Will the green shoots blossom? A new wave of social protection in Sub-Saharan Africa

Will the green shoots blossom?
A new wave of social protection in Sub-Saharan Africa

(Draft)

Armando Barrientos, David Hulme, and Miguel Nino-Zarazua[1]
Brooks World Poverty Institute
University of Manchester

Abstract

Historically social protection in sub-Saharan Africa has focused on risk management and in particular on food aid, food insecurity and famine or disaster relief. During the 1990s a 'Southern African model' of social protection has evolved centred on non-contributory pensions for poor, elderly people (and their households). This has diffused from South Africa to neighbouring states and, in South Africa, has been extended into the Child Support Grant. The Southern African model is largely financed from domestic revenues and supported by domestic political constituencies.

Since 2000 a 'Middle African model' (Central, Eastern, Western Africa and the Horn) has started to emerge based on the provision of cash transfers to vulnerable groups – extreme poor and destitute households, orphans and vulnerable children. Most of these programmes remain as pilot and/or experimental projects initiated by donors and financed through foreign aid. While they are generating useful knowledge there is a real danger that they will be seen as just another donor fad and that they will not be socially or politically embedded in African societies. The one major exception is Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). This reaches more than 7 million people and, although it is largely funded by aid donors, the Government of Ethiopia has been heavily involved in its design and management. In addition to cash transfers the PSNP is linked to services – to access benefits participants have to provide labour for public works.

This paper provides an overview and analysis of the recent rise of social protection programmes in sub-Saharan Africa; explores the contrasting policy processes behind these programmes; examines the major challenges they face (financial viability, institutional capacity and political support); and considers the prospects for the establishment of social protection programmes that can effectively reduce vulnerability and support poor Africans in their struggles to escape poverty.

Key Words: *social protection, transfer programmes, Sub-Saharan Africa, poverty*

1. Introduction

Social protection has gained increasing interest and support in Sub-Saharan Africa over the last decade. Social protection is now widely recognised as an effective policy framework to address the extreme deprivation and vulnerability which characterises the region. A number of developments demonstrate this shift in policy thinking in the region. Many countries have designed and developed national social protection strategies, in many cases as a progression from their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). While first generation of PRSPs focused primarily on developing a profile of poverty, second generation of PRSPs have looked deeper into the factors that drive

---

[1] Research Director, Executive Director and Research Fellow, respectively. Contact details at Brooks World Poverty Institute, The University of Manchester, Humanities Bridgeford Street Building, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9P, United Kingdom. Email: david.hulme@manchester.ac.uk.

households and communities into poverty, and at a wide range of policies that could prevent them from falling into poverty and promote pathways out of poverty.

National Social Protection Strategies are now beginning to be translated into social protection policies and programmes, as in Uganda, Rwanda, Ghana and Mozambique. The Livingstone process, under the leadership of the Africa Union, has embraced this process at a continental level. This is supported by international partners who agree on the need to replace emergency aid with regular and reliable support for poverty reduction. A *new wave* of social protection programmes, including the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia, the Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) in Kenya, the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) in Kenya, and a large number of pilot programmes elsewhere, will provide a sorely missing knowledge base on the effectiveness of social protection programmes in Africa. Adding to this picture the rapid extension of social transfer programmes in South Africa (the Child Support Grant) and other countries in Southern Africa (social pensions in Lesotho and Swaziland), and it becomes credible to suggest that the green shoots of social protection are emerging across Sub-Saharan Africa.

This is now set against the backdrop of the food, fuel and credit crises. There is considerable uncertainty over the depth and distribution of the impacts of the global crisis on countries in the region. However, it is important to acknowledge that, until the onset of the crisis, many countries in the region showed sustained economic growth for the first time in several decades. Revenues from the exploitation of natural resources were beginning to reach levels that could support a measure of optimism regarding the fiscal space for the extension of social protection. The much discussed shift among international partners from programme and project aid, to direct budgetary support, could create the conditions, at least on paper, for national governments to escape from the vagaries of project aid and focus instead on longer term social protection programmes. The crisis could well change these parameters, but by 2008 it was beginning to look as if the financing for social protection programmes was becoming less of a constraint that fiscal conservatives had argued. Responses to the crisis may well involve a rapid extension, and strengthening, of social protection programmes in those countries where fiscal space permits a fiscal stimulus.

However, the green shoots of institutionalised social protection are just that, green shoots[2]. The extension of social protection in the region is highly diverse and complex, and many constraints remain strong. In Southern Africa, the extension of the transfer programmes approach has emerged as a domestic policy development that is tax-funded, and relies primarily on means-tested and non-contributory transfers. By contrast, in 'Middle' Africa, the new programmes of the last few years are almost entirely funded from international aid, and the design of the programmes reflects the influence of international organisations. In addition, many of the new programmes are short term and small scale pilots, a fact that reflects the reluctance of some political elites in Africa to embrace social protection policies. Moreover, in West and Central Africa, most countries are at an early stage of developing social protection strategies and few programmes are yet at implementation. The responses to the food crisis in the

[2] Ravi Kanbur has recently argued that the flows should move from social protection projects and programmes to the design of social protection systems.

region suggests that it may not take much to persuade local elites and international organisations to fall back on the older models of social protection in the region, namely in-kind (usually food) emergency assistance. Arguably, Sub-Saharan African countries are at the cusp of a change in their policy approaches to poverty, and perhaps no further.

In this paper, we assess the growing importance of social protection in shaping thinking on poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, we review the region's recent wave of social protection strategies and programmes. We also discuss the main challenges ahead. The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 sets up a typology of social protection for Sub-Saharan Africa. Section 3 discusses the 'Southern African model' of social protection; Section 4 examines the main characteristics of emerging forms of social protection, what we refer to as the 'Middle African model'. Section 5 examines in more detailed the policy process involved including the role of North-based organisations and South-based initiatives in pushing forward the social protection agenda. Section 6 discusses the main challenges ahead, especially the issues of financing and capacity. Section 7 concludes.

2. A typology of social protection for Sub-Saharan Africa

Before embarking in a further discussion, it is pertinent to define the notion of social protection and then, draw a typological simplification of the various forms that are currently present in Sub-Saharan African. Social Protection has been defined as *"public actions taken in response to levels of vulnerability, risks, and deprivation, which are deemed socially unacceptable within a given polity and society"* (Conway, de Haan and Norton 2000).

The International Labour Office (ILO) divides those public actions into three general categories: 1) Social insurance; 2) Labour Market Regulation, and 3) Social Assistance. *Social Insurance* are usually contributory and (thus tax-funded) schemes designed to protect households against events associated to life-course and labour-market contingencies such as maternity, old-age, unemployment, sickness and accidents. *Labour Market Regulations* are legal frameworks aimed at ensuring minimum standards of working conditions, including workers rights. *Social Assistance* are policy instruments designed to address poverty and vulnerability (ILO 2001) that are usually publicly funded and non-contributory (in financial terms). It is important to point to the fact that in particular case of Sub-Saharan Africa, social assistance programmes have taken the lead and dominated most recent social protection policy devices, this contrasts with North Africa where social insurance is the main approach.

