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OPEN ACCESS
Converging divergence? Unpacking the new geography of 21st century global development

Rory Horner

1 Lecturer, ESRC Future Research Leader and Hallsworth Research Fellow, Global Development Institute, The University of Manchester, United Kingdom.

Email: rory.horner@manchester.ac.uk

David Hulme

2 Professor of Development Studies, Global Development Institute, The University of Manchester, United Kingdom.

Email: david.hulme@manchester.ac.uk

Cite this paper as:

Abstract

Building on a body of research on the “what” and “how” of post-2015 development, and motivated by the significant spatial shift to having a universal frame of reference in the Sustainable Development Goals, this article considers the “where” of contemporary development. The shifting geographies of economic, human and environmental aspects of development are charted. Some converging trends between the Global North and South render untenable the framing of international development as a 19th and 20th century world of “divergence big time”. Yet, some degree of global convergence does not adequately capture a world where development inequalities are profound. Instead, while the over-arching binary framing of development is blurring, such a trend is overlain by growing divergence at smaller spatial scales – especially within nations. “Converging divergence” characterises the new geography of 21st century global development, moving beyond overly optimistic claims of global convergence, but also beyond pessimistic accounts of the perpetuation of old development divides. The implications of “converging divergence” are explored and it is concluded that 21st century global development involves and must address a very different geography from that of 20th century international development.

Keywords

International development, global development, inequality, geography, post-2015.

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1. Introduction: new geographies of development

New geographies of development have been identified across several socio-economic spheres – wealth, middle classes, poverty, health, environment, development assistance and others – since the turn of the millennium. Such changes are present in both (Cowen and Shenton 1996; Hart 2001) “little d” development, considered as immanent processes of social and economic transformation, and “big D” development, understood as the project of active intervention. Meanwhile, the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have a global focus that represents a universalisation of the challenge of development, a clear departure from the Millennium Development Goals’ (MDGs’) almost exclusive focus on developing countries. The World Bank declared (in April 2016) that it will no longer distinguish between developed and developing countries in its annual World Development Indicators. The contemporary global map of development appears increasingly incommensurable with any notion of a clear spatial demarcation between First and Third Worlds, “developed” and “developing”, or rich and poor, countries.

Recognition of the increasing obsolescence of the old development map is in many ways a cause for celebration. Indeed, until relatively recently, feelings persisted that the macro-scale map might never change, with frequent lamentation of the durability of the divide between developed and developing countries. “Divergence, big time” was how one authoritative, late 1990s analysis of income levels characterised two sets of developed and developing economies from 1870-1990 (Pritchett 1997). In the early 21st century, however, somewhat more optimistic accounts have claimed that “the world is flat” (Friedman 2005), and have pointed to a “great surge of developing countries” (Radelet 2015) and “great convergence” (Mahbubani 2013; Baldwin 2016). The emergence of global middle classes is being heralded, while the number living in extreme poverty has fallen dramatically.

Yet a visitor to, and more importantly a citizen of, planet Earth approaching 2020 could also be confused about whether life is getting better or not, and for whom. Although increasingly widespread recognition exists that the distinction between developed and developing countries is no longer tenable, enormous inequality and unevenness persists, and to some extent is even augmented, under a new spatial configuration of development. Increasing attention has been placed on growing inequality within many countries in both Global North and South (OECD 2011; Ravallion 2014; ISSC, IDS and UNESCO 2016). One provocative argument has even suggested that “Euro-America is evolving toward Africa” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012).

While the “what” and “how” of the post-2015 era has been extensively debated (egeg Sumner and Melamed 2010; Oldekop et al 2016), this article explicitly focuses on the “where” question. We engage with shifting geographies of economic, human and environmental factors between North and South as well as recent research on inequalities between and within countries, to consider the “where” of global development. We use the term “converging” – defined as “inclining towards each other or towards a common point of meeting; tending to meet in a point” (Oxford English
Dictionary) to refer to such trends in various development indicators across Global North and South. We use converging over convergence to refer more to the direction rather than to suggest a complete convergence will or has occurred. We then use the term “divergence” to refer to the “the action of diverging: moving off in different directions from the same point…, so that the intervening distance continually increases” (Oxford English Dictionary) – in relation to the growing inequalities and difference at smaller spatial scales within the Global North and South – particularly growing within-country inequalities. The initially paradoxical notion of “converging divergence” aims to move beyond claims of global convergence, which don’t fully account for vast global inequalities, but also beyond pessimistic accounts of the perpetuation of old development divides, to better capture the geography of 21st century global development. It also provides a fundamental challenge to the assumption that “development” is only about the Global South.

The paper proceeds as follows. After briefly introducing the “old” geography of international development (section 2), converging trends between North and South are identified (section 3), before divergence – particularly within nations – is outlined (section 4). The implications of “converging divergence” are then considered (section 5) – in terms of the spatial reference of development, the spatial nomenclature, the meaning of development and big “D” development. It is concluded (section 6) that these changes necessitate a shift from analysing international development to global development.

2. “Divergence, big time”: the “old” geography of international development

The “divergence, big time”, of which Pritchett (1997) provided a detailed economic analysis, was based on a macro-scale geography which has underlain most mainstream conceptualisations of development – that of a world divided into two: developed and developing countries (in which the former Soviet bloc has always sat awkwardly positioned). The long-term divergence articulated between the two groups of countries – hereafter mostly termed Global North and South – characterised the course of the 19th and 20th centuries. It marked a sharp departure – or even “reversal of fortune” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2002) from the condition at the turn of the 19th century, when various estimates suggest that relatively little gap was then present between the two groups in aggregate1. Until 1820, most income inequalities in the

1 For example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) suggested that the Global South had been more prosperous until the “reversal of fortune”, while Bairoch (1993) suggested that at the turn of the 19th century, there was almost no income gap between developed and developing countries.
world were based on differences within countries\(^2\). Yet, with the industrial revolution in Europe and the accumulation of organisational and technological innovation and related factors of production there and in its offshoots (North America, Australia and New Zealand), along with the very significant influence of colonialism, inequalities between countries surged, as demonstrated in Figure 1 below\(^3\).

**Figure 1: Growing importance of income inequalities between countries in 19\(^{th}\) and 20\(^{th}\) centuries**

![Graph showing income inequalities between countries](image)


\(^2\) One estimate suggests a Gini coefficient for world income distribution of 0.50, which would have been only 0.16 if individual incomes were equal within each country (Bourguignon and Morrisson 2002, 727). Subsequently, inequality within countries, relatively high at the beginning of the 19\(^{th}\) century, increased slightly during the century, before declining from the first World War until the 1950s, and then relatively stabilising (Bourguignon 2015, 37).

\(^3\) Bourguignon and Morrison (2002) have presented slightly different figures to the World Bank data, although showing a very similar trend. From accounting for only 20\% of global income inequality in 1820, they estimated that between-country inequalities grew to 60\% by 1950—thus comprising a larger share of, and driving, growing overall inequalities between individuals.
Within this context of significant divergence, a focus on international development emerged with a varied nomenclature although very consistent spatial reference, along with a particular meaning of development, manifest in development assistance. Following “the ‘Big Bang’ of spatial terminology” in the 1940s as epitomised in Truman’s oft-noted reference to “underdeveloped areas”, a division into three different worlds was popularised by Sauvy (1952) and Worsley (1964) and gathered momentum in the context of the Cold War (Pletsch 1981). Although succeeded by the terminology of “Global South” following the Brandt Report of 1980, the focus has been on understanding, and intervening in, the “poor countries” of the world so that they can “catch up”. This relatively straightforward spatial binary was notably manifest in “big D” development assistance (eg Six 2009). Driven by developed countries, its goal – and a key characteristic of the international development paradigm – was “the development of somebody else” in “Latin America, Africa and Asia” (Six 2009, 1105).

As analysed and critiqued in depth by Escobar (1995), the classic focus of development in research and policy, then, had been how the South would emulate the North and become developed. A temporality was thus embedded along with the spatiality. Born in the 1950s, development economics focused on “the rescue of the people of the poor countries from their poverty” (Galbraith 1979, 29). A more multidisciplinary development studies also gained prominence in the 1950s and 1960s, notably in the United Kingdom and focused on former colonies in Africa and Asia. A clear overlap was understood between poor countries, their people and poverty (with the opposite association for rich countries). For many scholars of development, “countries in Asia, Africa or Latin America were considered to be a more or less homogeneous part of the world system” (Fold 2009, 13).

A spatial logic based on this simple and exclusive division has also been a key framing for understanding development in parts of the so-called developing world itself. Movements from within the then-called Third World adopted the framing in their own actions – representing the progressive use of the idea. Third Worldism (Berger 2004) was connected to national liberation projects and the New International Economic Order (NIEO) addressing North-South structural economic relations. Amongst developing countries, the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1950s, a United Nations voting bloc (the G77) in 1964, earned global diplomatic significance for this group.

Critical scholars have long questioned this spatial demarcation of international development. Pletsch, for example, referred to the three worlds scheme as “perhaps the most primitive system of classification in our social scientific discourse” (1981, 565). Postcolonial scholarship critiqued North-South binaries, highlighting “the contingency of North-South relations; the shifting contexts and contents of Northern views; the varied sites and agents of knowledge; and the complex utility of development to both North and South” (Radcliffe 2005, 293) as well as questioning their purpose in providing justification to develop others (Kothari 2005).
Although Pritchett’s (1997) analysis suggested “divergence, big time” until the 1990s, this characterisation was less clearly manifest across non-economic development indicators. Noting figures related to education and health, one observer suggested “nearly everything that matters is converging” (Kenny 2005). Inequalities between countries across a range of human development indicators (especially those with an upper bound for the Global North) – including improvements in life expectancy, reduction in mortality rates and increases in years of schooling – were found to have reduced from the mid-20th century onwards (World Bank 2006, 62). Taking an environmental indicator, carbon emissions between Global North and South are estimated to have begun a trend of converging quite early in the 20th century too (Chancel and Piketty 2015). Moreover, not all parts of the Global South suffered from divergence within the South to the same degree, with contrasting trajectories of East Asia, on the one hand, and regions elsewhere in the Global South, on the other, questioning the articulation of a coherent, underdeveloped, homogenous South (eg Therien 1999; Schuurman 2000; Poon and Yeung 2009).

