to Zawa and other community leaders and members, it was the Arrow Boys that made the LRA “afraid to return,” where they now prefer to raid the smaller villages in the region, “in rural areas. But even there, they [the LRA] are not safe.”⁶⁰ Local Zande people move freely in the area across borders, while it is more difficult for state security forces to cross foreign borders.⁶¹ For Zande like Bishop Zawa and others, the effectiveness of the Arrow Boys is proven by the fact that as they push out further to patrol more remote villages across the

⁵⁶ See Benedict Andersen, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso Press, 1991, 6-7.

⁵⁷ See Mareike Schomerus, “Improvising Border Security: ‘A Situation of Security Pluralism’ Along South Sudan’s Borders with the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 45, Iss. 3, 2014, pp. 279-294.

⁵⁸ Months after concluding fieldwork, I was to learn that Ezo was again attacked in November 2013, and sporadically through the summer of 2014. This despite the presence of a UPDF unit that is officially barred from pursuing LRA fighters when they retreat back into the bush on the DRC side of the border.

⁵⁹ Bishop John Zawa, ECS Ezo Diocese, during conversation with local community leaders during period of participant-observation. Ezo, South Sudan. April 2013.

⁶⁰ Bishop John Zawa, ECS Ezo Diocese, during conversation with local community leaders during period of participant-observation. Ezo, South Sudan. April 2013.

⁶¹ While an official border checkpoint exists, the reality is that it is extremely porous, and numerous footpaths nearby allow civilians to move about unhindered by the imposed borders.

border, the LRA attacks become further away as well. In contrast, the LRA were “not so afraid of the army [UPDF and host-nation forces] in the past to stay away.”⁶² This example of the Ezo community and the role of Arrow Boys versus official security forces illustrate an important point that the lens of hybridity reveals— local perceptions tend to view the Arrow Boys as the central threat to LRA mobility, and as the primary saviours of their community. While they concede that their activities are successful due to being legitimised by the AU-RTF and C-LRA mission (which many see as protecting them from marginalisation efforts by the government in Juba), most Zande perceive themselves as the main effort, with the foreign militaries being well-suited for long-distance travel and technological capability.

While the US did not send their advisers until late 2011, the UPDF and regional forces had been pursuing the LRA for years prior, which had done little to stop scores of attacks by Kony’s fighters, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands who fled their homes in fear. These self defence groups were initially mobilised spontaneously and were soon endorsed by both church leaders throughout WES and the South Sudanese government as a desperate measure to “do what outsiders failed to accomplish.”⁶³ As one man put it, Arrow Boys are a manifestation of Zande deciding to “defend our homes, our women, our children, our livelihoods, our dignity” against these [LRA] “animals from Uganda who have no business being here and doing these things to us.”⁶⁴

Being that state security forces deployed in the region tend to not be ethnic Zande, there is a predominant feeling that these troops are also outsiders—albeit to a lesser degree than the Ugandans or their US advisers. Both the AU-RTF senior leaders (both Ugandan and US) and local Zande Arrow Boys agree that in many ways, the national security forces are something of a formality—“proof that we are doing state-level capacity-building with our host nation partners,” according to some,⁶⁵ while in reality, the idea that this area will one day soon display state-based governance and thus not need either ‘top-down’ help from outside interveners or ‘bottom-up’ help from self defence groups is “probably a fantasy for at least a generation or two.”⁶⁶ Nevertheless, the SPLA, FACA, and FARDC troops in the region have increasingly become accustomed to being part of the AU-RTF, however nominally, and any resistance based on a

⁶² Interview with Bishop Samuel Peni, ECS Dicoese Nzara. Nzara, South Sudan. April 2013.

⁶³ Interview with Gori Faustino Basukangbi Badabu, Paramount Chief of the Zande. Nzara, South Sudan. April 2013.

⁶⁴ Interview with Milton, a local farmer and Arrow Boys militia fighter. Timbiro, South Sudan. April 2013.

⁶⁵ Interview with Captain Olaf, US Special Forces officer, Yambio, South Sudan. April 2013.

⁶⁶ Interview with Ryan, US Special Forces sergeant. Nzara, South Sudan. April 2013.

lack of ethnic-based loyalty has been adapted to somewhat by fixing themselves to the C-LRA operational concept (and the material support they receive).

Prior to the 2011 involvement of the US advisers deployed through AFRICOM, the local Zande had resisted the LRA and had expressed displeasure at the inability of the UPDF to adequately protect them. They had adapted to the insecurity by forming quasi-political attachments through non-governmental actors since their own state governments were so ineffective. For many civilians already barely surviving daily life at a subsistence level, displacement and fear resulting from LRA violence had seen “this trouble spread like a disease” through the region.⁶⁷ Over time, however, the existence of both local defence groups and civil society advocates became less a symbol of resistance (and frustration) and more a source of empowerment and a linkage to external political structures capable of bringing outside resources to bear. Thus, for Zande locals, the LRA’s incursion into Zandeland since the mid to late 2000s was akin to a foreign invasion, and something they were largely unable to defend against. Through resisting and adapting to this introduction of violence and resulting security vacuum (in varied ways depending on state membership), they grew increasingly linked to the solutions that these communities asked for—outside help to deal with a problem that came from the outside. The tendency of C-LRA interveners has been to incorporate local security actors into the larger civilian protection plan whenever possible, in order to maximize local legitimacy, gain valuable sources of intelligence for AU-RTF forces, and foster a spirit of cooperation that can hopefully sustain itself when they day comes for the external forces to leave.⁶⁸

4.5.4 *Local Alternatives*

In any discussion of local alternatives to the C-LRA intervention, the notion of *intentionality* is important. What began as resistance and resulted in alternative security measures (the formation of effective Arrow Boys militias in South Sudan, for example) has been absorbed into the greater C-LRA security plan. As a result, notions of security are understood as linked to C-LRA structures to a large degree, rather than sustained through alternatives. As one UPDF officer put it, “What we do here has been to provide the best practices available. If something works well, we do not fight it, we bring it into our plan and our local friends have come to expect this from us. In this way we owe a lot to the Americans who have helped us achieve greater

⁶⁷ Interview with Father Marciel, Catholic Priest. Obo, CAR. March 2013.

⁶⁸ Interview with Ryan, US Special Forces sergeant. Nzara, South Sudan. April 2013.

precision in our work here. Everyone benefits.”⁶⁹ The hybrid lens affords us a way to begin to understand the complex processes of social negotiations and power dynamics at work between locals and the various interveners and see what is coalescing and being incorporated into a unified purpose (and what is not). The lack of sustained local alternatives is mitigated by the external actors to some extent 'writing in' these alternatives as part of the AU-RTF's programme, and doing so *intentionally*.

Perhaps not unsurprisingly, the various security actors discussed here (US, UPDF, host-nation forces, and Arrow Boys) each tend to see themselves and their approach as being central to success in providing physical security against LRA attacks and in pushing out the LRA. While each group of actors has a somewhat unique narrative of their importance, each group of actors acknowledges that it is a collective effort that has allowed the overall security successes to occur, and give people hope (although the long-term threat from Kony's LRA remains). When pressed for ways in which alternatives have been introduced to the intervention, the tendency has been to point to some security measure the respondent was a part of, and then describe how it was incorporated into the larger C-LRA plan, leading to success.

Localised security measures that began as adaptations to the insecurity but became instrumental to perceived success are many. These include the intelligence platform and coordination capabilities provided by US advisers, refinement of UPDF tracking methods in the bush, a growing system of early warning radio networks across the region, the cooperation of the park rangers in DRC's Garamba National Park and the MONUSCO mission, and formation of the Arrow Boys in contact with AU-RTF actors who share information in sectors of concern. I was unable to find instances of local alternatives to the intervention taking place that change the shape of C-LRA which are not somehow either a part of C-LRA, or are some form of critique to the intervention from outside of Zandeland (and hence, not local).

As the discussion of Mac Ginty's hybridity concept applied to C-LRA security measures above indicates, the various inputs are not a list of issues that arise out of competition or conflict. Rather, they illustrate, through the conceptual lens of hybridity, that a hybrid peace is present as a result of *intentional mitigation* of these factors—achieving a rare accord whereby local needs and perceptions are a defining metric for operational success (or failure). Again, with little need for the coercion or compliance of locals (since they are for the most part a welcome presence), there is likewise little for locals to resist or provide alternatives *to*. The next section takes the

⁶⁹ Interview with Captain Mike, a UPDF intelligence officer. Yambio, South Sudan. April 2013.

discussion further by challenging the veracity of the critiques of current C-LRA efforts, followed by an expansion on the deeper dynamics of C-LRA linked to empirical evidence revealed through the lens of hybridity.

4.6 Expanded Discussion of Findings

4.6.1 *Response to the 'Militarisation' Critique*

First, the “military versus non-military” line of critique mentioned above, and its admonition for interveners to “do no harm” (while obviously well-intentioned) has several flaws, not the least of which is the obvious point that the proposed action had not yet been given a chance to work when it was offered. Yet, despite years of relatively successful ongoing C-LRA activities, this same viewpoint has been restated despite evidence to the contrary and a lack of empirical research by supporters of this position.⁷⁰ Second, in calling for peaceful, non-military solutions to prevail, they do not delineate what these approaches might look like, or how they differ from the substantial non-military approaches underway (which are discussed in detail in the following chapter).

Third, by invoking the “do no harm” principle with respect to intervention, it fails to ask about the harm incurred when *nothing* is done. The innocent civilians will sometimes have to bear much more harm when the international community fails to react. Fourth, the suggestion that just because there are daunting challenges to building a comprehensive strategy, such a project should not even be attempted seems strikingly fatalistic. Finally, in pointing to the ICG report as evidence of their argument against military support, it should be noted that the ICG report specifically *calls* for US military assistance in nearly the exact fashion it has taken shape since.⁷¹ An obviously better line of questioning that such a critique could adopt would be to examine the deployment *actually taking place* in the region, speak to communities affected, and then determine “is there any harm to civilians?” But its proponents have thus far failed to do this.

In short, asking why military solutions are being pursued over peaceful, non-military approaches overlooks the reality on the ground. C-LRA is not a military solution that eschews any peaceful dimensions. Nor does it simply repeat vague, unspecific calls for “peaceful solutions.” Such critiques are no doubt well-intentioned, but nevertheless represent “lower horizons with regard

⁷⁰ Ronald Atkinson and Kristof Titeca, “Why is the US hunting for Joseph Kony?” *Al Jazeera Online*. 11 May 2014.

⁷¹ See “Executive Summary and Recommendations,” International Crisis Group, “LRA: A Regional Strategy Beyond Killing Kony,” 2010.

to policy alternatives and conceptualise no clear agency of emancipatory possibilities.”⁷² Military and civilian actors are working alongside civilian communities in a manner that has been relatively successful—not according to some imposed technocratic standard—but according to local Zande people in LRA-affected communities and their representatives in local government, clergy, and civil society (which will be discussed further in the following section).

4.6.2 *Response to the ‘Protection’ Critique*

I now turn to Branch's critique of the C-LRA intervention's protection narrative (section 4.4.2), where he describes a “paradoxical consequence” of the success of “unaccountable networks” as being successful at reproducing themselves, but in a manner which is “unrelated to actually protecting civilians.”⁷³ This then begs the question, what forms of accountability are present in C-LRA actor networks? And do local civilians feel better protected as a result of C-LRA activities? The empirical data I collected in the field strongly indicates that local perceptions are not only listened to by external interveners, but they are accorded a role as a primary metric for the success (or failure) of C-LRA initiatives. In fact, countless local officials and Zande civilians vehemently proclaimed that they do in fact feel better protected by the task force presence and that their greatest fear as a result of the intervention is not from the interveners, but from what will happen when and if the AU-RTF leaves. Thus, the military response by the task force is not unsubstantial, but can hardly be called an invasion or occupation, as the 'protection' critique describes.

One other striking feature of the 'protection' critique—aside from not offering any viable alternatives to current C-LRA efforts—is that *consent* has played a key role in establishing C-LRA's legitimacy, and has been welcomed at the international, regional, and local levels.⁷⁴ Although Branch provides one line where he dismissively acknowledges that “it would appear that this militarisation of politics and society is here a consensual project”, he cites the calls from Ugandan peace activists for negotiated solutions, as well as their opposition to increased military action as evidence of the complex nature of this issue, and goes on to ask whose voices should be heard.⁷⁵ This is a crucial point. The 'protection' critique indicates that it is *northern Ugandans*—who for so long bore the brunt of the conflict, from both the LRA and the Ugandan

⁷² Nik Hynes and David Chandler, "No Emancipatory Alternative, No Critical Security Studies." *Critical Studies on Security*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2013, pp. 46-63, 46.

⁷³ Adam Branch, "The Paradoxes of Protection", 163.

⁷⁴ Adam Branch, "The Paradoxes of Protection", 175.

⁷⁵ Adam Branch, "The Paradoxes of Protection", 175.

security forces—that should be heard. In so doing, it seems implied that the opinions of the northern Ugandans—for whom the war has been over since 2006—should be weighted much more than those in the Zande communities in South Sudan, CAR, and DRC as to how to eradicate the LRA threat and achieve a legitimate peace. On the one hand, these Ugandan voices are important for understanding the LRA conflict which is rooted in the grievances of northerners toward the Ugandan regime. Their agenda is one that seeks to negotiate with Kony while seeking to reform Uganda’s current political trajectory. On the other hand, these concerns are absolutely irrelevant to Zande locals in the tri-border region who have their own quarrels with the national capitals that marginalise them—in addition to a Ugandan warlord who has preyed on them for the past five years. The problem with this view, then, is that it robs Zande civilians (who are *currently* victims of LRA attacks) of their own agency in deciding what is best for them.

4.6.3 *Local Perceptions of C-LRA*

According to some locals, before 2011, the worst incidents of UPDF misconduct tended to revolve around soldiers drinking and consorting with local women, sometimes leading to local families being torn between displeasure with Ugandan mischief and the need for a secure community.⁷⁶ With the arrival of the American advisers and their emphasis on improved professionalism, the Ugandan army “has never been a more refined instrument,”⁷⁷ and their relations with civilian communities is “many, many times better, since the arrival of the Americans.”⁷⁸

Another crucial consideration to understanding current C-LRA activities is regarding how local people in LRA-affected areas conceptualise their security in relation to external actors. In this remote region, distant from the capitals of the three respective states, the predominantly Zande people in LRA-affected areas are long “accustomed to being on the outside of political processes” inside their governments, as well as “on the outside of international affairs.”⁷⁹ It is this marginalisation and disconnection that has relegated people in this region to feeling accustomed to self-reliance in their communities and being mistrustful of outsiders—especially their own state militaries. Given the vast differences between perceptions of the UPDF inside of

⁷⁶ Interview with Father Marciel, Catholic Priest. Obo, Central African Republic. March 2013.

⁷⁷ Interview with Tom, a UPDF Intelligence officer, Nzara, South Sudan. April 2013.

⁷⁸ Interview with Father Marciel, Catholic Priest. Obo, Central African Republic. March 2013.

⁷⁹ Interview with Bishop Samuel Peni, ECS Nzara Diocese. Nzara, South Sudan. April 2013.

Uganda, and how they are perceived by Zande locals in LRA-affected areas, the question obviously becomes, why? The following two sections examine the factors linked to this change.

4.6.4 *UPDF Adaptation: Getting it Right*

US Army study cited the main set of problems with militarily defeating the LRA lies in the lack of professionalism within the UPDF in controlling abuses and losing popular support at a tactical level, as well as failures in imagination and planning, on the part of Ugandan military and intelligence officials at the strategic level.⁸⁰ Hybridity may show us that C-LRA is not merely an externally-imposed military occupation, and that past patterns of UPDF bad behaviour are not being repeated. It does not however, tell us why this particular activity is qualitatively different from Uganda's northern insurgency? One substantial component is obviously the fact that the entire operation is intricately linked—not primarily to discernible military objectives that require military solutions by states—but to the work of non-military humanitarian and civil society actors, advocating on behalf of populations with little or no voice connecting them to the outside world. That link and the role of civil society will be the subject of the following chapter, but within the more narrow military dimensions of security there has unquestionably been a significant degree of adaptation and change on the part of security actors which seems discernible to all levels of actors.

Military adaption that fulfils complex and traditionally non-military requirements has long been a significant—perhaps monumental—achievement. It may be counterintuitive for some to believe that militaries (even of major Western powers) often miserably fail to adequately adapt to fluid situations when deployed, but they certainly do. Nagl cites the US Army's inability to adequately adapt itself to win the Vietnam War as a stumbling block a generation later when US strategy was again bogged down in Iraq.⁸¹ Theo Farrell's work with British forces in Afghanistan has sought to provide us with a theory of how militaries adapt during war, defining adaptation as "bottom-up" changes to "tactics, techniques or existing technologies to improve operational performance."⁸² Uganda's UPDF, which had spent decades fighting the LRA in Uganda with little to no improvement appears to have positively adapted to newer, humanitarian-based, population-centric requirements in a rapid time period.

⁸⁰ Robert L. Feldman, "Why Uganda Has Failed to Defeat the Lord's Resistance Army." *Defense and Security Analysis*, Vol. 24, No. 1, March 2008, pp. 45-52, 50.

⁸¹ See John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya to Vietnam*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.

⁸² Theo Farrell, "Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand, 2006-2009." *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 4, July 2010, pp. 1-33.