In general, social protection can be identified as seeking instruments to accomplish either one or a combination of the following motives:

i) a *protective* motive, to guard the poor and vulnerable from idiosyncratic events and external shocks;

ii) a *supportive* motive, to ensure people's entitlements (or rights) are in place to support their functionings (or agency);

iii) a *promotive* motive, to facilitate investment in human and physical capitals, essential for the fight against structural poverty (Barrientos 2008).

These motives are related to different analytical frameworks of social protection: First, the notion of social protection as a *protective* policy device is closely associated with the World Bank's Social Risk Management framework that gives a strong focus to various types of risks as significant causes of poverty and vulnerability (World Bank 2001). Second, the notion of social protection as a *supportive* policy device is associated with ILO's Human Rights framework that gives a strong focus to basic human rights based on the concept of universal entitlements to a minimum standard of living. Third, the notion of social protection as a *promotive* policy can be linked to United Nations' framework of basic needs regarded as a precondition for human development[3]. In practice, while a country may focus its policies more towards one of these frameworks than the others. Emerging empirical studies in Southern Africa and elsewhere, particularly in Latin America, suggest that social protection policies combine 'risks', 'needs' and 'rights' frameworks.

In this paper we discuss social protection programmes with an explicit focus on poverty reduction. Social insurance programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa cover only a small proportion of the labour force and population, and in the main recent changes and reforms have been aimed at addressing the financial and governance structures of these programmes. Labour market regulation is limited in its implementation to formal employment. In the last decade, the most significant changes to the social protection systems in the region have focused on social assistance, hence the focus of the paper.

Social protection programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa show variations in structure, and scope by country, a fact that reflects differences in demographic characteristics, financial capacity, and social and political circumstances. Nonetheless, in an attempt to make a broad typological representation, we identify two models of social protection in the subcontinent: the 'Southern Africa Model'; and the 'Middle African model'[4]. Each model has evolved over time to adopt different forms of social assistance, particularly as *pure income transfers* or as *income transfers plus services*.

Each form of transfer programmes differs in terms of scope and duration. For example, while pure income transfers under the Southern African Model are mainly regular and unconditional, income transfers *plus* services under the new wave of social protection in Eastern and Central Africa are temporary and conditional. Examples of the former are the non-contributory old-age pension schemes in South Africa, Lesotho and Namibia whereas examples of the latter are Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme and Malawi's Improving Livelihood through Public Works Programme (see Appendix 1 for a full typology and list of programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa).

We also identified pure income transfers made regular and unconditional under the new wave of social protection in Eastern and Central Africa, although *income transfers plus services*, primarily conditional on public works, have been introduced on a very small scale and on a irregular and temporary basis in Southern Africa. Mozambique's Food

---

[3] For a detailed discussion, see Barrientos and Hulme (2008).
[4] By 'Middle Africa' we are referring to East, Central and West Africa, and the Horn of Africa.

Subsidy Programme; and Kenya's Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children are some examples of the former, whereas South Africa's Zibambele and Gundo Lashu Programmes are emerging examples of the latter[5] (see figure 1). This suggests a complex and dynamic interrelation between different approaches to social protection in the region. In the following sections, we discuss the two dominant models of social protection.

[5] Zibambele and Gundo Lashu are irregular and unreliable emergency programmes of humanitarian orientation, and in that context cannot be considered to as institutionalised social protection programmes. In that perspective, Ethiopia's PSNP is the only income transfers *plus* services social protection programme operating in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Figure 1. A typology of Social Protection in Sub-Sahara Africa

	Old wave of social protection (from 1920s to mid-1990s)	*New wave* of social protection (from late l990s - 2000s)	
	Pure Income transfers	Pure Income transfers	Income transfers *plus* services
Southern African model	▪ Non-contributory old-age pension scheme in South Africa. *Characteristics* : Means-tested and categorical. Transfers were made *unconditional* and on a *regular basis* but only for the vulnerable white and coloured old population. *Politics* : internally driven by white elites. *Finance* : tax-funded.	▪ Non-contributory old-age pension schemes: Extention of South Africa's scheme to the black population; introduction of programmes in Namibia; Lesotho; Swaziland and Botzwana. *Characteristics* : Means-tested and categorical. Transfers are *unconditional* and *regular.* *Politics: internally driven by domestic forces.* *Finance* : tax-funded. ▪ Child Support Grant in South Africa *Characteristics* : Transfer made unconditional and regular for orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) *Politics: internally driven by domestic forces* *Finance* : tax-funded	▪ Cash for work programmes. South Africa has introduced two small-scale cash-for-work programmes: Zibambele and Gundo Lashu. *Characteristics* : transfers are made conditional, temporary and on a irregular basis, by targerting at poor unemployed laboureres. *Politics: internally driven by domestic forces.* *Finance* : tax-funded.
Middle African model	▪ Food-aid humanitarian assistance programmes in countries like Ethiopia and Zambia. *Characteristics* : Programmes were introduced to address humanitarian emergencies caused by environmental disasters and civil conflict. Transfers were made unconditional, temporary and on an irregular basis. *Politics* : externally driven by international aid agencies. *Finance* : donor-supported.	▪ Examples are Mozambique's Food Subsidy Programme, and Kenya's Cash Transfer for OVC. *Characteristics* : transfers are made *unconditional* and *regular,* by targeting at extreme poor and vulnerable groups such as disable and OVC. *Politics* : most programmes are externally driven by aid donors and international NGOs, although in some countries, the programmes have been internalised by political actors and their constituencies. *Finance* : mainly donor-supported.	▪ Cash for work programmes. An example of this type of transfer is the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) that was introduced in Ethiopia as a development of food-aid humanitarian assistance. *Characteristics* : transfers are made conditional, temporary and on a irregular basis, by targeting at poor unemployed laboureres. *Politics* : most programmes are externally driven by aid donors and international NGOs, although in the case of Ethiopia's PSNP, it has been internalised by domestic (and local) political actors. *Finance* : mainly donor-supported.

3. The 'Southern African model' of social protection

The Sothern Africa model focuses on social assistance and can be tracked back to the introduction of a social pension scheme in South Africa in the 1920s. The South African government of that time introduced a non-contributory pension scheme that sought to ensure that none of the minority white population fell into poverty in old age. The pension was extended to blacks and coloureds in the 1940s but with discriminatory rules and benefits for whites. It was not until the fall of Apartheid in the 1990s, and the elimination of the official racial discrimination that the full benefits of the pension scheme were extended to the black population.

The Southern African model is largely characterised by *pure income transfers* made to poor old people and vulnerable children in the form of pensions and child support grants, although South Africa has recently extended the focus and incorporate small-scale *income transfers plus services* into its poverty reduction strategy. In section 3.1, we discuss briefly some programmes operating in Southern Africa that have adopted the pure income transfer approach[6].