Significantly, however, for most of the latter 20th century, and with the notable exception of the East Asian “miracle”, the global map of development appeared to many to be very durable. Cox refers to how although there was considerable optimism among newly independent countries, yet:

“by the late 60s and early 70s, this mood was changing. Despite the postcolonial surge of interest in development, the drawing up of ambitious plans and the like, the world’s development map seemed to have an obdurate quality about it. There were exceptions … but by and large Central and South America, Africa and South and Southeast Asia were much as they had always been” (Cox 2008, 392-393) [Italics added].

Korany even claimed that “if recent history can prove anything, it proves that North-South bipolarity is—if not the only real thing—at least the most perennial one” (1994, 13). One analysis suggested that between country inequalities had reached 75% of global income inequalities among individuals by 2000 (Bourguignon 2015, 42). Thus, Pritchett’s “divergence, big time” was far from unique in its characterisation of the global map of development in the late 1990s – one based on significant inequalities between (developed and developing) countries.

The developed-developing country divide persisted through the second half of the 20th century to such an extent that the major development framing exercise of the late 20th century, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), was almost completely set within this type of macro-geographical categorisation. A forerunner, the International Development Goals, was articulated in a 1996 OECD document produced by a group of rich countries (OECD, 1996). This pattern of dominance remained throughout the formation of the MDGs. Indeed, it has been suggested that “the MDGs are largely a rich world product for rich world audiences” (Hulme 2009, 2). Moreover, the focus of

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4 Albeit from a point of extreme convergence with Western Europe and North America accounting for more than a 90% share in CO2 emissions until the turn of the 20th century.
the MDGs, with the exception of Goal 8, was almost exclusively on poor countries. Saith thus argued that despite claims to:

“shared universal values, the entire MDG scaffolding and accompanying text is insufficiently global in its approach. It tends to ghettoize the problem of development and locates it firmly in the third world … Whatever happened to poverty and deprivation in the advanced economies? Are they to be silenced? … There is a major lacuna in the MDG frame of reference: it does not provide a global template, merely ‘our’ agenda for ‘them’” (2006, 1184) [Italics added].

3. 21st century converging North and South: Economic, human and environmental aspects

Since the turn of the millennium, a succession of new geographies of development can be identified. Cumulatively pointing to a dramatic blurring of the North-South boundary, these patterns are outlined below in terms of key aspects of the three main dimensions of sustainable development - economic, human and environmental factors. This section highlights a converging North and South, before the following section highlights a layer of “divergence” within countries in both North and South. No clear cut-off appears for when these trends emerge, with variation across different factors and many starting in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War and economic liberalisation in China and India. More broadly, the period around the turn of the millennium has been identified as “a watershed moment in the evolution of global inequality” (Bourguignon 2015, 28). Acknowledging such possible variations, we broadly refer to the 21st century as our time reference for this trend of “converging divergence”.

3.1. Converging economic development

Some countries within the Global South have begun to earn a much greater share of global income. Such a trend has been variously referred to as “a new world order with a more diffuse distribution of economic power”, a “new geography of growth” (OECD, post-2015a, p. 3), and a “great convergence” (Mahbubani 2013; Baldwin 2016). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in its own take under the banner “the rise of the South”, remarked how:

“A striking feature of the world scene in recent years is the transformation of many developing countries into dynamic economies … doing well in economic growth and trade … they are collectively bolstering world economic growth, lifting other developing economies, reducing poverty and increasing wealth on a grand scale” (UNDP 2013, 43).

The shifting geographies of wealth and poverty are broken down below into both national and individual trends. While China (and India) accounts for a significant proportion of these shifts, the converging economic trends – both national and
individual – are part of a broader new geography that goes well beyond China (and India).

3.1.1. National economic indicators

The aggregate group of countries classified by the World Bank as low-income countries (LICs) and middle-income countries (MICs) has begun to earn a much larger share of global gross domestic product (GDP), especially in the 21st century. The share of global GDP earned by high-income countries (HICs) was fairly static at around 80% for most of the second half of the 20th century (only falling from 79.5% to 76.8% between 1960 and 2000). It had fallen to 65.2% by 2015 (see Figure 2). The share of global GDP of the LICs and MICs thus increased from 22.5% in 2000 to 34.1% in 2015. Much of this increasing income share for low- and middle-income countries (L&MICs) is led by China, as well as India and Brazil. Those three countries’ share of global GDP, only 4.6% in 1960, and still 6.6% in 1990 and 9.3% in 2000, has almost doubled this century to 18% by 2015.

Figure 2: Share of Global GDP (constant 2010 US$), 1990 to 2015

Source: Authors’ construction based on World Bank World Development Indicators.

In terms of likely future direction, Thomas Piketty has suggested that “all signs are that this phase of divergence in per capita output is over and that we have embarked on a period of convergence” between rich and poor countries (2014, 61).

Significantly, especially given L&MICs substantial share of global population, their gross national income (GNI) per capita (PPP) has grown relative to HICs, although not
to the same degree. Average income in L&MICs as compared with HICs actually decreased from 18.2% in 1990 to a low of 15.3% in 1999 and 2000, before increasing to 20.5% by 2014.

The share of the world’s countries officially designated as middle and high-income status has increased, while the share classified as low income has fallen. From World Bank FY1990, where 46.7% were MICs and 24.6% were HICs, these shares were similar at 44.9% and 24.6% in FY2000 and have risen to 49.3% and 36.4% by FY2017. Correspondingly the share of LICs slightly increased from 28.7% in FY1990 to 30.4% by FY2000, but then more than halved to 14.3% by FY2017. Notably a number of countries have ‘transitioned’ from LIC to MIC status. This group includes large emerging economies (eg China, India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Vietnam), formerly centrally planned economies (eg Albania, Ukraine), and small countries (eg Mongolia, and Nicaragua). Remarkably, the percentage of the world’s countries classified as LICs has thus more than halved within the first 15 years of the 21st century (Figure 3).

**Figure 3: Classification of countries of the world by income grouping, 1987-2015**

The geography of trade and corporate ownership is also changing. Shifting income patterns involve a change in the geography of consumption and demand (Staritz et al 2011, Guarin and Knorringa 2014) as part of a “new geography of trade” (Horner 2016). Low- and middle-income countries have more than doubled their share of global import demand from 1990 – increasing from 13.4% then to 18.6% by 2000 and to 31.4% by 2015. Greater corporate wealth is also now present in the Global South with the share of firms from developing countries in the global Fortune 500 having increased.
from just 6.6% in 2000 to 30.4% by 2015 (Figure 4). Such a trend is particularly driven by the growing share of China (19.6% of the 2015 Fortune Global 500, as compared to just 2% in 2000).

**Figure 4: Globally-leading firms: Number and percentage of companies on the Fortune Global 500 list by headquarters**

![Figure 4: Globally-leading firms](image)

*Note: Headquarters location classified according to UNCTAD’s classification of developed, transition and developing economies.*


3.1.2. Individual economic indicators

For the first time since the Industrial Revolution, a trend of economic convergence between individual world citizens has been identified – from 1988 to the present (Milanovic 2013, 2016; Bourguignon 2015; World Bank 2016). Research on the global Gini coefficient across individuals consistently finds a recent fall, driven by reductions in between-country inequality as the share apportioned to within-country inequality has increased. A recent estimate of the global Gini coefficient of income distribution suggests a fall from 69.7 in 1988 to 66.8 in 2008 and 62.5 in 2013 (World Bank 2016, 81). Highly populous China and India are recognised as major drivers of this converging of population-weighted incomes across countries (eg World Bank 2016, 69). However, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America have also played a role in the 2000s (Bourguignon 2016, 44).

Both absolute numbers and the share (Figure 5) of the population in the Global South living in extreme poverty have fallen dramatically. Absolute numbers living in extreme
poverty peaked at 2 billion for the whole world in the 1970s and have since fallen to less than 800 million. The share of population in regions of East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa who have a daily consumption level of less than $1.90 has fallen from 49.6% in 1990 to 13.4% in 2013. In comparison, the share of people in those regions who live within the $5-$10 range increased four-fold (8% to 32%), as did the population share with consumption above $10 per day (4.9% to 19.4%) over that time period. Such trends have been particularly driven by rapid increases in average per capita incomes in China and India over the last three decades. Nevertheless, excluding China and India, the proportion of the world’s poor in MICs has tripled, due largely to increases in such countries as Nigeria, Pakistan and Indonesia (Kanbur and Sumner 2012).

**Figure 5: Population share in the Global South by daily consumption level, 1990, 1999 and 2013**

![Figure 5: Population share in the Global South by daily consumption level, 1990, 1999 and 2013](http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/home.aspx)

Low-income countries moving to MIC status, as well as more individuals moving out of extreme poverty, have led to what has been termed a "new geography of global poverty". Most of those who are still living in extreme poverty no longer live in what are classified as low-income countries (Kanbur and Sumner 2012, Sumner 2012). While some estimates suggest 73% of the world’s extreme poor lived in low-income countries in 1990, by 2008 74% were to be found in MICs. Moreover, a shifting geography of poverty towards MICs has also been found across various aspects of multidimensional poverty which give greater attention to human development (Kanbur and Sumner 2012; Fantom and Serajuddin 2016). Such a position marks a significant change from the “old North-South vision, which assumed the existence of an international ‘curtain’ of poverty” (Therien 1999, 736).
As well as MICs, a second new middle has also been identified (Sumner 2016a) - the rise of what has been referred to as a “global middle class” (eg BBC 2013, UNDP 2013). Such a group is growing as a share of world population, and although calculations vary depending on measures, a larger share of the world’s middle class now reside in the Global South (Guarin and Knorringa 2014). One estimate, based on a classification of people earning or spending US$10-100 PPP per day as middle class, suggests the Global South’s share of the global middle class population increased from 26% to 58% between 1990 and 2010 (UNDP 2013, 14).