One contributing factor is that current US assistance is much more direct and 'hands-on,' with advisers embedded with task force leadership in Uganda, at the AU-RTF headquarters in South Sudan, and with the forward-deployed UPDF units in the remote jungle base camps who then lead long-range patrols in the bush, "sharing the same space, every step of the way."⁸³ Another factor is that although specific personnel data was not forthcoming, it appeared that (aside from a few senior commanders) the majority of UPDF small unit leaders and almost all of their enlisted soldiers had no previous combat experience against the LRA during the Ugandan insurgency, although several had been on OLT since 2008-2009.⁸⁴

What these two facts suggest is willingness on the part of senior UPDF leadership to purge many of the veterans of the 1990s and 2000s from this mission, and to entrust C-LRA activities to the many ethnic Acholi soldiers taking part. This may be seen as a sign that the regime is becoming more inclusive so as to enhance its legitimacy among the people as well as making sense to deploy Acholi to help bring their fellow Acholi out of the bush and back home. A more cynical view may be that due to past UPDF abuses, and as a result of constraints like the Leahy Amendment passed by the US Congress (which prohibits military aid to units or individuals who have been implicated in human rights abuses), the current disposition of forces was deemed politically safer, and thus more insulated to human rights-based criticisms.⁸⁵

Some of the institutional adaptations that the US advisers have helped to bring about in their Ugandan counterparts deal with military tactics—most notably the use of communications and GPS technology to greater efficiency, and deploying more long-range patrols, but in smaller teams in order to be more agile and similar to LRA tactics in the bush. Perhaps most importantly, they have better adapted how they coordinate and control firepower when combat does occur, so as to minimise unnecessary casualties and provide opportunities for LRA fighters to surrender. One important task has been for the UPDF (and to a lesser degree in other host-nation forces) is in how to deal with LRA defectors non-violently, rather than treat them as combatants (in other words, not to kill them). This had been a major obstacle during the past decades, and even with prior US training and support, one officer conceded that:

⁸³ Interview with Captain Olaf, US Special Forces officer, Yambio, South Sudan. April 2013.

⁸⁴ As previously stated, however, some UPDF soldiers were themselves former LRA.

⁸⁵ Definitively proving facts like these was next to impossible, as the US embassy staff and AFRICOM leadership refused to even discuss any aspect of military activities in Africa, other than a referral to their respective websites. But numerous informal conversations with people from both countries, as well as the fact that these UPDF units seemed to have been newly created for the task (thus being safe from Leahy violations) suggests that there is at least some degree of truth to this viewpoint.

Events in the field tended to follow the 'shoot now, ask questions later' model. I can wholeheartedly say this has now changed. These UPDF out here understand what to do, and more importantly what not to do in the bush, and our confidence in them has grown tremendously. But of course, it really, really helps that we are physically here, sharing the same space with them. Otherwise, it would be a lot less certain, and I'd be a lot less confident.⁸⁶

For example, I was present during an instance of field training in South Sudan where a US adviser was demonstrating a prisoner search techniques which required some aggressive physical contact to the 'prisoner' (ensuring the subject is not armed or booby-trapped in some way). The response from the UPDF soldiers was a refusal to comply, as they understood their mandate was to not harm anyone in the field unless absolutely necessary. This caused the adviser to explain that this was not a harmful tactic per se, but a method to safely ensure that the prisoner is unarmed. Later, some of these junior UPDF soldiers present were overheard discussing and debating whether this particular technique was something they should do. The fact that they demonstrated concern for rules of engagement and sensitivity over human rights was a far cry from a month earlier, when UPDF roughly dispersed Ugandan citizens from a downtown gathering. Weeks later, upon relating this story to civilians back in northern Uganda who had endured the war and life in the camps years before, they were incredulous that this was the same UPDF they had suffered at the hands of, who to them seemed inured to brutal methods as a matter of routine.

Other activities that showcase Ugandan legitimacy with locals have more to do with inculcating a sense of responsibility and connectedness with locals on a human level. In so doing, these forces are working toward bridging the "disconnect" between "formal political representation" and the "social processes and relationships in which they were embedded."⁸⁷ One Ugandan officer explained what a turnaround it was to put these ideas into practice, and how it has helped troops deal with the stress of dangerous long-range jungle patrols and the absences from home:

We have changed very much in our behaviour out here. We encourage our men to leave the base, to go out and interact, but to be respectful. And most have done this very, very well. They learn to speak some Zande, they have Zande friends... they play football, they shop locally, [and] they eat locally. I began attending the nearby church and doing volunteer work outside of our normal duties. Now many of my soldiers join me, and it is a very nice atmosphere. I feel like I am defending the lives of my friends, of people I care

⁸⁶ Interview with Captain Olaf, US Special Forces officer, Yambio, South Sudan. April 2013.

⁸⁷ David Chandler, "Peacebuilding and the Politics of Non-Linearity: Rethinking 'Hidden' Agency and 'Resistance.'" *Peacebuilding*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2013, pp. 17-32, 23.

about. I want them to be okay, and I am so proud to see my Ugandan soldiers feel this way also. Very proud.⁸⁸

Some Ugandan soldiers described considerable pride in their service to the AU task force, even while privately insisting they have serious misgivings about their countries' political trajectory.⁸⁹ Such rapid improvements in how these forces not only deal with locals, but focus on societal spaces, practices and processes” as “the starting point for transforming social subjectivities” display the very forms of innovation which modern conflicts demand.⁹⁰ Unlike the situation when they fought the LRA inside of Uganda in the past, Ugandan forces today are not under the tight grip of their president and his political regime. Current C-LRA activities are divorced from the "systems of collusion" that government elites pursued during the war in northern Uganda. Then, such actions served a narrow political purpose. Today, Uganda's role in the AU task force serves another purpose—being perceived regionally and internationally as a responsible and legitimate force for good (and of course, to continue to benefit from continued US military and financial aid).

Both US and UPDF leaders acknowledge that much work needs to be done in inculcating these adaptive capabilities in the AU-RTF's host-nation forces. Ugandan senior officials are currently exploring ways in which such organisational capacity can be codified into the rest of the UPDF, as operations in Somalia and other possible future deployments loom on the horizon, and the need to change in order to meet these needs is pressing.⁹¹ This has historically been a much more daunting challenge, as pushing 'top-down' forms of innovation which look toward future operational requirements often have significant institutional hurdles.⁹² The ability to adapt thus plays a primary causal role in achieving three of the four strategic objectives laid out by policymakers and in shaping C-LRA security into a locally legitimate and militarily effective endeavour .

⁸⁸ Interview with Tom, Ugandan Army lieutenant. Nzara, South Sudan. April 2013.

⁸⁹ Conversations with Ugandan soldiers during ethnographic fieldwork at their forward operating base in Nzara, South Sudan. April 2013.

⁹⁰ David Chandler, "Peacebuilding and the Politics of Non-Linearity", 23.

⁹¹ Interview with Hon Min. Crispus Kyonga, Uganda Minister of Defence, Kampala, Uganda, May 2013.

⁹² See Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991.

4.6.4 The US C-LRA Advisers

All of this notable improvement mentioned above is due in part to the specialised nature of the US advisers. In addition to their casual appearance and relatively inconspicuous presence,⁹³ the advisers themselves often repeated that while the military patrols and training are vital, it is their ability to develop and maintain relationships that was the primary tool most effective in typical special missions like C-LRA.⁹⁴ According to civilian NGO partners, the flexibility and effectiveness of the US advisers has accomplished a great deal that "American diplomats can leverage... to promote more effective and self-sufficient security coordination across the region."⁹⁵

The US advisers are careful to not appear in charge of the mission, and insist that they are only there to assist.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, it is hard to overstate their obvious effectiveness in spurring UPDF adaptation. Crucial to their task is maintaining that "any successes derived from these collaborative SOF [special operations forces] operations must be 'owned' by the African country forces, in large part because of the legacy of post-colonial sensitivities."⁹⁷ They seem to impart above all, a sense of legitimacy among their African counterparts, and provide whatever ad hoc assistance necessary. The effective work of these US advisers has been instrumental in doing just that, and the UPDF thus far has overwhelmingly displayed its ability to outperform the low expectations that critics (as well as their own historical legacy) suggests would be the case.

Use of special operations forces may be seen as a way of institutionalising adaptation, as rapid adaptation and learning in uncertain situations seems to be their strong point. Advocates of special operations forces point to their ability to reduce or minimize what Clausewitz called "the

⁹³ Unless out on jungle patrols with the AU task force, the US advisers wore civilian clothes and drove civilian vehicles, often in pairs and not visibly armed. Although considered elite commandoes, to the unaware observer, they were hardly distinguishable from the more common Western aid workers or missionaries one may expect to occasionally find in the region.

⁹⁴ Conversations with US Special Forces advisers during ethnographic fieldwork, Nzara and Yambio, South Sudan, April 2013.

⁹⁵ Kasper Agger, "Completing the Mission: US Special Forces Are Essential for Ending the LRA." *The Enough Project*, October 2013, 4. Accessed 15 November 2013.

<<http://www.enoughproject.org/files/Completing-The-Mission-US-Special-Forces-Essential-to-Ending-LRA.pdf>>

⁹⁶ The aspects of the mission that the US advisers are in direct control of have to do with US air and intelligence assets and the flow of some types of classified information.

⁹⁷ James J.F. Forest, "US Military Deployments to Africa: Lessons from the Hunt for Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army." *JSOU Report 14-4, Joint Special Operations University website*, August 2014, p.6. Accessed 12 September 2014. <http://jsou.socom.mil/PubsPages/JSOU_14-4_Forest_LRA_FINAL.pdf>

frictions of war” to “a manageable level.”⁹⁸ They themselves acknowledge numerous times the dangers in US foreign policy when policymakers often attempt to replicate the successful methods of SF on a large-scale, often with undertrained and underprepared conventional forces who—though they have achieved limited successes—do not have the training and experience for SF-style missions. One SF officer mentioned the hazards in “assuming that what works well in one place with ten good men can easily be replicated and expanded with ten thousand men someplace else.”⁹⁹

One contributing factor to the rapid military adaptation characterising the C-LRA is the level of policy attention given versus other military activities. According to numerous conversations with US advisers, the perception is that in terms of budget, manpower and asset allocation, C-LRA is not a high priority for AFRICOM or US policymakers as compared to other activities in Africa that are focused on an Islamist enemy within the Global War on Terror strategic framework, or which provide significant military aid to allied states. They often expressed a sense of relief and satisfaction that C-LRA is quite unlike prior deployments to Afghanistan or Iraq, where higher level political issues too often resulted in frustrating their efforts at achieving success on the ground at the local level. One described C-LRA as a “pure” mission that he could be proud of, while another lauded the fact that unlike War on Terror activities, they were “mostly left alone to do what we do best, which is something we value.”¹⁰⁰

It should be stressed that the findings discussed in this chapter are not meant to excuse or minimise the culpability of Uganda’s ruling elite or the UPDF in past or current systemic abuses. Nor is it intended to provide intellectual cover for increased militarism—particularly by the US—in providing military aid to Uganda and elsewhere in Africa under the guise of liberal peace discourses. Each of these issues is troubling in their own right, and deserve the scrutiny they routinely receive. However, if we are to be intellectually honest and fair in how we assess the effects of intervention by external powerful states or institutions (especially when there is a growing consensus that studying these effects should be rooted in locally-recognised forms of peace), then we must confront limited successes where they occur, and as they are locally received and understood. If indeed, local voices are to be heard and their views respected, then C-LRA must be understood in these terms.

⁹⁸ William McRaven, *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1996, 1.

⁹⁹ Interview with Captain Olaf, US Special Forces officer, Yambio, South Sudan. April 2013.

¹⁰⁰ Interview with Ryan, US Special Forces sergeant, Nzara, South Sudan. April 2013.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to challenge some of the predominant critiques of C-LRA by arguing that it is not simply a military approach, and the idea that there is a choice between that and a *non-military* solution is a false dichotomy. It has set out to assess the veracity of the predominant critiques against C-LRA, and provide a robust appraisal of local reactions to the security situation which is thoroughly grounded in first-hand empirical fieldwork. The military pressure being applied on Kony has seen great gains be made in the other core areas of civilian protection, humanitarian aid projects, and defection and reintegration efforts.

The following chapter (Chapter Five) addresses another set of critiques which are focused on civil society actors, and will continue to illuminate a clearer picture of why current C-LRA efforts are significantly different from the history of the LRA insurgency in Uganda, as well as the semi-authoritarian nature of Ugandan politics today. In addition it will reveal ways in which these activities represent a departure from the status quo of typical peace interventions, in that it involves a role for civil society actors as major stakeholders at all levels.

CHAPTER FIVE: C-LRA and Civil Society

5.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, we discussed what the hybrid lens reveals about C-LRA security activities by focusing primarily on military and security actors. In this chapter, I turn to the important role of civil society actors in comprehensive approaches to addressing the LRA problem in central Africa, and analyse these approaches against the framework of Mac Ginty's notion of hybridity as it relates to externally imposed liberal peace interventions. The arguments put forth here are twofold. First, I intend to demonstrate that civil society actors can be seen as providing the social bonds that prevent otherwise competing interests, policies, practices and ideologies from overshadowing one another or coming into conflict in ways that result in ill-intended consequences. As the hybrid lens reveals, categories such as 'global' and 'local', 'civilian', and 'military' often serve to hinder nuanced understandings of power relations and the everyday practices of interventions at the local level. Viewing these activities as expressions along a civil society continuum takes us closer to dynamics as the various actors involved experience them. Second (and related to findings in Chapter Four), I argue that the prevalence of critiques against civil society's role in C-LRA from some activists and Africa scholars is in itself problematic in the way it misleadingly frames the conflict and its complex transnational response. By voicing overly dichotomous and anachronistic simplifications of the problems they view as harmful, these critics unintentionally contribute to distorted understandings of C-LRA and (by minimising local agency and suggesting inaction) risk worsening the humanitarian situation, rather than improving it.

Utilising the conceptual framework of hybridity, I examine the power relations agendas of actors and where they converge, as well as where they diverge. From there, I expand the discussion of empirical findings to support the argument that civil society actors, across the local-global expanse, serve an important function that binds otherwise-disparate actors and interests into loosely-unified coalition acting toward a shared purpose in ways that powerful state actors and global institutions have consistently failed to achieve. Finally, the discussion of findings extends to challenging with the predominant critiques of certain C-LRA civil society actors.

5.2 Overview of Civil Society's Role in C-LRA

Generally speaking, civil society can be seen as "the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values... [and] commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and

power."¹ Wanyande uses the term to mean the “assemblage of associations outside of the state and government that would otherwise wish to influence the direction of public affairs including political discourse and action by expanding political space.”² More relevant to how I employ the term here, MacGinty and Williams describe civil society as being "on the front line in development processes, the prevention of conflict, and peacebuilding and reconciliation in the aftermath of conflict" and "are often most prominent in 'bearing witness' or publicising injustice."³ The primary types of civil society groups at work in this region and for the purposes discussed here are non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and religious groups. Both types of civil society groups can be either local, or global, or—as we will discuss below—some hybridised form of both.

The failure of the Juba Peace Talks and the disastrous military offensives in 2008-2009, the LRA carried out a wave of retaliatory violence. Over the next few years, the resulting humanitarian crisis prompted NGOs and churches, both global and local, to organise across national boundaries in LRA-affected areas in a plea for external assistance. This coalition of civil society actors is broad and diverse, representing NGOs and the church and at the global, regional, and local levels. Many international groups have been reporting on the conflict for years, such as the International Crisis Group, Oxfam, and Human Rights Watch, while others take on a much more active role in achieving C-LRA objectives. In addition to the important work of clergy in the Anglican, Catholic and Muslim communities, several global NGOs are central to these C-LRA efforts including groups such as Resolve, the Enough Project, and Invisible Children. In addition are numerous regional and local groups such as Conciliation Resource, the *Commission Diocésaine Justice et Paix*, and the *Association des victims de LRA*, just to name a few.

In addition to various humanitarian development projects in LRA-affected areas, these actors work alongside the AU task force, design and distribute defection messaging, operate safe-reporting sites for LRA defectors, and work to expand an early-warning radio network for remote communities to share information about LRA threats. In addition, these groups seek to provide trauma counselling and reintegration assistance for returned LRA defectors. These groups claim

¹ Centre for Civil Society, "What is Civil Society?" *Centre for Civil Society website*, 2008.

² Peter Wanyande, "The Media and Civil Society and its Role in Democratic Transition in Kenya." *Africa Media Review*, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1996, pp. 1-20, 6.

³ Roger MacGinty and Andrew Williams, *Conflict and Development*. New York: Routledge Press, 2009, 82.

they "operate in the same space" as the military task force, as well as "the civilian communities we represent and advocate for."⁴

In an open letter to President Obama from twenty local civil society representatives in the region, these NGOs and religious leaders urged Obama's administration to "use all available channels of diplomacy to pressure our governments to recognize the LRA threat and make addressing the problem one of their top priorities."⁵ Specific needs they wanted addressed were lack of civilian protection from LRA attacks, lack of transportation and communications infrastructure, poor past performance of both their national armies and the Ugandan troops who sporadically appeared, and the need for demobilisation and rehabilitation measures and "improved collaboration and information sharing."⁶

Before moving on to the analysis of civil society actors within the framework of hybridity, the following section outlines a set of critiques directed at the work of these groups, which will set the stage for further discussions below.