3.1 Pure income transfers

Pure income transfers under the Southern African model have taken the form of social pensions and child support grants. In South Africa, for example, the non-contributory old-age pensions were introduced in 1928 to cover the vulnerable white old-age population. It was not until the collapse of the Apartheid in the 1990s, that the programme was extended to the black population. Non-contributory social pension schemes take the form of *unconditional* and *regular* means-tested income transfers that target the elderly in poverty. After a life-time of participation in informal labour markets and small-scale agricultural activities, most black South Africans are excluded from formal social security. The South African pension scheme is tax-funded, and estimated to reach almost 2 million beneficiaries, representing about 80% of South Africans over age 60, and nearly 100% of elderly blacks. The scheme is estimated to cost around 1.4% of the country's GDP.

The extensive examination of the non-contributory social pension system in South Africa, was pivotal in the expansion of the model to other countries in the Southern region during the 1990s and 2000s[7]. In Namibia, for example, the non-contributory social pension was extended in the 1990s to cover the black population. It is reported to have almost 95% coverage, although in remote Northern provinces coverage is lower. Such pensions account for an estimated 14% of rural incomes, although about half of the eligible recipients are regarded as non-poor. The scheme is tax-funded with an estimated cost of nearly 1.5% of GDP. Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland have also recently launched their own non-contributory pension schemes. For example, Lesotho's pension scheme was introduced in 2004 as an unconditional income transfer to people aged 70 and older. The programme covers around 70,000 beneficiaries, 60% of which are women, with a cost of about 1.4% of GDP (see table 1).

[6] The following sections are based on Barrientos et al (2008)

[7] For a discussion on the history and development of the South African old-age pension scheme, see Lund (1993).

Table 1. Selected non-contributory pension programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa

Country	Age eligibility	Criteria	Monthly Income Transfer in US dollars	% of people over 60 with a pension	Cost as % of GDP
Botswana	65+	Universal	27	85	0.4
Lesotho	70+	Universal 1/	21	53	1.4
Namibia	60+	Selective	28	87	0.8
South Africa	65+ men 60+ women	Selective	109	60	1.4

Source: Pension Watch, available from www.helpage.org
1/ Universal with the exception of 4% of eligible people receiving government pension

Social pensions have proved to be effective in extending protection to the poor and poorest when idiosyncratic events and covariate external shocks hit the household. This is of particular importance in the Southern African region. Rapid demographic transformations, due to internal and external migration have left the poor highly exposed to a wide variety of risks, and although remittances have mitigated some of the effects of risks, they have been insufficient to compensate the erosion of indigenous protection mechanisms and family networks that support the elderly and other vulnerable members in poor communities. That process also involves changes in the structure of the economy and labour markets, with shifts from agricultural activities to manufacturing industries that have left the poor and vulnerable at the exposure of hazards such as unemployment. But perhaps one of the biggest threats, especially in the Southern African region is the HIV/AIDS pandemic. It is estimated that the incidence of HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa is in the range of 15-40%, around 3 and 7 times the incidence reported in East and West Africa, respectively (UNAIDS 2008)

The HIV/AIDS pandemic has battered entire communities, and affecting traditional and informal systems of intra- and inter-household protection that often leaves households headed by old people and older children unprepared to care for their grandchildren and siblings (UNICEF 2008). These households show the greatest levels of exposure to risk and vulnerability to poverty, and extreme poverty, and are a major source of concern in the region (Barrientos, Gorman and Heslop, 2003). In that context, social protection programmes can play a crucial role in releasing the tension that the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other types of shocks put over informal protection systems. South Africa's Child Support Grant for example, was introduced in 1998 to partially address this problem. Unconditional income transfers target poor children aged 13 and less, foster carers and carers of children with disabilities. The programme is estimated to cover 2.5 million and costs about 0.7% of the country's GDP.

4. A *new wave* of social protection: the 'Middle African model'.

One of the major challenges yet to be overcome in Sub-Saharan Africa is food insecurity. It is estimated that more than 200 million people are malnourished[8] and that number may well be increasing. Food insecurity and hunger weaken people's physical capacity and intellectual ability to work, and increase their vulnerability towards illness and diseases. Food intake deficits are particularly devastating for children. Malnourishment in early age is found to be a significant factor in poor cognitive development and intellectual abilities in adults (see e.g. Alderman et at 2006, Glewwe and King 2001, and Behrman et al 2004) and

[8] For a detail account of the malnourishment problem in Sub-Saharan Africa, see FAO (2008)

this can certainly have terrible consequences for the prospects of future economic and social development in Africa.

Unpredictable weather conditions exacerbated by climate change, in combination with low investments in agricultural technology and poor infrastructure are important determinants of food insecurity. Civil conflict and war have severely affected the region. Since the 1980s, countries like Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda Uganda, Liberia, and Sierra Leone went through humanitarian crises due to political conflict and civil war (Cramer 2006). These conflicts have left more than 2 million refugees and about 7 million internally displaced people in Sub-Saharan Africa, with devastating effects on social cohesion and the economy in the region. The Red Cross and other aid agencies have put in place humanitarian schemes in several countries to address the emergency. These programmes are vital to address human suffering in the short term, but are not equipped to address poverty in the longer run.

Important steps made by countries such as Uganda, Rwanda, and Mozambique, towards peace have opened a window of opportunity for the experimentation of a new wave of social protection in Eastern Africa. More stable political conditions and recent trends of economic growth have enabled governments, and the international aid community to begin to consider moving from a temporary food-based humanitarian-aid approach to a more permanent income-based social assistance approach. The importance of social assistance in enhancing peace and social cohesion in the region is yet to be seen; however, in other regions, social protection has been used as a complementary instrument to securing peace [9].

Food-aid emergency and humanitarian schemes remain in some parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in regions that suffer from food insecurity due to political conflict and natural disasters. For example, Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger, and Somalia have received food relief since the year 2000. Ethiopia especially has become food dependant. Devereux and Cipryk (2009) report that at least four million people in the country have received food-aid every year since the 1990s. However, an increasing body of empirical evidence accounts for the important structural advantages of income transfers (or in-cash) vis-à-vis food (or in-kind) transfers. A common ground appears to emerge from the ability of cash transfers to reach the intended beneficiaries even in the most adverse conditions (Gore and Patel 2006)[10]. The use of income transfers is also, unlike food aid, less likely to harm local markets, create production disincentives, induced changes in food consumption and modify patterns of natural resources use (Barrett 2006), and recent evidence suggests that they income transfers may even act as *stimuli* in the context of highly fragmented labour and credit markets (see Ardington and Hosegood 2007 and Angeluci and Giorgi 2005).