Indicators also suggest the presence of a greater degree and share of extreme wealth in the Global South. As one indicator, an increasing number and share of the Forbes World Billionaires List are people from developing countries (Figure 6). Their share has increased from 16.7% in 2001 to 37.1% in 2016. China and India were ranked second and fourth in the world in 2016 for having the most US$ billionaires but even low-income countries such as Uganda now make this list.

![Figure 6: Extreme wealth: Share of US$ billionaires 2001 and 2016](image)

**Note:** Nationality of billionaire classified according to UNCTAD’s classification of developed, transition and emerging economies. Source: Author’s construction based on data from Forbes annual list of The World’s Billionaires.

Collectively, then, such trends have led to a transition in the world income distribution, from a twin-peak pattern (Quah 1996), with peaks (in 1988) around $PPP400 and another at $PPP8,000, to one with a single peak – at around $PPP3,000 – by 2008. The very richest people in the world benefited most during 1988 to 2008, as did the emerging global middle class of emerging market economies, while those who relatively lost were the very poorest 5% and the global upper middle class (between 75th and 90th percentiles on global income distribution). Indeed, the percentiles of the
global income distribution which did best from 1988-2008 were 90% comprised of Asians, while for the least successful, 86% were from “mature economies” ie the developed world (Lakner and Milanovic 2015, 23). The “elephant graph” (Figure 7) has become a popular way to demonstrate such trends and is also used to explain why US and European voters are turning against globalisation.

Figure 7: The “Elephant graph”: Relative gain in real per capita income by global income level, 1988-2008

3.2. Converging human development– Health and education

In human development, HICs and L&MICs have also been converging for key indicators, although some such trends are longer running than for the income trends presented above. One analysis of some quality of life indicators pointed to divergence across countries occurring until the early to mid-20th century before convergence in the second half of the century (Kenny 2005). Countries in the low and medium human development categories have had, on average, faster growth in their Human Development Index than those in the high or very high groups since the 1980s, and with a considerable fall in the population living in low human development (estimated from 3 billion in 1990 to just over 1 billion in 2014) (UNDP 2013). Nevertheless, noticeably some of this convergence in human development indicators such as literacy, years of schooling, mortality and life expectancy is where there is a clear upper bound which limits the continued improvement of the Global North (unlike for income or carbon emissions per capita and meaning that some inequality measures need to be treated with caution).
3.2.1. Health

The gap in various basic health indicators, including life expectancy and mortality rates, between HICs and L&MICs has continued a converging trend from the latter decades of the 20th century into the 21st century. The gap in life expectancy has continued to narrow as bigger improvements have occurred in L&MICs – with figures of 68.5 and 47 years for both groups in 1960, then 77.6 and 65.4 in 2000, and 80.6 and 69.6 years by 2014 – almost a halving of the gap to HICs in half a century (Figure 8).

![Figure 8: Life expectancy (years), 1960-2014](chart)

*Source: Author’s construction based on World Bank World Development Indicators.*

The overall under-five mortality rate per 1000 live births has fallen to one-quarter of its 1960 level, and has now reached the level the current HICs were at then (Figure 9). Significantly, Sub-Saharan Africa is part of this converging trend as its under-five mortality rate has dropped dramatically (from 154.8 to 83.2 per 1000) over 2000-2015. The maternal mortality rate has also fallen considerably – from 425 per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 376 in 2000 (an 11.5% fall from 1990) to 237 in 2015 (a 44.2% fall from 1990).
Figure 9: Mortality rate under 5 (per 1000 live births): 1960-2015

Source: Authors’ construction based on World Bank World Development Indicators.

The classic binary disease incidence associations of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) with developed countries and communicable diseases with developing countries have dramatically broken down (Bloom 2005; Frenk et al 2014). With life expectancies increasing, a surge in the global incidence of non-communicable diseases (from 43% of the global disease burden in 1990 to 54% in 2010), such as heart disease, diabetes and cancer, has emerged. Correspondingly, communicable, maternal, neonatal and nutritional disorders have declined in relative significance (from 47% to 35% of the global disease burden over that 20-year period) (Murray et al 2013). The vast majority of the incidence of non-communicable diseases is now found in L&MICs – where approximately 80% of deaths from NCDs occurred in 2010 (Lozano et al 2010). Cancer is one example. Once associated with HICs, cancer is now a leading cause of death and disability in L&MICs (Farmer et al 2010). Indeed, the developing world’s share of newly reported cancers is estimated to have increased from 15% in 1970 to 56% in 2008 and is projected to reach 70% by 2030 (Boyle et al 2008). For hypertension leading to cardiovascular disease, the major burden is also now in developing countries (Kearney et al 2005, 221). The shifting geography of poverty means that most child deaths, tuberculosis deaths, cases of tuberculosis drug resistance, and HIV incidence and deaths are found in what are classified as MICs (Jamison et al 2013, 1919).

As with other indicators, such trends have prompted convergence claims. For example, Frenk et al suggest that: "with the important exception of Sub-Saharan Africa, in health terms developed and developing countries have become more alike than different"
(2014, 94). It should be noted that big differences may still remain between L&MICs and HICs, as well as among L&MICs, in cardiovascular care and hence in the death rate (Gaziano et al 2010), and in cancer care (Farmer et al 2010), pain control and palliative care (Kaul et al 2015). Yet, Jamison et al (2013) have suggested that there is now potential for a “grand convergence” in health within a generation, reducing infectious, child and maternal mortality rates to universally low levels.

3.2.2. Education

Increases in literacy and years of schooling have led to claims of a converging trend in education enrolment, albeit one which may have commenced as far back as 1870 (Morrison and Murtin 2013)\(^5\). The share of the global population enrolled in primary school has increased from 24% in 1870 to 82% in 2010, and is now approaching universal coverage (Dorius 2013; Pritchett 2013). Improvements in primary schooling have led to big advancements in literacy – from 36% of the world population in 1950 to 82% by 1999 and 85% by 2014 (Roser and Ortiz-Ospina 2016). However, in both South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa illiteracy remains substantial – affecting just over one-third of the population in 2010 (Morrison and Murtin 2013, 288).

Based on enrolment rates, low-education nations are catching up, and this is expected to continue (Dorius 2013, 171; Figure 10). The gap in education of 4.1 years (in 2010) between the overall population aged over 15 in “developing” and “advanced” countries has narrowed by only one year since 1970 – slowed by the greater enrolment in tertiary education in the “advanced” countries (Barro and Lee 2013, 188). Nevertheless, education inequalities in enrolments remain at secondary level (45% global coverage in 2010, compared to 20% in 1960), and tertiary level, which only 10% of the world population have completed (Morrison and Murtin 2013, 286; Dorius 2013). Now the average person in developing countries receives more years of schooling than the average person in developed countries did in 1960 (Pritchett 2013). Some have even suggested these improvements in literacy rates have led to a decline in world inequality in human capital (eg Morrison and Murtin 2013, 288).

\(^5\) See also Kenny (2005) – in the late 19th and early 20th century huge differences were present between Europe, Canada, US, Australia and New Zealand as compared with the rest of the world. For example, primary school enrolment was over 80% for the former in the early 1900s, yet had not passed over 50% in any other world region by 1930 (Dorius 2013, 165).
Education trends based on cognitive attainment rather than years of schooling are not as clear in displaying a converging trend (Hanushek and Woessmann 2008). The 2015 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) test scores for student attainment in science, mathematics and reading – conducted on OECD and selected partner countries still show considerable gaps in average achievement between the two. Indeed, one analysis has suggested that “in terms of cognitive skills, little closing of the gaps between developed and developing countries has occurred” (Hanushek 2013, 211). Pritchett (2013) argues that it will take at least another century before children studying in schools in developing countries reach the same average attainment levels as today’s students in developed countries.

3.3. Converging environmental impacts – Carbon emissions

Using carbon emissions as a primary indicator of environmental impact, a converging trend between North and South may be detected in the 21st century. Historically, higher carbon emissions have been associated with the Global North. Since 1992, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change had distinguished differential responsibilities between “developed” or “Annex 1” countries, suggesting their need to “take the lead” in reducing carbon emissions, and that developing countries would follow. Yet, given much of the inequality in per capita CO₂ emissions may be attributable to inequalities in incomes (Duro and Padilla 2006), converging economic trends could lead to some degree of convergence. Since 2005, total carbon emissions from L&MICs countries have exceeded those from HICs and now contribute almost 60% of the global total. HICs had made almost two and a half times more annual “contribution” to global CO₂ emissions than L&MICs in 1960 (Figure 11). By 1990, this ratio had fallen to 1.27 and to 1.23 by 2000. A dramatic switch in share has occurred.

**Figure 10: Average educational enrolment in “advanced” and “developing” countries, 1950-2010**

Source: Authors’ construction based on Barro and Lee (2013) dataset. Advanced includes 24 countries and developing 122. Trend line based on observation at decadal-intervals.
since – now being only 0.62 by 2013 – a halving of the ratio since the turn of the millennium. Asia now contributes as much annual total carbon emissions as Western Europe and North America combined.