5.3 Predominant Critiques of C-LRA Civil Society Actors

Several global advocacy groups such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Conciliation Resources, and Child Soldier International support the current AU-RTF mission, yet they are nearly always omitted from the predominant critiques against C-LRA. Nor are the Catholic and Anglican/Protestant churches singled out for their roles, although they are instrumental C-LRA actors. Instead, the criticism is most often directed at the three advocacy NGOs who are well-known for their lobbying efforts at attracting US and global support. These three groups are Invisible Children, the Enough Project, and Resolve.

Of these three, none attracts more criticism than the advocacy NGO responsible for the controversial *Kony 2012* video, Invisible Children. A typical strand of such criticism involves the work of Amy Finnegan, a sociologist whose work focuses on Invisible Children. In response to the *Kony 2012* video, she finds that "the efforts of the campaign and its sponsoring organization,

⁴ Interview with Mundunga Patrick, Technical Projects Director for the NGO *Invisible Children*. Kampala, Uganda. March 2013.

⁵ Civil Society Task Force, "Letter to President Obama from Civil Society Representatives in LRA-Affected Areas." *Posted on Human Rights Watch website*, 11 November 2011. Accessed 25 November 2011. <<http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/11/letter-president-barack-obama-civil-society-representatives-lra-affected-areas>>

⁶ Civil Society Task Force, "Letter to President Obama from Civil Society Representatives in LRA-Affected Areas."

Invisible Children, deviate little from a historical record of American militarization of the African continent and cultural orientations that promote aiding others”, arguing that:

Invisible Children's collective action is a noncontentious form of activism for privileged young Americans that is unlikely to lead to sustainable social change in Africa or the United States because it sponsors a narrative in which Africa remains an object to be manipulated by outsiders instead of a dynamic context with talented and knowledgeable actors, compelling ideas, and potential resources. The grave implications of this form of activism are misinformed policy and lost opportunities for more comprehensive and ultimately efficacious activism.⁷

She goes on to state that “a lot of the Invisible Children rhetoric is very much continuing a neo-colonial story around Africa as a place primarily of victims that sort of implores Western intervention. It’s obviously much more than that; in fact, that victimhood... is very patronizing and ineffective in terms of how it addresses the issues in northern Uganda.”⁸ Finnegan goes further by claiming that Invisible Children’s impact in the region is marginal, recalling her outrage that Ugandans she encountered were not more outraged at the neo-colonial story being told on their behalf.⁹ In this description of the "white saviour complex" run amok, Invisible Children is reduced to a manifestation of the tragic mobilisation of privileged American youth openly calling for more violence by a belligerent US military in order to "save helpless Africans."¹⁰

While much ire is directed at Invisible Children, however, they, along with Enough Project and Resolve are often described as being US-based lobbying groups that frame the LRA issue in ways that are "weakly connected with the realities" of the conflict, and "in ways that suit their own agendas."¹¹ Branch claims that the C-LRA effort which these groups have so effectively lobbied for represents the culmination of the LRA conflict’s "ascendance in US public consciousness and the consecration of the official discourse on the conflict at the highest levels" and "represents the tragic ascendance of militarism in the US public consciousness."¹² He chastises the three major "American lobbying groups" (Invisible Children, the Enough Project,

⁷ Amy Finnegan, "Beneath Kony 2012: Americans Aligning with Arms and Aiding Others." *Africa Today*, Vol. 59, Iss. 2, Spring 2013, pp. 137-162, 137.

⁸ Amy Finnegan, quoted in Shannon Golden, "Invisible Children and Invisible Ugandans, with Amy Finnegan." *The Society Pages: Social Science That Matters* blog site, 03 April 2012. Accessed 24 March 2013. <<http://thesocietypages.org/specials/finnegan>>

⁹ Amy Finnegan, quoted in Shannon Golden, "Invisible Children and Invisible Ugandans, with Amy Finnegan." *The Society Pages: Social Science That Matters* blog site, 03 April 2012. Accessed 24 March 2013. <<http://thesocietypages.org/specials/finnegan>>

¹⁰ Adam Branch, *Displacing Human Rights*, 238-239.

¹¹ Kristof Titeca and Theophile Costeur, "An LRA For Everyone", 92-93.

¹² Adam Branch, *Displacing Human Rights*, 236.

and Resolve) for "egging on" further militarization and its devastating consequences¹³ by extending an "open invitation to AFRICOM."¹⁴

Given these condemnations of these groups' role, the obvious question turns to assessing the veracity of such claims. Are these groups pushing an agenda divorced from local context onto an unsuspecting population? Are they reinforcing neo-colonial stereotypes that negatively associate Africa with victimhood and chaos? Does their work in fact promote a "new intensification of US military involvement" and ignore emancipatory discourses?¹⁵ Having outlined the thrust of these critiques of civil society actors involved with C-LRA efforts, the following section examines the role of these actors through the lens of hybridity. In doing so, these critical claims are held up against firsthand empirical data collected during fieldwork. An expanded discussion of findings following that will expand on this and challenge these critiques in more direct detail.

5.4 C-LRA Civil Society and the Four-Part Hybridity Framework

It can reasonably be assumed that civil society actors themselves are not (or should not) be involved in coercive activities amidst the work they do. However, they may have an interest in seeking local compliance with their programmes through means of incentivisation, and as collaborators with security forces may unwittingly play a role in the 'top-down' projection of power by external interveners. Furthermore, civil society actors, to the extent that they are a representation of local expression, may be in a unique position to witness the everyday processes of social negotiation that take place, including efforts to resist, subvert, or provide alternatives to hegemonic programming. As such, the following expands on these possibilities by focusing on the civil society aspects of C-LRA within the framework of hybridity.

5.4.1 Coercive Powers

The ability of interveners to impose their prescriptions through coercion is certainly the least relevant component of the four-part model as it relates to C-LRA civil society actors. A few insights were gleaned, however, in conversations where the notion of coercive powers were a guiding theme. One local man underscored the important role the church plays in providing a linkage between outsiders and locals' perception of coercion when he began to complain about feeling like he had "no choice" but to accept the "foreigners" if he wanted his relatives to be kept

¹³ Adam Branch, *Displacing Human Rights*, 229.

¹⁴ Adam Branch, *Displacing Human Rights*, 237.

¹⁵ Adam Branch, *Displacing Human Rights*, 10.

safe and their 'Arrow Boy' activities to be left alone by the task force and state officials.¹⁶ This suggests one potential problem MacGinty associates with the imposition of the liberal peace: the perception that it is “the only game in town.”¹⁷ It should be noted that, upon further discussion, the same man said that he did not feel he was forced by the AU-RTF to accept the security situation, but that the blame for that lied squarely with the LRA, adding that while he felt mistrustful of outsiders for various speculative reasons, he felt confident that his church leaders represented his communities' best interest and ensured accountability from the interveners.¹⁸ Such expressions reveal that rather than C-LRA being imposed as the 'only game in town', the AU-RTF was responsive to the mechanisms of accountability imposed on it by local NGOs and clergy in the interests of local people. As such, civil society actors acted as a bulwark against coercive powers.

In another case where an informant felt “uneasy” about interveners was an American healthcare volunteer who described an atypical encounter with one of the US Special Forces members in the area she spoke to:

We were talking, like I do with those guys from time to time. I really like them [the US advisers], most are really professional and kind, and quick to help us out. But one of them once said to me 'We're here to do a job. If the locals want to help us out, and provide information for us, then we will support these clinics and do what we can. If they don't help me though, I won't help them.' I suddenly felt like this was some kind of back-alley kind of spy ring. I didn't like the way he seemed to imply he saw these people as sources, not as human beings. The assistance was a means to an end, the way he said it. Coerced? No, I wouldn't say [I felt] coerced. I wouldn't say that. But I definitely felt uneasy. Like it was odd, out of place. Most of the Americans [US military advisers] are great, they do a lot for us out here. This guy was new, he had just showed up. Maybe that's what it was, but he wasn't like the others, I didn't care for him.¹⁹

Neither of these examples, even if taken at their worst possible interpretation indicate that coercion is something local NGOs (or the people they represent) deal with regularly. Another NGO worker in Central African Republic relayed through an interpreter that his frustration dealing with outsiders was about a lack of consistent support—either financial or logistical—from their international counterparts, “No I never feel pushed. They ask us, we answer. We ask

¹⁶ Interview with Milton, a local farmer and Arrow Boys militia fighter. Timbiro, South Sudan. April 2013.

¹⁷ Roger MacGinty, “Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace.” *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 41, No. 4, August 2010, pp. 391-412, 403.

¹⁸ Interview with Milton. Timbiro, South Sudan. April 2013.

¹⁹ Interview with Katie, healthcare volunteer with local NGO/medical clinic. Yambio, South Sudan. April 2013.

them, they answer. Nobody interferes. We just make choices.”²⁰ This was a very typical response in LRA-affected areas from both NGOs and clergy.

There were NGOs such as *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF), who from the start politely refused to meet or interact with the AU task force soldiers or be involved in joint-civil society area meetings that routinely took place in South Sudan, citing neutrality.²¹ When asked if that upset the legitimacy of the C-LRA coalition when some groups behaved that way, one US adviser replied “absolutely not. It isn’t personal, but they have their mandate, just as we have ours. They can be neutral and maintain that posture. They have to. It does not diminish our work or theirs. There is enough space to work here for everyone.”²² A local clergyman deeply involved in civil society activities in support of C-LRA essentially agreed, saying “that is something they do. Obviously this is a Western issue. It is not about us [local Zande] here! But we know them, we work with them. They do not attend anything that involves security forces. I disagree, but that is okay. We still welcome their work, of course!”²³

Even these examples are questionable in terms of meeting the criteria for possible coercive strategies employed by any C-LRA actor, civil society or otherwise. There were never any claims of withholding funds if some local NGO did not go along with the global NGOs’ wishes, or any other type of support. The overwhelming response was that there is nothing like coercion occurring, other than in a military sense—that of the LRA fighters and the AU-RTF troops who pursue them.

5.4.2 *Incentivising Powers*

In the context of civil society activities, the most often reported aspect of ‘incentives’ involves the recognition of and response to local problems by regional and global actors. ‘Local’ NGOs and churches in LRA-affected areas do indeed benefit when they are linked with outside systems. Their work receives some funding and material support (although never enough) through such connections, and the rewards are tangibles such as supporting medical clinics with supplies and foreign expertise, enabling support and trauma counselling for LRA victims and former abductees, constructing radio towers for early-warning FM radio broadcasts (there is almost no mobile phone coverage in this region other than near a few populated centres), paying the

²⁰ Interview with Andre, a volunteer with the NGO *Association des victimes de LRA*, Obo, Central African Republic. March 2013.

²¹ See Peter Redfield, *Life in Crisis: The Ethical Journey of Doctors Without Borders*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2013.

²² Interview with Ryan, US Special Forces sergeant. Nzara, South Sudan. April 2013.

²³ Interview with Samuel Peni, Bishop of ECS Diocese. Nzara, South Sudan. April 2013.

meagre salaries of the few staff members, feeding and housing at-risk people often displaced by violence, building schools, improving roads, crafting defection messaging in local languages to inspire LRA fighters and captives to defect to 'safe reporting sites', and many other benefits too numerous to list here. All of these, however, are the not *incentives* in the sense of patronage networks or the bribing of 'locals' to accept an imposed orthodoxy. Rather, they are simply doing what needs to be done, and if outside assistance helps to serve this purpose, then NGOs both foreign and local, and local priests, nuns, and pastors along with Christian missionaries are all achieving their shared goals and enjoying the incentives of transnational linkages enjoyed by the C-LRA effort.

5.4.3 *Local Resistance and Adaptation*

Researching in LRA-affected areas brought forth some interesting responses during discussions thematically centred on the components of the conceptual model of hybridity. One interaction sums this up well. A Zande social worker who counsels female and child victims of LRA violence laughed in response to my inquiry about ways in which she has seen resistance to the efforts of the AU-RTF and outside civil society actors:

Resistance? Resist what? These troops here now are not attacking us, they aren't burning our homes or looting our stores. They aren't pushing us out of our fields and scaring our children. Only those [LRA] criminals have done that. They [The AU-RTF and C-LRA civil society actors] make our people feel safe. They bring help and supplies and funds. They tell our story to the world so that people will understand. You tell me, why would we resist that?²⁴

It should be made clear that civil society actors (local or global) are not constantly satisfied with the status quo. On the contrary, there is always more that needs to be done. The biggest complaint from civil society actors of all stripes is the underfunding of much-needed civilian programmes and inconsistent applications of humanitarian development assistance. All actors praise the effort as a whole, but point to specific improvements that must be addressed.

One contentious issue mentioned in discussions of 'resistance' involved the controversial practice of enlisting former LRA who have defected from the group, into the UPDF. On the one hand, some locals feel "it is wrong to send former LRA members back to areas in which they operated, now as protectors."²⁵ In some instances, former victims of rape are confronted with

²⁴ Interview with Jennifer, Yambio County Social Worker, Yambio, South Sudan. April 2013.

²⁵ Gaétan Zangagoumé, quoted in United Nations IRIN, "Victims Cry Foul Over Uganda's LRA Strategy." *United Nations IRIN website*, 30 October 2012. Accessed 13 May 2013. <<http://www.irinnews.org/report/96666/central-african-republic-victims-cry-foul-over-uganda-s-lra-strategy>>

their former rapist—only now the rapist is a uniformed soldier there to provide security. In reality, the LRA fighter is also a victim himself, and was forced to commit atrocities, as is standard LRA practice to inure captives to committing violent acts.²⁶ On the other hand, some are upset that this LRA-to-UPDF programme only applies to Ugandan Acholi and not to Zande boys and men who have been abducted and feel they would be of useful value as UPDF scouts—especially since there is a significant stigma associated with former LRA captives, as well as a dearth of economic opportunities in their home villages.²⁷

Some respondents expressed 'resistance' by reporting issues they disagreed with or were frustrated by. Most of these, however, were specific complaints rather than a push back against the C-LRA effort itself. If anything, what was 'resisted' was that there was not enough C-LRA activities to go around. In terms of providing reintegration assistance, funds for economic development and medical support for returnees is lacking, as is funds to support trauma counselling for the more remote areas—especially in CAR. When trauma counselling is available in LRA-affected areas, the funds allocated are for women and children, not for men.²⁸ Other complaints are less sensitive in nature but frustrating nevertheless. A Central African man complained after an NGO had “just donated a welder without providing a generator. I do not know how a machine of this kind can operate without a generator in a town without electricity,” lamenting how victims’ needs are often lacking from broader efforts to eradicate the LRA.²⁹ C-LRA military and civil society leaders express regret at these circumstances and insist they are working to address them, but cite lack of funds, the lack of transport, the remoteness of the region, and a lack of prioritising on the part of host governments (South Sudan, CAR, and DRC) to assist in these efforts—leaving it almost entirely up to the AU-RTF’s UPDF, US advisers, and affiliated NGOs and churches to coordinate what assistance can be scrounged up and distributed. Still, none of these issues caused anyone to express the desire for the activities of C-LRA interveners to go away—only that there be more of it, in more places, and soon.

²⁶ Conversations with local civilians during ethnographic fieldwork in South Sudan and Central African Republic. April 2013.

²⁷ Obviously, they are not citizens of Uganda which precludes them from qualifying for UPDF military service, and nobody expressed interest in serving their own national armies—who are rarely paid or equipped with minimal provisions. The practice of taking former LRA fighters into the army is controversial but the Ugandan officials and soldiers to whom I spoke (including former LRA who now serve in the UPDF ranks) insist it is voluntary—and helps toward reconciliation.

²⁸ Interview with Jennifer, Yambio County Social Worker Yambio, South Sudan. April 2013.

²⁹ Gaétan Zangagoumé, quoted in United Nations IRIN, “Victims Cry Foul Over Uganda’s LRA Strategy.” 30 October 2012.

5.4.4 Local Alternatives

This portion of the conceptual model involves how local actors are able to buttress against the 'hegemonic ambitions' of interveners and form alternative practices and policies.³⁰ Keck and Sikkink lauded the potential for transformative interventions through global civil society actors characterised by “principled ideas and values” and working through “transnational advocacy networks” that “challenge traditional notions of sovereignty.”³¹ They argued that these networks can “break the cycles of history” by opening “channels for bringing alternative visions and information into international debate.”³² This concept appears to be at work in the C-LRA efforts that have been spurred internationally by transnational networks that have superseded notions of the Westphalian state. One way in which alternatives are being realised by civil society actors in LRA-affected areas involves the lack of state governance. By definition, civil society exists apart from the state. Yet, for many Zande, there was never much of a 'state' in the first place. Aside from the few local government officials in these areas, and traditional tribal and clan organising, church officials and NGOs tend to be locally understood as the representatives of the *vox populi*.

Thus, the *alternative* being realised is in how local communities (through transnational civil society networks) are engaging with transnational armed forces to enforce human security needs that are largely separate from the political processes of their host countries. Thus, C-LRA intervention is not a 'typical' humanitarian intervention invoking liberal peace norms such as human security or the Responsibility to Protect doctrine in order to initiate regime change or conduct post-conflict statebuilding activities. Rather, C-LRA is an undertaking with narrow focus and limited scope, occurring across three separate states by both military (international and local) and civil society actors (international and local). Whilst military forces are paramount (especially the US and Ugandan forces), three of the four broad C-LRA objectives are achieved in large part by civil society actors (the provision of humanitarian aid, its role in defection messaging and abductee reintegration efforts, as well as the protection of civilians via early-warning networks). The result is an alternative form of politics—a hybridised effort blending civilian and military resources to achieve ambitious but not unrealistic objectives.