However, it is important to distinguish two separate shifts here: first, a shift from food-aid to cash (or income) assistance in the context of humanitarian emergencies[11]. Second, a

[9] In April 1998, a few months after Mexico's Progresa had been launched; President Zedillo announced the highest budget in the country for the scaling up of Progresa in the Southern state of Chiapas, where the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) had declared war against the Mexican state in December 1994. In that context, social assistance was seen, within a broader strategy, as a complementary instrument to securing peace in the region.
[10] For a discussion on the ability of cash transfers in emergency and humanitarian aid see Harvey (2007) and Peppiatt, *et at* (2000).
[11] Sen (1981) has identified the inaccessibility to, rather than a shortage of, food as the main source of famine. And as famine is an extreme form of deprivation caused by a decline in entitlements over certain

shift from emergency aid (whether it is in food, in-kind, or in-cash) to regular and reliable social protection. Ethiopia's PSNP, which supports human and other productive asset accumulation among the poor, is the prime example of this kind of shift in approach, although some programmes in Eastern Africa have been introduced recently as pilot projects.

These programmes vary in design and scope, however they share two common characteristics: first, an active involvement of external actors such as international NGOs, bilateral and multilateral agencies; and second, a financial dependency on donor support. As discussed in Section 2, we have identified two main types within this new wave of social assistance: 1) p*ure income transfers* and 2) i*ncome transfers plus services.* In the following sections 4.1 and 4.2 we discuss some these programmes characteristics, using information data from Barrientos et al (2008) Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database.

4.1 Pure income transfers

Pure income transfers under this new wave of social assistance are made on a regular basis and mostly unconditional to means-tested eligible groups that are considered to be vulnerable. These transfers vary in terms of scope and duration. In Kenya, for instance, two pilot programmes are being tested: the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) and the Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable (CT-OVC). The former provides income transfers to food insecure households living in semi-arid lands. In Phase 1, from 2007 to 2010, the programme is expected to cover 3 districts in the country with a high incidence of chronic food insecurity, targeting 300,000 people through a mix of community and categorical targeting. The government of Kenya operates the programme with a US$ 56 million support from the UK Department for International Development (DFID). The CT-OVC is an income transfer programme to encourage and support the adoption and fostering of orphans affected by the HIV/AIDS virus. The CT-OVC also contains a conditional component for controlled comparison that requires school attendance, health check ups and nutrition training. During the pilot, 500 children have been covered and there are plans to scale the scheme up to 7,500 children in the Garissa, Kwale and Nairobi districts.

In Zambia, the pilot Cash Transfer Scheme started in 2004 in the Kalomo District with financial support from *Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* (GTZ) with a focus on households headed by the elderly and caring for orphans and vulnerable children. About 1000 households have participated so far in the pilot. The cost of covering 10% of the poorest population is estimated at 0.4% of GDP. In Malawi, the Mchinji Social Cash Transfer Pilot Scheme started in 2006 targeting households with school age children to both encourage school enrolment and discourage child labour and premature drop outs. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the government of Malawi and the Malawi District Assemblies are involved in the pilot that covered 12,000 households by the end of 2008. The cost of scaling up the scheme to cover 10% of all poor households is estimated at US$ 41 million.

Similarly, in Mozambique two income transfer programmes were launched or piloted:

---

commodities (in this case food), then cash transfers can be seen as appropriate mechanisms to improving the ability of the poor to purchase food.

The Food Subsidy Programme (FSP) and the Minimum Income for School Attendance (MISA). After the Cash Payments to War-displaced Urban Destitute households (GAPVU) was closed, the government of Mozambique, through the National Institute for Social Action (INAS) decided to launch FSP to reduce food insecurity amongst those in extreme poverty and who are temporarily or permanently unable to work, through income transfers. The programme reaches about 100,000 direct beneficiaries and unlike most income transfers in East Africa, the programme is financed entirely through the state budget. On the other hand, MISA was a pilot scheme coordinated by the Ministry of Education, Health, Social Action and Natural Disasters, which aimed to provide income transfers to poor rural households with children of school age.

The rationale for most unconditional income transfer programmes targeted at households with school-age children are designed under the premise that the costs associated with schooling can be significant relative to the level of consumption expenditure of the poor. In that context, pure income transfers can play, as instruments of social protection, a very important role in compensating for these cost and encouraging investment decisions in human capital. This can be crucial for long-term patterns of social and economic development.

4.2 Income transfers *plus* services

Income transfers in combination with service utilisation usually take the approach of conditioning the income transfer on the household supplying labour for public and community works. This type of interventions has been adopted primarily in Ethiopia is now being piloted in Malawi (ILTPWP). In Ethiopia, the Cash for Work Programme (CFW); the Urban Food for Work programme (UFFW); the Meket Livelihoods Development Project (MLDP); and the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) are either in pilot or rolling out stage.

The main income transfer plus services scheme is Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP). Programme started in 2005 and has two components: labour intensive public works; and direct support for labour deficient households, over three to five years. Five million people are expected to benefit from the programme, scaling up to 15 million in an inter-year emergency programme. It will run in 8 regions: Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, SNNPR, Harari, Diredawa, Afar, and Somali. Government of Ethiopia and a joint donor group CIDA, DFID, the EC, USAID and the World Bank. The PSNP provides income transfers for a maximum period of 6 months per year. While these transfers were intended to significantly increase household income, they are now reported to have lost their purchasing power due to rises in food prices and therefore, may be too small to address the needs of the poor (see Gibson and Nyhus 2009).

Box about PSNP to be introduced here

CFW started in 2002 and provides an income transfer to poor households. Although the transfer can be unconditional, in most cases there is a work requirement. About 13,000 recipients have benefited, 35% were women. CFW is financed by German Agro Action (GAA); the Organization for the Rehabilitation and Development of Amhara (ORDA); and German Ministry for Economic Cooperation. Cash disbursed was US$ 577,000. Urban Food for Work (UFFW), Project started in 1997 in Addis Ababa, and provides short-term employment opportunities to the unemployed and underemployed in extremely poor areas, CARE. Figures about cost are not available.

Meket Livelihoods Development Project (MLDP). Programme started in 2003 and uses a mixture of cash-for-work and transfers for pregnant and lactating mothers, older people, children, and those with disabilities. The transfer is seasonal, and the amount of cash transferred increases with household size. There are about 46,600 beneficiaries. Save the Children UK; Funding by Government of The Netherlands. The budget was €898,260.

Arguments in favour of this type of programmes generally rely on two general assumptions: first, unlike other approaches to social assistance, conditional transfers reduce food dependency and the incentives to leisure; and second, they contribute to improving local infrastructure such as roads and irrigation systems. Arguments against income transfers made conditional on public works usually point at its self-exclusion element. Despite the fact that some programmes like Ethiopia’s CFW have included in their design quotas to ensure the inclusion of vulnerable groups like women, those too ill, old or young to participate in public works are *de facto* excluded from participation, despite being highly vulnerable groups. There are also concerns regarding the quality of the infrastructure built that may generate high maintenance costs in the future.