**Figure 11: Share of annual global CO$_2$ emissions (Kilo Tons), 1960-2013**

![Graph showing share of annual global CO$_2$ emissions from 1960 to 2013.](image)

*Source: Authors’ construction based on World Bank World Development Indicators.*

Importantly, such production-based measures overlook consumption-based emissions, thus reducing the share of HICs, and relatively inflating that of L&MICs. A considerable transfer of emissions from developed to developing countries occurs through international trade of goods produced in developing countries but consumed in developed countries (Peters et al 2011). Using consumption-based emissions centred around lifestyle, rather than production-based emissions of a national economy, increases the average emissions of North Americans by 13% and Europeans by 41% (Chancel and Piketty 2015, 28). Using consumption-based data thus involves a reallocation of emissions from a large number of relatively poorer people in China and South Asia to a smaller number of richer people.

Even with consumption-based data, however, aspects of a converging trend can be identified. Overall global carbon emissions inequalities between individuals are estimated to have decreased from a Theil index of 0.75 in 1998 to 0.70 in 2013. Such a trend has been driven by a clear reduction in between-country inequalities – from a Theil index of 0.46 in 1998 to 0.35 in 2013, attributed especially to the rise of China and other BRIC countries (Brazil, Russian, India, China). Breaking down emissions into those by individuals suggests that the major emitters (the top 10% who contribute 45% of global emissions) live on all continents, with one-third from developing and emerging
economies. Moreover, Western Europe, North America, Japan and Australia are estimated to now account for less than 50% of all emissions since the industrial revolution (Chancel and Piketty 2015, 15). Thus, for carbon dioxide a “new geography of global emitters” has been identified, necessitating further climate action in all countries (Chancel and Piketty 2015).

Emerging economies, such as China, India, and Brazil, have played a major role in contributing to L&MICs increasing share of global emissions (Viola and Basso 2016), from 10.1% in 1960 to 19.3% in 2000 to 35.7% by 2013. Such trends have been most dominated by China, whose share has increased from 8.3% of the global total in 1960 to 13.8% in 2000 to 28.6% by 2013. In 2006, China surpassed the US as the world’s largest emitter of CO$_2$ and by 2013 contributed just short of double the United States’ total emissions.

Big gaps remain in patterns of emissions per capita, HICs still contributing significantly more – just over 3 times greater – than L&MICs (Oxfam 2015) (Figure 12), albeit with some degree of a recent converging trend. From 7.5 and 1 metric tons (MT) per capita for HICs and L&MICs respectively in 1960, by 2000 such figures were 12.2 and 2.1. Since then a slight convergence has occurred – as the emissions per capita of HICs have declined to 11.0 MT in 2013, while that for L&MICs has increased by almost 75% to 3.5 MT per capita (driven particularly by China).

Figure 12: CO$_2$ emissions per capita (MT), 1960-2013

![Figure 12: CO$_2$ emissions per capita (MT), 1960-2013](source: Authors’ construction based on World Bank World Development Indicators.)
3.4. Converging North and South?

From a starting point of a great gap, or divergence, between the two macro world regions, this millennium has witnessed many converging trends – in economic, human and environmental indicators. Other issues could also be included, notably in terms of urbanisation. L&MICs, once majority rural at 76.7% in 1960 and still 60% in 2000, had reached almost 50% urban by 2015. The majority of megacities are in the Global South. Converging trends between North and South, in aggregate, are reinforced by survey reports which indicate widespread optimism in the Global South – perhaps even indicating belief in the development idea that “tomorrow things will be better” (Rist 2007, 485), while contemporaneously the opposite belief – that underdevelopment or decline is occurring – is increasingly prevalent within the Global North. A Pew Research (2013) survey of 39 countries around the world found that people in Africa, Asia-Pacific and Latin America are systematically optimistic that their children will have better lives than they themselves have, while the opposite was the case in the North America, Europe and the Middle East (see Figure 13). Similar patterns of greater optimism in lower-income countries and greater pessimism in higher-income countries about future life prospects have been found in other recent surveys (Pew Research 2007, 2015; Ipsos-Mori 2014).

![Figure 13: Children will be better off – worse off than their parents](image)

Source: Author’s construction. Data on belief whether children will be better off is from Pew Research 2013. GNI per capita PPP (current international $) is from World Bank World Development Indicators.
Despite such positive attitudes within the Global South, as well as dismal perceptions of “relative” falling in the North and the need to “take back control” in the UK or “make America great again”, actual convergence or meeting has not been achieved. For the most part, development indicators still reflect considerable inequality across the Global North and South. Global income inequality among individuals is still greater than inequality within any country, bringing about a “premium of citizenship” (Milanovic 2013, 2016). Milanovic argues that “more than 50 per cent of one’s income depends on the average income of the country where a person lives or was born” (2013, 204). A vast majority of people in the Global North are still considerably better off - at least in absolute terms and on income measures. For example, the poorest Americans are at the 50th percentile of world income distribution (Milanovic 2013, 206). For 2008, equalising mean incomes across countries would reduce global inequality by 77% if within-country distributions were unchanged. On the other hand, only a 23% reduction would be found by equalising incomes within country (Lakner and Milanovic 2015, 13). Others have suggested that while there may have been some declines in relative inequality, absolute interpersonal inequalities have increased (captured by standard deviation and absolute Gini) (Niño-Zarazúa et al 2016). Moreover, projections of a dramatic shift in the balance of location of the global middle class population towards the Global South need to be treated with some caution. Although many people in the Global South have moved out of extreme poverty, many are still living on relatively low incomes and are thus vulnerable to falling back into extreme poverty (Birdsall et al 2014; López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez 2014), leading to suggestions that a global middle class is more promise than reality (Kochar 2015). Moreover, deeper “convergence” has not been achieved in, for example, the quality of public goods.

Yet, it would be unrealistic, and almost impossible, for 15 or at best 25 years to have reversed an almost two-century long “divergence, big time”. Nevertheless, the trends identified above indicate a significant change in trajectory in the map of global development. Converging trends do not fully capture this changing pattern, however. The following section argues that along with a converging layer, patterns of significant and mostly increasing inequality and divergence are found within nations. At these levels a complex mosaic of rich and poor (sometimes very rich and very poor side-by-side) has evolved.

4. 21st century divergence within nations: economic, human and environmental aspects

Although any thought of a clear line between the “developed” and “developing” world is more questionable than at any time over the last one hundred years, many who hoped a blurring of this divide would lead to a much more equal world are likely to be unsatisfied. Across various aspects of economic development, human development and the environment, cross-country converging is overlain by vast, and often growing, inequalities between people living in the same localities, nations, and macro-world
regions. There is much intuitive evidence that inequality in countries in the Global South and North is rising. In virtually every Southern city there are slums and luxurious apartment blocks side-by-side, with the poor living metres away from the wealthy. Beggars no longer plead beside Morris Minors and Datsun 1200s – but beside BMWs, Porsches, Range Rovers and Maseratis. In the Global North, homelessness amidst prosperity proliferates while more broadly wider sections of the population are being noted as being “left behind”.

Growing within-country inequalities are particularly consequential given a tendency for perceptions of welfare to make relative assessments in relation to those in greater spatial proximity, giving reason to weight within-nation inequalities to a slightly greater extent than those between countries and different parts of the world (Milanovic and Roemer 2016). Bearing in mind that trends for the human and environmental indicators are somewhat more difficult to assess, this section sets out some indicative trends in both Global North and South.

4.1. Economic development – divergence

Economic inequalities have persisted and even been augmented over the last quarter century despite aspects of convergence between countries in North and South. Such trends are present across wealth, income and consumption and most notably for our purposes – both North and South. They are attracting growing attention, and are increasingly noted from China to the US and from India to the UK. The 2016 World Social Science Report (ISSC, IDS and UNESCO 2016), for example, has highlighted rising inequalities as a central challenge and even the International Monetary Fund has been warning of the consequences of rising inequality in recent years (Ostry et al 2016). Growing within-country inequality is an issue in many world regions, while high absolute rates of inequality are present in others (eg Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa).

The reduction in inequality between countries has coincided with growing inequalities within countries (Figure 14). Within-country inequality (population-weighted) actually rose rapidly in the last decade of the 20th century – from a population-weighted Gini index of 34 in 1988 to 40 in 1998, before falling slightly to 39 in 2013 (World Bank 2016, 10). Notably, the number of countries with declining within-country income inequality between 2008 and 2013 was actually twice that of those with widening inequality (World Bank 2016, 11). The growing relative share of within-country inequality within global inequality, however, raises possibilities of an internalising of global inequality and that “a partial substitution of inequality within countries for the inequality between countries” (ISSC, IDS and UNESCO 2016, 42).

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6 We see this every evening in Manchester where the numbers of the homeless we walk past on our ways home has increased in recent years.
Increasing income inequality within the Global North has been widely pointed to, including by the OECD’s Divided We Stand (2011) and In It Together (2015b). The average Gini in OECD countries increased by almost 10% from 0.29 to 0.316 from the mid-1980s until the late 2000s (OECD 2011). Many in the Global North have been left out of income growth since 1990 (Milanovic 2016). About two-thirds of 65 countries (with data available) had higher within-country inequality in 2011 compared to 1988 (Milanovic and Roemer 2016, 110), and likewise 18 of 23 OECD countries had an increase between the mid-1980s and 2013 (OECD 2015b, 24). The exceptions among OECD countries include Belgium, Spain and Italy – where wages and standards of living have dramatically fallen (Bourguignon 2015, 53). Figure 15 below displays the trend in selected major countries since 1990.
Moreover, income inequalities within developing countries have also been found to be higher than 1980 (Ravallion 2014), although with considerable regional variation. Inequalities within countries have been found to account for 31% of total inequality in the developing world in 1981 but 47% in 2010 (Ravallion 2014, 852). Within the Global South, despite high growth, analysis focused on the “consumption floor” finds the poorest of the poor have been left behind. One analysis suggests this measure of the lowest permanent consumption level has relatively fallen from 22% of the overall mean of household consumption per person in developing countries in 1981 to 13% in 2011 (Ravallion 2016, 153). The poor in different countries and regions have also had quite different trajectories. East Asia and the Pacific (notably China) had 50% of the extreme poor in 1990, but only 9.3% by 2013 when Sub-Saharan Africa had almost half and South Asia another one-third.