³⁰ Roger MacGinty, “Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace.” *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 41, No. 4, August 2010, pp. 391-412, 403.

³¹ See Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.

³² Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, x.

5.5 Expanded Discussion of Findings

The remainder of this chapter will discuss the implications of the findings laid out within the four-part framework and link them to the strands of critique previously mentioned, while expanding on the nature of civil society activities within the sphere of C-LRA efforts.

5.5.1 *Transnational Linkages and a Civil Society Continuum*

As mentioned above, civil society actors involved are often described as either local or global. But even this simplification misses the point. Overuses of discreet categories are problematic in of themselves, as the reality on the ground (as revealed through the 'hybrid lens') is that such dichotomous perspectives overlook what makes current C-LRA approaches so qualitatively different from those that came before. Rather than an overemphasis on 'local' or 'global', the notion of 'transnational networks' is more accurate in describing these civil society actors. Kassimir describes how non-state organisations "establish a physical presence in African localities" and "often become bound up in local processes of governance and in the formulation of representational claims."³³ Such a permanent presence "allows it to be seen both as an international organization with local branches and as a local organization 'networked' globally."³⁴ This is an important point since it relates to C-LRA civil society actors that critics regard as external and foreign. I argue that a transnationally-networked civil society that is rooted in local agency and afforded a significant role in shaping C-LRA activities is the reason for this.

In addition to linking local communities with government and military actors—sometimes holding these institutions accountable for their shortcomings and prompting them to constantly improve, they serve to bridge the global-local divide in a way that provides emancipatory 'voice' to locals and empowers local agency, while keeping the work of foreign-based actors on point and relevant. This idea of C-LRA civil society work as occurring along a transnational continuum is important to understand prior to addressing the previously mentioned critiques in the next section.

³³ Ronald Kassimir, "Producing Local Politics: Governance, Representation and Non-State Organizations in Africa" in *Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa: Global-Local Networks of Power* (Thomas Callaghy, Ronald Kassimir and Robert Latham, eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 93-112, 105.

³⁴ Ronald Kassimir, "Producing Local Politics", 105.

5.5.2 Response to Critiques of C-LRA Civil Society Actors

As mentioned above, many critics suggest that current C-LRA activities (including the advocacy by global civil society actors) represent a danger for locals. Here I will discuss the substance of the above critiques against empirical data collected in the field. I argue that there is in fact very little substantive justification for such condemnation and that perpetuating these simplistic dichotomies risks spreading misconceptions about what is empirically evident and actually taking place.

Titeca and Costeur examine how the LRA issue is framed by state actors and the advocacy NGOs who lobbied for the intervention.³⁵ They do not mention the AU's role and barely acknowledge the local people on whose behalf the intervention is occurring. In their analysis, the LRA issue is dismissed as merely an instrumentalised narrative that can be whatever selective actors want it to be in order to suit their specific political agendas, referring to civil society actors who called for US support of the intervention simply as "American lobbying groups."³⁶ Some suggest that such groups risk developing "within a context of disengagement by the major powers and the privatization of emergency assistance," and often "have contributed inadvertently to the escalation of violence rather than to conflict resolution."³⁷

It is true that the efforts of such groups have reaped significant dividends in terms of garnering bipartisan political support among Washington policymakers. One Republican congressman admitted that "without advocacy NGOs, this would be a forgotten conflict,"³⁸ while a Democratic senator credited her learning of the conflicts directly from "many who have experienced the violence firsthand and others, including many young people, who are determined to make sure these crises get the attention they deserve."³⁹ Although some critics assail their work as a "bizarre moral campaign,"⁴⁰ they often gloss over the nuance that does exist in their reporting.⁴¹

³⁵ See Kristof Titeca and Theophile Costeur, "An LRA for Everyone".

³⁶ See Kristof Titeca and Theophile Costeur, "An LRA for Everyone".

³⁷ Janice Gross Stein, "In the Eye of the Storm: Humanitarian NGOs, Complex Emergencies and Conflict Resolution." *Peace and Conflict Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 1, May 2001, pp. 17-41, 17.

³⁸ US Congressman Ed Royce, quoted in John Prendergast and Don Cheadle, *The Enough Moment*, 167.

³⁹ US Senator Barbara Boxer, quoted in John Prendergast and Don Cheadle, *The Enough Moment*, 228.

⁴⁰ Alan Boswell, "The Failed State Lobby: Inside the Bizarre Moral Campaign by Washington Politicians, NGO Do-Gooders, and Celebrities to Create an Independent South Sudan—Whether it's a Disaster or Not." *Foreign Policy Online*, 9 July 2012. Accessed 15 September 2013. <<http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/07/09/the-failed-state-lobby/>>

⁴¹ Jonathan Hutson, "Alan Boswell's White Whale: Enough Project Responds to Criticism of its South Sudan Advocacy." *Foreign Policy Online*, 25 July 2012. Accessed 15 September 2013. <<http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/07/25/alan-boswells-white-whale/>>

In a book co-authored with film actor Don Cheadle, Enough Project founder John Prendergast expresses “the need to assemble an unusual coalition and force better policies through popular demand”, adding that the “political will for real change will come from the bottom up.”⁴² In fact, their reporting is credited by C-LRA actors as being crucial to spreading detailed information about suspected LRA activities and determining ways in which local agency can be included in an overall unified plan that addresses their needs.⁴³

What is ignored, however, by focusing only on the lobbying efforts, is the work these groups do to support programmes locally to provide support for increased civilian protection, the defection and reintegration of LRA returnees, and improved humanitarian development work in vulnerable communities. Specifically, the Enough Project’s researchers have provided on-the-ground reporting of LRA’s role in ivory poaching in the DRC,⁴⁴ Joseph Kony’s safe haven in the Kafia Kingi enclave (and their support by members of the Sudanese army),⁴⁵ and ongoing assessments of relations between communities and AU task force members⁴⁶ that my own field research confirms. With a relatively small number of staff on the ground, the Enough Project manages to achieve disproportionately successful results in their analysis of C-LRA measures that hold security actors accountable and transnationally link local activities with the broader efforts by the AU-RTF. In addition, these oversimplified critiques ignore local civil society and the remote communities they represent, minimising their agency. While various narratives of the LRA threat certainly have been instrumentalised for some of the very purposes they focus on, this does not change the realities in LRA-affected areas as experienced by local civilian communities. Their experiences should be worthy of inclusion in a discussion that attempts to dismiss the LRA threat as an ‘internally-driven’ US foreign policy lobbying effort.

⁴² John Prendergast and Don Cheadle, *The Enough Moment: Fighting to End Africa’s Worst Human Rights Crimes*. New York, NY: Three Rivers Press, 2010, 16.

⁴³ Numerous conversations with locals and local civil society actors during fieldwork in LRA-affected areas in South Sudan and Central African Republic, April 2013. Interview with Kasper Agger of the Enough Project, Kampala, Uganda, June 2012. Interview with Olaf, US Army Special Forces captain, Yambio, South Sudan, April 2013.

⁴⁴ Kasper Agger and Jonathan Hutson, “Kony’s Ivory: How Elephant Poaching in Congo Helps Support the Lord’s Resistance Army” *The Enough Project website* (published jointly with *Resolve* and *Invisible Children*), June 2013. Accessed 27 November 2013. <<http://www.enoughproject.org/files/KonysIvory.pdf>

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⁴⁵ Paul Ronan, Michael Poffenberger, and Chelsea Geyer, “Hidden In Plain Sight: Sudan’s Harboring of the LRA in the Kafia Kingi Enclave, 2009-2013.” 26 April 2013. Accessed 27 November 2014. <http://www.enoughproject.org/files/HiddeninPlainSight_Sudans_SupporttotheLRA_April2013.pdf>

⁴⁶ Kasper Agger, “Mission in the Balance: Challenges for US Advisors in Helping to End the LRA.” *The Enough Project website*, 24 May 2012. Accessed 27 November 2014. <<http://www.enoughproject.org/files/MissionintheBalanceLRARreport.pdf>>

The way in which many critics never mention the African side of these organisations, preferring to focus on the controversies surrounding their US-based efforts instead, are described by Invisible Children CEO Ben Keeseey as “low hanging fruit.”⁴⁷ Paul Ronan of Resolve calls for a closer examination of the critical backlash for its use of “a set of oft-repeated critiques that make for great soundbites but (for the most part) don’t stand up to closer scrutiny.”⁴⁸ He sums up the shortcomings in such critiques:

Oversimplified explanations and misleadingly selective choices of evidence fail to capture the nuance and messy complexity of these dynamics. Perhaps the same media environment that incentivized advocacy groups to overemphasize the infamy of Kony and the LRA’s brutal tactics has also incentivized critiques that are, ironically, just as oversimplified and bombastic.⁴⁹

He adds that “whatever the cause, such arguments polarize the debate instead of providing a foundation for constructive dialogue”⁵⁰

No other group, however, has drawn such ire and sparked such ferocious debate than the NGO Invisible Children, which affords them a few words. Invisible Children was founded in 2003 by three American documentary filmmakers and a Ugandan woman. That woman, Jolly Grace Okot, a former aid worker who herself had previously been abducted and held captive by the LRA, was later the first Ugandan woman to be nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005 for her work championing women’s and children’s rights.⁵¹ Today she manages the organisation’s many programmes in the region and is widely seen as a reputable leader, and certainly not a foreigner.⁵² Invisible Children’s *Kony 2012* message is undoubtedly an oversimplification of a complex issue—something they readily admit (both their American headquarters staff as well as

⁴⁷ Jessica Testa, “Two Years After Kony 2012, Has Invisible Children Grown Up?” *Buzzfeed.com website*, 9 March 2014. Accessed 29 July 2014. <<http://www.buzzfeed.com/jtes/two-years-after-kony-2012-has-invisible-children-grown-up#.um7l4Knx3>>

⁴⁸ Paul Ronan, “Why We’re Trying to Catch Kony (Among Other Things).” *Inside the LRA Blog: The Resolve website*. 15 May 2014. Accessed 27 September 2014. <<http://www.theresolve.org/2014/05/>>

⁴⁹ Paul Ronan, “Why We’re Trying to Catch Kony (Among Other Things).” *Inside the LRA Blog: The Resolve website*. 15 May 2014. Accessed 27 September 2014. <<http://www.theresolve.org/2014/05/>>

⁵⁰ Paul Ronan, “Why We’re Trying to Catch Kony.”

⁵¹ George Wabweyo, “Jolly Okot; An Irreplaceable Heroine to Northern Uganda.” *New Vision Online*, 02 April 2013. Accessed 04 April 2013. <<http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/641239-.html>>

⁵² Numerous conversations with *Invisible Children* staff during fieldwork in Kampala and Gulu, Uganda. February to May 2013.

the local Ugandans they employ).⁵³ However, so too are the vast array of critical analyses by activist academics just as much an oversimplification of a complex issue.

In fact, Invisible Children has been around locally for over a decade, and their programmes in Uganda and Central Africa have been well-known for many years prior to the *Kony 2012* video. One European researcher with another global advocacy NGO offered his thoughts on the controversy:

Invisible Children rubs many folks the wrong way, no doubt about it. I thought the video was a bit too... fluffy for my preference. I personally did not think it was ideal. This is serious business. But then again, none of us can argue that they haven't been 100% successful at accomplishing their goal of making Kony famous, or infamous. Maybe it has been counterproductive in some ways, sure. But it has also been damn successful. A lot of people just seem to hate them because it was them who are becoming associated with this important movement and not their preferred NGO of choice. I think they [Invisible Children] get a lot of credit for programmes they collaborate on that are unfair compared to groups like mine. Ironically though, that is not what people get so mad about. They are mad because the *Kony 2012* message went viral and IC [Invisible Children] did that. Not them.⁵⁴

Some crucial aspects of their work include the fact that, along with the NGO Resolve, Invisible Children publishes the LRA Crisis Tracker, provides real-time information on LRA threats. They also operate child rehabilitation centres in Uganda (jointly with World Vision International) and in the DRC (jointly with the local *Commission Diocésaine Justice et Paix—CDJP*).⁵⁵ Invisible Children also creates defection messaging leaflets and develops radio programming for 'come home' broadcasts in LRA-affected areas.⁵⁶ In addition, their local activities in Uganda have helped thousands of women to seek small business ownership and employment through their programmes, and their scholarship programme has supported thousands of LRA victims from northern Uganda in their education—all administered by local Ugandan staff.⁵⁷ One Ugandan NGO director acknowledged that while he and many Ugandans did not see or care to see the *Kony 2012* video, which they correctly view as designed for Western audiences, the local work

⁵³ Invisible Children, "Thank You, Kony 2012 Supporters." *YouTube website*, 12 March 2012. Accessed 14 March 2012. < https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cRx8aXaJ_Cs>

See also Interview with Mundunga Patrick, *Technical Projects Director for Invisible Children*, Kampala, Uganda. March 2013.

⁵⁴ Interview with Karl, an LRA researcher with a global advocacy NGO. Gulu, Uganda. March 2013.

⁵⁵ Interview with Ashby Patrick, *DDRRR Officer for Central and East Africa, Invisible Children*. Kampala, Uganda. March 2013.

⁵⁶ Invisible Children, "Current Programs," *Invisible Children website*,

⁵⁷ Interview with Florence Ogola, *Communications Manager, Invisible Children*, Gulu, Uganda. March 2013.

of Invisible Children is very well-known and parallels their own work in many important ways (education, development, reintegration and community reconciliation).⁵⁸

While transnationally-linked NGOs are central to C-LRA efforts, so too is the work of church organisations. Often left out of descriptions by both critics and proponents, they are an invaluable asset to providing an emancipatory local voice.

5.5.3 *The Church and the Global-Local Divide*

In LRA-affected areas, the church plays a significant role in terms of organising followers, being a conduit for matters of vital concern to the communities they serve, and in being innovative in marshalling both local and foreign capabilities to address human needs. Some scholars have sought to examine civil societies in the context of healing ruptured societies after breakdowns and conflicts, seeking ways to safeguard civil society and re-activate modalities of positive civic engagement.⁵⁹ Following from that, religious organisations "often develop public agendas, mobilise followers based on reshaped social identities, and introduce new resources and new mechanisms of non-state governance."⁶⁰ C-LRA relies heavily on the human networks that the clergy maintain across the vast geographical terrain as well as across different denominations and faiths.

Clergy leaders in LRA-affected areas say that since civil society is still weak in Zandeland compared to other areas in the region, the church work hard to fill in these spaces.⁶¹ The highly-publicised (and criticised) international advocacy work surrounding C-LRA is matched by community-level healing programmes where clergy leaders such as Bishop Peni of South Sudan, and other trained facilitators, "lead trauma healing programs in communities that have been affected by the violence."⁶² Peni supports the government's effort for peace, but says the church must be involved as well:

⁵⁸ Interview with Francis Ondoonga, Director of NGO 'Human Rights Focus', Gulu, Uganda, March 2013.

⁵⁹ See Kai J. Jonas and Thomas A. Morton, *Restoring Civil Societies: The Psychology of Intervention and Engagement Following Crisis*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell Press, 2012.

⁶⁰ Ronald Kassimir, "Producing Local Politics: Governance, Representation and Non-State Organizations in Africa" in *Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa: Global-Local Networks of Power* (Thomas Callaghy, Ronald Kassimir and Robert Latham, eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 93-112, 105.

⁶¹ Jesse Zink, "In Sudan, Anglican Bishop Works to End LRA Militia Violence." *Episcopal News Service website*, 16 September 2013. Accessed 25 September 2013.
<<http://episcopaldigitalnetwork.com/ens/2013/09/16/in-sudan-anglican-bishop-works-to-end-lra-militia-violence/>>

⁶² Jesse Zink, "In Sudan, Anglican Bishop Works to End LRA Militia Violence."

When there is no peace, that means we can't have Christians in the church, that means we can't have prayers going on. For the church to be involved in peace efforts—at both the international and local levels—is simply what it means to be the church: The role of the church is to advocate for a peaceful environment, a peaceful community. Where there is hatred, where there is fighting, our role as the church is to go there and make peace.⁶³

Moreover, Evangelical Christians from the US are linked inexorably to locals in a variety of ways, both in terms of American clergy periodically visiting and sponsoring the work of their counterparts in far-flung communities in Zandeland, as well as in linkages through popular culture that helps recruit the West's faithful to assist in regional efforts. One sensational example of these linkages and controversial peacemaking practices is the subject of the 2011 film 'Machine Gun Preacher', which tells the story of Reverend Sam Childers, an American criminal-turned-Evangelical minister, and his exploits in rescuing children from Kony's rebels while engaging in combat against LRA fighters in then-southern Sudan alongside the SPLA. Today, Childers lives in Uganda and operates several businesses and children's orphanages there and in South Sudan, and is close to several Ugandan and South Sudanese officials—including Uganda's President Museveni.⁶⁴ Whilst there has been some condemnation of Childers over the issue of reconciling his unconventional (and sometimes violent) actions against the LRA with ethical humanitarian work and with professed Christian principles,⁶⁵ many of the former abductees he rescued and now employs laud him as a man of action and strong faith.⁶⁶ However one may view these issues, both the Hollywood film and the real-life 'Machine Gun Preacher' on which the movie is based represent the significant draw that this narrative has on inspiring young Evangelicals—both African and American—to involve themselves in helping to address the LRA conflict and deal with its aftermath.