Especially important are some issues that are connected to programme design features. Income transfers conditional on public works are designed to address seasonal unemployment and therefore, are made on a temporary basis. But that makes them unpredictable, making it very difficult for poor households to take full advantage of the schemes in future household planning. Thus, although these programmes can represent important short-term and medium-term safety nets against some types of risks, they do not address long-term deficits of well being. This is the central difference between the type of programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa and India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme (NREGP), which entitles at least one adult in every household in rural areas to a minimum of 100 days of guaranteed employment every year. The programme also entitles beneficiaries to unemployment allowance if the job under the scheme is not provided within a specified period; medical treatment in case of injury under the programme; and. child care for the women that are employed under the scheme (one-third of all beneficiaries).

In marked contrast to the successful experience of conditionality in Latin America, Sub-Saharan African countries have not engaged in conditioning income transfers on school attendance and health check ups. Governments in the Sub-Saharan region are concerned about issues regarding institutional capacity and local infrastructure. After all, this type of conditionality requires a minimum degree of accessibility to, and quality of, educational and health services[12].

[12] Some studies have attempted to microsimulate the effect of this type of conditionality. Kakwani, N. S., F and Son, HH (2005) for instance, find that in order to significantly reduce poverty, income transfer programmes will need to be large enough, in the order of 2 to 8 percent of GDP, although an unconditional transfer would not increase school attendance significantly, suggesting that conditionality may be desirable to achieving desirable outcomes in human development and poverty reduction.

5. The green shoots of Social protection and the Policy Process

There is much discussion about whether the emergence of social protection as a policy framework in Africa responds to domestic demand or is simply a new donor fad. On the one hand, the Livingstone process[13], a ministerial level African Union initiative to develop national social protection plans, suggests a strong measure of support for social protection from national governments in the region. On the other hand, the proliferation of pilot social protection projects supported and financed by multilaterals and bilaterals suggests the influence of the development industry[14]. In fact, there is more light, and eventually fruit, to be gained from a nuanced examination of the processes of policy diffusion and learning in the region. Everyone agrees that reliance on emergency food aid as the main instrument for addressing poverty and vulnerability in the region, the 'old model' of doing social protection, has been ineffective, and perhaps damaging, for social and economic development in the region. There is little opposition to the view that new approaches must be adopted that can be effective in reducing widespread and persistent deprivation. The main debates are about who is driving the evolution of policy; issues of programme design (conditional or unconditional, universal or means-tested, etc) and financing.

The Livingstone process does constitute an important step forward in expressing the commitment of the national governments in the region to move ahead with the extension of social protection, even if the process itself was funded and facilitated by the UK's DFID. And while the work of multilaterals and bilaterals in generating awareness and capacity around social protection, and in providing technical support, is generally a very positive step; the proliferation of pilot projects reflects as much the weakness of domestic policy formulation processes in the countries concerned as it reflects the failings of the 'development industry'. Below we discuss some of these issues in more detail.

5.1 Internal and external factors

He debates about 'who' is driving the policy agenda related to both actors and to ideas and/or models. Often these interact in complex ways. For example, the origins of the 'Southern Africa model' providing unconditional means tested grants to vulnerable groups reflects the adaptation of the European model of social assistance to South Africa in the 1920s. The social pension in South Africa which began as a programme supporting poor white and Indians, was later extended to coloureds and blacks, and substantially reshaped with the democratisation process in South Africa after the collapse of Apartheid. It has been the influence of the South Africa social pension programme that has been fundamental in the diffusion of social pensions to Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland. To an important extent the large share of social expenditure allocated to the grants in South Africa reflects the endorsement of domestic political elites in response to the increasing demands of their constituencies. The introduction of the Child Support Grant extends support to children in poor households that was previously restricted to older and disabled groups in poverty.

---

[13] The Livingstone process refers to the ministerial conference that took place on March 2006 in Livingstone, Zambia, and where 13 African governments agreed to put together national social protection plans to support older people and other vulnerable groups. Subsequently, the ministers met in Windhoek in November 2008 to take plans forward. For a detail description of the Livingstone call for action, see www.helpage.org

[14] The CT-OVC in Kenya provides a classic example. So many donors were involved that its model became excessively complicated. Fortunately, during implementation, this design has been simplified (A. Barientos).

It has been suggested that the introduction of the social pension in neighbouring countries demonstrates a ‘domino effect’ in policy diffusion. Devereux and Cipryk (2009) for instance, report that the Old Age Pension scheme in Lesotho was a determinant factor in the final result of the 2007 general election. The disruption of pension payments in Swaziland in 2006 led to the suspension of Parliamentary activities until payments were reinstalled. These elements of the political process in Southern Africa suggest that social protection has been instrumental in empowering vulnerable groups, traditionally excluded from political debate, on the grounds of entitlements and citizenship. Even when the influence of the social pension in South Africa is acknowledged, it is important to note that Namibia’s social pension is universal in the sense that it is paid to all qualifying older persons. Lesotho’s social pension is also universal but is collected from age 70. In Botswana, on the other hand, the social pension is means-tested.

In Eastern Africa, the involvement of bilateral and multilateral agencies and international NGOs is much stronger, and they have exerted significant influence on the emergence of social protection strategies and social protection programmes. The focus on social protection among donors is stronger where emergency aid has been a major and agency activity. Linkages are well established between, for example, UNICEF and Safe the Children, and pilot transfer schemes in Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Rwanda, Mozambique and Ethiopia. DFID has influenced and financed many of these social protection programmes. GTZ was the main international partners in Zambia’s Kalomo Social Transfer Pilot. The Japanese aid agency is supporting a pilot pension scheme in Tanzania. The ILO has been involved in providing technical support for social pension schemes in West Africa, and has also supported community health insurance schemes there. The World Bank has provided technical assistance in several countries, usually in combination with other development partners.

Interestingly, South to South policy diffusion initiatives are beginning to take shape in the region. This South-South cooperation appears to be taking off particularly between Brazil and some Western African countries. The Africa-Brazil alliance was born in 2005 with the explicit objective of promoting knowledge sharing and technical cooperation. In 2007, the government of Brazil provided the government of Ghana with technical assistance in the design of a pilot income transfer scheme (Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty) that has been financially supported by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development. Nigeria, which is at the design stage of an income transfer programme, has established linkages with Brazil for technical assistance[15].

The influence of external actors works best where engagement with domestic political and policy processes enable a stronger ownership from national governments, and where the influence of external actors results in a menu of options available. The influence of international partners did not prevent the Government of Ethiopia from shaping the Productive Safety Net Programme in ways that supported its own priorities and orientation. In fact, Government ownership of the programme strengthened when its own expectations of the success of the programme in graduating households out of poverty proved difficult to achieve. By contrast, in Zambia the government has been reluctant to scale up four pilot programmes pushed, financed, and largely managed by international partners. These contrasting examples demonstrate that the influence of international partners around social protection can be exaggerated, while demonstrating at the same time that the extension of

[15] For more details, see http://www.undp-povertycentre.org

social protection can be thwarted by the lack of attention to domestic political and policy processes.