China, India and Russia are prominent examples of rising domestic income inequalities over the last three decades or so (see, for example, ISSC, IDS and UNESCO 2016). Various estimates for China suggest a rise there in Gini coefficient from approximately 30 in 1980 to approximately 40 in 2000, to the high 40s by 2008 with a drop since by a couple of points (presented in Zhuang and Shi 2016, 2; see also ISSC, IDS and UNESCO 2016, 84-88). Urban-rural income gaps have increased in China – the ratio of household per capita income between the two increasing from 2.5 in 1997 to 3.0 in 2009 (ISSC, IDS and UNESCO 2016, 86). Indian survey data (based on consumption)
also reports increasing income inequalities (from a Gini 0.31 in 1993-94 to 0.34 in 2011-12), although are thought to be significantly underestimated. Income-based estimates from the India Human Development Survey showed a Gini of 0.54 for 2011-12. Urban-rural consumption gaps and inequalities across regions in India are also suggested to have increased (ISSC, IDS and UNESCO 2016, 89-92). Russia’s Gini has also risen by more than 20 points in 25 years – mostly very quickly around 1990 (ISSC, IDS and UNESCO 2016, 36).

Notably, Latin America and Africa, regions where countries tend to have the highest within-country Ginis, have not seen systematic increases in within-country inequality, with Ginis in Latin America actually falling (World Bank 2016). In the African case, for example, the majority (60% in 2008, albeit down from 73% in 1993) of inequalities among all Africans are based on within-country rather than between-country inequalities (Jirasavetakul and Lakner 2016).

Wealth inequalities between individuals in the world are even greater than those for income and consumption (Davies 2011; Piketty 2014). One analysis based on household balance sheet data for 148 countries for 2000 suggested a global Gini coefficient of 0.802. Their decomposition of between and within country inequality suggests that 29% (or 0.269) of a global Gini of 0.802 in 2000 is attributable to within-country inequality, a higher share than Milanovic’s estimate for global income inequality for 1998 of 17% of a global Gini of 0.641 being within-county (Davies et al 2001, 251). In terms of wealth, Piketty also points to the significance of domestic inequalities, bringing rich and poor within a country into tension with each other (Piketty 2014, 44).

Other analyses of the global distribution of wealth find some extreme concentration or polarisation. A recent Oxfam analysis found that just eight people had an amount of wealth equivalent to the bottom half of the world’s population, or 3.6 billion people. Moreover, the wealth of the top 1% has been found to exceed that of the other 99% of the global population (Oxfam 2017). The wealthiest 10% in 2015 were found to own 89% of the assets, while the bottom half own less than 1% of total wealth (Credit Suisse 2016). Although the shares of the top 1% and 10% had fallen in the late 20th century, more recently they have risen (Credit Suisse 2016).

Growing inequality in income from labour and a relative surge in that income going to capital are widely cited as key factors behind growing inequality (eg OECD 2011; Piketty 2014). For Piketty, the primary source of growing inequality is an “unprecedented explosion of very elevated incomes from labor” for senior management (2014, 24). Indeed, recalibrating the Milanovic elephant graph (Figure 7) by share of the absolute gain in income in the world over the previous two decades shows a dramatic skew toward the very high end of the income distribution (Milanovic 2015). Globally, the share of corporate gross value added paid to labour has declined by 5 percentage points since 1975, with 42 of the 59 countries for which there is at least 15 years of data experiencing a decline in that share from 1975 to 2012 (Karabarbounis and Neiman 2014, 61-62). In countries for which data is available, higher shares of income are recognised to go to the top 1% (World Bank 2016, 69). While there have
been significant increases in the share of income going to the upper centile in the Global North, considerable variation has been experienced between rich countries in the extent eg 20% in the US in the early 2010s compared to 9-10% in Australia. At the extreme level, the top 0.1%’s share of national income in the US has increased from roughly 2% in 1980 to around 8% in 2010 (Piketty 2014, 319).

At the other end of the spectrum, populations living precariously have also been identified increasingly across Global North and South. Increasing reference is now made to the “precariat” – a global class in the making, according to Standing (2011). They are characterised by precarious jobs, uncertain occupational identities and career pathways and limited rights. This ‘vulnerable non-poor’ group has been growing in both South and North as jobs that pay a living wage have become increasingly insecure and perhaps precarious.

4.2. Human development – divergence

Trends in health and education between the North and South – and between countries – were notably different from those of income in relation to longer-term patterns, with some convergence starting in the mid-20th century. In terms of within countries, substantial inequalities are present in relation to health and education. While the existence of inequalities is clear, including at the turn of the millennium, the extent to whether they have systematically increased or not for human development is less clear (cf. Bourguignon 2015, 68). To some degree data availability issues make such non-monetary aspects more difficult to assess (eg Bourguignon 2015, 69). Given that within-country income differences have been found to have damaging health and social consequences, it may be expected that growing economic inequalities would lead to growing health inequalities (Pickett and Wilkinson 2015). Some preliminary evidence presented below suggests they are increasing, although this is much less conclusive than the economic trends presented previously.

A wide variety of within-country inequalities are present in health in both Global South and North. Rates of avoidable infectious disease, maternal mortality and under-five mortality are higher in rural than urban settings and for wealthier and poorer populations in low- and middle-income countries (Jamison et al 2013, 1910). For example, under-five mortality rates were estimated to be up to 60% higher in rural areas in L&MICs during the period 2001-2010 – a gap which has not changed since 1991 (Jamison et al 2013). Another observation noted that, in the first decade of the 21st century, for every developing country that managed to reduce inequalities in mortality rates, three experienced an increase (Vandemoortele 2011). In an extreme example of differences in life expectancy from within the UK, a staggering 28-year gap can be found within Glasgow between people in different parts of the city. Male children in Calton have a life expectancy of just 54 years, compared to the then UK average of 77 and another part of Glasgow, Lenzie North having 82. In Washington DC in the US, life expectancy was reported to be only 63 for African-American men compared to a
national average of 75 and an age of 80 for nearby Montgomery County in Maryland (WHO 2008).

Some time series evidence does suggest growing inequalities of health within nations. In the US, life expectancy gaps have been widening between higher and lower income people for a few decades (Bosworth et al 2016). The life expectancy gap between the richest 1% and poorest 1% of Americans was 14.6 years for men and 10.1 years for women in 2014, and has been growing (Chetty et al 2016). For example, between 2001 and 2014, life expectancy increased considerably more for higher earners (top 5% - 2.34 years for men, 2.91 years for women), than the bottom 5% of the income distribution (0.32 years for men, 0.04 years for women) (Chetty et al 2016). In Russia, the gap in life expectancy at age 20 between university and non-university educated people was found to have increased since the early 1990s (WHO 2008).

Within-country inequalities are also widely identified in education (UNESCO 2016). Access to, and quality of, education are highly linked to inequality in income per capita (World Bank 2016, 138) and gender. Of illiterate people, two-thirds are women. One analysis suggests that within-country differences are the major source of inequalities in years of schooling – accounting for 77% of the inequalities in years of schooling in 2010, an increase from 72.5% in 1990 and 58% in 1950 (Morrison and Murtin 2013, 292). Moreover, significant within-country inequalities in educational achievement have also been detected. In terms of science, PISA 2015 results show that almost all (91.6%) countries included have a gap between students in the top socio-economically ranked quarter and those in the bottom, which is greater than the differences in average score in science between OECD and non-OECD partners. In 22 of 35 (62.9%) OECD partner countries, the top quarter of students have a higher average science score than that of the bottom quarter-performing students in the OECD area. PISA 2015 results do not, however, present a clear trend as to whether such inequalities are increasing or not (see also UNDP 2014 for similar finding on education more broadly). One study reports of a widening academic achievement gap in the US: 30-40% larger for children born in 2001 than 25 years earlier and that this gap has grown for at least 50 years. This has been noted to be slightly earlier than income trends and interpreted by the author as an increase in the relationship between income and inequality (Reardon 2011). Other data on whether gaps in education are growing or not appear harder to come by.

4.3. Environmental divergences

Data on environmental inequalities are still emerging and are particularly limited for within-country trends (Raworth 2012), with most analyses focused on between-country differences. While various forms of environmental inequalities may be identified including “exposure inequalities” (differential, and greater impact on tropical countries), pollution inequalities (differential contribution of different groups to environmental degradation) and policy effect inequalities (environmental policies that alter distributions) and policymaking inequalities, we focus on pollution inequalities.
One recent analysis suggests significant and growing inequalities between within-country groups. In a detailed composition of within- and between-country components, Chancel and Piketty (2015) construct a consumption-based emissions estimate across individuals. They detect huge global inequalities – a 10-50 relationship whereby the top 10% of emitters make close to 50% of emissions and the bottom 50% contribute only about 10% (Figure 16). In their analysis, the within-country Theil index moved from 0.29 to 0.35 between 1998 and 2013, indicating a rise in inequality. The global Theil – between individuals – fell from 0.75 in 1998 to 0.70 in 2013, with the estimate of the share of within-country inequalities having risen considerably, from 39% to 50% of the global inequality in emissions. The estimates of the between-country component vary according to their income to CO$_2$ elasticity, from 37% for 0.7 to 62% with 1.1. With their chosen value of 0.9 based on an average of estimates from previous literature, within- and between-country inequalities are estimated to be equal (Chancel and Piketty 2015). For carbon emissions, within-country differences are thus estimated to be relatively more significant than in the case of income inequalities.