Moreover, the role of religion is not limited to the good intentions of foreigners. In South Sudan, when asked about how he reconciles his Christian faith with the activities of the Arrow Boys self-defence groups, one local clergy leader recalled the role he and some of his colleagues have played in organising their communities for self-defence (as discussed in the previous chapter):

⁶³ Bishop Samuel Peni, quoted in Jesse Zink, "In Sudan, Anglican Bishop Works to End LRA Militia Violence."

⁶⁴ Interview with Sam Childers, Kampala, Uganda. February 2013. See also Telephone interview with Lt. Gen. Nathan Mugisha, UPDF (retired). Kampala, Uganda. May 2013.

⁶⁵ See Dave Gilson, "The Machine Gun Preacher: Saint or Scoundrel?" *Mother Jones Online*, 23 September 2011. Accessed 30 May 2012. <<http://www.motherjones.com/mixed-media/2011/09/sam-childers-machine-gun-preacher>> See also Mark Moring, "Machine Gun Preacher Under Heavy Fire," *Christianity Today*, 22 September 2011.

⁶⁶ Discussions with security personnel employed by Sam Childers' company, *MGP Security*, during ethnographic fieldwork, Kampala, Uganda. February 2013.

You ask as if there is a difference. But you see, I am them and they are me. We are all Zande people, some of us may be more educated than others. Some may be farmers or diggers or pastors or teachers, and this an issue I cannot raise around some Westerners especially, but we are with them [the Arrow Boys]. We take weapons, we go to the bush. As a religious man, I will reject violence at every turn—but when evil is brought to us, we will act, and I would be a hypocrite if I did not protect my flock as it is said in the Book of John.⁶⁷

This is to illustrate that one does not have to be a so-called 'white saviour' from the West in order to flip conventional conceptions of appropriate roles on their head—in this case, local clergy leaders who feel as a last resort they must take up arms if necessary and lead their communities to be responsible for their own safety if official state institutions will not. For the most part, however, this type of action is not the norm, and the role of the clergy in LRA-affected areas is in facilitating communication and mediating contentious issues in everyday life. In this way, the church provides a local voice in response to difficult circumstances. By contrast, church representation from the Global North should not be viewed as a separate entity from local church—but they provide much-needed human and material assistance, in this way also illustrating the role of transnational linkages to address human insecurity.

The preceding sections have sought to bolster the empirical data presented in this chapter and expand on the nature of civil society activity within the sphere of the C-LRA mission.

5.6 Conclusion

Carothers reminds us that “transnational civil society is much like domestic civil society... it carries the potential to reshape the world in important ways, but one must not oversell its strength or idealize its intentions.”⁶⁸ Indeed, the role of civil society in C-LRA is controversial, yet appears to yield some positive and emancipatory results. This and the previous chapter have sought to provide a grossly underrepresented viewpoint largely missing from current scholarship on the LRA issue: That there are reasonable voices who acknowledge that while misgivings over US military aid to Uganda are entirely understandable, some form of military intervention is necessary to protect LRA-affected civilians—provided it is in the appropriate form and only a component of a broader overall strategy. Civil society actors appear optimally placed give these activities a fair chance and to ensure these efforts are both locally legitimate and effective.

The following (final) chapter culminates the empirical findings of this research with a final comprehensive analysis and concluding discussion.

⁶⁷ Interview with local Anglican clergyman (who asked to not be quoted by name on this matter), Yambio, South Sudan. April 2013 (presumably he was referring to the Bible's New Testament, John 10:14).

⁶⁸ Thomas Carothers, “Civil Society: Think Again.” *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1999-2000, pp. 18-29, 28.

CHAPTER SIX: Final Analysis and Conclusion

6.1. Introduction

It has been said that solid research should satisfy the twin criteria of first, being "important in the real world," and second, it must make a "specific contribution to an identifiable scholarly literature."¹ The contribution in terms of real world relevance is to provide a much-needed understanding of how C-LRA is lived and experienced by the range of actors involved--and most importantly *by locals themselves*--which so far have received little attention from scholars. The other contribution that this thesis makes is in its employment of the conceptual framework of hybridity, which is utilised as a guide in both gathering and analysing empirical data involving power relations.

The following section provides an overview of the key findings of this research gleaned from across the three previous empirical chapters. The section after that will link Mac Ginty's conceptual model directly with the subsidiary research questions I posed in Chapter Two. The next section then discusses the utility of the hybridity concept itself, after which I will discuss the broader implications of this research. Finally, some areas for future research that have been gleaned from earlier sections will be discussed prior to my conclusion.

6.1.2 Key Findings

RQ 1: Using Mac Ginty's hybridity model in order to better understand the dynamics of power and agency in this case, what kind of 'hybrid peace' or 'hybrid politics' has emerged at this point in time?

- Hybridity reveals vast qualitative differences between C-LRA activities occurring in Central Africa, and the US-Ugandan security relationship, with the former being bottom-up in nature and largely retaining local power and agency, and the latter characterised by top-down hegemonic forces that stifle resistance and emancipatory potential.
- Within Uganda, there is a major qualitative difference temporally, between the UPDF's brutality in the past during the LRA insurgency in northern Uganda, and its current configuration of inspiring local legitimacy characterised by its professionalism and adaptability while it is deployed outside its borders as part of the AU-RTF.
- The hybrid lens highlights the role of civil society actors under both contexts: In C-LRA, civil society actors are empowered and vital in establishing and maintaining transboundary linkages between locals and external networks. In Uganda, civil society is

¹ Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994, 15.

instrumentalised as a patronage network, is symptomatic of the increasingly authoritarian nature of the regime, and belies contradictory donor agendas.

- The level of policy attention and the scope of the intervention's objectives correlates with the resilience and adaptability of locals and the less powerful: The totalising agenda associated with a higher level of policy attention reproduces hegemony and stifles local agency, while the far less ambitious and limited goals linked with a lower level of policy attention are not only more realistic in their accomplishment, but they allow locals to retain a degree of power and agency.

6.2. MacGinty's Four-Part 'Hybrid Peace' Conceptual Model

This section is intended to provide a brief overview of the findings of previous empirical chapters, and describes how they may be taken together thematically linked to each of the model's four component parts, which again are:

1. The compliance power of the liberal peace, or the ability of liberal peace agents, networks, and structures to compel others to follow its instructions.
2. The incentivising power of the liberal peace, or the ability of liberal peace agents, networks, and structures to incentivise others to follow its wishes.
3. The resistance of local actors, or the ability of local actors, networks, and structures to resist, ignore, subvert, and adapt liberal peace interventions.
4. The alternatives provided by local actors, or the ability of local agents, networks, and structures to provide alternatives and modifications to the liberal peace.²

6.2.1. Coercive Strategies of Powerful Actors

RQ 2: To what extent and to what effect are compliance powers employed?

Mac Ginty states that liberal peace promoters are "able to mobilise a formidable suite of compliance mechanisms to encourage conformity and discipline attempts at deviance".³ These mechanisms vary, and include but are not limited to direct force, and can include "binding relationships predicated on Western...norms" as well as "the co-option of local actors as agents," which means that "in many cases, the management of compliance is devolved from the international to the national to the local."⁴ Taken outside of the liberal peace paradigm, however, the ability to coerce remains just as important to assessing the agency of disparate actors among whom power is distributed asymmetrically, whether it produces positive or negative effects.

Inside Uganda, the ability of powerful actors to coerce is self-evident, as the government deploys a wide range of compliance mechanisms to ensure that the regime is not politically

² Roger MacGinty, *International Peacebuilding*, 77-78.

³ Roger MacGinty, "Hybrid Peace", 398.

⁴ Roger MacGinty, "Hybrid Peace", 399.

challenged while ensuring that the donor support the regime relies so heavily upon is also maintained. The most obvious compliance mechanism is that of direct force, which it occasionally does employ in response to perceived challenges to its authority. The UPDF does not function as a national army as civil-military relations are typically conceptualised in the West. Rather, it operates as an instrument of presidential power. This direct control, cemented through family members and loyal associates in key positions, ensures that the monopoly on violence remains in the Museveni family.

Despite the presence of elections, opposition political parties, and an ostensibly free media that helps to assuage the preferences of Western donors, the capacity of the executive to 'encourage conformity and discipline attempts at deviance' only grows. The provision of basic public services in many regions is predicated on proven NRM loyalty. At a higher level, the hybrid lens reveals another point regarding the ability to coerce or gain compliance inherent in the US-Ugandan partnership, where a global superpower appears unable or unwilling to reign in the increasing authoritarian behaviour of its regional proxy. The regime's capacity to apply 'reverse leverage' vis-à-vis donor states continues unchecked, due to its employing a host of "image management strategies" that situate Ugandan militarism within the rubric of US regional interests.⁵

Ironically, the willingness to employ brutal methods, which has long characterised the UPDF domestically, is largely lacking from its current operations in Central Africa. The C-LRA intervention is a case that arguably falls outside of the liberal peace paradigm as well, although in another direction. In Central Africa, AU forces have established a locally legitimate peace that has been effective not only at protecting civilians from the LRA, but empowering these locals to define their own security interests and play an active role in achieving them. The role of civil society actors has been instrumental in mediating the demands of locals with the mandate of the task force, and neither locals nor civil society groups are co-opted to work toward hegemonic prescriptions, but that they themselves ascribe the parameters of success and failure. Other than the obvious military operations conducted in the bush against the LRA itself, coercive force is lacking in C-LRA, and compliance appears to give way to mutual tolerance and negotiation.

⁵ See Jonathan Fisher, "International Perceptions and African Agency: Uganda and its Donors 1986-2010." *PhD Thesis*, University of Oxford, 2011.

6.2.2. *Incentivising Strategies of Powerful Actors*

RQ 3: To what extent and to what effect are incentivising powers employed?

It has been said that incentivisation can be a contentious concept depending on the context, and can represent the positive potential of the liberal peace's political ambitions, while at the same time representing social distortions through rewards which can be "illusory and unevenly shared."⁶ In the case of C-LRA and the US-Ugandan security partnership, we find divergent conceptions of incentives and the manner in which they are produced and distributed.

According to Mac Ginty, "through a positive lens, reinforcing statehood can enable widespread social improvement: protecting and promoting human rights, ensuring the widespread provision of public goods, and establishing a bureaucracy capable of managing democratic transitions," adding that "democratic governance can help promote responsibility and the civic virtues that may prevent conflict recidivism".⁷ In Uganda, however, the hybrid lens reveals that existing forms of donor support that strengthen and 'build the capacity' of the state should be seen through a definitively negative light. Various strategies have been employed by the NRM regime to "build its power base by creating vertical relations between the centre and the regions. In the process, horizontal relations between societal actors have been suppressed or constrained".⁸ Additionally, civil society in Uganda is largely donor-driven, and instead of garnering popular support from the population, is instrumentalised as a form of patronage which Branch calls a "terrain of entrenched corruption" that is "not voluntary but professional, does not have the active participation of citizens, and is not egalitarian but is restricted to those who have the requisite connections".⁹ Incentivising strategies employed by Uganda's government domestically serve as a means for maintaining authoritarian repression, increasing corruption, ignoring popular needs, and exacerbating insecurity as state resources are often misused for the purposes of regime protection.

The C-LRA intervention does involve incentives, but in what appears to be a positive manner free of coercive implications, and without relying primarily on existing state structures. While many Zande were initially sceptical, especially given the dire consequences of military operations against the LRA prior to 2011, and the desperate historical situation among the Acholi of northern Uganda, they were receptive to international assistance, while being largely

⁶ Roger Mac Ginty, "Hybrid Peace", 401.

⁷ Roger MacGinty, "The Hybrid Peace", 400.

⁸ Aili Mari Tripp, *Museveni's Uganda*, 111.

⁹ Adam Branch, *Displacing Human Rights*, 145.

mistrustful of their own state apparatus. Confronting the LRA with requisite force is arguably the primary incentive. Additional incentives associated with the AU intervention include the proposition that traditional Zande norms would not be disturbed, while access to humanitarian aid, education, and economic development via improved transportation and communication networks would be increased--as would assistance in reintegrating LRA abductees.¹⁰ Civil society actors, as well as the local civilians whom they represent, appear to have only benefitted from additional resources to help their far-flung communities subsist. Rather than being in exchange for accepting unwanted military presence, the military presence is largely viewed as an incentive itself, as it represents a shift away from the chaos instigated by Kony's LRA since the late 2000s. The incentives at play here are voluntary, non-binding, and with no apparent 'strings' attached.

6.2.3. *Ability of Local Actors to Resist and Adapt*

RQ 4: To what extent and to what effect are local actors resisting and adapting?

As MacGinty reminds us, "the power to resist will vary according to context, and in some contexts exogenous actors, networks and structures will dominate, leaving minimal room for local agency", whereas in others "local actors may be capable of considerable autonomous action".¹¹ The degree to which the less powerful actors are able to resist the imposition of external or unaccountable forms of political will varies significantly between Uganda and in LRA-affected areas.

In Uganda, very illiberal form of hybrid politics is taking place. The vast patronage networks and power structures of the NRM regime continue to dominate the political space, allowing very little room for the less powerful to resist or subvert these networks and structures. As Western donor aid (including US security assistance) has steadily increased since taking power in 1986, the NRM regime has been characterised by decreased political freedoms, criminalisation of opposition parties, a weakening of the judiciary and legislature, and an expansion of executive power with direct control over an expanded military presence.¹² Dissent is not tolerated other than within the arbitrary and ill-defined confines of protest allowed by the regime. Moreover, this dominance of regime power extends over civil society in Uganda, where it has become

¹⁰ One direct incentive worth mention is the \$5 million reward for the capture of Joseph Kony announced by the US during the spring of 2013. See John Kerry, "More Work to Bring War Criminals to Justice." *Huffington Post Online*, 03 April 2013. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/johnkerry/war-crimes-rewards-program_b_3007049.html>

¹¹ Roger MacGinty, "The Hybrid Peace", 402.

¹² Aili Mari Tripp, *Museveni's Uganda*, 36-37.

essentially a foreign-funded "grand act for donors" which does not draw its political support from the population, and offers little or no chance for any substantive political reform.¹³

Also crucial here is "the extent to which traditional or indigenous structures and norms... are intact".¹⁴ Decades of civil conflict have contributed heavily to a breakdown of traditional structures and norms in northern Uganda, particularly in Acholi society, where forms of psychological and cultural debilitation characterising "the weakening or disappearance of what people considered their traditional practices, but also to the adoption of new [hybrid] practices, which were at odds with and made a return to pre-conflict social relations more difficult."¹⁵ This of course should be seen as situated within the larger context of how the Ugandan regime enforces a top-down form of hegemony, and an explicitly negative hybrid configuration.

Comparatively, we find a vastly different form of hybridity emerging in C-LRA, where locals are able to adapt to exogenous forces rather advantageously. Perhaps most importantly, C-LRA is not an expansive undertaking linked with the agenda of the liberal peace (or more troubling illiberal variants). Its narrow focus and limited scope render it achievable, tolerable, and even desirable among local actors, who are able to exercise a fair degree of agency. An important factor associated with local ability to resist, subvert and adapt includes "the extent to which local actors retain power..., the extent to which external actors are dependent on local actors".¹⁶ In LRA-affected areas, the agency of locals is prioritised to a major extent by AU-RTF, which has the effect of making the C-LRA effort not only acceptable to local Zande, but welcomed. Civil society actors that operate there along the local-regional-global spectrum play a vital role in giving an amplified voice to expressions of local autonomy. These groups are comprised mostly of local Zande people, and their legitimacy necessitates that their work for and with the AU-RTF be viewed as transparent, honest, and accountable. In this way, external intervening forces (both military and civil society) depend on local Zande to an enormous degree. Through these localised networks of NGOs, churches, and Zande tribal kinship structures (which include the mobilisation of the Arrow Boys self-defence groups in some areas), local actors retain power through indigenous social structures that remain largely intact.

¹³ Adam Branch, *Displacing Human Rights*, 146.

¹⁴ Roger MacGinty, "The Hybrid Peace", 402.

¹⁵ Chris Dolan, *Social Torture*, 171

¹⁶ Roger MacGinty, "The Hybrid Peace", 402.

6.2.4. *Ability of Local Actors to Provide Alternatives*

RQ 5: To what extent and to what effect are local actors providing alternatives?

During external interventions by powerful actors, hegemonic ambitions "attempt, often successfully, to minimise the space for alternative versions of peace, development, security and governance," thereby promoting the "perception that it is the 'only game in town'".¹⁷ The potential for a radically transformative bottom-up politics depends on the extent to which the subaltern is able to withstand such external ambitions and offer something other than the imposed order.

Since the LRA insurgency in Uganda ended a decade ago, the imminent threat of violent attack (by either the LRA or the UPDF) no longer remains. However, northern Uganda is still characterised by forms of structural violence in the form of unequal access to basic public services such as healthcare, energy, education, and employment opportunities, are severely limited and dependent on support of the NRM. Perhaps ironically, the inability of this large segment of Ugandan society to provide alternatives to the status quo is at the heart of the mutual discontent between the Acholi and Museveni's NRM, and thus, at the root of the LRA conflict itself.

It is worth noting that although substantially supported by foreign donors economically, politically and militarily, a peaceful transition of state power has yet to take place in a postcolonial Uganda. Regardless of geographic region or ethnic identity, the ability of the less powerful to provide alternatives is so stifled in Uganda that President Museveni's very political identity exudes the notion that his leadership is the 'only game in town', and political alternatives are not only dangerous, they are not an option. While democratic structures formally exist, they are co-opted to such a degree that any substantive challenge to the status quo is deemed a threat to national security and subsequently criminalised and dismantled--all justified as managing public order.