6. Challenges ahead

Several challenges face the extension of social protection in Sub-Saharan Africa; here we focus on the two aspects that concern policy makers and other actors in the region the most: First, concerns regarding the long-term financial viability of these programmes are often raised by finance ministers, who fear fiscal and especially political pressures once the programmes are incorporated into budgetary system. Second, concerns regarding the institutional capacity of implementation and delivery that may restrict the scope and effectiveness of targeting and therefore, the magnitude of poverty impact. These concerns, which are internally contested, are discussed in this section.

6.1 Financial viability

Governments in the African region are generally concerned about the financial implications from introducing social protection programmes in the context of a high incidence of poverty and extreme poverty. Even if social protection programmes could be initially restricted to the extreme poor (as in Malawi and Zambia where programmes target only the poorest 10% of the population), Finance Ministers are justified in having concerns that a rapid escalation of the programmes would generate large and long term liabilities beyond their budgetary capacity. It is important for those advocating the extension of social protection to articulate precisely the scope and reach of new programmes. The ILO has undertaken very detailed simulations across a range of countries in the region, with varying fiscal capacity and macroeconomic conditions, of the costs of different interventions. Their conclusions are that well designed programmes directed at older and disabled people, children and covering primary health provision could be affordable in most countries. Very roughly, their simulations suggest that 1% of GDP could be sufficient to cover a basic pension, 2% of GDP a child focused transfer, and 2-3% of GDP could finance primary health provision. These costs calculations cover universal programmes (in the sense that they would extend entitlements to al in the respective age or categorical group). If governments were to adopt targeted programmes instead, the cost calculations would result in significantly lower figures.

Even if targeted programmes are adopted, even a 1% of GDP spend on social protection programmes would be hard to achieve in situations where the government tax collection capacity is very limited. Uganda, for example, collects around 13% of GDP in taxes, and a 1% of GDP allocation to social protection would involve a significant expenditure switch or additional resource mobilisation. Improving the tax collection capacity of governments in the region is thus essential. Experts believe that the key is to improve the efficiency of tax agencies, rather than create new taxes. As regards additional resource mobilisation, studies of the marginal costs of raising social funds in the region suggest that the distortions arising from collecting an additional 1% of GDP in taxes are likely to be small. Estimates for the region suggest that it takes on average around US$1.15 to raise US$1 for government expenditure. The issue then is to demonstrate that social protection programmes would have rates of return which exceed the costs of raising social funds [CHECK]. This work has not been undertaken to date, but measures of the rates of return to education in Africa, for example, would suggest that social protection programmes that raised human capital among those in poverty could easily meet this test.

While in low income countries, international aid could provide a source for financing the set up costs of introducing social protection programmes and the costs of transfers in the initial stages of a programme, it is imperative for the sustainability of these programmes that they become reliant on domestic sources of finance. The financial viability of social assistance can also be achieved progressively with donor and technical support. This implicitly requires working on capacity building, including the development of operational capabilities and the expansion of the fiscal base over time. But this can only be regarded as a feasible option if there is political will and minimum cooperation with other actors, such as research institutions, and inter-institutional dialogue. This connects to the issue of institutional capacity.

6.2 Institutional capacity

Social Protection is about building institutions for addressing poverty and vulnerability. It is not surprising that policy makers and other actors involved in poverty reduction strategies perceive institutional capacity as a barrier to the expansion of social protection in some parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. These actors fear that constraints in terms of local capacities to generate and expand the knowledge-base may restrict the process of scaling up and delivering social protection programmes beyond the small-scale pilot stage. And if programmes' rolling out is finally undertaken, technical capabilities will be need for monitoring, impact-evaluation and fine-tuning.

International NGOs and multilateral and bilateral agencies have a role to play in supporting and assisting the process of building up local capacities. The experience of Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Program can be illustrative in that context. However, although important, the role of external forces are undeniably limited in terms of length and scope of programme implementation and in some instances, even inappropriate as channels of institutional change. External actors can only take on a supportive function in a broader internal process of social and political transformation that permits social protection to scale up and embed into the social and political system. If the green shoots of social protection are going to root and blossom, then important parallel efforts needs to be taken in order to strengthen the capacity of local institutions involved. Barrientos and Hulme (2008) for instance, point out that "*a successful extension of social protection will involve the horizontal integration of poverty researchers, policy analyst, political scientist, financial experts, programme managers, information system analysts and developers, accountants and field officers*". This will necessarily require a long-term vision from local universities, research institutions and policy makers. However, it is unclear whether these agents in parts of Eastern, Western and Central Africa are able or prepared to embark in such social transformation.

7. Concluding remarks

In this paper we have discussed the *new wave* of social protection programmes that are sprouting as green shoots in the field of poverty reduction programmes across Sub-Saharan Africa. These programmes have taken different approaches to social assistance although there are two dominant models of social protection: the Southern African model and the Middle African model.

One is the Southern Africa model. The rapid extension of social protection in Southern Africa, especially with the introduction of non-contributory old-age pensions in Lesotho Botswana, and Swaziland and the Child Support Grants in South Africa. The second is the *new wave* of programmes including the Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia, and the Orphans and Vulnerable Children, and the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty, both in Kenya, and a large number of pilot programmes in Eastern, Western and Central Africa. These signal an important shift in policy thinking in the region, moving from the delivery of temporary and unreliable humanitarian relief for addressing food insecurity, towards more permanent and reliable income-based approaches to social assistance for addressing poverty and vulnerability. This reflects the apparent increasing consensus in relation to the limited effectiveness of emergency food aid as an instrument against extreme poverty.

But although the green shoots of social protection have sprouted across Sub-Saharan Africa, it is unclear as to whether they will root and blossom. Concerns are especially related to long-term financial viability and the institutional capacity at the country level, particularly outside the Southern African region.

Social protection under the Southern African model has extended as part of historical and domestic policy developments in South Africa and neighbouring states. South Africa's fiscal base and policy formulation and implementation capacities have been central to these processes. However, most programmes in Eastern, Western and Central Africa are heavily reliant on international aid, and their design and management often reflect the influence of international organisations. The fact that most programmes remain at a small-scale pilot stage, may reflect the reluctance of domestic political elites to embrace social protection. The Livingstone process constitutes an important step forward in expressing the commitment of African governments to move ahead with the extension of social protection, although the need for political ownership remains significant. This may restrict the prospects for scaling up the existing, newly planned and implemented pilots programmes in several countries, to cover large proportions of the extreme poor population. The large scale of Ethiopia's PSNP, and the strong role of the government of Ethiopia in programme design, mark this programme out from much of what is happening in Middle Africa. The performance of the PSNP will have a significant impact on what happens in Sub-Saharan African outside of Southern Africa. Whether Ethiopia will eventually become a base for policy evolution that diffuses regionally, as is the case with South Africa, remains to be seen.