**Figure 16: Global income deciles and associated lifestyle consumption**

![Chart showing percentage of CO$_2$ emissions by world population. The richest 10% make up 49% of emissions, the poorest 50% contribute only about 10%.](source: Oxfam (2015, 4))

Tellingly, in Chancel and Piketty’s estimations, a major share of these carbon emissions is attributed to people across various locations. The analysis moves beyond somewhat of a developed-developing country divide when estimating individual emissions – seeing, for example, some of the emitters in the middle of the distribution being spread across Tanzania (top 1%), Mongolia and China (7th decile), and income-poor French and Germans (2nd and 3rd income declines). Another recent analysis of methane (CH$_4$) along with carbon dioxide (CO$_2$) from 1970-2008 suggests a possible longer-term pattern in growing within country inequalities, and now more significant than those between countries (Sauter et al 2016). One analysis within China finds large regional differences in CO$_2$ emissions in China (eg Xu and Lin 2017).
4.4. Whither converging divergence?

The trend of converging divergence that we detect refers to a relatively short period of time (the last 15 to 25 years) in comparison with the two centuries of “divergence, big time”, so it is a significant question as to what extent it may be expected to continue. While it is not the purpose of this initial empirical synthesis of “converging divergence” to produce a detailed future projection, observations from some research suggests a continued relevance of such a pattern.

Various analyses suggest a converging trend between North and South will continue, with a growing relative importance of within-nation aspects of inequality. For example, as other countries and regions grow, Piketty predicts that the European-American share of global GDP will continue to fall, from the 50% of 2010 to 20-30% during the 21st century – similar to the share Europe and the US had until the start of the 19th century (Piketty 2014, 59). The UNDP’s projections for the Global South’s share of the global middle class population, albeit at a very low threshold, suggests a further increase from 58% in 1990 to more than 80% by 2030 (UNDP 2013, 14). Moreover, poverty is expected to be an enduring challenge for MICs (Alonso 2012; Edward and Sumner 2014). Between country gaps in quantity (if not quality) of education are expected to decrease (Dorius 2013). Although differences in per capita emissions are not all income related (energy intensity and carbon intensity also being crucial), greater convergence in income across countries may reasonably be expected to continue to bear a corresponding reduction in between-country CO₂ inequalities due to a greater increase in developing economies’ emissions (Chancel and Piketty 2015).

While it may be less clear the extent to which within-nation inequalities can grow, their relative significance is almost certainly likely to increase in importance (cf Bourguignon 2015, 128). While Piketty’s (2014) suggestion is that within-country inequalities may continue to increase, Milanovic (2015) notes that there are upper bound factors – including redistribution measures which curb against increases in inequality. Nevertheless, even if degrees of inequality within nations were to stay the same, if converging trends continue – as many predict they will – the relative importance of the within-nation aspect of global inequalities increases. Such a trend is of significance given that within-nation inequalities – possibly underestimated (Bourguignon 2015) – have been claimed to carry greater relative weight than between-nation inequalities (eg Milanovic and Roemer 2016).
5. The implications of converging divergence: from international development to global development

Converging trends at a global level, along with more localised divergence, challenge many of the key aspects of dominant ideas about development – including its spatial reference and nomenclature, the meaning of development, as well as the orientation of "big D" development. Yet rather than lead to the abandonment of development, we suggest in this section that across these three crucial related aspects, a reformulation of development can be found. We synthesise this reformulation as a shift from international to global development: a recognition that we live in 'one world' and not first and third worlds.

5.1. Beyond the Global South: the universalisation of development

With recognition of the increasingly blurred nature of the North-South divide (which long characterised international development), divergence within more proximate geographic regions, and the universal challenge of sustainability, common development challenges can be found anywhere, in relation to anyone. With the extent of unemployment and people living under the poverty line in the OECD countries, inequality and poverty were recognised two decades ago as being issues which “are global in character and affect all countries” (UN 1995; also de Haan and Maxwell 1998; Therien 1999). In a statement that is even more prescient now, a host of common challenges were identified then too:

“If 'development studies', by induction, is what students of development do, then many current themes are relevant to both North and South: restructuring the state; poverty reduction and livelihood; political development and governance; gender inequality; social capital; agency and participation ... the list goes on - and of course includes social exclusion” (Maxwell 1998, 25-26).

More recent themes identified with research potential across Global North and Global South include urban issues (Robinson 2011; Parnell 2016), precarious work (Siegmann and Schiphorst 2016), local and regional development, as well as socio-spatial inequality (Pike et al 2014). Most prominently of all, the SDGs outline 17 goals which have global relevance.

The framing of development as sustainable development has arguably been a crucial, although not sufficient, step to moving beyond the classic spatial focus of international development to thinking about development globally. A break from the earlier spatial framing was not inevitable for the SDGs, as earlier pleas for sustainable development, such as the Brundtland Report of 1987, pointed to particular challenges of developing countries and were framed in the binary of developed and developing world (Perkins 2013, 1005). Yet, the SDGs’ universal frame of reference (agreed in 2015) marks a sharp contrast from the earlier MDG era when the goals, largely set by developed countries, were almost exclusively for developing countries. Increasing reference is made to “the growing urgency of sustainable development for the entire world” (Sachs 2012, 206), along with recognition of the world reaching planetary boundaries (Steffen
et al 2015). The SDGs have thus been cited as having radical potential in challenging one of the main tenets of development policy, “that development is something for, and occurs in, the ‘developing world’ (Death and Gabay 2015, 598), and that it “might do more to challenge the labels of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ than decades of academic critique” (Death and Gabay 2015, 600). Combined with various shifting geographies of big D development outlined below, the SDGs are arguably particularly significant in terms of shifting the spatial frame of reference for development.

The establishment of the SDGs highlights more prominently than ever a need to consider (sustainable) development as a test that has relevance everywhere. Initial attempts to create indexes of progress towards the SDGs highlight that all countries face challenges, although the extent and nature of these challenges varies considerably. Indeed, Sachs et al note that “even many high-income countries fall far short of achieving the SDGs” (2016, 14) – particularly in relation to environmental issues, such as climate change (SDG 13), ecosystem conservation (SDG 14 and 15) and sustainable consumption and production (SDG 12). Other indicators where OECD countries are found to fall short include those on agricultural systems, malnutrition (related to obesity), development cooperation (SDG 17), jobs and unemployment as well as gender equality. Recognising the presence of planetary boundaries providing biophysical limits for “a ‘safe operating space’ for global societal development” (Steffen et al 2015), highlights notable challenges for HICs. Global public goods (eg Sumner and Tiwari 2010; Sachs 2012; Leach 2015) also come into focus – as a collective challenge – with significant global relevance. Issues that have been identified cross the three domains of economic, human and environmental considered here – such as financial stability and arguably taxation cooperation, treatments for serious global diseases, and mitigation of carbon emissions and adaptation to climate change (Alonso 2012; Leach 2015).

By encompassing development issues wherever they occur, such a focus helps address long expressed frustrations of a separation of research on the Global North from that on the Global South (eg Pollard et al 2009) and moves beyond awkward questions such as why, for many in the Global North, it has been alright to do development “over there”, but not “over here” (Jones 2000). Rather than a group of experts from one place telling a subordinate group from another what to do, a charge often raised within and against international development, such a perspective opens opportunities for mutual learning, and associated collaborative action, across and within the Global North and South (McFarlane 2006; Sumner 2011; Leach 2015).

The Global South still warrants taking a key, although not exclusive, focus within global development. Shifting away from an emphasis on the Global South might be akin to “throwing the baby out with the bathwater”. While recognising that development challenges can be felt anywhere, they vary in priority, while different people and places have very different capabilities to participate in, and impact on, global economy or society. Considerable inequalities between countries still exist despite some trend of converging this century.
A continued trend within global development must be attention to the most pressing development challenges. This notably includes issues faced by the poorest people on the planet. What Collier (2007) called the planet’s bottom billion – or by now 800 million if measured according to extreme poverty – still live in the most severe deprivation and are an obvious starting point. The SDG Index and Dashboards do show huge basic needs challenges for low-income countries – in relation to poverty, hunger, health care, education, water and sanitation, jobs and infrastructure (Sachs et al. 2016). In terms of assessing severity of challenges, it is also necessary to avoid a problem of somewhat arbitrary lines, where people who have escaped from income/consumption poverty are overlooked, despite being considerably vulnerable. A graduated approach, calibrated to degrees of severity, may be necessary. Moreover, taking seriously the challenge of climate change and environment puts considerable emphasis on the Global North (where, for example, many but not all of the highest carbon emitters are found) and elite populations in terms of where some of the biggest development challenges must be tackled.

A layered approach may be suitable. A layer of universal challenges involves the connections between, and shared challenges of, development in the North and South. Such a focus must also be joined by an understanding of extreme deprivation as part of challenges that are graduated in severity.

5.2. Nomenclature: Beyond rich North and poor South

Patterns of “converging divergence” question the feasibility of megaregional spatial demarcations of development levels and render untenable an exclusive association of development with an assumed synonymy of poor countries and poor people. Such critiques are not new (for example, Harris 1986; Therien 1999; Dirlik 2004), with many having suggested abandoning the terms “Third World” and Global South. Yet, this century, calls to move beyond these macro-scale spatial categorisations of development have grown more frequent. Widespread agreement appears to exist that new “maps of development” are emerging, questioning the demarcation of whole world regions based on their levels of per capita income or human development, calling for more “nuanced maps” (Sidaway 2012). The World Bank’s removal of the classification of developed and developing countries in the World Development Indicators from 2016 has followed through on this. Considerable debate has thus emerged over how to capture this new map of development, a significant issue given the importance of lexicon and discourse and how these “frame the world-making projects of the development enterprise” (Cornwall 2007, 471). Should the nomenclature of North/South (rich/poor, First/Third World) be abandoned?