In stark contrast, the hybrid lens reveals that the ability of locals in LRA-affected areas to provide alternatives to top-down, hegemonic order remains intact. When traditional practices were unable to counter the destructive effects of LRA encroachment into Zandeland, locals there then began to express their desire for an alternative, most often via civil society networks since state structures were not responsive. Moreover, these locals sought an alternative to the chronic instability that accompanied past C-LRA efforts in Uganda's Acholiland. Any lauded

¹⁷ Roger MacGinty, "The Hybrid Peace", 403.

'population-centric' approach by the AU-RTF is the result of the agency and power of local people that demanded an external response to assist them with what they view as an externally generated problem. Thus, current (post-2011) C-LRA efforts represent locals' preferred alternative to both the LRA threat and the botched military responses that initially accompanied it. The inclusive bottom-up partnership with external actors occurring today is a far cry from the 'social torture' experienced by the Acholi, and incongruent with the dire prognoses assumed by many activist scholars when the new phase of C-LRA began.

Perhaps what is most interesting is that the emancipatory hybridity of C-LRA is enabled and carried out by UPDF soldiers who are supported by the US military. Meanwhile, inside of Uganda, the UPDF is also supported by the US military and are propagating an explicitly negative hybridity to substantially illiberal ends. As to why this sharp contrast exists, my argument is that the primary causal factor for this difference is the institutional level at which parameters are established and priorities are set. At a higher level, the priorities may become far-removed from localised conceptualisations, and can remain rooted in hegemonic narratives (such as the Global War on Terror). However, as this research indicates, when those parameters are narrow and local agency prioritised, even armed forces can provide alternatives to the hegemonic prescriptions emanating from higher-level policymakers.

6.3. Expanded Discussion of Hybridity as Conceptual Framework

RQ 6: In what ways does this research contribute to a more refined understanding of hybridity's utility, both as a critical lens, and its potential as a desired normative framework for future interventions?

The following section discusses the conceptual framework of hybridity in its two forms mentioned in Chapter Two, that of a critical lens (which has been the way I have employed hybridity in this research), as well as the notion of a prescriptive hybridity as a desired political objective that can shape or guide policy action.

6.3.1. Hybridity's Utility as a Critical Lens

Hybridity as I have borrowed it here, has been used as a guide with which to collect data, and a tool to critically analyse and better understand how power and agency is distributed among actors across the global-local spectrum in an under-studied multinational intervention of limited scope. This necessitates a focus on hybridity not as a thing to be attained, but rather as a *process* of social negotiation to be studied and critically examined. In this way, hegemonic assumptions and other forms of bias may be avoided in favour of a nuanced understanding of

how various actors view themselves and the rest of the actors in relation to one another, and how they characterise the forms of politics and peace that result from their interactions.

The utility of hybridity as critical lens goes beyond gaining empirical data to inform the social sciences, and is valuable in its ability to highlight the less powerful and disadvantaged local, whose disenfranchisement and dehumanisation too often characterises international interventions in the Global South. Indeed, many academics now explicitly reject acquiescence to the established conservative orthodoxy that takes existing social orders for granted, and wish their work to contribute toward the transformative improvement of the people and institutions they study (and rightfully so). According to Jackson, a shift in analytical focus toward *resistance* is badly in need, one which has "the potential to re-focus the field on local agency and priorities, local and everyday forms of peace, the role of power dynamics in conflict and peace, structural violence, solidarity, antiviolence and social justice."¹⁸ Hence, methodologies and practices that highlight where and how power asymmetries and forms of resistance occur are potentially vital to such inquiries. As this research demonstrates, the hybrid lens captures the frustrated efforts of the less powerful in Uganda, whose efforts at resistance or largely clamped down upon by economic power, ethnic division, sheer force

One must bear in mind that hybrid politics, and the hybrid peace, are imperfect and ongoing, with variable results, whose value lies in its ability to improve understandings of these ongoing, imperfect processes. Oliver Richmond has identified a dilemma inherent in hybridity whereby "the power relations that circulate through these encounters, and the political structures that arise" reveal a tension between hybridity's negative forms on one hand, "in which structural violence and inequality remain," and its positive forms on the other which allow for "social justice and a contextual form of progressive politics".¹⁹ In order to illustrate the point that the critical hybrid lens can reveal negative or positive forms of hybridity, I have made reference throughout this thesis to the stark contrast between the negative type of hybridity occurring inside of Uganda, a militarised semi-authoritarian state that spawned the LRA conflict and has employed various image management strategies to continue donor support and maintain regime power versus the positive or emancipatory type of hybridity occurring in LRA-affected areas in the tri-border region where the AU-RTF operates. Thus, a hybrid peace is not inherently either good or

¹⁸ Richard Jackson, "How Resistance Can Save Peace Studies." *Journal of Resistance Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2015, pp. 18-49, 18.

¹⁹ Oliver P. Richmond, "The Dilemmas of a Hybrid Peace: Negative or Positive?" *Cooperation and Conflict* (published online), June 2014, pp. 1-19, 5. Accessed 1 October 2014.
<<http://cac.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/06/11/0010836714537053.full.pdf+html>>

bad. It can be one or the other, and in many cases it can be both, depending on the point of view. Hybridity, or the hybrid peace, or hybrid politics can produce all sorts of conclusions depending on the questions one asks when employing the concept, but does so in a manner that captures the attitudes and opinions as well as the power and agency of actors, wherever they fall on the spectrum of power. Simply put, hybridity describes what *is*. With this data, one can make then analytical judgments about how to characterise the political or social situation under study, and then address issues or raise further questions, from either an academic or practical policy standpoint.

Robert Cox credited Gramsci with taking over from Machiavelli "the image of power as a centaur: half man, half beast, a necessary combination of consent and coercion".²⁰ If a principal objective of critical theory is to transcend the existing order and "clarify the range of possible alternatives",²¹ then employing hybridity to determine the loci of power and to what end it is wielded holds enormous transformative potential to serve the interests of alternative orders and ultimately, of emancipatory peace. The employment of hybridity as a critical lens brings this notion of power sharply into focus, illustrating the figurative man and beast duality alluded to above by Machiavelli, Gramsci, and Cox--that which is consensual, and that which is coercive. Moreover, such distinctions allow us to identify problematic areas, test assumptions and may provide cues to follow in order to provide viable alternatives to existing orders. Hybridity is an analytical tool able to span the Coxian dichotomy--that is, it is effective as a lens to determine how externally led liberal peace interventions are received and how they may be adjusted within the accepted parameters of the status quo, as well as being a critical lens that can stimulate alternative and counter-hegemonic programming that radically alters existing orders.

In sum, the hybrid lens should be seen as a constructive conceptual tool with which to understand relations of power in various political forms, critique the assumptions of hegemonic programming, and highlight the role of individual (local) agency in hybrid politics. The potential applications of hybridity-as-critical lens elsewhere are many and a few suggestions will be offered further below.

²⁰ Robert W. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 2, Summer 1983, pp. 162-175, 167.

²¹ Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders" in *Approaches to World Order* (Robert W. Cox and Timothy Sinclair, eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 85-123, 90.

6.3.2. Potential for Hybridity as a Prescriptive Policy Guide

Given the usefulness and utility of the hybrid lens as a critical conceptual tool, it may be tempting to view it as a normative concept to be applied prescriptively. As Peterson notes, "the supposed transformative power of hybridity has... highlighted the revolutionary or emancipatory promise of hybridised forms of peace and development".²² This rhetoric of "hybridity as progress" has fostered hope in some who suggest it offers an alternative to the hegemonic discourses of liberalism.²³ Such a notion, however, is fraught with potential problems.

As mentioned previously, both positive and negative types of hybridity occur, ranging from constructive to destructive in terms of effect, similarly to Richmond's description of the gradations of the liberal peace associated with external intervention (hyper-conservative, conservative, orthodox, and emancipatory).²⁴ Since Richmond provides a description of what a positive hybridity and an emancipatory form of peace would look like, interveners could conceivably work backwards from there and construct an intentional hybridity that affords optimum local agency. If interveners prioritise a locally legitimate peace, and provide support to achieving it, the chances of success are far better than if they prioritise a host of objectives amenable to the external parties, which are surely to provoke resistance and alternatives to such objectives. However, a hybrid peace or a hybrid politics are not in of themselves positive or emancipatory, and are dependent on the priorities and behaviours of intervention programmers, and as such a positive and emancipatory result is not a given.

The C-LRA effort is an international intervention designed to bring some external set of solutions to a local problem, occurring in an area plagued by poor or little governance. However, this is in response to what locals have long called for through their transnationally-linked local civil society actors that lobby foreign governments. Still, since the goals of C-LRA are limited in scope and do not involve governance reforms, structural adjustments, privatisation, or most other technical prescriptions of the liberal peace, an emancipatory type of intervention characterised by a positive form of hybridity suddenly appears achievable. While this underscores the problematic nature of the flawed assumptions, ideals, and practices associated with liberal peace that are discussed elsewhere, it also points to the problem of associating the positive and emancipatory forms of hybrid politics with the liberal peace at all. This is a very important point that will be discussed further below, but for the purposes of a prescriptive hybrid

²² Jenny H. Peterson "A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity", 16.

²³ Jenny H. Peterson "A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity", 16.

²⁴ Oliver P. Richmond, *The Transformation of Peace*, 217.

approach to intervening, the evidence here suggests that the positivity of the intervention is inversely proportionate to the scope of its objectives.

Another problem associated with unequal power and an intervener invoking hybridity is the employment of "languages and technologies that imply that local actors are themselves central in their own underdevelopment and insecurity".²⁵ In this way, pointing to hybridity allows a powerful actor to justify their actions with a 'blame the victim' narrative, which can be instrumentalised to mask underlying intentions and sustain unequal underdevelopment.²⁶ This is essentially the line of argument that Adam Branch and other critics of C-LRA make, in which the narratives that invoke ideals such as protection of civilians, human security, and humanitarianism may be instrumentalised with the intention of extending militarised control over a given population, geographical area or political space.²⁷ What is likely, of course, is that hybridity would be invoked as yet another common refrain to mask hidden agendas and justify hegemonic actions, as Branch argues has taken place when human security or the responsibility to protect doctrine have been invoked.

As a 'selling point,' hybridity can suit the powerful quite well. Peterson poses the question, "Is it possible that dominant liberal institutions will point to their use and acceptance of hybridity as a defence against some of the charges of neocolonialism and ideological self-interest directed against them?," answering that "the increased use of 'hybrid peace operations' and 'hybrid courts' and promises of 'local partnership' likewise hint at the trend towards hybridisation as a badge worn by those seeking greater legitimacy".²⁸ While C-LRA may provide a counterexample (with the caveat of limited objectives and being de-linked with the often more ambitious agenda of the liberal peace), the notion of prescriptive hybridity, as a desired political objective should be avoided. To do so would be to miss the point entirely of what brings about a positive hybridity, which could be described as a "reflexive" or "emancipatory version of peace".²⁹ As Peterson reminds us, and as this research agrees, hybridity is *not* progress, but hybridity *can* be progress. Rather than it equating to progressive political forms, hybridity affords an opportunity for progress inasmuch as it provides a contextual picture that can be acted upon in various ways. How actors choose to respond determines the resulting type of peace.

²⁵ Jenny H. Peterson "A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity", 17.

²⁶ See Mark Duffield, "Global Civil War: The Non-Insured, International Containment and Post-interventionary Society." *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2008, pp. 145-146.

²⁷ See Adam Branch, "The Paradoxes of Protection: Aligning Against the Lord's Resistance Army." *African Security*, Vol. 5, Iss. 3-4, December 2012, pp. 160-178

²⁸ Jenny H. Peterson "A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity", 17.

²⁹ Oliver P. Richmond, *The Transformation of Peace*, 197.

6.3.3. *Employing the Hybrid Lens: Opportunities and Challenges*

While hybridity may seek to avoid "the limitations of reductionism and parsimony"³⁰ and be seen as a remedy for dichotomous or essentialist thinking, the concept is itself subject to critique for potentially falling into similar intellectual trappings. Peterson acknowledges that hybridity's necessity to "essentialise groups (both the local and the external) in order to engage in analysis of the hybrid" is problematic. Spivak refers to what she calls "strategic essentialisms" which can serve to level the impact of imposed global homogeneity³¹ and justify "the need to categorise, and thus, essentialise, a particular subject based on the need to bring an area to light".³² According to Cox, the starting point for the "contemplation of undivided reality" is "some division of reality, usually dictated by convention".³³

However, this need to in some way divide reality and essentialise as a starting point is in part necessary in order to produce analytical clarity. Moreover, with the focus of Mac Ginty's four-part model being on ongoing processes rather than on the actors per se, as well as local bottom-up forces having equal weight with hegemonic top-down forces, the problems acknowledged above can be overcome. Peterson adds:

The issue of essentialising and the methodological problems entailed in relation to this critique... are worth raising here to point out that the possibility of greater nuance and clarity through the use of hybridity are not guaranteed, as analysts must still make assumptions and judgments on categorisations that could skew findings in the same way that binaries and universals often do. This... suggest[s] the need for greater methodological clarity. Researchers interested in exploring hybridity need to consider carefully who or what they seek to analyse and more carefully justify the use of that actor.³⁴

In the preceding chapters, categories and actors have been selected according to what can be gleaned about the phenomenon under study in a coherent and consistent manner. For example, in Chapter Four I categorised the AU-RTF's security forces (UPDF, FARDC, FACA and SPLA) as discrete groupings since they are recognised as being such by all actors and doing so leads to useful and relevant empirical data, whereas focusing instead on various units within each of these national security forces (how some performed objectively better than others, the differing skill sets and tasks assigned to these sub-units, etc.) was not sufficient to enhance the

³⁰ Oliver P. Richmond, "The Dilemmas of a Hybrid Peace: Negative or Positive?" *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2015, pp. 50-68, 52.

³¹ Brian Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffis, *Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts*. Abingdon: Routledge Press, 2000, 79.

³² Jenny H. Peterson "A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity", 14.

³³ Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders", 85

³⁴ Jenny H. Peterson "A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity", 13-14.

research. When discussing civil society actors in Chapter Five, I categorised actors as either clergy or NGOs, and either global, regional, or local in nature, since doing so was essential to understanding the dynamics at work in terms of who was exercising power and agency and at what level. Thus, going too far or not far enough in decisions to categorise and essentialise can lead to analytical obscurity, rather than clarity. Sharpening the analytical focus where it needs to be is accomplished through adherence to the research objectives and operationalisation of concepts.

With the discussion of hybridity concluded and the primary set of research questions answered, I now move on to the secondary or tertiary set of research questions, that of the broader implications gleaned from this research.

6.4. Broader Implications of Thesis Findings

RQ 7: What are the implications of these findings on broader issues involving the militarisation of US-Africa policy, the emerging security-development nexus, forms of online issue-advocacy, as well challenges involving traditional IR assumptions about the liberal peace and the state?

6.4.1. The Militarisation of US-Africa Policy: The US Africa Command (AFRICOM)

- While the US Africa Command increasingly appears to be the preferred policy instrument of the US government in Africa, its effects on the continent are as authoritarian or emancipatory as the level of policy attention directing its varied activities. This level of attention matters, as seen in the divergent priorities and policy level between C-LRA and US military aid to Uganda.

Given the increased attention toward Africa and the creation of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM), the US-Uganda security relationship and the C-LRA mission reveal much about the US military role in Africa. The first point is that just as we see the US-Uganda partnership and the C-LRA operation producing vastly different results through the critical lens of hybridity, AFRICOM remains a 'mixed bag', playing different roles in different contexts. As the Pentagon's Geographic Combatant Command for Africa,³⁵ the command is responsible for coordinating and executing all military activities on the continent, from humanitarian assistance activities to full-scale combat operations, and everything in between. On the one hand, as the hybrid lens reveals, C-LRA is a locally legitimate and effective undertaking which showcases a positive application of military assets. Due to the relatively small numbers of US personnel and the limited nature of their assigned tasks, commanders and planners can address the needs of

³⁵ The exception is Egypt, which falls under the US Central Command due to its proximity and relations with Middle Eastern states across the Sinai peninsula.

LRA-affected communities and civil society actors there given that these do not conflict with a broader agenda emanating from a higher level.

On the other hand, the US-Uganda security relationship is a major factor in producing an authoritarian, top-down form of hybrid politics that increasingly marginalises and disempowers locals. This type of US military activity, that of 'capacity-building partnerships', much better characterises what the US military most commonly does on a daily basis across the continent (in terms of budget, manpower, level of policy attention and sheer numbers of activities across the continent).³⁶ While there have been exceptions (from medical outreach to fight Ebola in West Africa on one hand, to providing massive air power for Operation: 'Odyssey Dawn,' which removed Qaddafi from power in Libya), for the most part, through both the George W. Bush and the Obama administrations, engagement in Africa has more or less followed a similar policy toward Africa. The preferred method of engagement has been building the capacity of allied African states in order to have proxies which can fight Islamist terror networks, protect access to resources and maintain regional stability, all with a minimal US 'footprint'.