With reference to the long-term financial viability, recent cost simulations have shown that social protection programmes are affordable even for the poorest countries in the region, although donor support may be needed for a transition period while countries strengthen their fiscal base. The discussion among the international aid community regarding a shift from programme and project aid, to direct budgetary support could create favourable conditions for a transition towards the development of long-term social protection institutions. Some fear that the impact of the global financial crisis could delay the prospects of expansion of social protection in the region although policy actions could be taken domestically, especially in countries where fiscal space permits a fiscal stimulus, to support a rapid extension and strengthening of social protection programmes to help the poor to mitigate the effect of the crisis.

And in the poorest countries, the aid community could play a central role in supporting, during a transition period, the countries' budgets for scaling up social protection programmes. However, budgetary support will not be enough. After all, social protection is about building institutions for poverty reduction. Several countries will need support to strengthen their institutional capacity while scaling up their programmes. That entails the commitment of multilateral organisations, bilateral donor agencies, international NGOs, and research institutes and think-tanks in the North and South, to support the process of building up local capacities and know-how in the poorest countries. The experience of Ethiopia's PSNP offers promising prospects. But while the work of external actors can be very positive in taking on a supportive function, it is only through domestic policy making and political processes that the green shoots of social protection can become rooted in African societies and blossom to contribute in the fight against extreme poverty and vulnerability in Sub-Saharan Africa.

8. References

ALDERMAN, H., HODDINOTT, J. & KINSEY, B. (2006) Long term consequences of early childhood malnutrition. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 58**,** 450-474.

ANGELUCCI, M. & G. DE GIORGI (2005). Indirect effects of an Aid Program: the case of Progresa and Consumption**:** 54.

ARDINGTON, C. C., A. & HOSEGOOD, V. (2007). "Labor supply responses to large social transfers: longitudinal evidence from South Africa." NBER Working Paper Series(13442): 42.

BARRETT, C. (2006) Food Aid's Intended and Unintended Consequences. *Background Paper for FAO State of Food and Africulture 2006.*

BARRIENTOS, A., GORMAN, M. & HESLOP, A. (2003) Old-age poverty in developing countires: contributions and dependence in later life. *World Development,* 3.

BARRIENTOS, A., HOLMES, R. & SCOTT, J. (2008) Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database. Version 4.0. Brooks World Poverty Institute.

BARRIENTOS, A. & HULME, D. (Eds.) (2008) *Social Protection for the Poor and Poorest. Concepts, Policies and Politics,* London, Palgrave MacMillan.

BEHRMAN, J., ALDERMAN, H. & HODDINOTT, J. (Eds.) (2004) *Hunger and malnutrition,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

CONWAY, T., DE HAAN, T. & NORTON, A. (2005) *Social protection: New Directions of Donor Agencies,* London, Department of International Development.

CRAMER, C. (2006) *Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing,* London, Hurst and Company.

DEVEREUX, S. & CIPRYK, R. (2009) Ford Foundation Social Protection Scoping Study Regional Chapter: Sub-Saharan Africa.

GLEWWE, P. & KING, E. M. (2001) The Impact of Early Childhood Nutritional Status on Cognitive Development: Does the Timing of Malnutrition Matter? *The World Bank Economic Review,* 15**,** 81-113.

HARVEY, P. (2007) Cash-based responses in emergencies. *Humanitarian Policy Group.* London, Overseas Development Institute.

ILO (2001) Social Security. A New Consensus. Geneva, International Labour Office.

KAKWANI, N. S., F AND SON, HH (2005): "Conditional Cash Transfers in African Countries," *International Poverty Centre Working Paper,* 44.

LUND, F. (1993) State Social Benefits in South Africa. *International Social Security Review,* 46**,** 5-25.

PEPPIATT, D., MITCHELL, J. & ALLEN, P. (2000) Cash Transfers in Emergencies. A review drawing upon the tsunami and other experiences. *Social Policy and Economic Analysis.* Bangkok, Thailand, UNICEF East Asia and the Pacific Regional Office.

SEN, A. (1981) *Poverty and Famines : An Essay on Entitlements and Deprivation,* Oxford, Clarendon Press.

UNAIDS (2008) Report on the global AIDS epidemic. Geneva, United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS.

UNICEF (2008) The State of Africa's Children. New York, The United Nations Children's Fund.

WORLD BANK (2001) Social Protection Sector Strategy. From Safety Net to Springboard. In Group T. H. D. N. T. W. B. (Ed.). Washington DC, World Bank.

Appendix 1

Table A1. Models of Social Protection in Sub-Sahara Africa

Models of social protection	Typology		Country	Programme	Characteristics	Agencies involved and cost
Southern African model	Pure income transfers	Unconditional and regular	South Africa	Non-contributory Old-Age Pension	Means-tested categorical scheme. Started in 1928 and extended gradually to black population over the 1990s. Take up is mearly universal amongst blacks, and covered nearly 2 million beneficiaries in 2002.	Government of South Africa and provincial authorities. The scheme costs about 1.4% of GDP
				Child Support Grant	Cash transfer introduced in 1998 to poor children age 13 and less, and to foster carers and carers of children with mental disability. Programme started in 1998 and covered 2.5 million children in 2003.	Government of South Africa. The programme cost about 0.7% of GDP
			Lesotho	Non-contributory pension scheme	Programme started in 2004 as a monthly transfer to older citizens from the age of 70. The programme covers around 70,000 beneficiaries, 60% of which are women.	Government of Lesotho. The programme cost about 1.4% of GDP
			Namibia	Non-Contributory Old-age Pension	Categorical scheme. Programme extended to black population in the 1990s. About 95% of eligible invidivual receive the pension, although coverage is lower in remote northern provinces, and the likelihood of receiving the pension falls when social worker posts are unfilled.	Government of Namibia. The scheme costs nearly 2% of GDP
	Income transfers and service utilisation	Conditional on public works but irregular	South Africa	Zibambele	Provides permanent employment through labour-intensive road maintenance. Workers are employed on a part-time basis (8 days per month). The contract is given to a household rather than to an individual, so that if the primary worker is unable to work employment in the shifts to another household member. Programme covers 14,000 workers.	Provincial Department of Transport in KwaZulu Natal. Budget in 2002/03 was R56 million
				Gundo Lashu	Programme focused on employment creation and taining for labour-intensive road rehabilitation. Period of employment ranges between less than one month and four months, and covers about 1700 labourers on the basis of the Special Public Works Programme.	Roads Agency Limpopo, with financial support from DFID and the ILO. Budget in 2003/4 was R50 million