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7 Earlier Robert Zoellick (2010), when President of the World Bank, argued that the term Third World was no longer relevant in the context of the multipolar world economy. He suggested that as 1989’s demise of Communism was to the Second World, 2009’s financial crisis and the rise of developing countries economically would be to the Third World.
One approach suggests mostly retaining the meaning of the terms North (as rich/privileged) and South (as poor/marginalised), but switching their spatial reference to potentially being found anywhere as part of a shift in understanding from a purely Euclidean and territorial sense of First and Third World or Global North and South, to a relational one (eg Dirlik 2004; Sheppard and Nagar 2004). Moving beyond an understanding where national or even continental boundaries distinguish wealth from poverty or development from underdevelopment, Sheppard and Nagar point to a meaning of North as privileged and South as marginalised:

“in short, the global North is constituted through a network of political and economic elites spanning privileged localities across the globe (Castells 1996). By contrast, the global South—whose population is disproportionately made up of “indigenous” communities, people of color and women—is to be found everywhere: foraging the forests of South Asia, undertaking the double burden of house and paid work, toiling in sweatshops within the United States, and living in urban quasi-ghettos worldwide” (2004, 558).

Such a perspective seeks to account for privilege and prosperity in what have been called developing countries and marginalisation and relative poverty in developed countries. It also facilitates provocative discussion of whether, for example, Washington DC can be considered as a “Third World city” owing to the presence of inequality, social marginalisation and poor environmental health (Bratman 2011), or Manuel Castells’ socio-geographic conception of the “Fourth World” as conditions of exploitation, exclusion or deprivation which can occur globally. Others, however, caution against retaining the terms Third World or Global South to refer to the poor or marginalised, and associated places, as that can run a risk of overlooking the progressive mobilisation of the terms and risk essentialising the parts of the world which the terms have been most associated with (eg Sidaway 2012).

The progressive mobilisation of the Third, Non-Aligned World or Global South is one which has been suggested to be retained, notably for its potential to bring hope and faith in collective politics (eg Dirlik 2004). Some have also pointed to the use of the term to understand foreign policies of what are referred to as non-Western states (Gilley 2015, also Perkins 2013). For example, Perkins has suggested that:

“it may be premature to retire the developing world to the garbage can of spatial terminology altogether. Most importantly, perhaps, the term retains its salience in a geopolitical sense. Thus, despite evidence of growing fragmentation, the idea of a developing world remains relevant as a signifier of identity, shared interests, and normative principles and as the basis for collective action” (Perkins 2013, 1011).

It can be argued that Perkins’ speculation has now been empirically demonstrated by the ways in which the G77 (an informal collective of the UN’s 130 “developing countries”) coordinated their actions to convert the ‘post-2015 Development Agenda’ into the Sustainable Development Goals agreed by the UN General Assembly (Hulme, 2015).
The challenge of capturing this reformulated macro-scale cleavage is made all the
greater by the absence of easy replacements for the conventional terminology. This is
probably a reason for their durability. For example, for Dirlik, “there is no convenient
short-hand substitute available in describing the areas of the world covered by the term
‘Third World’, or one that does so more accurately or efficiently, such as, for instance,
the ‘South’ of ‘North–South’” (2004, 132). To date, the most prominent and influential
new categories which have emerged, such as BRICs, Next 11 and MINTs, are
emerging markets and investment portfolio-oriented (Sidaway 2012). While it is unlikely
the terms Global North and South, as well as developed and developing countries,
will cease usage overnight, and as we have struggled to avoid using in this article, they
clearly need to be used in a much more nuanced manner than previously. Nor can they
carry the same meaning or degree of explanatory power as may once have been the
case by simply dividing the world into two, as was the case with international
development.

A more fruitful line, perhaps, is the increasing attempts to capture greater differentiation
at a smaller spatial scale. Such efforts are arguably driven by the persistence, and
perhaps even magnification of geographically uneven development (Cox 2008; Stiglitz
2007), despite some North-South converging uneven trends. While a variety of new
categorisations/classifications of countries have emerged within development policy
(Fialho and Van Bergeijk 2016; Sumner 2016a), the sub-national scale has attracted
particular attention (Sidaway 2012; Perkins 2013). For example, Perkins argues the
need for more disaggregated schemes which move beyond national level
generalisations or which refer to “a single group of developing countries” (2013, 100),
with his suggestion being to look at particular subnational spaces, social groups or
communities and around networks (Perkins 2013). Notions of connectivity (Schmitz
2007), peripherality (Fischer 2015) and enclaves (Sidaway 2007, 2012) are also
increasingly noted as bearing contemporary relevance. For example, Sidaway has
pointed to “a proliferation of export processing/maquiladoras, tourist, financial,
residential, and extractive mining (and similarly demarcated and often fenced) zones”
(2012, 57) over the last three decades. Power has captured some of the increasingly
prominent juxtapositions of wealth and poverty in localised areas – such as Angola’s
“archipelagos of utopian luxury and the splintering urbanisms that result from them”
(2012, 1010). With such work, clearly considerable further research can help deepen
understanding of the development heterogeneity within, not just the developing world,
but the one world we all live in. Such perspectives may be attuned to capturing a layer
of much more unevenness or divergence in greater spatial proximity on top of a layer of
converging North and South.

5.3. A changed meaning of development

Patterns of “converging divergence” mean that any notion of development being about
developing countries emulating the paths previously taken by developed countries is
also completely untenable. Again, critiques of developmentalism are not new. Yet the
blurring of the boundaries between “developed” and “developing” countries in the 21st
century and the massive inequalities which remain, both between and within countries, also arguably question such an emphasis as much as decades of critique. Moreover, and related to the spatial demarcation, any notion of a temporal trajectory of the Global South towards “development” as manifest in the Global North are also undermined.

Increasingly, “transformation” and sustainability have been suggested as a key foci of post-2015 development. The UN High-Level Report (2013) pointed to a need for five, big transformational shifts, including “leave no one behind”, “put sustainable development at the core”, “transform economies for jobs and inclusive growth”, “build peace and effective, open and accountable institutions”, and “forge a new global partnership”. It suggests development should be re-framed from a narrow focus on poverty and inequality in the Global South, through incremental change and one-way knowledge transfer to more sustainable, inclusive and secure futures, within a universal framing of development, through transformations, via multilevel and multiway learning. Similarly, Ghosh has suggested that “true development is less about simply reducing deprivation and more about transformation—structural, institutional and normative—in ways that add to a country’s wealth-creating potential, ensuring the gains are widely shared and extending the possibilities for future generations”, advocating a need to move beyond incremental approaches” (2015, 321). Leech makes a case for “reframing of post-2015 development as transformational politics towards equality, sustainability and security, enabling people to realise well-being and justice in terms that make sense to them” (2015, 816). It has even been suggested that “global sustainable development” may now be the central focus of a new development consensus as part of “a new global development paradigm” (Gore 2015). A shift in the spatial frame of reference thus leads to perhaps the most prominent, and mainstream, critique of developmentalism yet.

5.4. Beyond North-South? 21st century “big D” development

“Converging divergence” poses a challenge to the framing of big D development around rich countries aiding poor countries guided by a moral geography of charity. Both traditional donors and recipients are now very differently positioned, while new actors have also emerged since the turn of the millennium.

With greater wealth in parts of the Global South, the number of countries who are highly dependent on aid has fallen significantly (Figure 17). From a peak of almost 50% of LICs and MICs being highly dependent on development assistance in the early 1990s, by 2014 that share had more than halved, with less than 30 countries in such a situation (see also Sumner 2016a). Domestic inequalities, political economy and distribution have thus been pointed to as having greater potential significance for ending poverty at lower poverty lines (Hoy and Sumner 2016, 152; Sumner 2016b). An earlier perspective based on 2005 data suggested little capacity for redistribution within developing countries if such redistribution were to be based progressively on those with consumption more than the US poverty line (Ravallion 2010). One recent analysis (Hoy and Sumner 2016), however, suggests that more than 75% of global poverty at lower
lines could be eliminated via domestic redistribution funded by new taxation and reallocation of public spending. In the field of health, Jamison et al (2013, 1898) suggest that with economic growth, “most of the incremental costs of achieving convergence could be covered from domestic sources, although some countries will continue to need external assistance”. Taxation in many MICs is at very low levels, for example less than 10% of GNI in Pakistan, and there is considerable potential to increase domestic financing (see Moore, 2013).

**Figure 17: Declining aid dependency of low & middle-income countries, 1970-2014**

Source: Authors’ construction based on World Bank World Development Indicators. Last accessed 27th November 2016. Dependency classified as >9% (net ODA received as % of GNI) following OECD-DAC (Sumner 2016a).

Greater prosperity in some parts of the developing world, alongside domestic challenges in the Global North, has also posed considerable debate over the future of aid among traditional donors (Kanbur and Sumner 2012; Sumner 2012, 2016a; Hulme 2016). Indeed, the UK announced in 2012 it would end financial grant aid to India by 2015 as part of its “new development relationship with India” – involving sharing expertise (trade, investments, skills, health) and investments in private sector projects. The seeming paradox of a country with significant poverty having a space programme was frequently commented on in sections of the UK media. Significant organisational changes have occurred in Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, the US and other donor countries.
countries. Bilateral aid agencies have been merged with foreign affairs and trade departments. For example, in 2013 the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) was merged with Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) into what has become Global Affairs Canada. In Australia, something similar happened with the incorporation in 2013 of AusAid into the Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT).