Among the reasons that C-LRA has been so successful at producing a locally legitimate, emancipatory hybridity is the ability of US advisers and the UPDF forces to adapt their priorities to a population-centric approach that supports existing non-military efforts first and foremost, and where military force is only one subordinate aspect of the larger operation. Glaring contradictions exist between Uganda, where US-supported forces are routinely deployed at home to stem opposition amidst silent complicity on the part of the US, and C-LRA, where US-supported forces are engaged in a locally legitimate effort that is well-received by the local population amidst US advisers who maintain at least an appearance of openness and transparency in their activities.

Critics of AFRICOM, who see the command as a neo-colonial structure aiming to militarise Africa, are not entirely wrong. Through capacity-building activities that bolster the lethality of often-despotic proxy states AFRICOM is creating conditions unfavourable to fostering human development, democracy, and human rights. The once-lauded civilian component of AFRICOM remains understaffed and underfunded, which indicates where the priorities of officials in the White House, Congress, State Department, and Pentagon actually lie. When however, AFRICOM deploys forces that are capable and willing to provide robust support to locally

³⁶ See Nick Turse, "The US Military's Rising Daily Incursions in Africa." *The Herald Online*, 31 March 2014. Accessed 5 May 2014. <<http://www.herald.co.zw/us-militarys-rising-daily-incursions-in-africa/>>

legitimate operations through regional institutional frameworks such as the African Union, we find an exception to the general rule. In sum, AFRICOM is not inherently a positive or negative development, and is but an instrument of foreign policy. How that instrument is used depends on the policymakers who utilise it, and to what ends. Unfortunately for most Africans, in its current configuration, despite occasional anomalies such as C-LRA, AFRICOM (and for that matter, US diplomacy across Africa) is used in a manner that underscores the contradictions of espoused liberal peace values and the national strategic calculus.

6.4.2. *Role of Civil Society/Advocacy Networks in Foreign Policymaking*

- As the controversial *Kony 2012* video shows, while holding much potential for mobilising awareness and limited support for policy action, this form of social media advocacy has acted as a policy accelerant by promoting existing policies and reinforcing hegemonic power.

An additional issue raised by this research has been the relationship between policy action and forms of issue advocacy characterised by the veritable flood of popular activism via online social media. Similar to the debates surrounding the "CNN Effect" during the 1990s (the impact of twenty-four hour media coverage on foreign policy action)³⁷, the influence of internet activism has similarly come under scrutiny for its role in influencing foreign policy decision-making. Robinson describes three ways in which policy influence may occur: media influence may take place when there is a degree of *policy uncertainty*, certain *policy types* are associated with media influence, and influence is more likely at a certain *policy stage*.

In the case of intervening to eradicate the LRA threat, neither policy uncertainty, policy type, nor policy stage appear to have been major determinants of decision-making, since supporting regional forces to tackle the LRA problem had a history of support from US officials, the limited nature of the US role has never been challenged, and the operation was already underway when *Kony 2012* was released. The social media awareness campaign surrounding Kony and the LRA can, however, be seen as what Livingston refers to as an *accelerant* to policy decision-making.³⁸ As the critical backlash toward *Kony 2012* and similar campaigns indicates, such internet populism is not without a significant downside, that of (often unwittingly) reinforcing certain ideological narratives associated with hegemonic forces. This is especially salient given the nature of US military aid to Uganda, and how it is then instrumentalised to brutally maintain regime power.

³⁷ See Piers Robinson, *The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention*. New York: Routledge Press, 2002.

³⁸ Steven Livingston, "Clarifying the CNN Effect," 2.

The implications of social media activism's relationship to foreign policymaking are certainly not benign, and have far-reaching ramifications. Coverage of Africa as home to endemic humanitarian emergencies is certainly nothing new. Public perceptions of Africa tend toward what Hunter-Gault calls "four d's" that characterise much of the discourse on Africa, "death, disease, disaster, and despair".³⁹ Branch highlights "the danger of building activism around simplified moral narratives and decontextualized images of suffering, because that activism, having no critical perspective on the subject, can be easily manipulated toward violent and destructive ends... This type of activism is the antithesis of genuine solidarity".⁴⁰ Africa is a particularly vulnerable space in terms of affixing powerful external narratives, due to both its colonial past and uncertain future in relation to the rest of the world. These representations can serve to provide intellectual cover for policies that reinforce dominant ideologies.

At first glance, the ubiquity of online activism does not appear constrained by the same "filters" as traditional elite media outlets.⁴¹ According to Robinson, the medium of communication is secondary to the processes of issue framing that are underpinned by certain ideological narratives.⁴² The propagation of these favoured ideological narratives thus becomes the prize for those who frame humanitarian crises for global consumption. How foreign policy issues are framed--either by the traditional news media and popular entertainment sources or by social media advocacy--can reveal the underlying ideological discourses that perpetuate the hegemonic social forces of the status quo.

Nevertheless, despite its often-harmful consequences, such activism does possess enormous potential in linking local concerns (rooted in humanitarian crises) with the outside world. Kassimir describes how transnational advocacy groups (of the "real" offline variety) "often become bound up in local processes of governance and in the formulation of representational claims".⁴³ This is somewhat desirable, in terms of spreading critical awareness and facilitating resource allocation from global society to meet local needs. In sum, *Kony 2012* demonstrates

³⁹ See Charlayne Hunter-Gault, *New News Out of Africa: Uncovering the African Renaissance*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

⁴⁰ Adam Branch, *Displacing Human Rights*, 239.

⁴¹ This 'filtering' function refers to the elite domination of the type and flow of information in a manner that discourages alternatives to the political and economic status quo. See Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1988, 306.

⁴² Piers Robinson, "Media as a Driving Force in International Politics".

⁴³ Ronald Kassimir, "Producing Local Politics: Governance, Representation and Non-State Organizations in Africa" in *Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa: Global-Local Networks of Power* (Thomas Callaghy, Ronald Kassimir and Robert Latham, eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 93-112, 105.

minimal influence on policy action, serving only to accelerate and promote existing policies, and in so doing indicates the potentials and limitations of online activism affecting policy. Thus, the ways in which online advocacy can reinforce hegemonic power are revealed. With improved civic participation (both on-and offline), and critical learning skills, prospects for the transformative power of technology (as well as foreign policy reform that leads to actions more consistent with espoused values), would likely improve as well.

6.4.3. *Africa, the State, and the Liberal Peace*

- The evolution of the LRA conflict into its current form, as well as the US-Ugandan security partnership offer critical challenges to traditional IR understandings of the liberal peace and the sovereign Weberian state.

An important implication of this research is its relationship with the problem of situating the politics of conflict in Africa within discussions of the liberal peace, as well as other assumptions underpinning international relations. According to Richmond, the liberal peace is highly varied and "is made up of different strands of thought, theory, policies, and strategies used in different issue areas", adding that the reality of the liberal peace is that it "masks dissensus and is heavily contested both in discourse and practice".⁴⁴ In addition to its shortcomings that overemphasise technocratic governance reforms, it too often neglects issues such as the character, agency, and needs of civil society actors resulting in a peace that is "often very flimsy and at best 'virtual' rather than emancipatory".⁴⁵ Moreover, due to its structural power, the Western liberal peace is limited in its space for alternative approaches.⁴⁶ In fact, it becomes problematic to use the language of the liberal peace at all when discussing both the long-term US support to Uganda and the more recent C-LRA efforts, as neither fit within the construct of the liberal peace, for very divergent reasons.

This is highlighted by the nature of ongoing Western support to Uganda since (most of) it emerged from enormous conflict in the mid-1980s. While liberal peace rhetoric has often been used to justify US support to Uganda, what results in Uganda can hardly be described as 'liberal'. Alluding to its north-south divide, donor attitudes toward Uganda have been characterised as a type of "moral agnosticism", whereby the liberal peace is readily and willing

⁴⁴ Oliver P. Richmond, *The Transformation of Peace*. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan Press, 2005, 123.

⁴⁵ Oliver P. Richmond, "The Problem of Peace: Understanding the Liberal Peace." *Conflict, Security and Development*, Vol. 6, Iss. 3, October 2006, pp. 291-314, 291.

⁴⁶ Roger MacGinty, "Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace", 139.

to "tolerate war and dislocation in areas adjacent to showcase examples of 'success'.⁴⁷ On the one hand, Uganda is portrayed as democratic and a reliable counterterrorism ally, and has proven willing to take on the neoliberal economic prescriptions of the Washington Consensus. On the other hand, Uganda is simultaneously replete with examples of a 'hollow' donor-driven civil society, a kleptocratic government plagued by nepotism, a corrupt public sector, and direct presidential control of the security forces and national resources.

Conversely, the hybrid framework reveals an emancipatory form of intervention occurring in LRA-affected areas, which is locally legitimate and regionally effective in terms of achieving most of its limited goals. C-LRA seeks to protect civilians from physical violence, provide humanitarian assistance to LRA-affected communities, assist in the defection and reintegration efforts of former LRA fighters (who are also abductees), and finally to apprehend Joseph Kony and dismantle the LRA as a fighting force. C-LRA is not about building a state or reforming a political economy in the neoliberal image of the West, but about tackling a specific set of problems which have caused immense human insecurity amongst an already-vulnerable population. This is accomplished largely by outside forces (both military and civil society) who are linked with local actors to address these problems and to a large part is doing so in a manner that bypasses the affected states other than in the most superficial ways.⁴⁸

Africa challenges many of the assumptions scholars too often make when conceptualising the state. Rather than focusing on the legitimacy of elites who run the state, it is the state model itself which is increasingly viewed as bankrupt.⁴⁹ In Uganda, the state represents a massive distribution network of patronage, and controlling the state equals control of the distribution of power through these networks along ethnic, regional, and family lines.⁵⁰ Meanwhile, states such as South Sudan, the DRC and CAR, however, are not Weberian states in the traditional sense,

⁴⁷ Timothy M. Shaw and Pamela K. Mbabazi, "Two Ugandas and a 'Liberal Peace'? Lessons from Uganda about Conflict and Development at the Start of a New Century." *Global Society*, Vol. 21, No. 4, October 2007, pp. 567-578, 577.

⁴⁸ Here I refer to the scarce policy attention and relatively paltry contributions of material and manpower to the AU-RTF by the governments of South Sudan, DRC, and CAR, compared to the Ugandan and US governments. While the operation is physically occurring in the territories of these states, their governments frame the LRA as a low-priority nuisance at best. See Kristof Titeca and Theophile Costeur, "An LRA For Everyone."

⁴⁹ Kevin C. Dunn, "Uganda: The Lord's Resistance Army," in *African Guerillas: Raging Against the Machine* (Morten Bøås and Kevin C. Dunn, eds.). Boulder, CO: Lynn-Reiner Press, 2007, 55.

⁵⁰ See Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996.

and largely do not enjoy anything beyond what is known as "juridical sovereignty".⁵¹ As such, the vast majority of people in LRA-affected areas of these states are largely excluded from patronage networks emanating from their national capitals, and are instead linked through transboundary formations with outside states, regional institutions, and global civil society actors.

Anthropologist David Graeber questions the ways in which mainstream social science is often underequipped to deal with truly transformative politics, preferring to view such questions under the guise of "policy issues", which are of little help when one delineates between (top-down) policy and (organic, bottom-up) politics:

The notion of 'policy' presumes a state or governing apparatus which imposes its will on others. 'Policy' is the negation of politics; policy is by definition something concocted by some form of elite, which presumes it knows better than others how their affairs are to be conducted. By participating in policy debates the very best one can achieve is to limit the damage, since the very premise is inimical to the idea of people managing their own affairs.⁵²

Bearing in mind Mac Ginty's caveat that warns against romanticising or idealising the local,⁵³ it has been noted how a form of "post-liberal peace" that is locally oriented might emerge on the 'margins of the state' where culture, custom and tradition are predominant, and where neo-traditional civil society organisations act as vehicles" for negotiating these engagements with outside forces, often allowing locals to lead the process.⁵⁴ I argue that this is the case in LRA-affected areas, where the totalising agenda of the liberal peace is non-existent and the traditional reference frame of the state is obsolete, or at least far less relevant.

6.5. Areas for Future Research

Although not exhaustive, this section aims to offer some tentative suggestions that may be of future interest.

6.5.1 *Hybrid Analyses Elsewhere in Africa*

Perhaps the most obvious manner to which this research can be followed up is borrowing Mac Ginty's four-part conceptual model and applying it to other issue areas and conflict zones,

⁵¹ See Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood." *World Politics*, Vol. 35, Iss. 1, October 1982, pp. 1-24.

⁵² David Graeber, *Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology*. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2004, 9.

⁵³ Roger MacGinty, *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance*, 68.

⁵⁴ Patrick Tom, "The Liberal Peace and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa: Sierra Leone." *PhD Thesis*, University of St. Andrews. November 2011. Accessed 22 February 2015 < <https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/2469> >

especially those comprising multiple actors at multiple levels, and particularly in Africa given its problematic relationship with conceptions of the state and the liberal peace.

A strong candidate would be the response to the Boko Haram military group. Currently, the African Union is partially emulating the C-LRA regional task force concept in areas adversely affected by Boko Haram,⁵⁵ which similarly spans four states.⁵⁶ This AU task force is comprised of troops drawn from all four states and have an element of US special operations forces to advise and assist the mission. To date, the 7,500-strong multinational joint task force (MNJTF) has been authorised by the AU, but remains in its early stages, awaiting further financial and logistical support.⁵⁷

Another suitable candidate involves the joint AU-UN mission, AMISOM, which is dedicated to eradicating the al Shabaab militant group in the Horn and creating political space for the new Somali government to eventually take over its own security affairs. Unlike the AU force emerging in West Africa against Boko Haram, AMISOM has been deployed since 2007, and has evolved considerably from its inception, in terms of its makeup, its mission, what it has accomplished, and how it relates to the new Somali government in what is still an uncertain and tenuous security situation. While both the MNJTF and AMISOM involve international troops confronting armed rebels as the AU-RTF does, there is the added dimension of religion, since both Boko Haram and al Shabaab are considered Islamist terror groups (making these missions highly politicised and entangled in the narrative of Washington's "War on Terror" paradigm).

6.5.2 *Online Activism and Policy Action*

Another promising line of further research involves what the aforementioned phenomenon of online advocacy campaigns and their effect on influencing policy action.⁵⁸ Related to previous research on the CNN Effect, understanding the variability of media influence of different types on policy has become a central research goal.⁵⁹ As mentioned previously, narratives rooted in

⁵⁵ "Nigeria: Boko Haram Not Just a Domestic Problem." *Peace and Security Council Report : Institute for Security Studies website*, 24 July 2014. Accessed 10 September 2014.

<<https://www.issafrica.org/pscreport/situation-analysis/nigeria-boko-haram-not-just-a-domestic-problem>>

⁵⁶ Though most often associated as being a domestic Nigerian group, Boko Haram in fact is currently operating in under-governed spaces along Nigeria's border regions with Niger, Cameroon, and Chad.

⁵⁷ "567th PSC Meeting on the Boko Haram Terrorist Group." *African Union Peace and Security Council website*, 14 January 2016. Accessed 2 February 2016. <<http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/567th-psc-meeting-on-the-boko-haram-terrorist-group#sthash.fBkITlrA.dpuf>>

⁵⁸ See Moses Naim, "The YouTube Effect: : How a Technology for Teenagers Became a Force for Political and Economic Change." *Foreign Policy Online*, 14 October 2009, <<http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/14/the-youtube-effect/>>

⁵⁹ Piers Robinson, "The CNN Effect Reconsidered," 6.

unseen but powerful ideologies can serve as a type of the cultural hegemony required to promote norms and values that maintain the status quo.⁶⁰ Awareness of this should ground any future research approaches in the examination of both the potentials and limitations of, policy influence by new media sources such as the internet, as well its relationship to powerful interests.⁶¹

Social media advocacy of issues will surely continue to proliferate, offering opportunities to investigate the linkages between forms of issue advocacy and policy action. Africa, in particular, is ripe for this form of activism, as well as for its exploitation and co-optation by external powers. Future research should look carefully at the way in which issues are framed and options are presented, especially when they involve increased military adventurism or significant economic intervention. In addition, such research should critically examine the origin and implications of the powerful narratives that may be reinforced by some forms of activism, even if inadvertently.

6.5.3 *The Future of C-LRA and Regional UN Missions*

Another possible strand of future inquiry involves how C-LRA will evolve in relation to other peace support missions in the region. Now entering its fifth year, the AU-led C-LRA mission continues and remains subject to periodic reauthorisation through its states and the AU itself, although it is the biannual reauthorisation from the US Congress that seems the one the mission hinges upon as the US provides the bulk of funding and material resources. As I have set out to argue in this thesis, despite much of the initial uproar over the US role at its start, there has been little in the way of oppressive US-led militarisation or domination in the LRA-affected region under the guise of the AU-RTF's mission. C-LRA activities have been locally legitimate, "bottom-up" in nature and have not trampled upon the people in the region but rather have succeeded in assisting and empowering them, at least in areas where task force operations are able to reach. In addition, C-LRA activities have increasingly become streamlined with UN missions in the region. Tackling the myriad of social, economic, and security concerns in Central Africa provides a daunting challenge, and as many correctly point out, eradicating the LRA threat is but one of them.⁶²

However, there is no guarantee that this will always be the case. In Chapter Four I argued against Branch's warnings of instrumentalising the "protection narrative" to further militarise and

⁶⁰ See Antonio Gramsci, *The Prison Notebooks, Volume Two* (Joseph A. Buttigieg, ed.). New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

⁶¹ Piers Robinson, "The CNN Effect Reconsidered", 10.