Food-Aid Humanitarian Assistance	Food and cash transfers	Unconditional but irregular	Ethiopia	Non-emergency food aid and food-for-work	Programmes started in the 1980s to provide food to those in need, and in the 1990s, a transfer conditional on work was introduced.	Government of Ethiopia. Figures not available but equivalent to 15 million tons of food per annum in 1990s.
			Liberia	Internally Displaced People Relief Assistance Project	Food-based programme that targets at 41,000 war-affected people living in 3 camps of the Montserrado County: Wilson, Jahtondo Town, and Blamasee Displaced Centres.	World Relief Canada; Christian and Missionary Alliance; Mennonite Central Committee; Association of Evangelicals of Liberia (AEL). The budget cost is C$786 thousand.
			Gambia	Programme combines two projects: Child Survival Project and Sesame Growers' Association (SGA) Project	Programme started in the 1990s and aims at improving infant and child feeding practices, improved maternal health and nutrition, and improved home based care of childhood illnesses. Through the SGA project, the programme also promotes sesame as a cash crop for women farmers, providing an alternative food and income source.	Catholic Relief Service provided funding and implementation in association with local partners, the National Women Farmers Association (NAWFA) and the Gambian Food and Nutrition Association (GAFNA). Cost estimated at 63,534 MT.
			Zambia	Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS)	It started in the 1950s, providing support to Zambian war veterans, but almost ended by the early 1990s. It was evaluated and re-designed in 1997 and launched in 2000. Programme is community-based and offers social assistance to the most vulnerable in terms of food, shelter, education, health, and clothing. It reaches about 90,000 people.	Government of Zambia; Department of Social Welfare under the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services. Funded by GRZ, GTZ, UNICEF, DANIDA.
			Zimbabwe	Protracted Relief Programme	Programme started in 2004, aiming at boosting food production by providing agricultural inputs, promotion of low input technologies and limited targeted food assistance with particular emphasis on AIDS-affected households. Expected to cover 1.5 million beneficiaries.	DFID; various NGOs. Cost estimated at £18m for the whole programme (initial 2 years).
			Malawi	North-Central Food Response	Programme started in 2002, following the Malawian food crisis, and aims at providing food to HIV/AIDS-affected families and improving the nutritional status of children under the age of 5. The total number of recipients will be more than 28 thousand.	World Relief Canada; World Relief Malawi. Budget estimated at C$514,795

Middle Africa model	Pure income transfers	Unconditional and regular	Kenya	The Hunger Safety Net Pilot Programme (HSNP)	Pilot programme that provides transfers to food insecure households in semi-arid lands. It aims to reduce dependency on emergency food aid. In Phase 1 (2007-2010), 3 districts with a high incidence of chronic food insecurity will be selected, targeting 300,000 people through a mix of community and categorical targeting.	Government of Kenya and DFID. US$56m budget for Phase 1
				Pilot Cash Transfers for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC)	Pilot cash transfer with both unconditional and conditional components for comparison. It aims to encourage adoption/fostering of orphans affected by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. During the pilot, 500 were covered with the aim to scale up to 7,500 children in Garissa, Kwale and Nairobi districts.	Government of Kenya; UNICEF; DFID; SIDA; World Bank. The total cost of the grant and delivery for 300,000 children is estimated to be within the range of US$37 to US$48 million, whcih represents between 1% and 2% of total government expenditure.
			Zambia	Pilot Cash Transfer Scheme Kalomo District	Pilot started in 2004 aimed at reducing extreme poverty, with a focus on households headed by the elderly and caring from orphan and vulnerable children. During pilot about 1000 households have benefited. Target population is 10% of population in area covered by pilot.	Ministry of Community Development and Social Services and GTZ. The cost of covering all destitute households in Zambia is estimated at 0.4% of GDP.
			Malawi	Mchinji Social Cash Transfer Pilot Scheme	Scheme started in 2006. Cash is transferred to households and a bonus is given to households with children of school-going age to encourage school enrolment and attendance and to discourage child labour and premature drop outs. It is estimated that by the end of 2008 12,000 households were reached.	UNICEF; Government of Malawi; Malawi District Assemblies. Costs for Pilot scheme for one year is US$ 371,000. If the programme is scaled up to cover 10% of all poor households it is estimated to cost US$ 41 million.
			Mozambique	Food Subsidy Programme	National programme set up in 1997 after GAPVU was closed. The cash transfer aims to support entitlements to food through raising household income. There is multiple eligibility criteria, making targeting complex. The scheme previously focused on urban and peri-urban areas, but expansion to rural areas has been approved. It reaches about 69,095 direct beneficiaries and 91,411 indirect beneficiaries.	Government of Mozambique - The National Institute for Social Action (INAS), under the Ministry for Women and Social Action (MMAS). Programme financed entirely through the state budget.
				Minimum Income for School Attendance (MISA)	Pilot programme started in 2002, and provides a cash transfer to poor households in rural areas with children of school age; girls are especially targeted. Around 5,000 families receive benefits.	Ministry of Education, Health, Social Action and Natural Disasters. Cost figures are not available.

Middle Africa model	Income transfers and service utilisation	Conditional on public works and irregular	Ethiopia	Cash for Work (CFW)	Programme started in 2002 to provide cash to poor households, and although the transfer can be unconditional, in most cases has a work requirement. About 13,000 recipients have been benefited, 35% were women.	German Agro Action (GAA); the Organization for the Rehabilitation and Development of Amhara (ORDA); co-financed by German Ministry for Economic Cooperation. Cash disburshed was US$ 577 thousands.
				Urban Food for Work (UFFW)	Project started in 1997 in Addis Ababa, and provides short-term employment opportunities to the unemployed and underemployed in extremely poor areas	CARE. Figures about cost are not available.
				Meket Livelihoods Development Project (MLDP)	Programme started in 2003 and uses a mixture of cash-for-work and transfers for pregnant and lactating mothers, older people, children, and those with disabilities. The transfer is seasonal, and the amount of cash transferred increases with household size. There are about 46,600 beneficiaries.	Save the Children UK; Funding by Government of The Netherlands. The budget was €898,260.
				Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP)	Programme started in 2005 and has two components: labour intensive public works; and direct support for labour deficient households, over three to five years. Five million people are expected to benefit from programme, scaling up to 15 million in an inter-year emergency programme. It will run in 8 regions: Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, SNNPR, Harari, Diredawa, Afar, and Somali.	Government of Ethiopia and a joint donor group CIDA, DFID, the EC, USAID and the World Bank. Cost figures not available.
			Malawi	Improving Livelihood Through Public Works Programme (ILTPWP) (Part of MASAF)	Pilot programme started in 2003 with an integrated approach. This includes savings mobilisation, promotion of economic activities and capacity building in planning, project management, monitoring and evaluation. Public works included road infrastructure, dam projects and afforestation projects. Beneficiaries are selected by a wealth ranking and mapping exercise.	DFID, MASAF, CARE, District Assemblies. Cost figures not available but cost per beneficiary ranges from: MK7,276 in Ntchisi to MK8,824 in Dowa.

Source: Barrientos et al (2008)