The “new geography of poverty”, with most of the world’s poorest people living in what are officially classified as MICs, challenges allocation criteria of traditional donors based on average per capita income in a country (Kanbur and Sumner 2012; Sumner 2012, 2016a). Some have suggested that a country’s per capita income moving above the low-income line does not necessarily end the potential value of receiving development assistance, for reasons including pockets of poverty, spillover effects, knowledge transfer and moral obligation based on exploitative historical relations (Kanbur and Sumner 2012) and that donors can and should continue to help the poor – wherever they are (Hulme 2016). One suggestion in reformulating allocation criteria suggests a need to distinguish between different types of MICs (Sumner 2012), from emerging powers (eg India, Indonesia) with relatively little need for aid, to fragile MICs (who may have limited need, but struggle for state capacity eg Nigeria), to stagnant, nonfragile MICs (which may have a need to support productive sectors eg Ghana).

At the same time, new or “non-traditional” donors have grown in relative importance, playing a significant role in challenging key characteristics of the existing development intervention paradigm. The OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members – the “traditional donors” – are all Western, except for Japan (joined 1961) and South Korea (joined 2010). Yet, South-South development cooperation, although having had a strong legacy from the Bandung Conference and Non-Aligned Movement, has proliferated over the last decade (Mawdsley 2017). The terms aid and donor are shunned, as part of a distinction from Northern aid (Eyben and Savage 2013, 467; McEwan et al 2012). Estimates vary of the financial extent of such activity, one suggestion being a rise from 5% of the DAC official development assistance share in the late 1990s to 15-20% by the early 2010s (Mawdsley 2017, 110). The BRICS New Development Bank has been established and the Chinese-initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was launched in January 2016. One estimate even suggests that China is now the major source of development finance (Kamal and Gallagher 2016).

This changing context of “traditional” and new donors has been argued to have led to “an unprecedented rupture in the North–South axis that has dominated post-1945 international development norms and structures” (Mawdsley 2017, 108) and a “beyond aid” era (Janus et al 2015). Indeed, the binary constructions and imaginaries of developed and developing, North and South, which underlie development intervention

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have been challenged (Six 2009; Mawdsley 2012, 2017; Sidaway 2012), which for some even questions the “big D” development paradigm as a whole (eg Six 2009). It is increasingly difficult to locate some places on traditional development binaries eg China as both aid recipient and giver, as well as having both low, middle and high-income elements (de Haan 2011). As Mawdsley reminds us, many have long wished for this moment when “the formal realm of international development is being ‘provincialized’, as Western hegemony – material, ontological and ideational – is at last being eroded” (Mawdsley 2017, 114; also Six 2009). To be clear, some are sceptical as to how much change such South-South-cooperation may lead to (Quadir 2013), with possibilities for continuity (eg Bond 2016 in relation to the BRICS New Development Bank). Yet, the idea of development cooperation as a Western, postcolonial project, characterised by a moral geography of charity is clearly undermined. A new era of multidirectional cooperation appears instead.

Shifting geographies of development also pose challenges to the policy infrastructure of global development governance, designed in a different era, which underrepresented the South (UNDP 2013, 7), and has been long accused of being characterised by major power inequalities between developed and developing countries (Peet 2009). Some changes have taken place – the G20 which includes several relatively larger (economically) developing countries, has replaced the G8 as a major international forum; India and Brazil wielding greater power at the World Trade Organisation, albeit in a set-up which has stalled (Hopewell 2015). Some have nevertheless questioned how much power has shifted (Wade 2011), with the BRICs failing to coordinate at the World Bank (Nayyar 2016).

In a highly significant departure from the MDGs formed at the culmination of two centuries of “divergence, big time”, the process of formulating the SDGs was much more inclusive of actors from the Global South than was the case for the MDGs. The G77, and Brazil in particular, played prominent roles in creating the SDGs (see Hulme 2016 for more detail). Indeed, significant global changes have occurred since the MDGs were formed, as Tiwari has highlighted:

“The global landscape appeared to be exhibiting relatively clear demarcations between the developed and developing regions with more inequities and poverty concentrated in the developing countries. In just fifteen years, the global terrain could not be more different. The post-2015 agenda is being conceived in a world of acute financial uncertainties since 2008, predictions of a grim future and rapid blurring of boundaries between the developed and developing contexts in terms of rising inequities and poverty” (2015, 314).

5.5. From international to global development

We suggest that, collectively, changes in the spatial reference and nomenclature of development, in the meaning of development and in development cooperation, involve a shift from international development to global development, as outlined in Table 1 below. Accentuated by the creation of the universal Sustainable Development Goals, increasing reference, at least in passing, has been made to what may be thought of as
a global development era (eg Pieterse 2012; Gore 2015; Scott and Lucci 2015). While Currie-Alder (2016) provides a well-developed elaboration of global development (focused on global interdependencies) as one strand of development operating in parallel to streams of international development (foreign hotspots) and national development (sovereign decisions over improving the human condition at home) (Currie-Alder 2016), the perspective outlined here sees global development as an overarching focus, characterised by a number of dimensions – including both international (between-country) and national (within-country) issues. This global development approach may involve both aspects of a “one-world” (Singer 2002; Mehta 2006), and a “bottom billion” (Sumner 2011) approach, rather than seeing the two as alternates. In sum, this global development approach attuned to the 21st century pattern of “converging divergence”, and the shifting geographies of “little d” and “big D” development it involves, marks a significant departure from the dominant orientation of 20th century international development towards a relatively synonymous “poor countries” and “poor people”.

Table 1: From International Development to Global Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geographic focus</strong></td>
<td>Place-specific: synonymous “poor countries”, “poor people” and Global South</td>
<td>Universal: Sustainable development issues wherever they exist - Interconnected issues, shared issues across North and South, ‘one world’ and graduated challenges toward bottom billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spatial nomenclature</strong></td>
<td>First-Second-Third Worlds; Developed/Developing; Global North-South</td>
<td>Layering: Global convergence, national and sub-national divergence (enclaves, peripherality, connectivity/exclusion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prominent meaning of development</strong></td>
<td>Modernisation and growth: Southern countries becoming like the Global North</td>
<td>SDG agenda: Transformation, true “global development”; sustainability; social justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Big D development morality and actors</strong></td>
<td>Charity and development aid by Northern states, NGOs</td>
<td>Development cooperation by traditional and new donors; multiple domestic and international sources of public and private development finance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ construction.

6. Converging divergence: the new 21st century map of global development

21st century “Converging divergence”, at its most simple, is based around falling between-country inequalities – especially between countries in the global North and
South - and rising within-country inequalities. The term seeks to reconcile an empirical reality of how simultaneously various claims of “global convergence” are made, led by observation of highly populous rising powers of China and India, while growing inequality – particularly within countries – has attracted increasing attention. A trend of lines converging does not imply convergence has been achieved, particularly when such a pattern is at most two decades old and follows almost two centuries of “divergence, big time”. Moreover, accounts of convergence must be tempered with recognition of relatively growing inequalities and unevenness within nations. We argue that instead of a “great convergence” having superseded “divergence, big time”, 21st century global development is characterised by “converging, divergence”. Some people across countries are having increasingly similar standards of living, while gaps within countries are growing in relative importance.

Trends of “converging divergence” present a shifting “where” of global development, dramatically reshaping the geographies of development. This synthesis of new geographies of economic wealth, poverty, human development and the environment since the turn of the millennium has systematically demonstrated that the North-South boundary of international development is increasingly untenable. Such rapid changes were almost unthinkable even at the dawn of the 21st century, when many had hoped for a weakening of the North-South international development divide would lead to a transformational change for all people in the Global South, even though prospects for such a change appeared extremely low. While the North-South divide has been blurred, significant questions remain as to how inclusive this change has been for many in the Global South, while increasing inequalities are also present within various domains in the Global North. Wealth and poverty – be they in economic, human or environmental forms – are now juxtaposed in new ways, with different levels of development increasingly found within proximate geographical locations. A more complex, messier geography of development has thus emerged as part of a trend of “converging divergence”. As one step, a layering approach for global development has been identified here, which involves examining interconnected, collective issues and comparative, common issues “everywhere”, but also recognising and paying attention to the layer of often extreme inequality and deprivation.

While this article has explored the trajectory of such changes, a future agenda warrants attention to unpacking the causes of “converging divergence” and its emerging consequences (such as popular support for ‘anti-globalisation’ demagogues in Europe and the US). Although involving various processes and understandings, such broad catch-all explanatory categories as globalisation, neoliberalism and capitalism are easy candidates. Is “converging divergence”, for example, a map of “winners” and “losers” from globalisation? While it would appear to be the latest spatial manifestation of geographically uneven capitalist development, why has it taken this form recently? Piketty’s (2014) “Capital in the 21st century” presents a clear identification of both forces for convergence – including diffusion of knowledge and investment in training and skills while divergence forces include the separation of top earners rom the rest, but also the accumulation and concentration of wealth, plutocracy and even regulatory

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capture. Moreover, neoliberal policies of deregulation of markets, liberalization, and falling average tax rates have also proliferated, with capital appearing to benefit (Bourguignon 2015).

“Converging divergence” – and the shifting geographies and growing within-country inequalities it involves – questions an *exclusive emphasis* of development studies and policy on the Global South and addressing an imagined development divide with the Global North. A sole focus on differences between countries in the North and South increasingly overlooks the trajectory of change of growing differences within North and South, particularly within countries. At the same time, the continued extent of between country inequalities, despite aspects of some converging trends between North and South as two aggregate groups, means that an interest in addressing such inequalities – the historical focus of international development – cannot be abandoned or ignored. Arguably addressing global inequalities, both between and within countries, regions and North and South, must play a central role in development and thus it is vital to pay attention to the shifting geography of these changes. Global development must thus include both international development and national development concerns, particularly seeking to identify fora where progressive changes in both are complementary (cf Rodrik 2017). Facing a different socio-spatial manifestation of development divides to that which characterised most of the 19th and 20th century, the challenge now – for scholars, policymakers, activists and states – is to understand and work towards addressing 21st century global development divides.
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