⁶² See Kristof Titeca and Theophile Costeur, "An LRA for Everyone".

control the area's land, its people, and its resources. To be fair, as the LRA becomes weakened, it is possible that when Kony is eventually removed (through either death or capture), the operation may be transformed and sustained using some other justification. But, will Branch's warnings prove prescient at some future time? Might C-LRA, possibly in concert with nearby UN missions, eventually morph into some tangential objective that shifts the balance of power within the current hybrid peace toward the benefit of powerful actors? Given the history of Africa before, during and since colonial times, as well as the proclivities of Western power (in particular US power projection through its military), these should not be regarded as foolish concerns.

As myself and others have argued, since it has geographically expanded outside of Uganda, the LRA conflict has critically challenged many assumptions about notions of conflict, security, regionalism, and the role of the state, making it an important subject for scholarly study.⁶³ More importantly, work on the future of C-LRA operation and how it evolves is imperative if its practical successes to date is not to be in vain. As the nature of regional AU and UN missions evolves, and as Kony and his fighters continue to move into different geographical areas, pursuing newer ways to support themselves through banditry, poaching or seeking assistance from national actors, area rebels or others, this evolution will continue to be of interest to those pursuing future research.

6.5.4 The 'Boomerang Effect': Domestic Policies and Policing

Hybridity has allowed us to examine problems associated with externally led interventions, especially those advocated by transnational forms of advocacy and intergovernmental institutions such as the AU. With hybridity, there is potential to assess and better understand the intricacies of bureaucratic interventions in the myriad forms they occur. One such area involves the same top-down versus bottom-up tensions between the powerful and the marginalised as discussed here, only in a domestic, rather than an international context. Sporadic popular uprisings have long been a feature of the political landscape of Africa and the developing world. Increasingly, however, growing inequality and perceived corruption of the political class by elites are becoming serious political issues in Western states.⁶⁴ This growing dissatisfaction among what Guy Standing calls the "precariat" class is evident in the growing popularity of electoral

⁶³ Kevin C. Dunn, "The Lord's Resistance Army and African International Relations", 50.

⁶⁴ See Ronald Inglehart, "Inequality and Modernization: Why Equality is Likely to Make a Comeback." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 95, No. 1, January/February 2016, pp. 2-10.

candidates such as Jeremy Corbyn or Bernie Sanders in the UK and US, respectively.⁶⁵ This dissatisfaction with the Western consensus transcends mere economic issues and affects those on the margins of society in terms of policies associated with crime, justice, and representation.

As described by Foucault, the "boomerang effect" refers to the practices of colonisation which, once implemented on other continents, these modes and mechanisms of power are brought back to the West, and on to "the apparatuses, institutions, and techniques of power" with the result being that the West practices "something resembling colonization, or an internal colonialism, on itself".⁶⁶ Coyne and Hall discuss the phenomenon of foreign intervention as analogous to an experiment in state control whereby "the intervening government becomes more effective at controlling not only foreign populations but the domestic population as well".⁶⁷ In this vein, just as MacGinty's conceptual framework of hybridity is effective at critically assessing forms of liberal peace imposed on distant societies (as this research on the AU's C-LRA efforts attempts to do), there is the potential that the asymmetries of power in domestic settings are in similar need of such study.

The hybrid lens could conceivably be useful in identifying unequal power relations in communities characterised by systemic poverty, inequality, and criminal violence on one hand, and police abuse and judicial overreach on the other. How police and courts deal with marginalised communities and minority populations could potentially be informed by the precepts of a 'hybrid politics' analysis, which takes into consideration broad-based notions of peace and justice, with the intent of intra- and inter- community reconciliation. As analytical hybridity has shifted from European colonial power to externally driven aid interventions associated with the so-called liberal peace, it is reasonable to see a shifting of hybridity's analytical advantages yet again toward domestic peace enforcement activities, especially in light of social activism campaigns such as Occupy Wall Street, Black Lives Matter, and other similar protest movements gaining ground.

⁶⁵ The "precariat" defines the millions of people becoming a "new dangerous class," disaffected with the neoliberal agenda, and clamouring for structural social-political change through collective action. See Guy Standing, *The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class*. London: Bloomsbury Academic Press, 2011. See also Simon Wren-Lewis, "Bernie Sanders, Jeremy Corbyn and the Financial Crisis." *Social Europe Online*, 29 January 2016. Accessed 5 February 2016. <<https://www.socialeurope.eu/2016/01/bernie-sanders-jeremy-corbyn-and-the-financial-crisis/>>

⁶⁶ Michel Foucault, from a 1976 talk at the Collège de France in Paris, as quoted in Stephen Graham, "Foucault's Boomerang: The New Military Urbanism." *Open Democracy website*, 14 February 2013. Accessed 19 January 2015. <<https://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/stephen-graham/foucault%E2%80%99s-boomerang-new-military-urbanism>>

⁶⁷ See Christopher J. Coyne and Abigail R. Hall, "Perfecting Tyranny: Foreign Intervention as Experimentation in State Control." *The Independent Review*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Fall 2014, pp. 165-189.

Despite the fact that Western forms of government codify domestic restraints on the exercise of force and violence, many argue that these are meaningless in real terms as marginalised communities live constantly under threat of violence, and that an entirely different standard exists for those marginalised communities.⁶⁸ This concept is not new, and has been a part of earlier iterations of hybridity as discussed in the context of post-colonialism. Homi K. Bhabha describes hybridity as "the name for the strategic process of domination through disavowal"⁶⁹ and it is within the "contact zones" created by the powerful clashing with the powerless that provides analytical space to consider these new social and political movements.

6.6. Concluding Discussion

This thesis has sought to accomplish the twin criteria mentioned at the outset of this chapter: that solid research must display both real-world importance and a contribution to an identifiable scholarly literature.⁷⁰ As a matter of real-world importance, it can hardly be argued that the evolution of this conflict presents nothing less than an extraordinary human security dilemma that has too often received short shrift in terms of global recognition and action. It was their brutality that served to sensationalise the LRA and propel them to global notoriety in circles familiar with humanitarian and conflict issues. While this helped galvanize external support to address the regional threat to civilians, this very real threat to civilians was in many ways exacerbated by the reactionary rejection by many academics of the plan calling for US advisers being sent to assist the Ugandans and other forces accomplish this goal. More attention to the LRA conflict since entering its current phase (of direct US advisory support to the AU effort) was in dire need at the outset of this research. While Invisible Children's *Kony 2012* video raised awareness of the conflict, it only worsened the confused arguments not only over what to do about the LRA, but whether or not it was really a problem at all (when to Central Africans, it remains a very real life-or-death problem).

As indicated throughout these pages, the four-part hybridity framework has been a constructive tool with which to critically interrogate power relations among actors in the dynamic, multinational effort to eradicate the LRA, mainly through the US regional proxy-power, Uganda's military. Examining this intervention has provided a range of practical insights into how Africa fits in to foreign policy considerations of powerful state actors such as the United States, with its

⁶⁸ See Dale Rogers Marshall, David H. Tabb, and Rufus P. Browning, *Protest is Not Enough: The Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality in Urban Politics*. University of California Press, 1986.

⁶⁹ Homi K. Bhabha, "Signs Taken for Wonders" in *The Postcolonial Studies Reader* (Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, Helen Tiffis, eds.). London: Routledge Press, 1985, pp. 29-35, 34.

⁷⁰ Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry*, 15.

tendency to seek military solutions to complex problems, as well as the manner in which 'weaker' African states relate to the US, to one another. It has also afforded us an improved understanding of how the efforts of security forces and non-military civil society actors, under certain limited circumstances, may converge and accomplish what are perceived by locals as emancipatory goals. This is in contrast to previous work on the LRA conflict that ignored local perceptions during this new phase of the LRA conflict.

The hybridity framework has yielded fruitful results not only about the practical relevance of the LRA conflict and its place within the context of the region. It has been tested and utilised in a manner consistent with which it was conceived--a critical lens with which to view power relations within the interfaces and interactions of powerful external actors and less powerful local actors, at the same time as debates surrounding the liberal peace and international relations in Africa take a decidedly "local turn".⁷¹ I have sought to turn Mac Ginty's "exercise in conceptual scoping"⁷² into a conceptual framework to guide field research and empirical analysis in order to better understand the composite political forms resulting from top-down and bottom-up interaction in a particular sphere of activity--in this case, the multinational C-LRA intervention, as well as the US-Uganda security relationship which enables it. The overarching purpose of this thesis has been to provide a useful and timely contribution, that, informed by the hybrid peace conceptual model, in turn provides additional empirical material that may be drawn from to further future research in similar contexts.

To be sure, issues of ethnicity, marginalisation, poverty, national disunity, problematic governance, oppressive policies, and revenge all lie at the heart of conflict within Uganda dating back to the Amin and Obote eras. C-LRA efforts, however, illustrate that potential alternatives are germinating, and the hybridity framework affords us a lens to imagine and hopefully realise such alternatives across a wider spectrum. It remains to be seen how the C-LRA intervention will play out, as well as the long-term effects of US donor support to militarising Uganda's NRM regime. The future of the tri-border region post-Kony is marked by as much uncertainty as the notion of a post-Museveni Uganda. Today, while Kony remains at large and the LRA continues to attack remote communities and abduct locals (albeit in a much more weakened state), Uganda continues on its unfortunate path toward authoritarianism.

⁷¹ Roger MacGinty and Oliver P. Richmond, "The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace." *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2013, pp. 763-783, 763.

⁷² Roger MacGinty, "Hybrid Peace", 391.

US policy in the region possesses a great deal of responsibility for this destructive outcome inside Uganda, and yet (perhaps ironically) also deserves credit for the successes of one aspect of its legacy of military aid: providing exceptional symbolic and material support to the African Union forces and civil society groups which have done so much to bring hope to the tri-border region affected by the LRA. Perhaps this contradiction is inherent in such a dynamic and multilayered sociopolitical context as Africa offers, represented by tragedy and turmoil as much as by harmony and hope, and by coalescence as much as conflict.

APPENDIX A: Glossary of Acronyms

AFRICOM: The US Africa Command. Refers to the United States' geographic combatant command dedicated to pursuing US national security goals and protecting strategic interests in and around the African continent.

AMISOM: refers to the multinational joint United Nations-African Union Mission to Somalia.

AU: The African Union, a supranational continental union consisting of fifty-four African states.

AU-RTF: The African Union Regional Task Force, is the military component tasked with the elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army and protection of local civilians.

CAR: The Central African Republic (République centrafricaine).

C-LRA: Counter-LRA, the combination of military and civil society efforts to eradicate the threat posed by LRA rebels.

CSTF: The Civil Society Task Force. Refers to the loosely unified coalition of global, regional and local civil society actors (NGOs and clergy groups) who call for and support the African Union's C-LRA efforts.

DRC: The Democratic Republic of the Congo.

FACA: les Forces armées centrafricaines (Central African Armed Forces) is the military of the Central African Republic.

FARDC: Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo).

ICG: The International Crisis Group, a non-governmental organisation which has closely monitored the LRA conflict in East and Central Africa and assessed the various efforts to combat it there.

LRA: The Lord's Resistance Army, the Ugandan rebel group currently weakened but still operating in Central Africa.

MONUSCO: Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo (The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo).

NGO: Non-Governmental Organisations. Refers to voluntary groups organised on a local, national or global level.

NRM: The National Resistance Movement, which grew out of Yoweri Museveni's former 'National Resistance Army' rebel group, and has been the dominant ruling political party of the Uganda since 1986.

OLT: Operation Lightning Thunder, a controversial US-supported Ugandan military offensive against LRA rebels in 2008-09.

POMA: The Public Order Management Act, a controversial Ugandan law enacted in 2013 that strictly regulates free assembly and has been condemned by activists for effectively criminalising protests and opposition politics.

SF: Special Forces. Refers specifically to a small number of specialised units within the US Army, also known as the "Green Berets."

SOF: Special Operations Forces. Broadly refers to military units trained to perform unconventional missions.

SPLA: The Sudanese People's Liberation Army, the military of the Republic of South Sudan.


UPDF: The Uganda People's Defence Force, the military of the Republic of Uganda.

UN: The United Nations, an intergovernmental organisation which promotes international cooperation.

WES: Western Equatoria State, which contains LRA-affected areas lying in the extreme southwest of the Republic of South Sudan.

APPENDIX B: Area Maps

Figure I. The following map situates the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) area of responsibility along with the other five US military geographic combatant commands within the US Department of Defense.



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Figure II. The following map highlights LRA-affected states within Africa, as well as the remote tri-border area which roughly overlaps with Zandeland in the DRC, CAR and South Sudan.



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
Figure III. The following map illustrates LRA-affected areas over time, indicating the LRA's movements after leaving Uganda and moving west into Central Africa.

⁷³ Image taken from "The United States Africa Command". *Wikipedia website*, 19 June 2016. Accessed 19 June 2016.

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Africa_Command#/media/File:Unified_Combatant_Commands_map.png>

⁷⁴ Image taken from "Democratic Republic of Congo Hands Over 500 Strong Contingent to the African Union-led Regional Task Force for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army." *African Union Peace and Security Council website*, 15 February 2013. Accessed 19 June 2016.

<<http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/democratic-republic-of-congo-hands-over-500-strong-contingent-to-the-african-union-led-regional-task-force-for-the-elimination-of-the-lord-s-resistance-army>>



Map of LRA affected areas. This map is intended for illustrative purposes only. Borders, names and other features are presented according to common practice in the region. Conciliation Resources takes no position on whether this representation is legally or politically valid. © Conciliation Resources

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Figure IV. The following map illustrates ivory smuggling routes (as well as LRA movements more generally) from poaching sites in the DRC, along the tri-border area to Joseph Kony's suspected safe haven in the disputed Kafia Kinge enclave.



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⁷⁵ Image taken from "The Voice of Peace - News and views from conflict-affected areas of CAR, DRC, South Sudan and Uganda - Issue 12, October-December 2014." *Relief Web (UNOCHA) website*. Accessed 19 June 2016.
<http://reliefweb.int/map/central-african-republic/map-lra-affected-areas-31-dec-2014>

⁷⁶ Image taken from Ledio Cakaj, "Tusk Wars: Inside the LRA and the Bloody Business of Ivory." *The Enough Project website*, 26 October 2015. Accessed 19 June 2016.
<http://enoughproject.org/reports/tusk-wars-inside-lra-and-bloody-business-ivory>

APPENDIX C: List of Interviews

A great deal of the data this thesis draws upon were gleaned from countless hours of ethnographic participant-observation among a great many individuals. This appendix contains a list of those persons formally interviewed at least once (and in some cases, multiple times) and cited as direct sources in the pages herein. It is not an exhaustive list of all interviews conducted during fieldwork, but only includes those who have been directly quoted or paraphrased within the thesis. Nor does it include numerous informal conversations with subjects during periods of ethnographic participant-observation.

The following interviewees have been directly quoted in this thesis and are listed by name:

Kasper Agger, LRA Researcher with the global advocacy NGO, *The Enough Project*. Kampala, Uganda. June 2012.

Gori Faustino Basukabanobi Badabu, 'Paramount Chief of the Zande', Nzara, South Sudan. April 2013.

Rev. Sam Childers, American businessman, clergyman, and inspiration for the Hollywood film, *Machine Gun Preacher* in Kampala, Uganda. May 2013.

Hon. Min. Crispus Kyonga, Ugandan Minister of Defence. Kampala, Uganda. May 2013.

Nathan Mugisha, Retired UPDF Lieutenant General. Kampala, Uganda. May 2013.

Florence Ogola, 'Communications Director' for NGO *Invisible Children*, Gulu, Uganda. March 2013.

Francis Ondoonga, Director of local NGO *Human Rights Focus*, Gulu, Uganda. March 2013.

Ashby Patrick, 'DDRRR Officer for East and Central Africa' for NGO *Invisible Children*, Kampala, Uganda. March 2013.

Mundunga Patrick, 'Technical Projects Director' for the global advocacy NGO *Invisible Children*. Kampala, Uganda. March 2013.

Bishop Samuel Peni, ECS Diocese, Nzara, South Sudan. April 2013.

The following interviewees have also been quoted in this thesis, but wished to remain anonymous, and are identified either by first name only or by an alias:

Andre, a volunteer with the NGO *Association les Victims de LRA*, Obo, CAR. March 2013.

Catherine, a shopkeeper in Obo, CAR. March 2013.

Gary, US Special Forces sergeant, Nzara, South Sudan. April 2013.

George, a local labourer in Pakwach, Uganda. June 2012.

Jennifer, Yambio County Social Worker. Yambio South Sudan. April 2013.

Karl, LRA Researcher with a global advocacy NGO in Gulu, Uganda. March 2013.

Katie, American healthcare volunteer with local NGO and medical clinic, Yambio, South Sudan. April 2013.

Father Marciel, Catholic Priest in Obo, CAR. March 2013.

Captain Mike, UPDF intelligence officer. Yambio, South Sudan. April 2013.

Milton, local farmer and 'Arrow Boys' militia leader, Timbiro, South Sudan. April 2013.

Captain Moses, UPDF infantry officer. Nzara, South Sudan. April 2013.

Captain Olaf, US Special Forces officer, Yambio, South Sudan. April 2013.

Ryan, US Special Forces sergeant, Nzara, South Sudan. April 2013.

Lieutenant Tom, UPDF intelligence officer. Nzara, South Sudan. April 2013.

(Anonymous) Ugandan Member of Parliament, Kampala, Uganda. June 2012.

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